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WICj"
fuBRARYj
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/TAf Story of The Great War
: History of the European
War from Official Sources
COMPLETE HISTORICAL RECORDS OF EVENTS TO DATE.
ILLUSTRATED WITH DRAWINGS, MAPS, and PHOTOGRAPHS
T'refaced by
WHAT THE WAR MEANS TO AMERICA
MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, U. S. A.
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR
REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, U. S. N./O"
THE WORLD'S WAR 1^ ( LIBRARY
FREDERICK PALMER
THEATRES OF THE WAR'S CAMPAIGNS
FRANK H. SIMONDS
THE WAR CORRESPONDENT
ARTHUR RUHL .
(UBRARYJ
^f fdited by
FRANCIS J. REYNOLDS 0^,0-^ ALLEN L. CHURCHILL
Former Reference Librarian of Congress iissociate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
FRANCIS TREVELYAN MILLER
Editor in Chief, Photographic History of the Civil War
O L L I E R
NEW YORK
O N
The
STDRY "OF TH^
C^K!{-'^^ WAR
■ i' i-v L Hj jM i O '
• AT:F^ ITALY
•IZIA
A great war Zeppelin on a bomb-dropping expedition is sailing
over an enemy city. High above it are the city's defending air-
craft— a biplane and a monoplane — ready to attack the raider
with their machine guns
vV YORK
The
STORY OF TH
GREAT WAR
NEUVE CHAPELLE • BATTLE
OF YPRES • PRZEMYSL
MAZURIAN LAKES • ITALY
ENTERS WAR • GORIZIA
THE DARDANELLES
VOLUME III
COLLIER y SON • NEW YORK
Copyright 1916
By p. F, Coixier & Sow
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VIL
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.
XXV.
XXVI.
PART I.—RUSSIAN AND TURKISH CAMPAIGN
PAGM
Campaign in the Caucasus 9
Turkish Advance Against Egypt 15
Failure of "Holy War" Propaganda ....... 21
Results of First Six Months of Turkish Campaign . 25
The Dardanelles — Strategy of the Campaign .... 27
Fortifications and Strength — First Movements ... 34
PART II.— JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST
Why Japan Joined the Allies 40
Military and Naval Situation in the Far East ... 46
Beginning of Hostilities — Attacks on Tsing-tau Forts . 52
Capture of Tsing-tau 60
PART III.— THE WAR IN AFRICA
Campaign in Togoland and the Cameroons .... 62
German Southwest Africa — Rebellion in Union of South
Africa 68
PART IV.— THE WESTERN FRONT
Preparations for an Offensive 79
Battle of Neuve Chapelle Begins 83
Operations Following Neuve Chapelle 92
Beginning of Second Battle of Ypres 99
The Struggle Renewed 106
Other Actions on the Western Front 115
Campaign in Artois Region 121
British Forward Movement — Battle of Festubert . . 128
Sir John French Attempts a Surprise 134
Attacks at La Bassee 140
Operations Around Hooge 146
Franco-German Operations Along the Front .... 151
Campaign in Argon ne and Around Arras 158
Belgo-German Operations 166
1
CONTENTS
PART v.— NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHAPTER PAGE
XXVII. The Wak Zone 170
XXVIII. Attack on the Dardanelles 174
XXIX. German Raiders and Submarines 179
XXX. Italian Participation—Operations in Many Waters . 186
XXXI. Story of the Emden 193
XXXII. Summary op the First Year of Naval Warfare . . 206
XXXIII. Fights of the Submarines 209
XXXIV. Sinking op the Lusitania 222
PART VI.— THE EASTERN FRONT— AUSTRO-RUSSIAN
CAMPAIGN
XXXV. The Carpathian Campaign — Review op the Situation . 235
XXXVI. Battle of the Passes 241
XXXVII. Battle of Koziowa — Operations in the Bukowina . . 244
XXXVIII. Fall of Przemysl 249
XXXIX. New Russian Offensive — Austro - German Counter-
offensive 258
XL. Campaign in Galicia and Bukowina — Battle op thb
DUNAJEC 264
XLI. Russian Retreat 276
XLII. Austro-German Reconquest op Western Galicia . . 281
XLIII. Campaign in Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina . . 289
XLIV. Russian Change of Front — Retreat to the San . . 293
XLV. Battle of the San 297
XLVI. Recapture of Przemysl . 301
XLVII. Capture of Lemberg 306
PART VII.— RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN
XLVIII. Winter Battles of the Mazurian Lakes 313
XLIX. The Russians Out of Germany 317
L. Tightening op the Net — Report of the Booty . . . 319
LI. Battles of Przasnysz — Before Mlawa 324
LII. Fighting Before the Niemen and Bobr — Bombardment
OF OSSOWETZ 329
LIII. Russian Raid on Memel 334
LIV. German Invasion op Courland — Capture of Libau . . 337
LV. Russian Offensive from Kovno — Forest Battles in
May and June 342
CONTENTS
3
PART VII.— RUSSO-GERMAN CAWPAlGlf -Continued
CHAPTER PAGB
LVI. Campaign in Southern Poland — Movement upon War-
saw 345
LVII. Battle op Krasnik — Capture of Przasnysz .... 348
LVIII. Grand Offensive on the Warsaw Salient .... 356
LIX. Beginning of the End 361
LX. Warsaw Falls 366
PART VIII.— THE BALKANS
LXI. Diplomacy in the Balkans 369
PART IX.— ITALY ENTERS THE WAR
LXIl. Spirit of the Italian People — Crisis of the Government 379
LXIII. The Decision Made — Italian Strategy 382
LXIV. Strength of Italian Army and Navy ...... 388
LXV. First Engagemi^nts 392
LXVI. Fighting in the Mountains 402
LXVII. Attacks in Gorizia 408
LXVIII. Fighting in the Alps — Italian Successes .... 416
LXIX. More Mountain Fighting — Results of First Campaign 419
PART X.— THE DARDANELLES AND TURKEY
LXX. Beginning of Operations 423
LXXI. Preparations for Landing — Composition of Forces . 429
LXXII. Plans of Sir Ian Hamilton — First Landing Made . . 437
LXXIII. The British in Danger — Bitter Fighting .... 446
LXXIV. Further Efforts at Landing — Failure to Take Krithia 454
LXXV. Krithia Again Attacked — Heroic Work of "Anzacs" . 459
LXXVI. Russo-Turkish Operations .469
PART XI.— THE WAR IN AFRICA
LXXVII. The Cameroons 481
LXXVIII. British Conquest op Southwest Africa 484
LXXIX. Other African Operations 493
PART XII.— WAR IN ARABIA, MESOPOTAMIA,
AND EGYPT
LXXX. Mesopotamia and Arabia 497
LXXXL Syria and Egypt 503
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Zeppelin Attacked by Aeroplanes Frontispiece
OPPOSITE PAGB
Belgians Re-forming for a Fresh Attack 78
Prayer in a French Church Used for a Hospital 158
Great Liner Lusitania 222
Grand Duke Nicholas 270
Triumphal Entry of Austrians into Przemysl ...... 302
Prince Leopold of Bavaria in Warsaw 366
Cloud op Poisonous Gas Released by Italian Troops .... 414
Stores at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli 462
LIST OF MAPS
PAGE
Strategic Railway System in Eastern Germany Which Made
Quick Concentration Possible {Colored Map) . . . Front Insert
Gallipoli 29
KlAO-CHAU (TSING-TAU) • 43
German Possessions in Africa 65
Western Battle Line, January 1, 1915 81
Neuve Chapelle, Battle at ... 88
Yfres, Gas Battle of 113
Fighting in Alsace-Hartmannsweilerkopf 119
Artois, Battles in 126
German Submarine War Zone 172
Emden Landing Party, Cruise of 195
Carpathian Passes and Russian Battle Line 237
PRZEMYSL, Detail Maps of the Forts of 248
Galician Campaign from Tarnow to Przemysl 279
Galician Campaign from Przemysl to Bessarabia 291
Riga, German Advance on 338
Warsaw, German Attempts to Reach, in 1914 358
Warsaw, Advance and Capture of 367
Coasts of Italy and Austria, Showing the Naval Raid in
May, 1915 395
A-ustria, Italian Attack on 410
Dardanelles, Pictorial Map of, Showing Where the Allies
Landed 439
German Southwest Africa, Conquest of 491
Mesopotamia — The British Operations from the Persian Gulf . 499
Suez Canal, Turkish Attack on . . 506
PART I— RUSSIAN AND TURKISH CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS
DISQUIETING as was the British offensive in Mesopotamia,
the Turkish General Staff were not to be drawn by it from
considerations of larger strategy. Acting in agreement with the
German and Austrian General Staffs, plans were rapidly pushed
for an aggressive offensive in the Caucasus, that old-time battling
ground of the Russians and the Turks. Germany was being hotly
pressed in France by the armies of Belgium, France, and Eng-
land, and feared an offensive on the part of the Russian
army.
Across the great isthmus separating the Caspian and Black
Seas run the Caucasus Mountains. Parallel to this range of
towering mountains, the highest in Europe, runs the frontier
line of Russia and Turkey and Russia and Persia, winding in
and out among the Trans-Caucasian Mountains. About two
hundred miles from the Russo-Turkish frontier stands Tifiis, the
rich and ancient capital of Georgia, and one of the prime ob-
jectives of any Turkish offensive. One of the few railroads of
this wild country runs from Tifiis through the Russian fortress of
Kars, forty-five miles from the Turkish frontier, to Sarikamish,
thirty miles nearer. On the Turkish side the fortress of Erzerum
stands opposed to Kars, but suffering in comparison by the lack
of railroad communication with the interior of Turkey.
Despite all these discouraging circumstances, however, the
Turkish General Staff, dominated by the indefatigable and am-
bitious Enver Pasha, was not to be deterred. A brilliant and
9
10 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
daring plan of campaign, aiming at the annihilation or capture
of the entire Russian Caucasian army, the seizure, of Kars and
Tiflis, and the control of the immensely valuable and important
Caspian oil fields, was prepared. The unwelcome task of carry-
ing this plan to completion and success was intrusted to Hassan
Izzet Pasha, under the general guidance of Enver Pasha and his
staff of German advisers.
The heroic efforts of the Turkish troops, their grim but hope-
less battle against equally brave troops, appalling weather con-
ditions, and insuperable obstacles, their failure and defeat when
on the very verge of complete success, make an intensely inter-
esting story.
Stationed at Erzerum, Turkey had the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Corps. In addition, the Thirty-seventh Arab division
had been brought up from Bagdad to strengthen the Eleventh
Corps. At Trebizond two divisions of the First Corps had been
brought from Constantinople by sea. These forces totaled about
140,000 troops. At and about Kars, General Woronzov, the Rus-
sian commander, had between 100,000 and 110,000 troops at his
disposal from first to last. But although weaker in numbers he
had the inestimable advantage of operating with a line of rail-
road at his back, whereas the Turkish commander had to depend
entirely upon road transit, 500 miles from the nearest railroad.
The conditions absolutely necessary for the success of the
Turkish plan were the holding of the Russian force beyond
Sarikamish, and the accurate timing of the flanking attacks,
otherwise the Russian commander would be able to deal with
each force separately and defeat and perhaps destroy them.
The campaign opened on November 20, 1914. The Russians,
advancing across the frontier from Sarikamish, took Koprikeui,
within thirty miles of Erzerum. There, for some time, they re-
mained while the Turkish command prepared for their great
coup.
About the middle of December, 1914, the Eleventh Corps of the
Turkish army moved out of Erzerum, engaged the Russians at
Koprikeui, defeated them after a short, sharp struggle, and drove
them in disorder a dozen miles to Khorasan. While the Eleventh
CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS 11
Corps was thus engaged the Ninth and Tenth Corps, marching
forty miles to the north in terrible weather, succeeded in cross''
ing the high mountains that guard the Russian frontier. On
Christmas Day they looked down on the town of Sarikamish and
the vital railway that stretched away to the eastward. At the
same time the two divisions of the First Corps, stationed at Trebi-
zond, making a wider sweep, had, by forced marches through
a blinding blizzard that threatened to make necessary the aban-
donment of the artillery, reached the vicinity of Ardahan.
The Tenth Corps had reached and was threatening the railway
east of Sarikamish on the road to Kars. Its defeat was absolutely
necessary to the safety of the Russian army. It was therefore
the object of General Woronzov's first attack. During four days
every available man and gun he could bring up on the railway
were thrown against the rapidly dwindling ranks of the Tenth
Corps. The Turks fought bravely, but weight of numbers and
superiority of communications told in the end, and the Ottoman
forces were driven into the mountains to the north.
The defeat and retreat of the Tenth Corps exposed the left
flank of the Ninth, commanded by Iskan Pasha. General
Woronzov took full advantage of the situation. Iskan and his
40,000 troops were soon fighting a desperate battle against an
enveloping movement that threatened to encompass them.
Of the 40,000 troops of the Ninth Corps, a bare 6,000 struggled
out of the mountains to the vicinity of Sarikamish, where they
were rallied by Iskan Pasha. For six days and nights this heroic
band made a determined attempt to capture the town held by a
comparatively weak Russian garrison. Finally, when, sur-
rounded by overwhelming Russian forces, it became apparent
that no Turkish relief could reach him, Iskan Pasha and the
remnant of his once proud corps surrendered.
Sarikamish was defended against Iskan's 6,000 by a mere
handful of soldiers. Time and time again urged by their German
officers, the Turks hurled themselves against the thin Russian
line. It bent but did not break, as step by step, fighting fiercely
all the way, it retreated before weight of numbers. And when
relief did come to the defenders, and Iskan and his force were
12 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
compelled to surrender, the brave little Russian band was com-
pletely exhausted.
In their pursuit of the remnants of the Tenth Corps the Rus-
sians met with some of the difficulties that had been the undoing
of the Turks. Furthermore, although the Ninth Corps had been
hemmed in so that no relief could reach it, the Turkish command
had by no means lost the power of effective counteraction. The
Eleventh Corps at Khorasan carried on an energetic campaign
against the Russian front, gained a local and tactically important
success, and drove the enemy back as far as Kara-Urgan, less
than twenty miles from Sarikamish. Indeed, so serious became
the threat to the Russian forces that General Woronzov, much
against his wishes, was compelled to call off the pursuit of the
Tenth Corps and strengthen the Sarikamish front with the,
troops that had been operating farther to the east.
In the second week of January, 1915, between these forces and
the Eleventh Corps of the Turkish army a fierce battle, lasting
several days, opened. The struggle was of the utmost intensity,
at times developing into a hand-to-hand combat between whole
regiments. On January 14 the Fifty-second Turkish Regi-
ment was put to the bayonet by the Russians. At Genikoi a
regiment of Cossacks charged, during an engagement with a
portion of the Thirty-second Turkish Division, and killed and
wounded more than 300.
It must be remembered in judging the terrible nature of the
struggle that the armies were fighting in difficult country. The
battle of Kara-Urgan, furthermore, was waged in a continual
snowstorm. Thousands of dead and wounded were buried in
the rapidly falling snow and no effort was made to recover them.
By the end of this week, January 16, 1915, owing largely to their
superior railway communications and the possibility of reen-
forcements, the Russians had not only checked the Turkish offen-
sive, but had decisively defeated the Eleventh Corps. Pressing
their advantage the Russians pursued the beaten Turks towarc^
Erzerum, but the heavy snows prevented them gaining the fuL
fruits of their victory.
If the Eleventh Corps had not won a victory it had, however,
CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS 13
accomplished its object in that it had relieved the pressure on
the Tenth and enabled it to make good its escape to the north,
where it proceeded to effect a junction with the First Corps.
The experience of this First Corps had not been a happy one.
We left it on Christmas Day, 1914, overlooking Ardahan. A
week later it entered the city and prepared to carry out its role
in the general offensive by advancing upon the Russian right
flank at Kars. It met serious opposition, however, when it
attempted to move out of Ardahan, was itself compelled to
retreat, and finally sought safety beyond the ridges to the west.
There, in the valley of the Chorfik, it joined up with the Tenth
Corps. Together they continued their retreat upon Trebizond.
Subsequently they tried a new offensive in the Choruk valley
which was undecisive, however, and at the end of January, 1914,
the situation had developed into a deadlock.
The Turkish troops in their operation in the Caucasus ap-
peared to have suffered from the difficulty of keeping open their
sea communications with Constantinople. Lacking railways
they relied too much upon supplies arriving at Trebizond. The
Russian fleet in the Black Sea was active, however, and
upset the Turkish calculations. In the first week of January,
1915, at Sinope a Russian cruiser discovered the Turkish
cruiser Medjidieh convoying a transport. After a short en-
gagement the Medjidieh was put to flight, and the trans-
port sunk.
On January 6, 1915, the Russian Black Sea fleet ran into the
Breslau and the Hamidieh and damaged them both in a running
fight. A week later Russian torpedo boats sank several Turkisl^
supply boats near Sinope.
While this fighting was taking place in the north, farthef
to the south toward the Persian frontier the Russians were
attempting a turning movement against the Turkish right flank.
At the same time that the Russian force in the north crossed
the Turkish frontier the Russian column entered Turkey fifty
miles farther southeast. On November 8, 1914, this force en-
tered the Turkish town of Kara Kilissa. A week later, making
its way southwest for a distance of twenty miles, it engaged.
14 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
near the village of Dutukht, a Turkish force composed largely
of Arab troops of the Thirteenth Corps. At the outset the
Russians met with a measure of success, but on November 22,
1914, the Turks, having been reenforced by troops from Bagdad,
began a fierce offensive. After indecisive fighting in the Alash-
gird valley the Turks, about the middle of December, 1914,
almost caught the Russians in a bold enveloping movement
north of Dutukht. In order to escape the Russians were com-
pelled to retreat hurriedly and thus ended their offensive opera-
tion in this section.
Still farther to the south, in Persia, the Turks and Russians
also battled. Not only because of political conditions, but be-
cause of the nature of the country, it was easier for Russia
and Turkey to attack each other through Persia than directly
across other frontiers, just as it was easier for Germany and
France to reach each other across Belgium. At the outbreak of
war both Turkey and Russia, recognizing these circumstances,
were occupants of Persian territory. Early in November two
Russian columns marched across the northwest corner of Persia
and into Turkey by the Kotur and Khanesur passes, evidently
with the important city of Van, on the lake of that name, as
an objective. At a point near Dilman, and again at Serai, they
drove the Turkish troops back toward Van, but were checked
by reenforcements.
Meanwhile the Turks had a more considerable success to the
south. Apparently taking the Russian higher command com-
pletely by surprise, Turkish troops advanced almost unopposed
to Tabriz, the most important of the cities of northern Persia.
Alarmed by this, Russia sent a strong force which, on January
30, 1915, succeeded in recapturing the city.
Thus, up to the end of January, 1915, nothing decisive had
been accomplished on the Caucasian front by either Turkey
or Russia. The Battle of Sarikamish, resulting in a Turkish
loss estimated by the Russian authorities at 50,000, while decisive
enough locally, seems to have had no appreciable effect upon the
situation as a whole. For reasons resting very largely in the
difficulty of finding the troops necessary, as weil as in the con-
1— War St. 3
TURKISH ADVANCE AGAINST EGYPT 16
ditions of the country and the weather, the Russians had been
unable to follow up their success. Indeed, the offensive appears
to have continued in the hands of the Turks.
It is probably the case that Russia was unwilling to detach
any considerable number of troops from her Polish and Galician
front, where important events were brewing. Her General
Staff rightly regarded the Caucasian front as of secondary im-
portance— and like Austria on her Italian frontier, determined
to fight a defensive campaign.
However that may be, conditions after the first few months of
campaigning settled down into a stalemate. Engagements op
a relatively small scale were reported from time to time, but
the balance of advantage remained fairly even. Both countries
had fronts where victories would bring larger returns and
more immediate effect upon the ultimate outcome of the war.
CHAPTER II
TURKISH ADVANCE AGAINST EGYPT
rjlO the Turk no operation of the war appeared more important
-■-than did the campaign against Egypt. That in the early
days of the struggle in 1914 he contented himself with what
amounted to little more than a demonstration designed to hold as
many British troops in Egypt as possible was due primarily to
considerations of larger strategy. Undoubtedly, by his incursion
into the Sinai Peninsula and his half-hearted attempt with a
hopelessly small force to cross the Suez Canal, he learned many
lessons invaluable in any future and more ambitious campaign.
Considered as a diversion the early advance upon the Suez was a
success : as a serious military operation, resting on its own legs,
it was a fiasco.
No operation the Turks might have conducted could have been
so unwelcome to the British as was that against Egypt. For
weeks in advance it was discussed by English writers and, while
2_War St. 3
16 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
they all, naturally, agreed that it was foredoomed to failure, there
was an undercurrent of apprehension in official circles. It was
realized that many untried problems and theories would be put
to a severe test by such a campaign, if undertaken in a serious
way by a large and well-equipped force. Of a purely Turkish
force, commanded and organized by Turkish officers, there was
no fear, but such wonderful organizers had the Germans proved
themselves to be that the combination of Teuton brains and
Turkish fighting qualities and endurance was regarded as
formidable.
It was realized in England also that any measure of success
that might come to an invading force would have two very
serious results. It would not only threaten, and perhaps sever,
the shortest route to the east and so seriously embarrass the
trade, military and naval efficiency of the Allies, but it would
have a grave and perhaps decisive effect upon Mohammedan
malcontents in Egypt and India.
The exact truth of the conditions in India and Egypt will
possibly never be known, so rigorous were the operations of
the censorship set up by the British War Office. One thing is
certain, however: in both countries political conditions were
serious before the war and they could not, by any stretch of
optimism, be conceived as improving with the coming of a great
struggle aimed at the only remaining independent Mohammedan
power.
For many months previous to August, 1914, the Indian office
in London had been apprehensive of rebellion in India. In
Egypt the circumstance that at the beginning of the war the
British authorities announced that they would make no use of
the native Egyptian army speaks for itself. It was believed in
Constantinople and in Berlin that both Egypt and India were
ripe for a terrible revolt against the rule of the British Raj : the
uprisings of millions of fanatical natives that would forever
sweep British control from these two key places to the trade of
the world and would institute a Turkish suzerainty, backed and
controlled by Berlin. This was thought all the more likely as
thousands of the British regular troops had been withdrawn
TURKISH ADVANCE AGAINST EGYPT 17
from India and Egypt for service in France, being replaced by
raw levies from England and the Colonies.
These, then, were the major considerations that prompted the
early offensive against Egypt. It was based upon sound political
and military strategy. Just how near it came to complete suc-
cess, just how much additional worry and effort it added to the
burden of Great Britain and France, only a complete revelation
of the progress of events in all fields will tell.
In the attack upon the canal the Turks operated primarily
from their base at Damascus. As preparations progressed the
troops that were to take part in the actual advance were con-
centrated between Jerusalem and Akabah. Under command of
Djemel Pasha, Turkish Minister of Marine, there were gathered
some 50,000 troops consisting mostly of first line troops of the
best quality, reenforced by about 10,000 more or less irregular
Arab Bedouins,
During November and early December, 1914, the force was
moved forward by slow and methodical stages, until by Decem-
ber 15 it was awaiting orders to advance, encamped on the con-
fines of the great desert that separated it from its objective.
Here it is well that the reader should have a good idea of the
difficulties of the task the Turkish higher command had imposed
upon Djemel Pasha and his troops.
The two chief difficulties to be met by the invaders of the
Sinai were lack of transport facilities and lack of water. Three
routes were possible for the Turkish army, all artificial obstacles
being for the moment ignored; two by land, across the Sinai
desert, and the third by sea, across the Mediterranean. The
latter, however, must be ruled out because the seas were con-
trolled by the Anglo-French fleet. For the same reason, the
northern land route had many disadvantages, because it could
be commanded for a part of its length by warships. However,
it is instructive to examine it in detail.
The whole region crossed by the sea road is desert of the
most difficult and forbidding character. By this road all the
great invasions — ^the Roman, Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek, and
French — ^have been made. The road enters the desert at Efl
Ig THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Arish and from there to El Kantara on the Suez Canal, the
probable point of attack of an army moving by this route, is
100 miles. Over this whole distance there are only three
places, once an army has left El Arish, where water can be
had. The first is a matter of a day's march, at El Maza, thirty
mileis^away; the second is at Bir-El-Abd, another day's march;
and the third at Katieh, within striking distance of the canal.
Without the construction of a special railway the transport of
Sifoike large enough to efficiently control the canal by this route
seems to be out of the question.
The southern route, known as the Hadj, or Pilgrim's Road,
running from Akaba to Suez, besides being longer is even worse
off in the matter of water. This was the traditional path of
pilgrims traveling from Egypt to Mecca, and still is much in
use for that purpose.
Something like 150 miles separate Akaba and Suez, yet only
two watering places are to be found in the whole distance. The
first is three days' march from the former place, at a point called
Nakhl, where modem cisterns had been built and an adequate
supply of water for a large force probably was obtainable. The
next watering place is another three days' march, at Ayun
Mousa, or Well of Moses, within a short distance of the canal.
But tremendous as were the problems facing a considerable
body of men in attempting to cross the Sinai desert and arrive at
the Suez Canal in condition to fight a strong, fresh and fully
prepared foe, they were not to be compared to the difficulties that
would face such an army when the canal had been reached. We
have seen how great an obstacle a wide river, such as the Vistula,
proved to be to an army when attempting to cross in the face of
a prepared enemy. In the case of the Suez Canal, although
there were no strong currents, a force attempting to cross it had
to contend with two added difficulties: The Suez Canal could
not, in the circumstances be turned, as was the Vistula by the
Germans. Furthermore its defensive value was immeasurably
increased by the circumstance that it could and did carry war-
ships of the largest type which not only had the value of
fortresses mounting the heaviest of guns, but were mobile as
TURKISH ADVANCE AGAINST EGYPT 19
well. And finally, because of the nature of the shores of the
canal, it was possible for an attacking force to cross it at but
few points.
The question of crossing the canal or dominating it in any
sense was for the Turks largely a question of bringing to bear
a superior force of artillery — a task that had only to be stated
to reveal its difficulties. No force with smaller or fewer guns
would hope to cross the Suez in the face of the concentration of
artillery and naval gunfire that the British could bring to bear
at any threatened point.
The defenders on the western side of the canal had the
additional advantage of railway communication running along
the entire canal from Suez to Port Said, and connecting with
interior bases.
There were five points from which, once having conquered
the desert and reached the canal, the invaders could advan-
tageously launch an attack or attacks upon the canal defenses.
The first is just south of El Kantara, where the old sea road
crosses the Suez. Just south of Ismailia a group of heights on
the east bank provides a second opportunity. The third is found
at the point called the Plateau of Hyena. The fourth is just
north of the Bitter Lake, and the fifth is to the south of the
same body of water.
Late in December, 1914, Djemel Pasha began active prepara-
tions for an advance upon the canal. This campaign the Turks
later called a reconnaissance in force and as, of their total
strength of 50,000 men, only 12,000 at the outside and possibly
less were used, the limited term seems justified. Although the
southern route was used by the main force, a small force eluded
the watchfulness of the Anglo-French naval patrol operating
along the shore commanding the first day's march of the northern,
or sea road, and ultimately struck at El Kantara. Furthermore,
sometime before one of these two forces — ^the larger, or southern
— reached the vicinity of the canal, it split and conducted an
independent attack at Suez.
There had been much speculation among military writers all
over the world as to the possibility or probability of the construe-
20 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tion by the Turks of a light railway running a part of the dis-
tance across the Sinai Desert and linking up with the line to
Mecca. It was realized that such a railway would be an enormous
help to Djemel Pasha and his army, especially in the transport
of supplies, ammunitions, and artillery. Indeed, it was held that
only by the construction of such a railway, extending almost to
the canal, could the absolutely essential artillery be brought
into action. There was serious doubt of the ability of the Turks
to build such a line. The strength of the German "stiffening"
in the army based upon Damascus was believed to be slight.
Djemel Pasha is said to have seriously opposed any great num-
ber of Teuton officers, especially in the higher commands. Thus
the assistance the Turks could expect from the Germans in the
organization and construction of such a railway would be small.
Whether or not the scheme was feasible at that time it is im-
possible to say. At any rate the Turks, for reasons best known
to themselves, did not put it to a test.
The British force in Egypt was well supplied with aeroplanes
and kept the Turkish army under constant observation. With
the exception of the use of the first section of the road, covering
a couple of days of time, there was probably no element of
surprise in the Turkish attack upon the canal. Realizing the
limited possibilities of attack from the east shore, the British,
taking their lesson from experience in France, had constructed
an elaborate system of trenches to the east of the canal at the
five points where attacks would possess some likelihood of suc-
cessful conclusion.
It was the end of January, 1915, before the Turkish army,
marching in easy stages across the desert reached the vicinity
of the canal. Their German mentors had constructed for them
elaborate carriages with the wheels of enormous width to carry
the artillery and the heavy supplies across the soft sands. Also,
in preparation of a crossing of the canal, the Turks brought a
supply of ready-assembled pontoon bridges, running on wheels
and similar to those used by the German army in Europe, except
that they were much lighter.
In the transport of all this material the Turks were dependent
FAILURE OF "HOLY WAR" PROPAGANDA 21
upon camels, suited as are no other animals for work in the desert.
In thousands, they had been collected at Hadj, the cooperation
of the Arab Bedouins being specially valuable in this work.
The consideration of these events in the campaign which begins
in February, 1915, will be found in Volume III of this work.
CHAPTER III
FAILURE OF "HOLY WAR" PROPAGANDA
ONE of the most interesting of the various phases of the war,
so far as the participation of Turkey was concerned, was the
religious development. Countless pages of learned speculation
had been written for years before the struggle in an attempt to
forecast the outcome of exactly the conditions that had arisen. It
must be said at once that in the first six months of the war reality
failed to live up to prophecy. The cataclysm that was expected by
many to involve the revolt of millions and a vast change in the
political color of much of the earth's surface did not appear.
Any change that took place operated so quietly and on so com-
paratively small a scale that it was lost to view beside the greater
interest of the struggle on the battle fields of France and Poland.
It is desirable, however, that the situation be examined. Abbas
II, Khedive of Egypt, had early in the war openly shown his lack
of sympathy with the British in Egypt. By his actions he left
no doubt regarding his attitude. He not only vehemently ex-
pressed his adherence to Constantinople but left Cairo, and
journeyed to Turkey, safe from British official pressure or per-
suasion. Whereupon the British Government called upon him to
return, threatened him with deposition, and finally took that ex-
treme step, setting up another in his place on December 18, 1914.
Furthermore, the day before, Great Britain declared Egypt
a British protectorate independent of Constantinople. In this
action Great Britain relied not upon any legal right to take such
action, but merely upon the right of actual possession. Since
22 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Great Britain had taken over the government of Egypt in 1883,
she had acknowledged the sultan's rights of suzerainty and had
countenanced the payment to that ruler of certain considerable
yearly sums from the Egyptian exchequer.
Indeed, Great Britain was in Egypt merely by virtue of an in-
ternational understanding and on a definite agreement to release
her control of the country when certain conditions of political
and financial stability had been restored. The other nations had,
willingly, or unwillingly, become resigned to her possession of
this strategically important land. Great Britain a decade before
the war, at the beginning of that rapprochement with France
which led up to the Entente and which had so many fateful con-
sequences for the whole world, sought to legalize her position in
Egypt — at least so far as the other great north African power
was concerned. A bargain was struck with France by which the
English occupation of Egypt for an indefinite period was recog-
nized in exchange for a free hand in Morocco. Great Britain
could now urge that the coming of war, and especially the entry
of Turkey into the struggle, placed her administration in Egypt
in a position impossible to maintain. In theory she was, so long
as she acknowledged the suzerainty of the sultan, in the country
merely on that ruler's sufferance. She admitted his ultimate
authority and especially the loyalty and duty of the Egyptian
army and khedive to him. Strictly she could make no move to
prevent an armed occupation of the country by the sultan's
troops nor could she call upon the khedive and his cabinet to
repudiate Constantinople's sway. To put an end to this condition
of affairs was the most legitimate reason for England's action.
Although the native Egyptian is in religion allied to the
Turk, his religious fervor was not great enough to induce him to
rise against British control. Among the better educated of the
Egyptians and especially among those who had traveled, there
was a strong '^Nationalist" movement. At times, even in the
period of peace, this movement had threatened to make matters
extremely unpleasant for the British rulers. For some years
before the war, German and Turkish agents had been working
among these ardent Egyptian patriots, encouraging and ad-
' FAILURE OF "HOLY WAR" PROPAGANDA 23
vising them, and when war with Turkey came England was seri-
ously alarmed. Using the country as a central base for her
Turkish, Persian, and Balkan operations, Great Britain imported
thousands upon thousands of troops into Egypt. Just how many
hundreds of thousands of armed men passed in and out of the
country from first to last only the records of the British war
office would show, but it can be said that England never had a
force of less than 90,000 trained men in Egypt at any one time.
Any chance of effective action that the Egyptian nationalists
might have had was neutralized by the indifference and lack of
interest in the vast body of their countrymen. There were more
than 10,000,000 Mohammedans in Egypt, but only a small minor-
ity of them, under the most promising of circumstances, could
have been counted upon to pay the least heed to the call of Con-
stantinople. The Egyptian fellah is anything but a fighter.
Lazy, unlearned, unambitious, he is content to accept his daily
lot, perhaps conscious that the British rule has brought a certain
amount of comparative prosperity even to him.
On the other hand, there were in Egypt something like 600,-
000 nomads, a very large proportion of whom could be depended
upon to follow the lead of Constantinople. The males of these
wild tribespeople were remarkable fighters, subject to no con-
trol, hating the English sway, and so independent of roads and
transport that they could keep busy an even larger force of less
mobile troops. Their chief weakness was their lack of cohesion
and the impossibility of any concerted action on their part.
This, then, was the native situation in Egypt. In other parts of
the world, where Great Britain maintained sway over large
numbers of Mohammedans, the situation was equally complicated.
With the issue of a call for a Holy War by the Sheik-ul-Islam, the
religious ruler of the Mohammedan world, many well-informed
observers looked for a large measure of trouble in India. So
many were the elements of dissatisfaction, and even open re-
volt, in India that it was believed the Sheik-ul-Islam's call would
be the match applied to the powder magazine.
The attitude of the various Indian potentates was uncertain.
Some of them were known to be only outwardly loyal to the Brit-
24 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ish authority. The now famous incident at the visit of King
George to India, some years before the war, when one of the
richest and most important of the native princes refused to bend
the knee, was indicative of very widespread dissatisfaction. In-
numerable cases of individual and even concerted violence against
British rule immediately preceded the war, and several of these
were openly encouraged by native princes.
So far as definite action was concerned, the opening of the war
with Turkey and the months that immediately followed falsified
all these predictions of disaster to British rule in India. Many
of the native princes were effusive in their professions of loyalty
to the British Empire, and several offered personal service at the
front or financial contributions to the huge cost of the struggle.
Notable, and perhaps decisive, was the open adherence to
Britain of the Agar Khan, the immensely powerful ruler of mil-
lions of Indian Mohammedans. The Agar Khan had spent many
of the years previous to the war in England in daily association
with English high society and official circles. At the outbreak
of the war with Turkey, in October, 1914, at the request of the
British Government, he visited Egypt, and it was largely upon
his advice that the former khedive was deposed and the new
one elevated to the post. Indeed, at one time there were strong
rumors, afterward energetically denied by the British Govern-
ment, that the Agar Khan had advised a Mohammedan repudia-
tion of the authority of the caliph and the elevation of another
to his place under a British guarantee. In support of this plan
it was pointed out that Great Britain, judged by the number of
adherents under her rule, was the world's greatest Mohammedan
power. It was intolerable to many English people, especially to
those of strong imperialistic tendencies, that the real control,
even in theory, of so large and important a section of the people
of the British Empire should be in Constantinople, safe from the
"influence" and "persuasion" of the British Government. By
these people it was held that the sultan's lineal claim was weak,
and that an even better claim to the headship of the Moslems
could be established for any one of several other men who might
have been named. However, the plan was never achieved.
RESULTS OF TURKISH CAMPAIGN .25
CHAPTER lY
RESULTS OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF
TURKISH CAMPAIGN
WHAT was the situation as a whole, so far as Turkey and her
military actions against the Allies were^oncemed, as to the
outcome of these various operations in three fields — the Caucasus,
Mesopotamia, and Egypt — during the first six months of the war?
The military narrative is recorded in the chapter following. It
will be seen that all of them were inconclusive. Indeed, from
what we knew of the circumstances surrounding them, all we are
justified in saying is that none of them was serious in the sense
that they were not intended to have any decisive effect, directly,
upon the progress of the war. Of them all it might be urged
by a military authority that they were subsidiary operations,
dangerous and wasteful in that they withdrew valuable men,
munitions, brains, and energy from the decisive fronts. Their
only justification is that they imposed similar action on the part
of both armies, and so, in just that degree, scattered their forces.
For the Turk it can be urged that at least two of the cam-
paigns were forced upon him by his German mentors, whil^
the third was imposed upon him by a British offensive.
Furthermore, the Turk was entirely cut off from his Austro-
German allies, and there was no possibility of his bringing his
weight to bear in one of the main fields. From that point of
view it is possible to justify the Turkish offensives as sound
strategy.
Aside from a desire to protect the oil supply in Persia, it is
hardly as easy to justify the British offensive in Mesopotamia.
As events subsequently demonstrated, it was possible for the
Turks to throw an overwhelming number of troops into Bagdad
and to the south, and, furthermore, they were fighting under
vastly more advantageous conditions than were the invaders.
Only on the assumption that the Turks were hopelessly demora-
lized and disorganized, and that as fighting men they would belie
26 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
all their past history, was it possible to visualize success for the
British operations in Mesopotamia.
Turkey had definitely come to grips with England and with
Russia. She had in none of these fields measured swords with
France, although she was equally at war with that country. Thei
exact apportionment of the actual work to be done by the indi-
vidual powers of the Entente seems to have led to considerable
disagreement, and resulted at times in serious delay. Such ar-
rangements depend, of course, upon each country's idea of its
spheres of influence. Obviously, no country, if it can help it,
is going to waste its men or its efforts in a field in which it has
only a minor political or commercial interest. So far as France
was concerned, the Caucasus, Egypt — aside from the possibility
of the closing of the canal — and Mesopotamia were not of enough
importance to justify her in participating in the struggle with
the Turks even were it physically possible. All these remarks,
of course, are subject to modifications imposed by considerations
of the larger strategy of the Entente Powers; but for many
months of the war the agreement of the Entente Powers in the
matter of general strategy was conspicuous by its absence.
With her neighbors in the Balkans Turkey had maintained
remarkably good relations considering the bitterness engendered,
not only by centuries of strife, but by the recent events of the
two Balkan wars. Bulgaria, smarting under the loss of territory
through the attack upon her by Serbia, Greece, and Rumania
in the Second Balkan War, was openly conducting friendly nego-
tiations with Turkey for the acquisition of valuable territory —
a compact that could mean only one thing. Greece, frightened by
the menace of the German power, had resisted up to the moment
all the blandishments of the Entente Powers, who urged her to
active participation in the struggle. Rumania, largely isolated
from the Entente Powers, menaced on the north by Austro-
German forces, on the south by a revengeful Bulgaria, borrowed
heavily from Britain, the universal money bag, but straddled
the fence.
Thus Turkey, which in different circumstances might have been
in a precarious military situation, felt reasonably secure, despite
THE DARDANELLES 27
her isolation. In the early part of the war, however, events
moved rapidly and not exactly to her liking. For they threat-
ened to sweep the whole Balkans into the whirl of war, and no
man could tell exactly how the various petty states, under the
stress of sympathy, military and naval considerations and dy-
nastic control, would align themselves. With these events came,
too, the first participation of France in the war against Turkey
in the campaign in the Dardanelles, now to be described.
CHAPTER V
THE DARDANELLES — STRATEGY OP
THE CAMPAIGN
THE beginning of the bombardments in the Dardanelles opens
a remarkable chapter in military and naval warfare. The
desperate campaign to batter down the fortifications which lead
to Constantinople and the disastrous attempt to conquer the most
strongly barricaded city in the world, probably excited more
world-wide interest or put to the test more theories of warfare
than did the Dardanelles campaign undertaken by Great Britain
with the assistance of France. It was fiercely attacked by military
critics almost from the start. It was, however, a boldly conceived
operation, calculated to have a most important effect upon the
war as a whole — certainly upon the war in the southeast corner
of Europe.
The Dardanelles campaign was largely conceived and con-
trolled by the Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, the re-
markable and able British Secretary of the Admiralty. He hag
been widely condemned for his share of the operation, but rev-
elations that have been made would appear to clear him of a
great measure of the blame.
What were the considerations that weighed with the British
admiralty in deciding to undertake one of the most difficult
operations in the whole world? Primarily it seems to have had
28 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the idea of relieving the pressure on Russia. The Turkish offen-
sive in the Caucasus had come to grief about the end of Decem-
ber but a resumption was momentarily expected and feared.
Hindenburg's victory at Tannenberg in East Prussia had been a
terrible blow to Russia and she had no troops to spare for de-
fense in the Caucasus.
Furthermore, Constantinople, besides being one of the objectives
of the war, was Russia's only warm sea gate into Europe. It must
have been apparent to the Russian military authorities that the
existing supplies of munition and guns of the czar's army would
not suffice to withstand a hard German- Austrian drive. In other
words the condition that resulted in the defeat of the Russian
army in Galicia and Poland in the summer of 1915 were foreseen.
Russia called upon England and France to force the Dardanelles.
One can find it easy to condemn the operation but few can be
found who will deny that it was a glorious failure. One that added
luster to the glory of the British army, navy, and many un-
matched pages to the story of their bravery. And no less credit
and glory did it bring to the Turkish armies.
In addition to the question of war supplies there were other
reasons for opening the Dardanelles as soon as possible. Russia's
ability to finance a war of the magnitude of the one there being
fought, especially where large foreign purchases were made, de-
pended very largely upon the maintenance of foreign commerce.
Russia was buying from all the neutral world as well as from her
Entente partners. England, for instance, was not only making
for her millions of dollars' worth of war supplies, but she was, for
the moment, financing many of Russia's purchases abroad.
In return for all this it was important that Russia should ex-
port as freely as possible. Now one of her most valuable com-
modities and one in high demand not only in England, but in
other countries, was wheat. Millions upon millions of bushels of
Russian wheat were stored in her great Black Sea ports waiting
to be shipped through Constantinople when the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles were commanded by Entente guns and ships.
Greece, under the leadership of Premier Venizelos was hesitating
on the brink of a plunge into the struggle as an ally of the En-
THE DARDANELLES
29
GALUPOLI
ao THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tente and not only agreed to the use of Greek islands but actu-
ally considered a proposal to send a Greek force of not less than
20,000 and possibly as many as 40,000 over to the Dardanelles.
Bulgaria was in that state where a striking victory in the Turk-
ish peninsula would have swept her off her feet. Italy was at
loggerheads with Austria, her ally, and about to break.
Then from the English point of view there was the possible
effect upon the Mohammedan throughout the British Empire.
Possibly not for many years, if ever, will the world know the
trutlji of the conditions in India during the war. One thing is
certain. In one way and another there was much disaffection,
much open rebellion and much fear of an even wider spread of
revolt. The need for the maintenance and even strengthening of
British prestige must have been constantly before the British
ruler and no other campaign could possibly serve this end so effi-
cacious as a successful assault upon Constantinople and the
temporal power of the sultan. It would clinch probably for gen-
erations to come Britain's claim to be the great Mohammedan
power of the world and would destroy the one condition that for
years before and at that time especially had contained the seeds
of rebellion against the British yoke.
In beginning the campaign which Great Britain and France
carried on in the Dardanelles there reappeared a very old problem
of war — ^the question of Warships versus Forts or land fortifica-
tions. It appears to have been the consensus of opinion among all
except the more extreme exponents of battleships that land forti-
fications would possess an undoubted advantage in a contest
against purely naval forces.
This it seems had been the opinion of the American naval
authorities in the Spanish-American War, when the American
commander. Admiral Sampson, was expressly warned not to risk
his ships against the shore defenses of Santiago Harbor. It also
appears to have been the opinion of many British admirals who
have placed their views on record. Indeed, there was in existence
the views of several competent naval authorities as to the possi-
bilities of a purely naval attack upon this very system of defenses.
It was not by any means the first time that an attempt had
THE DARDANELLES 31
been made to force the Dardanelles. Many such attempts had
proved this narrow neck of water running between high banks
to be one of the great natural defensive spots of the world. The
realization of that obvious and oft-proved fact had made Con-
stantinople through the ages one of the most fought for and
schemed for cities of the whole world.
It is necessary to study these attempts in order to understand
clearly the difficulties which faced the British and French Allies
in 1914. Of. the previous attacks that had been made to force a
way through the Dardanelles and so up to the city of Constanti-
nople, that of the famous Admiral Hornby in 1877 was one of
the most interesting as well as one of the most instructive.
Ordered by the British Government to take his fleet past the
forts that lined the approaching banks, he proceeded to carry out
his orders, but wrote a warning in which he pointed out that,
while it might be possible for his fleet to make its way into the
Sea of Marmora, once there it would be helpless if the land de-
fenses were controlled by the enemy. Out of coal, ammunition,
and food, the ships would be at the mercy of the Turks. "Al-
though the forts might not prevent a strong fleet passing through
the Dardanelles, they certainly," wrote Admiral Hornby, "could
sink armed and unarmed transports and supply ships." In view
of these considerations, Hornby urged the British Government
to provide a land force of sufficient strength to carry and hold
the land defenses. His superiors, however, did not agree with
him, for they told him to go ahead with a purely naval operation.
His ideas were never put to a real test because the Turks offered
no resistance to his passage of the straits.
The situation in the Great War of 1914 presented Constanti-
nople as the same perplexing military problem. If we go back
another three-quarters of a century to 1807, the experience of Ad-
miral Duckworth throws some light on the subject, although con-
ditions had changed radically. Duckworth, with his sailing ships,
ran past the forts in the Dardanelles and anchored in front of
Constantinople. It was hoped that a threat of bombardment
would bring the Turks to their knees, but the latter refused to be
intimidated. In the end, the British admiral ran out of food and
3— War St. 3
32 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
water and was compelled to leave without accomplishing any-
thing.
The student of the War of 1914 also must consider that dur-
ing the war between Italy and Turkey, the Italian General Staff
is known to have worked out an elaborate plan for an attack upon
the Dardanelles. However, at the critical moment, the European
powers interfered and forced upon Italy an agreement that the
war should not be extended to the mainland of Europe. In the
Balkan War, the Bulgarians threatened the lines of Bulair, the
narrow neck which connects the Gallipoli peninsula to the main-
land, but never launched the attack.
When in 1914 the British and French determined to press a
purely naval attack upon the Dardanelles, they appear to have
been influenced by two major considerations. At the time there
was not ready a sufficient number of troops to make a land cam-
paign successful and, at the last moment, King Constantine of
Greece repudiated a personal agreement made by Venizelos, the
Greek Premier, with the Allies by which Greece was to pro-
vide at least 20,000 troops to assist the France-British fleet.
Even after the fall of Venizelos it was still determined to push
the naval attack because of the second consideration. In the
opinion of the British admiralty the full power of modern naval
guns of 11- and 12-inch had never been tested and in their opin-
ion they would suffice to reduce the Dardanelles defenses in a
comparatively short time. Furthermore, the British authorities
appear to have relied largely upon the new 15-inch guns of the
Queen Elizabeth and her sister vessels, then nearing completion
in British yards. So tremendous was the power of these new
guns and so great their range that it was believed the Queen
Elizabeth and her sister ships could stand miles out of range of
the heaviest of the Dardanelles guns and quickly smash them to
an unrecognizable mass of ruins.
It was evident that the British naval command held these
views even in spite of the experience of British warships off the
coast of Belgium earlier in the war. For a while in 1914 British
monitors and battleships bombarded almost at will the German
troops posted along the coast running from the Dutch frontier
THE DARDANELLES 33
line almost to Nieuport. Finally, however, the Germans brought
up heavy army and naval guns and, mounting them in concealed
spots among the sand dunes, soon drove off the British naval
force.
But Turkish guns were not German guns, Turkish gunners
were not German gunners, and above all, the munition supply of
the Turkish army was not fed by factories able to turn out a
quarter of a million shells a day. Some such considerations as
these appear to have convinced the British higher command that
there was a difference in the two tasks.
The command of the Dardanelles forts at the entrance to Con-
stantinople and the Black Sea is similar, except that it is per-
haps more sure as to the command of the entrance to the Baltic by
Copenhagen, the Mediterranean by Gibraltar, and, in a lesser
degree, of the North Sea by Dover.
The narrow passage of water called the Dardanelles separates
the peninsula of Gallipoli and the Asiatic shore of Turkey. It
connects the ^gean Sea and the Sea of Marmora, which in turn,
through the Bosphorus, connects with the Black Sea. Curiously
enough this tremendously important waterway, the only warm
sea outlet of Russia, had been closed against that country by the
action of the very powers now fighting desperately to smash it
open. The Black Sea was a Turkish lake in the seventeenth cen-
tury but in the century following the growth of Russia in that
part of Europe made the question of the control of the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles one of supreme importance to her. Thus we
find, in the so-called "will" of Peter the Great, among other in-
junctions he lays upon his successors, an admonition never to
rest until Constantinople had been wrested from the Turk. But
whether this "will" is authentic or not, Russian policy has stead-
ily kept that object in view.
The Crimean War was an attempt by France and England to
stem the almost resistless tide of Russian expanse toward the
southwest. Russian control of Constantinople was regarded as
the chief danger that threatened the western powers and, in 1856,
by the Treaty of Paris, not only was the strength of the Russian
Black Sea fleet expressly limited, but the Dardanelles were closed
34 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
against the passage of Russia's warships into the Mediterranean.
France and England revived what they called "an ancient rule of
the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been
prohibited for ships of war of foreign powers to enter the Straits
of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus."
Turkey was of no mind to leave the enforcement of this "an-
cient rule" to the powers. She began the construction of more
elaborate fortifications commanding both the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles. German advice, especially after the Franco-Prus-
sian War, was asked and obtained and Krupp sent some of his
gigantic pieces for the defense of the narrow waters. This
German cooperation with the Turks in the strengthening of thosi*
positions through all the years that have intervened is significant.
CHAPTER VI
FORTIFICATIONS AND STRENGTH —
FIRST MOVEMENTS
T ET US inspect the fortifications in the Dardanelles at the begln-
•*-i ning of the war in 1914. The Dardanelles, from end to end,
have a length of forty-seven miles. From the town of Gallipoli to
the MgesLTiy however, the full distance of the narrow section of
the waterway, is a matter of thirty-three miles. At one point the
passage is less than 1,400 yards wide and at no point is it more
than 7,000. Although there is a good depth in much of the
channel, shallows are to be met with in most unexpected places.
To make navigation even more difficult, there is a swift and
powerful surface current running through the Narrows, on
some occasions at a speed of eight knots an hour. In addition
there is not only a strong undercurrent, but, as well, many cross
currents. At certain seasons of the year the wind and weather
make navigation of large vessels almost impossible.
Both sides of the Dardanelles offered natural positions of enor-
mous advantage to a defending force. On the Gallipoli side were
FORTIFICATIONS AND STRENGTH 35
a tangled mass of rocks and hills, almost devoid of vegetation
except for stubby yellow bushes. In a few of the little valleys,
stray clusters of olive trees relieved the monotony of the view.
Heights rose upon heights and along the shores of the penin-
sula nearly perpendicular cliffs made landings almost out of
the question.
Thi« whole peninsula was a difficult country to traverse even
in times of peace. No large maps existed of its intricate paths,
there were few roads, and those that did exist were so com-
manded by heights and concealed positions for guns and infantry
that the progress of an attacking force would inevitably be most
difficult and costly.
Water was almost nonexistent. Most of the available sup-
ply was so protected that an attacking force would in no case be
able to use it until its task of conquest was complete. As such
a force advanced inland, these difficulties as well as those of the
country would constantly and rapidly increase. From Cape Hel-
las, at the tip of the peninsula where a sandy beach made a land-
ing possible, if difficult, the ground rapidly rose to a height of 140
feet. Hill country then led to ridges standing 600 feet, while a
mile and a half beyond stood 600 feet in the air the command-
ing peak of Achi Baba, destined to play so large and so tragic
a part in the struggle for the peninsula of Gallipoli. At the
narrowest part of the Narrows, the real key position to the
straits, stood the Kilid Bahr plateau, 700 feet, while to the north-
west, almost 300 feet higher, stood the precipitous eminence of
Sari Bair, a dense mass of trackless ravines and thickets.
Where the peninsula of Gallipoli joined the mainland is, com-
paratively speaking, a narrow neck of land. Even this, however,
presented tremendous potential difficulties to any force. A hill
almost 500 feet in height rose in the center and marshed on either
side prevented a turning movement. Furthermore, the difficulties
of landing a force in the face of an enemy strongly intrenched
on the heights were not lessened by the circumstance that the
cliffs rose to a height of 300 feet, almost straight from the water's
edge. In short nature seems to have designed the country in
every way as a protection against an armed force seeking to
36 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
force its way either in or out of the Black Sea. To just what ex-
tent these natural advantages had been utilized by the Turks it is
impossible to say. It is not likely, however, that they, or their
German mentors, had been idle, in view of the importance the
Allies were known to attach to the straits.
In September, 1914, and probably for some time before, the
Turks were known to be busy strengthening the forts. Subse-
quent events led to the conclusion that they, or their German
advisers, were alive to the lessons of the early days of the war
in France and Belgium and had made elaborate arrange-
ments for the placing of heavy guns in concealed positions. In
addition they perfected the mobility of even the heaviest of
pieces, so that it became impossible for observation from the
Franco-British ships or from aeroplanes to locate them with
any certitude.
The Turks also seem to have secured a plentiful supply of sea
mines, with which the waters approaching the Dardanelles and
the actual passage of the straits were strewn along the shores.
Toward the Narrows were constructed shore batteries for the
launching of torpedoes, as well as for the launching of floating
mines. The strong current of the straits could be depended upon
to carry these latter engines of destruction among the allied
ships of war should they venture within the narrow, confined
waters of the Dardanelles.
This was the condition of affairs, then, on November 8, 1914,
when a joint Anglo-French squadron sailed in close to the tip
of the Gallipoli peninsula and opened a bombardment of the outer
defenses of the Dardanelles. For this and subsequent naval oper-
ations against the Turkish position, England was able to detach
from her main theatre of naval activity — ^the North Sea — a con-
siderable number of old, but still extremely powerful, battleships
and battle cruisers. These boats, with the exception of the Queen
Elizabeth, which, later appeared on the scene, were all built pre-
vious to the introduction of the dreadnought and were to a con-
siderable extent made obsolete by that vessel. At any rate they
could not engage the more modem ships of the German navy and
could not be attached to the grand fleet of England because of
FORTIFICATIONS AND STRENGTH 37
their lack of high speed and the heaviest of guns. For these rea-
sons, although their loss in any engagement against the Turkish
defenses would not be relished by the British authorities, still
such a disaster would not be decisive in any war. As Winston
Churchill subsequently pointed out, many of them would have,
in the ordinary course of events, but a few more years of life in
the British navy, so rapidly were modern battleships deteriorat-
ing under the rapid advance of naval science.
At the entrance to the straits the Turks had erected two major
positions and several minor ones. On the Asiatic shore stood
the Kum Kale Fort, known as the "New Castle of Asia." There
the main battery consisted of four 10.2-inch guns. A short dis-
tance down the coast stood Yeni Shehr, where a main battery of
two 9.2-inch guns and a short battery of smaller pieces had been
erected. On the European side, opposite Kum Kale, stood Sedd-
el-Bahr, with six 10-inch and two 5.9-inch guns. At Cape
Hellas, the extreme point of the Gallipoli Peninsula, was the
Erteghrul Battery, mounting two 9.2-inch guns and some
minor pieces.
Each of the attacking warships fired about a score of shells at
these forts and an attempt was made to determine just how much
damage had been done. None of the forts were silenced, however,
and it was finally decided by the commander of the Anglo-French
naval force. Vice Admiral Carden, that conditions were not propi-
tious for pushing home the attack and the vessels retired out to
sea, where they maintained a tight blockade of the Dardanelles.
Then there followed a long period of naval inactivity, at least so
far as the larger vessels were concerned.
About a month later, however, on December 13, 1914, the com-
mander of a British submarine accomplished a feat in the Sea of
Marmora that not only aroused his countrymen to enthusiasm
but as well won for him the coveted Victoria Cross, the first in-
stance of the winning of that decoration by a naval officer since
the beginning of the war.
Lieutenant Holbrook was in command of the B-ll, a 316-ton
submarine launched as far back as 1906. It was in no sense to be
compared to the giant underwater crafts that were being
38 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
launched and used at the outbreak of the war, some of them
measuring 800 feet. The B-11 carried only sixteen men in all —
two officers and fourteen men.
Early in the morning of December 13, 1914, she started
through the straits. Evidently her commander had knowledge of
the disposition of the Turkish mine field, for Lieutenant Holbrook
successfully navigated his ship through it, dived under five rows
of mines, any one of which would have blown his frail craft into
a thousand pieces, and came up under the side of the Turkish
battleship Messudiyeh. The Messudiyeh, in any other navy, would
have been retired long before, but Turkey had none two many
ships and probably had been saving her to fight against the
equally ancient vessels of some other minor power. Launched
as far back as 1874, she had been reconstructed and rearmed in
1901. She was lying in the Sea of Marmora, guarding the very
mine field under which Holbrook had dived his craft.
Holbrook observed the Messudiyeh through the periscope of
the B-11, maneuvered for position, dived, came up again and
launched his torpedo. It struck home and the ancient sides of the
Messudiyeh gaped wide. Slowly she sank while Holbrook dived
to safety. For nine and a half hours the latter felt his way out
of the straits and when he returned to the fleet his little vessel
and its daring crew received an enthusiastic demonstration from
the soldiers of the larger warships. Besides the Victoria Cross,
received by Holbrook himself, his second in command. Lieutenant
Sydney T. Winn, received the Distinguished Service Order, and
each of the fourteen members of the crew received the Distin-
guished Service Medal.
On the next day, December 14, 1914, the British submarine
B-9 attempted to repeat the feat, but the Turks were pre-
pared. When she came to the surface mines were exploded
all around her, and she had all she could do to make good her
escape.
On January 15, 1915, not content that the British should have
all the danger, or the glory, the French submarine, Saphir, en-
tered the straits. Near Nagara Point she struck the bottom in
one of those shallow spots that abound in the Dardanelles, was
FORTIFICATIONS AND STRENGTH 39
compelled to come to the surface in a disabled condition and was
quickly shot to pieces by the Turkish shore batteries.
The movement against the forts in the Dardanelles was now
begun. This campaign, which was begun with so much con-
fidence of ultimate success, was destined to become one of the
greatest repulses that the Allies had encountered thus far during
the war.
PART II— JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST
CHAPTER VII
WHY JAPAN JOINED THE ALLIES
THE battle lines of the Great War on land and sea were now
beginning to encircle the earth. While the gigantic armies on
the battle grounds of Europe were engaged in the greatest test
of "the survival of the fittest" that the world had ever witnessed,
while the sharp encounters on the seas were carrying the war
around the globe, the outbreaks in the Far East were bringing
the Orient and the Occident — ^the two competitive systems of civ-
ilization— into a strange alignment. The Moslem world was
dividing against itself as had the Christian world. The followers
of Buddha and the Brahmins were in direct conflict.
It is important, therefore, to consider in this chapter the de-
velopment of events in the Far East, which have been only out-
lined in the preceding narratives. Of all the powers that joined
the coalition against Germany in August, 1914, none could state
H clearer cause of action than Japan. From the first outbreak of
iiostilities there was never any question of whether the "England
of the East'' would enter the war, and on which side she would
be aligned. Japan decided promptly and, having decided, acted
with characteristic energy,
For a casiLs belli the Japanese statesmen had only to hold up
to the eyes of the world the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had
been signed on August 12, 1905. The object of this agreement
was the maintenance of the general peace in eastern Asia and
India, the preservation of the common interests of all powers in
China, by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese
4(?
WHY JAPAN JOINED THE ALLIES 41
Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce
and industry of all nations in China, the maintenance of the ter-
ritorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of
eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special inter-
ests in the said regions. If these rights and interests were
jeopardized, Japan and Great Britain agreed to discuss fully
and frankly what measures should be pursued for defense, and to
act in common in case of unprovoked attack or aggressive action
wherever arising on the part of any other power or powers.
Thus, in those critical days of August, 1914, one of the first
acts of the British Government, when war was declared on Ger-
many, and the empire was reaching out for every possible means
of defense and aggression, was to ask Japan for assistance under
the terms of this alliance. And Japan did not hesitate — she
threw herself vigorously into the Great War. The Japanese
Emperor in his declaration of war against Germany did not
suggest that Japan acted in response to her ally's direct request
for assistance, but the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Kato,
in his speech explaining the situation to the Diet, laid emphasis
upon the treaty as the most important factor in the situation.
"German warships and armed vessels," said the foreign min-
ister, "are prowling around the seas of eastern Asia, menacing
our commerce and that of our ally, while Kiao-chau was carrying
out operations apparently for the purpose of constituting a base
for warlike operations in eastern Asia. Grave anxiety was thus
felt for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.
"As all are aware," he continued, "the agreement and alliance
between Japan and Great Britain has for its object the con-
solidation and maintenance of general peace in eastern Asia, and
the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China, as
well as the principle of equal opportunities for commerce and in-
dustry for all nations in that country, and the maintenance and
defense respectively of territorial rights and special interests of
contracting parties in eastern Asia. Therefore, inasmuch as we
are asked by our ally for assistance at a time when commerce in
eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike as one
of their special interests, is subjected to a constant menace,
42 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Japan, who regards that alliance as a guiding principle of her
foreign policy, could not but comply to the respect to do her part."
The Japanese statesman offered this explanation to his people :
"Germany's possession of a base for powerful activities in one
comer of the Far East was not only a serious obstacle to the
maintenance of a permanent peace, but also threatened the im-
mediate interests of the Japanese Empire. The Japanese Gov-
ernment, therefore, resolved to comply with the British request,
and, if necessary, to open hostilities against Germany."
Baron Kato's speech was delivered after Japan had declared
war. The Western world, when it found time to turn its atten-
tion from the absorbing drama already being enacted in Belgium
to the minor crisis in the Far East, was not left long in doubt
regarding the intentions of Great Britain's ally. War was de-
clared on August 24, 1914, nine days after Japan had dispatched
to Germany an ultimatum, which Germany scornfully ignored.
The text of the ultimatum was as follows: "We consider it
highly important and necessary in the present situation to take
measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the
Far East, and to safeguard general interests as contemplated in
the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain.
"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia,
the establishment of which is the aim of the agreement, the
Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give
advice to the German Government to carry out the following two
propositions :
"(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese
waters the German warships and armed vessels of all kinds, and
to disarm those which cannot be withdrawn.
"(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the
Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the en-
tire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual
restoration of the same to China.
"The Japanese Government announces at the same time that in
the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an
answer from the German Government signifying unconditional
acceptance of the above advid offered by the Japanese Govern-
WHY JAPAN JOINED THE ALLIES
43
rJ^ST CHINA SEA
KIAO-CHAU (TSING-TAU)
44 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ment, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem
necessary to meet the situation."
The intervention of Japan in the war, welcome as it was to
Great Britain, created special problems for that empire. The
British in China, and the people of Australia, New Zealand, and
western North America had long been uneasy regarding the com-
mercial and political policy of Japan. On the Pacific Coast of
the United States and Canada a strong anti-Japanese sentiment
had developed. British statesmen were apprehensive lest the
entry of Japan into the war might be used to alienate American
sympathy from the Allies and diminish the zeal of the Canadian
and Australasian colonies for the war.
To meet this situation, the British Government issued a formal
statement which said : "It is understood that the action of Japan
shall not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Sea, ex-
cept in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese ship-
ping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of
the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except territory in
German occupation on the continent of eastern Asia." This
declaration went far toward allaying uneasiness, especially in the
United States.
The Japanese people accepted the situation calmly. There were
few noisy demonstrations. Germans living in Japan were not
molested, notwithstanding the action of Germany, which immedi-
ately after the ultimatum was issued arrested every Japanese
subject in Germany and seized funds of the Japanese Govern-
ment deposited in the Deutsche Bank of Berlin. In Tokyo the
chief of police told the people that although the two Governments
had entered into hostilities, the people individually were not to
cultivate hostility. The German Ambassador remained at the
Japanese capital until August 30, 1914. A number of Germans
who decided to stay in Japan were allowed to continue their
regular occupations.
When no answer came from Germany up to the time of the
expiration of Japan's ultimatum, the imperial rescript declaring
the existence of a state of war was issued next day.
The emperor said : "We hereby declare war against Germany
WHY JAPAN JOINED THE ALLIES 45
and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities
against that empire with all their strength, and we also command
all our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance
of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the
limit of the law of nations.
"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calam-
itous effect of which we view with grave concern, we, on our
part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far
East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of
Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open
hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its
leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while
her armed vessels, cruising the seas of eastern Asia, are threat-
ening our commerce and that of our ally. The peace of the Far
East is thus in jeopardy.
"Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic
Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other,
agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the pro-
tection of the general interests contemplated in the agreement of
alliance, and we on our part, being desirous to attain that object
by peaceful means, commanded our Government to offer, with
sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the
last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government
failed to receive an answer accepting their advice.
"It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent de-
votion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war,
especially at this early period of our reign, and while we are still
in mourning for our lamented mother.
"It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valor of our
faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the
empire enhanced."
46 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER VIII
MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION
IN THE FAR EAST
WE now pass to the first fighting ground in the Far East.
Unlike the campaigns in the west, the war in eastern Asia
developed along lines which any observer, possessing the least
knowledge of history and international politics and military
strategy, could foresee. From both military and commercial
standpoints none of Germany's possessions in the Far East could
compare in importance with the little tip of the Shantung Penin-
sula leased for a term of ninety-nine years from China in 1898.
This concession, about fifteen miles long and ten miles across,
was designated Kiao-chau. In the sixteen years since their tenure
began, the Germans had laid out at Tsing-tau, situated at the
extreme southern end of the peninsula, a city which was rapidly
growing to foremost importance among the ports of the Chinese
coast. A large part of the native population was induced to
migrate, hills were leveled, roads constructed, trees planted, and
waterworks and sewers laid out along the most up-to-date
lines.
The Great War found Tsing-tau a modem city, almost
European in appearance, with a magnificent harbor, where
natural advantages had been enhanced by the construction of
immense piers and breakwaters. One line of railway connected
the port with Chi-nan, capital of Shantung Province, and Ger-
many held concessions for the construction of two new lines. The
census of 191B showed a total population of 58,000, of which
Germans, exclusive of the garrison, numbered 2,500. Non-Ger-
man Europeans, Americans, and Japanese numbered but 630.
The European quarter was distinctly Teutonic.
The attack on Tsing-tau was a foregone conclusion. As a naval
base and a seat of menace to the commerce of hostile nations,
Tsing-tau occupied an unexcelled situation, almost equidistant
from Nagasaki and Shanghai, in virtually the same latitude as
SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 47
Tokyo, San Francisco, and Gibraltar. Its defenses were second in
strength only to those of Port Arthur and Hongkong.
Kiao-chau was under the administration of the German
admiralty. The German fleet seized it in 1897 ostensibly to
secure reparation for the murder of two German missionaries in
Shantung. The ninety-nine-year lease subsequently arranged
gave Germany the right to fortify the new concession, and the
thoroughness with which this privilege was exercised was
proved by the stout resistance the garrison was able to make
against far superior forces of besiegers. The whole concession
occupied 117 square miles.
Although Kiao-chau was the kaiser's only continental colony
in Asia the outbreak of the war found Germany in possession
of several islands and groups of islands in the Pacific. These
included German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the
Caroline, Pelew Marrana, Solomon and Marshall Islands and a
portion of the Samoan group. But the strongly fortified port on
the Shantung Peninsula was the naval base for the protection
of all these ocean possessions; and the Japanese statesmen
rightly concluded that with Tsing-tau in their grasp the reduc-
tion of the other German colonies would be only a formal task
of seizure. Therefore the 27th of August, 1914, four days after
the declaration of war, saw a Japanese fleet blockading Tsing-
tau and Japanese transports carrying troops for landing expedi-
tions in cooperation with the warships.
Germany began the concentration of all available forces inside
the Tsing-tau fortifications on August 8, 1914. But she was
able to gather there when the siege began only 5,000 men, a hand-
ful compared with the great force Japan could muster for the
reduction of the fortress. The garrison of peace times was
augmented by reservists, who came from treaty ports along the
Chinese coast, from Japan, Siberia, and from every part of
the Far East near enough to enable German veterans to reach the
city before communication was cut off.
The crew of the Austrian cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth, more
than 300 men, who had left Tsing-tau by railroad before Austria
decided to join her ally in the Far East as well as in Europe,
4— War St. 3
48 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
hurried back in small groups and in civilian clothes to escape
detection. Squads of the Landsturm, the last reserve, middle-
aged men who had left their families and their business in all
parts of China joined the ranks and went to drilling in prepara-
tion for the hard fighting expected as soon as the invading fleet
passed the outer defenses of the harbor. Altogether the de-
fenders mustered three artillery and infantry regiments and
four troops of cavalry. They had three aeroplanes and a few
machine guns and in the harbor were four small gunboats in
addition to the Kaiserin Elizabeth.
Tsing-tau's principal points of defense were Mount Moltke,
Mount Bismarck and Mount litis. The rugged slopes of these
positions commanded the plain. Beyond the plain the important
outer line of defense was along the Litsum River, which flows
into Kiao-chau Bay and then through the mountains to the sea,
a line about eight miles long and about ten miles distant from
the city. Preparations to oppose a landing of hostile troops
were made at points along the coast of the leased territory
for a distance of twenty miles. At the entrance of the bay
shore batteries and mines made a bombardment by the
Japanese fleet impracticable, except with the support of land
forces.
The first line of defense comprised five forts connected by
trenches and barbed wire entanglements. The shore defenses
consisted of five forts, called respectively : "The Kaiser's," armed
with two large guns mounted upon unsheltered platforms and
two cannon of medium caliber shdtered; "August Point," a
square closed fort with unsheltered gun platforms, and two guns
of large medium caliber; "Taisichen," unsheltered with four
large cannon; "Kaiser Northeast," unsheltered four cannon;
"Yunuisan Point," two cannon of medium caliber. The main
line of defense was for both land and sea work ; "Fort Moltke"
at the base of the German left wing had a shelter trench and
guns of medium caliber ; **Fort Bismarck" had three heavy gun
platforms in addition to a platform for rapid fire guns of large
caliber. From this the guns could be turned in any direction.
"Fort litis" mounted four heavy guns of large and medium
SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 49
caliber besides mitrailleuse of large size. Two heavy guns were
mounted in the summit of Mount litis.
In command of the German forces was the Governor General
of Kiao-chau, Admiral Meyer-Waldeck, a naval officer of ex-
perience and reputation. The defenses of both land and sea were
under his control.
This entrance of Japan into the war introduced a factor
fraught with unknown possibilities. Unlike the other enemies
of the Teutonic alliance, Japan had nothing to fear for her home
territory or her possessions. Secure from attack, she was able
to devote all her energies to the task of driving the Germans
out of the Far East. By this accomplishment she not only
fulfilled the terms of her alliance with Great Britain, but
strengthened her own supremacy in that quarter of the globe.
Tsing-tau, since its occupation by the Germans, had been like
a mailed fist brandished in her face. Since Japan's victory over
Russia no other European power had occupied a position on
the Asiatic coast that offered a threat comparable to this Ger-
man stronghold. Also, it was only human that the Japanese
remembered how Germany compelled them to abandon many
of their fruits of victory in their last war with China.
The unknown factor of her participation was just how far
Japan would go in aiding her new allies. The military and naval
potentialities of the Island Kingdom when the war started were
greater than ever before. She was twice as strong as when she
went to war with Russia. Her navy was sufficiently formidable
to resist, in home waters at least, that of any other power except
England. Her army, twice proved during recent years against
the soldiers of Russia and China, was steadily increasing its
size and equipment. Her predominant position in the Far East
was absolutely assured.
The Japanese army, based to a certain extent upon the German
model, numbered at the outbreak of the war somewhat over
250,000 men of all ranks. This was its peace strength. Military
service was obligatory upon all able-bodied males between the
ages of seventeen and forty. This law made available each year
550,000 men, but in practice during times of peace the annual
50 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
conscription amounted to only 120,000 men taken by ballot from
among the number eligible. The total effective military strength
of the Empire was estimated at a million and a half trained
soldiers.
The army was divided into nineteen divisions, four independ-
ent cavalry brigades, three independent field artillery brigades,
six regiments of heavy field artillery and a communication bri-
gade. Each divisional unit consisted of two infantry brigades of
six battalions each, a cavalry regiment (three squadrons of 120
men each), a field artillery regiment (six batteries of six guns),
and a battalion of army service corps. A battalion of mountain
guns was attached to certain divisions. Thus the army on a
peace footing consisted of seventy-six infantry regiments (228
battalions), twenty-seven regiments of cavalry, 150 field bat-
teries, nine mountain batteries, nineteen battalions of garrison
artillery and nineteen battalions of engineers. When the reserves
were summoned to the colors the Japanese system provided for
an indefinite increase in the number of battalions for each
regiment.
The Japanese navy had weathered a storm which at one time
threatened to interfere seriously with its steady growth, and
the year 1914 found it at a formidable climax of strength and
efficiency. The war with Russia had left the nation on the verge
of bankruptcy and the annual budgets from 1907 to 1910 con-
tained no appropriations for naval increases. The lull in naval
construction, however, was of short duration. The wisest states-
men realized, from the time when Japan first emerged from
her Oriental seclusion and eagerly set out to learn the lessons
of western civilization, that their country's insular situation
made a strong navy the first requisite of national independence.
It was the warships of the western world that forced the
Japanese to open their door to the foreigner. Fifteen years after
the Japanese had seen the foreign men-of-war riding dominant
in their harbors, their antiquated collection of war junks had
been replaced by an up-to-date navy, manned and officered by
sea fighters trained upon the best western models. In 1910
the Japanese began to compare their nav^^ equipment with that
SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST 51
of Germany, and from that time their shipbuilding program
was designed to make them secure against the chance of Ger-
man aggression, ever present since the Ibasing of Kiao-chau.
At the outbreak of the Great War the Japanese navy had
nearly doubled its strength since the close of the war with Russia.
It included two battleships of the dreadnought class, the
Kawachi and the Settsu, both over 21,000 tons, with a speed of
twenty knots, two dreadnought battle crusiers of 27,500 tons
each and a speed of twenty-seven knots, the Kongo and the Hiyei;
two semi-dreadnought battleships, the Aki and Satsuma, between
19,000 and 20,000 tons each and a speed of twenty and eighteen
and a quarter knots, respectively ; four first-class battle cruisers
with speeds ranging from twenty to twenty-three knots and
averaging 14,000 tons; six battleships of slightly heavier dis-
placement and slightly less speed; six first-class coast defense
ships, averaging 13,000 tons and seventeen and a half knots;
nine first-class cruisers ranging from 7,300 to 9,800 tons and
twenty to twenty-one knots ; thirteen second-class cruisers, some
of which had a speed of twenty-six knots; seven second-class
coast defense ships; nine gunboats, two first-class destroyers
capable of thirty-five knots an hour ; two second-class destroyers
with a speed of thirty-three knots ; and forty-six other destroyers
of varying speeds; thirty-one torpedo boats and thirteen sub-
marines, besides auxiliary craft, hospital ships, dispatch boats,
etc.
Although the Japanese air fleet gave a good account of itself
during the operations before Tsing-tau it developed no sur-
prises, and accomplished no exploits to confirm rumors prevail-
ing before the war that in Japan naval aviation had reached a
special and advanced stage. The Japanese Flying Corps con-
ducted itself upon lines made familiar by the British, German
and French aviators in Europe.
52 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER IX
BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES — ATTACKS
ON TSING-TAU FORTS
HAVING reviewed the military and naval situation in the Far
East at the outbreak of war, we come now to the beginning
of actual belligerent operations.
Japan's declaration of war against Germany was dated August
23, 1914. The morning of the preceding day witnessed the de-
parture from Japanese war ports of the greatest fleet of war-
ships and transports the Empire had sent to sea since the
Russian War. It comprised the Second Squadron, embracing
battleships, cruisers, destroyers and hydro-aeroplanes, a dozen
in all. The transports carried land forces numbering 22,980
officers and men and 142 guns to be put ashore as soon as the
landing forces had ground for their advantageous location.
The Japanese troops included the Eighteenth Division, under
Lieutenant General Mitsuomi Kamio, who was Commander in
Chief of the expedition ; the Twenty-third Brigade of Infantry
(Major General B. Horiuchi) ; the Twenty-fourth Brigade of
Infantry, commanded by Major General Hanzo Yamanashi,
Chief of Staff, and other divisional troops. The Twenty-ninth
Brigade of Infantry (Major General G. Joholi). Siege Artil-
lery Corps (Major General Y. Watanebe), the Miyama Heavy
Artillery Regiment, the Yokosuka Heavy Artillery Regiment,
the Shimonosoki Heavy Artillery Battalion, and the Tadanoumi
Heavy Artillery Battalion. Detachments of Engineers and Army
Service Corps from the Sixth and Twelfth Divisions. Two Rail-
Way Battalions. Railway Guard Troops, the Eighth Infantry
Regiment. Detachment of the Flying Corps. Marine Artillery
Detachment. Being intended for siege work this army carried
no cavalry, horse artillery or light field artillery.
In command of the fleet was Vice Admiral Hikonojo Kam-
imura, whose reputation as one of Japan's war idols was
established when his squadron had defeated three Russian war-
BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 53
ships, the Rurik, Gromoboi and Rossia, off the east coast of Korea.
Later his squadron had taken a commanding part in the great
battle in the Japan Sea, which put an end to Russia's naval power
in the East. Admiral Kamimura was sixty-five years old, and
had spent the greater part of his life in naval service. After the
final Russian defeat he was rewarded with the title of Baron
and invested with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun and the
first-class of the Golden Kite.
On September 23, 1914, the Japanese were joined by a British
force of 1,369 men under command of Lieutenant Colonel
Nathaniel Walter Barnardiston, commander of the British forces
in North China, including Wei-hai-wei. Although the British
did not arrive until a month after the forces sailed from Japan,
the distance that separated Laoshan Bay, where the former made
their landing on the original leased territory and thus avoided
the breach of neutrality against China committed by the
Japanese, was so much shorter and the landing place presented
so much less difficulty than the Japanese encountered in their
preliminary advance, that the British really arrived on the
scene of actual operations just as the Japanese were finishing
their first engagements in force, on September 28, 1914.
Colonel Bamardiston's command consisted of 910 noncom-
missioned officers and men of the Second Battalion South Wales
Borderers, and 450 non-commissioned officers and men of the
Thirty-sixth Sikhs, besides nine staff officers.
The bombardment of the Tsing-tau forts began on August
26, 1914, and on September 1, 1914, the Japanese bluejackets
seized several small islands in Kiao-chau Bay, which the Ger-
mans were unable to defend except by long range fire from their
shore batteries, and by mines with which the harbor had been
thickly sown. Mine sweeping therefore occupied the first activi-
ties of the fleet. This operation was signalized by one of the
many acts of patriotism and bravery that characterized the
siege on both sides. One hundred Japanese women who made
their living by diving for pearls in these waters offered to enter
the water and release the mines from their moorings so that
they would be carried away by the tides. Their courageous offer
54 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
was declined, not because the Japanese admiral believed it could
not be carried out, but because the Japanese law expressly
prohibited the employment of women in warlike operations.
When one of the small boats that acted as mine sweepers was
blown up during the dragging that followed the women renewed
their offer, but again it was declined.
The first landing on the Shan-tung Peninsula was mad<
September 2, 1914. Ten thousand troops were put ashore; but
it was not until September 25, 1914, that the invaders made
their first capture of a German outpost, Weihsien. The check
on the Japanese advance, however, was due less to the defenders
of Tsing-tau than to the torrential rains, which swelled the
streams and for a time effectively barred further movements. The
Japanese artillery was compelled to return to Lung-chow, their
original base on the mainland.
The Japanese leaders proceeded with deliberation and caution.
They had the enemy penned up with no hope of reenforcement,
and nothing was to be gained by haste or the unnecessary waste
of men and equipment. On September 19, 1914, to facilitate
the movement of their troops behind the beleaguered city, they
seized the railway connecting Tsing-tau with the Chinese pro-
vince of Shantung, and China, prompted by Berlin, protested
against the act as a violation of neutrality. This was the second
Chinese protest, the first having been sent to Tokyo after the
Japanese made their first landing on Chinese territory at Lung-
chow. To the former objection Japan had no answer except to
set forth that the landing was a militairy necessity and made with
no intention of permanent occupancy. To the second protest,
however, she replied without hesitation that possession of the
railway line was justified since it was owned by Germans. The
wide area covered by the Japanese investment campaign is
shown by the fact that by September 13, 1914, they had
established guards at the railway station of Kiao-chau — a town
having the same name as the whole German concession — ^twenty-
two miles distant from Tsing-tau.
While the Japanese infantry and engineers waited for the
floods the naval airmen were not idle. The first damage inside
I
BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 55
the city was inflicted by two seaplanes which dropped bombs
upon the railway station and barracks. Although one of the
planes was hit several times by the German guns, both made a
safe return. This raid was the forerunner of a systematic air
campaign, designed as much to strike terror and discourage-
ment into the hearts of the garrison and the civil population as
to gain any military end by the actual destruction of defense
works. Bombs were dropped also upon ships in the harbor.
Occasionally the Japanese flyers scattered circulars calling upon
the defenders to surrender and pointing out the uselessness of
further resistance.
The first serious losses on either side were naval. On August
28, 1914, two days after the first bombardment a typhoon swept
the Japanese fleet, causing havoc among the little destroyers and
sending one to the bottom. Five days later another destroyer
ran aground in Kiao-chau Bay. A German merchant ship in the
harbor was set afire by the Japanese aerial bombs and destroyed.
The greatest naval losses suffered during the whole engagement
were the destruction of the Austrian cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth
and of the Japanese cruiser Takachiho. The Kaiserin EUzabeth
was sunk by the naval bombardment; but the loss of the Tak-
achiho was due to the German torpedo boat 8-90,
It was September 26, 1914, before the floods subsided sufli-
ciently to permit the Japanese to resume their advance. On that
day they drove the Germans from the high ground between the
rivers Pai-sha and Li-tsun, and next day they pushed forward to
a point seven miles northeast of Tsing-tau, between the Li-tsun
and the Chang-tsun. The following morning found them estab-
lished within five miles of the fortress. Their casualties were re-
ported as three killed and twelve wounded.
These two days saw the heaviest fighting thus far during the
siege. While the land forces were pushing up to the main Ger-
man forts the fleet carried on a general bombardment, having by
this time moved in close enough to make gun fire eflFective and
having learned the range. The Japanese warships were assisted
by the British battleship Triumph, which had joined them a
short time before with the British destroyer Usk. These British
56 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
boats remained throughout the investment, the Triumph was a
favorite mark for the German gunners, but escaped with com-
paratively slight damage.
By September 30, 1914, the Germans were driven in from their
outer fortifications and Tsing-tau itself was completely sur-
rounded. On that day the defenders made a desperate attempt to
regain some of their lost positions, but they were repulsed, and
the Japanese settled back for a few days to await the bringing
up of their heavy siege guns.
It is said that the failure of this assault, in which the Ger-
mans apparently concentrated all their resources, convinced Gen-
eral Kamio that the capture of the city would not prove the long,
arduous task that had been expected, and he abandoned forth-
with his plans for a long, slow siege and made preparations to
take the place by assault. At the same time the Japanese com-
mander showed no disposition to sacrifice his men unnecessarily,
and while waiting for their big guns the Japanese worked like
beavers with pick and shovel protecting their positions and dig-
ging saps and zigzag trenches up to the very face of the German
defenses. They labored under a storm of shells but so little ex-
posed that losses under the bombardment were small compared
with the casualties of the actual assault operations.
For eight days the Germans poured projectiles into the enemy's
works ; but for the most part their shooting was a waste of am-
munition. Just why the defenders of Tsing-tau were so prodigal
of ammunition at this time never has been satisfactorily ex-
plained. Military correspondents estimated that during one
period of twenty-four hours the forts on the three hills contain-
ing the main defensive positions fired more than 2,000 shells
without inflicting any loss whatever.
But by October 8, 1914, the German fire slackened perceptibly.
They had found that they were wasting their resources and that
several positions were almost out of ammunition. The warfare
of that period is described in a letter written by an officer with
the British expeditionary force :
"That night," he said, "we were working in trenches along a
river bed at the bottom of the slope, where the others had been
BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 57
wounded, and sans doute most darnation close to the enemy. A
beginning had been made on this trench the night before, so there
was a little cover. The two redoubts were about 800 yards on our
right and left respectively, the enemy's trenches about 350
yards to our front.
"Well, for the first hour after getting down we were left se-
verely alone. Then they started throwing star rockets and sort of
Roman candle things which lit up the place like day, and at the
same time they peppered us with Maxims, pompoms, and rifle
fire from all three places. We had some men hit further back in
■the communication trench, but funnily enough none in the for-
'^ard line. . . . We were entertained by a certain amount of shell
ire during the rest of the night. Next night we were due to
leave for the forward trenches at dusk to carry on, having had
>ur usual entertainment in the afternoon from the Germans,
^hen suddenly they began throwing shrapnel at our trench. For
about half an hour it was all over us, and Fm blest if I know why
nobody was hit. It was the overhead cover, I fancy, that saved
us this time. We came out like a lot of rabbits when it was over
and proceeded to get down below.
"The Japanese artillery was supporting us that night, as we
were working on the enemy's side of the river, within 200 yards
of their advance trenches. Never have I felt a more comforting
sensation then when watching those Japanese shells bursting
just over our heads, a little in advance, the shrapnel from them
going slap into the Germans every time. I must say it was a
magnificent sight when the Japanese guns were going, the Ger-
man rockets, etc., and their machine guns and rifles joining in
when they could get their heads up. One had to shout to make
oneself heard, and those who saw it from the top of Heinrich Hill
in rear said it was very fine."
During the early days of the siege life in the beleaguered city
went on about as usual. A large part of the civil population had
withdrawn while there was yet time, but enough shops remained
open to supply the needs of those who remained. Cafes continued
business and meals were served without interruption at the Ger-
man Club throughout the siege, although toward the end the num-
58 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ber of those who gathered at the club's tables dwindled to a few
administrative officers and civilians.
In a proclamation the day before the expiration of the Japanese
ultimatum, Governor Meyer-Waldeck had expressed the spirit of
the little garrison in the following words ;
"Never shall we surrender the smallest bit of ground over
which the war flag is flying. From this place, which we with love
and success have endeavored during the last seventeen years to
shape into a little Germany across the seas, we shall not retreat.
If the enemy wants Tsing-tau, he must come and take it."
Few, if any, military men in Tsing-tau doubted the outcome of
the siege; but every resource was prepared for a desperate re-
sistance. The city did not lack food ; and after the surrender it
was found that enough still remained to provision the garrison
for more than three months longer. The supply of running water
ceased about the middle of October. News from the outside world
came in until November 5, and invariably it told of German
successes.
"I remember one evening," said the Tsing-tau correspondent of
the Associated Press, and the only foreign press representa-
tive in the city during the siege, "the roar of laughter that went
up in the German Club when the news was read that England
had asked Portugal for assistance. For two or three days it
looked, according to the news, that the British Empire was going
to pieces. We heard of revolutions in India, riots in Alexandria,
mutiny and martial law in South Africa and even disaffection in
Sarawak and North Borneo."
When it became clear that the end was drawing near prepara-
tions were made that as few war munitions as possible should
fall into the hands of the enemy.. The warships in the harbor
that had escaped the bombardment were blown up. When the
big guns in the forts had fired their last shots the gunners under
orders destroyed them. In many cases this was done because
without ammunition the guns were useless.
October 31, 1914, the anniversary of the emperor's birthday,
was selected by the Japanese and English for their final bombard-
ment. From 142 guns now occupying commanding positions came
BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 59
a deluge of shells that continued for seven days. The gunners by
this time had the exact ranges and wasted no ammunition. The
staffs of the two expeditionary forces gathered on Prince Hein-
rich Hill to watch the final act of the passing of German rule
in the Far East. The warships ranged in the harbor joined in,
and after an hour or two it became evident that the German
defenses would be swept away by mere weight of metal. Under
cover of this terrific gunfire the Allies' troops drove their saps
and trenches up the very edge of the defense works, where they
waited orders to take the place by storm.
The Germans replied bravely. A great cloud of smoke and dust
arose over the doomed city visible far out at sea. In the city the
noncombatants took refuge in their cellars and helped care for
the wounded. Almost every German position, except the bomb-
proof casements where the guns stood, was hammered to pieces.
The electric power station was destroyed, so that during the last
few nights the city was in darkness.
The last handbills dropped into Tsing-tau by the Japanese
iviators contained the following appeal : "To the honored officers
md men in the fortress : It is against the will of God, as well as
the principles of humanity, to destroy and render useless arms,
jhips of war, and merchantmen, and other works and construc-
tions, not in obedience to the necessity of war, but merely out of
jpite, lest they fall into the hands of the enemy. Trusting, as we
lo, that, as you hold dear the honor of civilization, you will not be
[betrayed into such base conduct, we beg you, however, to an-
[nounce to us your own view as mentioned above.
(Signed) "The Besieging Army."
It is needless to say that the enemy's plea was not heeded. By
fovember 6, 1914, only spasmodic fire from widely scattered posi-
tions answered the Allies' bombardment. That night the Japa-
nese and English charged across open ground and took the middle
Port in the first line of defense with surprising ease, capturing
too prisoners. The charge was led by General Yoshimi Yamada
it the head of companies of infantry and engineers. At one point
bhey surprised a squad of Germans in charge of a searchlight.
60 THE STOHY OF THE GREAT WAR
To have fired upon them would have betrayed the advance to the
defenders of the adjacent fort; so, the story says, the Germans
were quietly and quickly dispatched by the engineers with picks
and shovels.
CHAPTER X
CAPTURE OF TSING-TAU
TSING-TAU fell early on the morning of the next day, Novem-
ber 7, 1914. Encouraged by the unexpected successes of the
night, the Japanese commander gave the order for a final grand
assault. Nobody was more surprised than the Japanese them-
selves. They had expected a last-ditch resistance and feared they
would have to sacrifice a thousand men before gaining these posi-
tions commanding the city. But the Germans, their ammunition
almost gone, gtunned by the continuous rain of shells and broken
by long fighting, had decided that further resistance was useless.
The Japanese infantry occupied the central positions on the 4
main line of defense soon after midnight. Just before dawn they
captured the north battery on Shaotan Hill, then the east battery
of Tahtungehin and the Chungchiawa fort on the west. The
heaviest loss suffered by any of the Japanese detachments in the
final assault fell upon a company that was caught by machine-
gun fire in an attack upon Redoubt No. 2. Out of 250 men only
87 escaped. The total Japanese casualties in the final assault
were 450 killed and wounded. The British casualties were
slight.
Daylight found the Japanese and British in possession of every
position commanding the city and nearly 20,000 men were await-
ing the signal to charge the last line of defenses when a white
flag appeared on the Tsing-tau military observatory. Within the
next hour flags of surrender were flying from all the other Ger-
man forts. So unexpected was the sudden collapse of the defense
that at six o'clock, when the Governor sent Major von Kayser, his
adjutant, with a white flag to make terms, the signal of sur-
CAPTURE OF TSING-TAU 61
render was not observed and the Japanese, far from suspecting
the German officer's purpose, opened fire, killing Von Kayser's
trumpeter and shooting his horse under him.
The formal capitulation of Tsing-tau came at 7.50 o'clock on
the evening of November 7, 1914, when both sides signed the
Japanese terms. The Germans surrendered unconditionally, but
were accorded the honors of war. On November 10, 1914, at
10 a. m., Governor Meyer-Waldeck formally transferred posses-
sion to General Kamio, and German's last foothold in Asia passed
from her possession.
News of the fall of Tsing-tau, although not unexpected, caused
great rejoicing throughout Japan and among her allies, and pro-
foundly stirred the German world.
The German attitude was expressed by an editorial in the
Berlin "Lokalanzeiger," which said : "Never shall we forget the
bold deed of the yellow robbers, or of England that set them on
to do it. We know that we cannot yet settle with Japan for years
to come. Perhaps she will rejoice over her cowardly robbery.
Here our mills can grind but slowly. Even if the years pass,
however, we shall certainly not often speak of it, but as certainly
always think of it."
The Japanese and British forces made formal entry into the
captured city on November 16, 1914. The Germans had done all
in their power to destroy supplies, nevertheless the spoils of vic-
tory included 100 machine guns, 2,500 rifles, 30 field guns, a small
amount of ammunition, about $6,000 in cash, 15,000 tons of coal,
40 motor cars, and a large quantity of provisions. Prisoners
taken numbered 4,043, including the governor general and 201
German officers and 3,841 noncommissioned officers and men.
The casualties on both sides, considering the length of the siege
and the intensity of the gunfire in both directions, were remark-
ably small. The Japanese had 236 killed and 1,282 wounded, the
British had 12 killed and 63 wounded, including two officers.
The Germans estimated their losses in killed and wounded at
about 1,000 men. To the Allies' losses must be added 10 killed
and 56 wounded, all Japanese, by the explosion of Gerp^an land
mines several days after the surrender.
PART III— THE WAR IN AFRICA
CHAPTER XI
CAMPAIGN IN TOGOLAND AND THE
CAMEROONS
THE first shots of the Great War had hardly detonated across
Europe when their echoes were heard in Africa. The war
fever began to hover over Germany's colonial possessions in
Africa — Togoland, the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa,
and, greatest of all, German East Africa. Each of these colonies
became in turn the scene of armed invasions and fierce conflicts,
as important to the small forces involved as the great campaigns
on the continent across the seas.
When Great Britain declared war on Germany on August 4,
1914, and the news flashed across the world to the official repre-
sentatives of the warring nations in Africa, the British acting
governor of the Gold Coast and the French governor of Dahomey
planned a concerted campaign by land in cooperation with the
warships to be found in African waters.
The first blow was struck on August 8, 1914, in Togoland, a
country about the size of Ireland, lying between French Dahomey
and the British Gold Coast. It is populated by a million Hausas
and about 400 whites. At the beginning of the war the military
force of Togoland could not have exceeded 250 whites and 3,000
natives. Hemmed in on three sides by French and British terri-
tory, with a coast line easily approached by warships, the colonj''
was not in a position to offer much resistance if attacked.
On August 8, 1914, a British cruiser appeared before Lome,
the capital of Togoland, and the town was surrendered without
62
CAMPAIGN IN TOGOLAND AND CAMEROONS 63
a shot being fired. But before the British force landed, the little
German army of about 60 Europeans and 400 natives fell back to
Atakpame, 100 miles in the interior.
While this was happening at Lome an expeditionary force
composed of the Gold Coast Regiment, with British officers and
commanded by Captain F. C. Bryant, R. A., crossed the frontier
in motor cars on August 8, or 9, 1914, and a French force en-
tered Togoland from the other side. A few days later the Allieip
had possession of all the southern part of Togoland, and advanced
together toward Atakpame to capture an important German
wireless station at Kamina in the same region.
The only real fighting in this campaign took place on August
25, 1914, when Captain Bryant and his forces had crossed the
Monu River. The Allies drove the enemy from his intrench-
ments, seized the wireless station, and occupied Atakpame.
Their losses were two officers and 21 men killed and about 50
wounded.
On August 26, 1914, the Germans surrendered unconditionally,
and the Allies came into possession of three Maxim guns, 1,000
rifles and 320,000 rounds of ammunition. It was stated at the
time that the Germans offered such a feeble resistance because
many natives, on whom they had counted, refused to take up
arms against the British.
Togoland having fallen to the Allies, it was arranged between
the officials of Great Britain and France that the colony should be
jointly governed, each to control that part of Togoland nearest
her possessions. In a few months' time normal trade was re-
sumed in the Allies* colony, and since private property had been
respected during the invasion, there was nothing left to show that
the country had recently been the scene of small but decisive con-
flicts, far-reaching in their effects.
The action in the African war drama now shifts to the Came-
roons (German Kamerun Colony) , which Germany took posses-
sion of in 1884. It has a seacoast of about 200 miles on the Bight
of Biafra. To the northeast and south are the British Protec-
torate of Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa. The country is
largely mountainous and is 290,000 square miles in extent. Be-
- ^ - 5— War St. 3
64 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
fore the war there were less than 2,000 whites among a popula-
tion of 2,500,000 negroes, principally of the Bantu race.
The Cameroons, though surrounded by territory of the Allies,
was a more difficult country to conquer than Togoland, owing to
its natural advantages and the difficulties of communication over
great distances. The first moves of the Allies met with disaster.
It was in the African rainy season and misadventures multiplied
as the invading troops marched through a wild and badly mapped
country. It was decided between the Allies that two French col-
umns should move from French Congo, while British columns en-
tered at different points on the frontier of Nigeria.
On August 8, 1914, a detachment of mounted infantry of the
West African Frontier Force left Kano and, marching 400 miles
in seventeen days through West Africa, got in touch with the
Germans at Tepe, a frontier station just inside the Cameroons.
In the fierce engagement that followed the Germans were re-
pulsed, losing five officers and suffering other casualties.
On August 29, 1914, the river station of Garua was attacked,
and here one of the most disastrous battles of the campaign was
fought. On August 31, 1914, Lieutenant Colonel Maclear, com-
manding the Royal Dublin Fusiliers and native troops, left their
intirenchments 400 yards from the German forts and advanced to
attack. The German gunners having perfect range, poured a
murderous fire from machine guns on the British forces. The
native troops wavered and fled, leaving British officers in the
trenches, and these in turn were soon forced to fly to escape com-
plete annihilation. Lieutenant Colonel Maclear was killed, and
of the 31 other officers only 10 escaped, while 40 per cent of the
native troops were lost. The remainder of the British force re-
treated into Nigeria in such an exhausted condition that had the
Germans followed up their victory not a man would have escaped.
The second British expedition which entered the Cameroons
from a more westerly point along the Nigerian frontier occupied,
after slight resistance, the German station of Nsanakong a few
miles from the border, where a week later the Germans attacked
in force at two o^clock in the morning. The British resisted stub-
bornly, but, having exhausted their ammunition, the garrison
CAMPAIGN IN TOGOLAND AND CAMEROONS
65
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GERMAN POSSESSIONS IN AFRICA
66 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tried to cut their way out with the bayonet. The British lost
three officers, while large numbers of native soldiers were killed
or made prisoners. The remainder, escaping to the bush, after
many hardships found their way back to Nigeria. Another Brit-
ish expedition from Calabar, near the coast, occupied Archibong,
August 29, 1914, while about the same time a German force took
possession of the Nigerian station of Okuri.
The British had failed by land ; they were more successful on
the sea, as will be seen in the chapter on Naval Operations. On
September 4, 1914, an attempt was made by the Germans to
wreck the British gunboat Dwarf, which with the cruiser Cum-
berland was watching German ships in the Cameroon estuary.
The German merchantman Nachtigal tried later to ram the same
gunboat and wrecked herself with a loss of 36 men. Further
attempts to destroy the Dwarf also failed.
The British now taking the offensive cleared the channel for
three miles, where the Germans had sown mines and sunk 10 or
12 steamboats to obstruct the waterway to Duala, the capital of
the Cameroons. H.M.S. Challenger and five troopships joined
the Dwarf and Cumberland on September 26, 1914, and, moving
on Duala, bombarded the town.
On September 27, 1914, the Germans offered to surrender Duala
unconditionally, and on September 28, 1914, Brigadier General
C. M. Dobell came ashore and took it over. About the same time
a battalion landing at Bonaberi, across the river from Duala,
capitulated after some desultory fighting. The wireless station at
Duala was found to have been wrecked, but the British took sev-
eral hundred prisoners, captured 8 merchantmen with valuable
cargoes and the German gunboat Soden, which was at once put
into commission in the British navy. While the British were
successful around Duala, a French force by sea from Libreville,
French Congo, escorted by their warship Surpris, attacked
Ukoko on Corisco Bay, south of the Cameroons, during which the
armed vessels Khios and Itolo were sunk.
The Allies had captured the chief port and controlled the coast,
but the most difficult work lay before them in the mountainous
and almost roadless region still to be conquered. The retreating
CAMPAIGN IN TOGOLAND AND CAMEROONS 67
Germans occupied a defensive position on a river at Japona, where
on October 8, 1914, a French column came up with them, forced
a bridge, and compelled them to continue their retreat.
On October 8, 1914, Colonel E. H. Gorges, commanding a Brit-
ish naval and military force and four field guns, sailed up the
Wuri in launches and found the enemy intrenched near Jabassi.
The British made a spirited attack, but were driven back by the
accurate fire of the enemy. After a flank attack failed, the order
was given to retreat, and the British returned to Duala.
The Allies reenforced, and with two 6-inch guns resumed the
attack on October 14, 1914, when the German batteries were
soon silenced. After a brisk engagement the infantry occupied
Jabassi, taking ten European prisoners. Minor successes won
by the Allies at this time were the defeat of the Germans at Susa,
and the occupation of the region around Mora, near Lake Chad
by a Nigerian Regiment which had entered the colony from the
northeast.
Two columns of Anglo-French troops under Brigadier General
Dobell^ with Colonel Mayer commanding the French colonial in-
fantry, followed the retreating Germans to Edea on the Sanaga
River, some fifty miles from Duala. Part of the road led through
a thick forest where snipers were concealed, who harassed the
expedition at every step and were dislodged with great difficulty.
On October 26, 1914, Edea was taken without resistance, and the
enemy retired to Yaunde, a station far in the interior. Mujuka,
a station about fifty miles from Duala, was occupied by the
British a few weeks later.
Early in November, 1914, General Dobell planned an attack on
le German capital of Buea, and its seaport Victoria. The latter
)lace was bombarded by the French cruiser Bruix and the yacht
llvy; marines were landed, and after a short and spirited fight it
[was taken, while the enemy, who had concentrated on the hills
leading to Buea, were scattered by the Allies' forces advancing
:rom different directions.
The Germans made a determined effort to regain Edea, but
'^ere forced to retire with a loss of 20 Europeans and 54 natives.
Meanwhile, in the hinterland, the French General, Aymerich,
68 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
with a force of men and a steamer loaned by the authorities of
the Belgian Congo drove the enemy from the Congo-Ubanghi
region, which had been given to Germany in 1911. After two
days of strenuous fighting the German posts of Numen and Nola
were taken, and some officers, guns, and ammunition.
The greatest campaign in December, 1914, was the capture of
the entire northern railway line, with rolling stock, locomotives,
two aeroplanes, and about sixty white men. Mendawi, Bare, and
Nkongsamba were other posts taken at this period.
At the close of the year the Cameroons were not conquered,
but the Germans had been driven into the interior, could not
secure supplies, and it was only a question of time when they
must surrender or be annihilated. The allied forces were con-
stantly harrying their enemy.
The Allies' next movement was an advance in three columns
against Yaunde, where they fought two little battles January 27-
28, 1915, and seized the post of Bersona. Near the coast some
important operations were successful.
CHAPTER XII
GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA — REBELLION
IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
GERMAN Southwest Africa, to which we will now turn, was in
a different situation at the outbreak of the war from that of
the German colonies of the east and west. Over the frontier was
a self-governing dominion, the Union of South Africa, with an
independent parliament made up of a strange mixture of differ-
ent parties. The irreconcilables in the Dutch population who had
dreamed of a greater Afrikander Republic, would they not take
this opportunity to side with Germany who promised to further
their ambitions ? Great Britain expected some trouble from this
element in the Union, and prepared for the worst, while Germany
was equally active, and there was much intriguing to persuade
REBELLION IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 69
the Dutch to cast in their lot with them. In other parts of Africa,
Germany had to fight her battles unaided, but here in the enemy's
camp there was every hope of gaining powerful assistance.
Until the situation in the Union became clear, it was Germany's
part to defend her colony in Southwest Africa, hoping by a brave
display of arms to win over the Dutch, who were bitter against
England.
German Southwest Africa enjoys many natural advantages.
Her capital is far in the interior. Between her railway on the
south, which almost reaches the Cape frontier, and her border
spreads out the desert of Kalahari and the arid, waterless plains
of northwest Cape Colony. The branch railways are separated
by about 200 miles from German territory, and on the northern
line Kimberley was a little less than 400 miles distant. British
forces entering the colony by land must encounter many diffi-
culties, especially in the desert region, which the Germans left
undefended because they believed it could not be crossed by
troops.
Before the war, according to the official returns, the colony had
a force of 3,500 men, mainly whites ; but with reserves and vol-
unteers from among the population of German blood it has been
variously estimated that an army of from 6,000 to 10,000 men
could be gathered together. The Germans were believed to be
strong in artillery, and were known to have sixty-six batteries of
Maxims. There was also a camel corps 500 strong.
After the declaration of war in August, 1914, Dr. Seitz, the
German Governor, began to carry out his plan of defense. In
the second week of August, 1914, the Germans abandoned
ISwakopmund and Luderitz Bay, their principal stations on the
coast, and after destroying the jetty and tugs in harbor, retired
[With their military stores to Windhoek, the inland capital. In the
last weeks in August they made short dashes into British terri-
tory, intrenching themselves in some places, and occasionally en-
gaged in a skirmish with farmers on the frontier.
Thus, when the Union Parliament met September 8, 1914, it
was informed by General Botha, the Premier, that Germany had
begun hostilities against the British colonies. On the following
70 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
day, as a challenge to the pro-German party, he moved a resolu-
tion to convey to King George an address, assuring him of the
loyal support of the Union. Upon this General Hertzog moved an
amendment to the effect that attacking German territory in South
Africa was against the interests of the Union and the empire.
But the victory was with General Botha's Government when the
questions were voted on. Only 12 of the 104 votes cast were in
favor of Hertzog's amendment.
It was evident that many burghers living in districts on the
borders of German Southwest Africa shared Hertzog's opinion,
and were opposed to taking offensive measures against the Ger-
man colony as long as the Union was left in peace. From the
time that Hertzog had been dropped from Botha's cabinet he had
posed as a martyr. His adherents believed that he had been
"sacrificed to please the English," and that Botha was merely a
tool in the hands of the British Government.
The spirit of rebellion in the Union did not show itself openly
for some time, but the leaders — Beyers, De Wet, Maritz, and
Kemp — ^were busy conspiring and stirring up disaffection
among the burghers who had never become reconciled to the
Union.
De Wet, because of his world-wide fame during the Boer War,
has been given undue prominence for the part he played in
the rebellion. He was not the head and front of the move-
ment, though his name was one to conjure with among the
disaffected Boers, and he proved to be a valuable recruiting
agent. His operations during the rebellion, as will be subse-
quently shown, were generally ineffective in the field, and ter-
minated ingloriously, before he could work any great harm.
General Beyers, the most dangerous foe the Union had in the
rebellion, was a direct contrast to the rude and unlettered De
Wet. He was young and brave, and had shown himself one of the
ablest soldiers the British had to fight against during the Boer
War. He looked the dashing officer that he was — ^tall, straight,
black bearded, and with his pleasant manners and easy speech
he was just the man to inspire enthusiasm in others.
Colonel Maritz and Colonal Kemp, the other chief leaders in the
REBELLION IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 71
rebellion, had never been as prominent in South African affairs
as Beyers and De Wet. Maritz had shown ability as a leader in
the Boer War, had held various military positions since, and at
the beginning of the European War was in command of the
South African border between the Union and German Southwest
Africa, to which he had been appointed by Beyers, who was
commandant general of the citizen forces. General Smuts, the
Minister of Defense, may have suspected some sinister motives
in this appointment, for Maritz had many friends in the German
colony, but for the present he had to keep his suspicions to him-
self and await some overt act of offense.
Colonel Kemp, the remaining chief leader, had never done any-
thing to give him special prominence. He had proved himself an
efficient soldier during the Boer War, and appears to have been
in command of a training camp in the western Transvaal when
the rebellion was started.
Under these four leaders, acting independently, or in conjunc-
tion with them, were subleaders, an indefinite number, members
of the Government, and men connected with the church and army,
whose part in the rebellion was to stir up the people.
An interesting character among the somewhat nebulous sub-
leaders in the rebellion was Van Rensburg, sometimes called
"Prophet" Lichtenberg, from the place where he lived. During
the Boer War he had predicted a remarkable victory for the
Boers, which had resulted in the capture of Lord Metiiuen, and
ever since the burghers of the Union had held him in reverential
awe. When the war with Germany broke out he made various
prophecies. He discovered that the events foretold in the Book
of Revelation would now take place. Germany, he said, had
been divinely ordained to conquer the world and purify it. Any
attempt to resist this divine ordinance would be punished by the
righteous anger of an offended deity. Nor was the "prophet'* for-
getful of local politics, for he had another "vision" in which he
predicted that Generals Delarey, Beyers, and De Wet were
divinely appointed leaders, who would restore the old republic.
These "prophecies" were spread broadcast throughout the Union^
were eagerly believed by the superstitious burghers, and served
72 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to hearten up the disaffected who had some grudge against the
Government.
A great meeting of the burghers was summoned to meet
August 15, 1914, at Treurfontein. This date had been fixed be-
cause Van Rensburg in a "vision" had seen "a dark cloud, with
blood flowing from it, inscribed with number 15, and General
Delarey, the uncrowned king of western Transvaal, returning
home without his hat, followed by a carriage full of flowers."
Eight hundred burghers attended the meeting, but Delarey, who
spoke, had been warned by General Botha, and therefore spoke
calmly, urging the burghers to remain cool and await events.
Such was Delarey's influence over the assembly, who had come
expecting to make a fiery speech, that a resolution expressing
confidence in the Government was passed.
On September 15, 1914, General Christian Beyers resigned
his position of commandant general of the defense force in a
letter which was practically a declaration of war against the
British Empire. It developed that for some weeks he had been
organizing rebellion. He was secretly arranging a scheme of
operations in which the German forces were to take part, while
making plans for the Union Government. He hoped to win over
General Delarey, leader of the Boers in the western Transvaal,]
but this officer was accidentally killed by the police near Johan-
nesburg. The patrol out looking for the notorious Jackson gan|
of bandits, then in the neighborhood, had orders to examine anj
motor car and fire at once, if when summoned to stop their chal-
lenge was ignored. The car bearing Generals Beyers and Delare]
had been twice challenged while passing through the town. Th<
third time a policeman fired at the wheel to disable the car, an<
the bullet ricocheted and killed Delarey.
A thousand armed Boers at this time were encamped a1
Potchefstroom in Delarey's district. Colonel Kemp, who ha(
sent in his resignation to the Union Government, and was work-
ing here for Delarey, had won over their officers, and on parade}
urged the men to refuse to volunteer for German Southwest
Africa. He also collected in his tent such ammunition as he coul(
lay his hands upon.
REBELLION IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 73
The death of General Delarey disconcerted General Beyers,
and his fellow conspirators, and Colonel Kemp withdrew his
resignation from the Union army. Over the grave of Delarey
General Beyers, in the presence of General Botha, declared that
he had no intention of advising or causing a rebellion, yet the
following day, with General De Wet and others, he was urging
the Boers who had come to the funeral of their dead leader to
revolt against active service should the commandos be called
out under the Defense Act.
Botha knew the men who were stirring up rebellion and acted
quickly. He called for volunteers, announcing that he would
lead in person the Union forces against the Germans, and the
immediate response he received was gratifying. The conspira-
tors remained quiet for some weeks, but General Beyers and De
Wet were secretly at work against the Government of the Union.
On September 26, 1914, Colonel Grant and a small force of
African Rifles and Transvaal Horse Artillery operating at Sand-
fontein near the German border were trapped by two German
battalions while on their way to a water hole. From the heights
the German guns swept the circular basin below where the Union
force was gathered. The advantage was all in favor of the
Germans. High explosive shells from ten guns wrought havoc
among the South African soldiers, but not until their ammunition
ran out and every man of their gun crews was either killed or
wounded would the little band of Boers and Britons surrender.
It developed later that Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Maritz, a Boer
leader commanding Union forces in the Northwest territory,
had turned traitor and arranged the disaster. It was through
General Beyers that he had been appointed to an important com*
mand on the German border.
Maritz who was now ordered by General Smuts, Minister of
Defense, to report to headquarters and give up his command,
sent a defiant reply October 8, 1914. He stated that in addition
to his own troops he had German guns and men, and had signed
an agreement with the Governor of Southwest Africa ceding
Walfish Bay (a British possession) and certain portions of
Union territory in return for a guarantee of the independence
74 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the South African Republic. All his officers and men who
were unwilling to join with him had been sent as prisoners into
German territory.
General Botha replied to the rebel by proclaiming martial
law throughout the Union. General Brits, with the imperial
Light Horse, was sent to capture Maritz, and in an engagement
October 15, 1914, at Ratedraai, near Upington, took seventy
rebel prisoners.
On October 22, 1914, Maritz with 1,000 rebels and seventy
German gunners, attacked at dawn the post of Keimos, where
there were only 150 loyalists. The little garrison held out until
reenf orcements arrived and the battle then turned against Maritz,
who offered to surrender for a free pardon. This being refused,
the fight went on, and Maritz eventually fled wounded into Ger-
man territory. Two days later a party of rebels with German
gunners were defeated at Kakamas.
General Hertzog, who had represented the pro-German party
in the Union Parliament, gathered a commando and broke out
in revolt on October 21, 1914. He issued a manifesto complain-
ing of English oppression, and announced that he would tolerate
it no longer. Three members of the Union Parliament and a
member of the Defense Council, Mr. Wessel-Wessels, came out
in arms. In the western Transvaal and the northern Free State
the rebel leaders had about 10,000 men in separate groups.
Their plan was to join their commandos with a force under
Maritz from German Southwest Africa.
The situation from a military point of view seemed to be
serious for the Union, but Generals Botha and Smuts w^ere
active and resourceful and in a few weeks had 40,000 men in
the field. The loyal Boers were in a difficult position, for now
they were asked to fight against their own kith and kin for the
British Empire. In battle the Dutch generals showed that they
were anxious to spare their own kinsmen, and ordered their men
to withhold firing to the last moment, hoping that the rebels
would surrender. The rebels were not allowed time to join
their forces, for General Botha gave them no rest night or day.
On October 27, 1914, General Beyers and his commando
REBELLION IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 75
operating near Rustenburg were driven in headlong flight all
day long by General Botha and a force of loyalists. Two days
later General Beyers was a fugitive. His scattered commandos
were defeated by Colonel Alberts at Lichtenburg and again at
Zuitpansdrift on November 5, 1914. Meanwhile, Colonel Kemp,
who had been acting with General Beyers, now separated from
his chief, and with a large force started for German Southwest
Africa, pursued by Colonel Alberts. Beyers, trying to get in
touch with De Wet, entered the Orange Free State, closely fol-
lowed by a large loyalist force under Colonel Lemmer.
On November 7, 1914, Beyers's commando was attacked by
Lemmer near the Vet River and though Beyers led in person,
he was defeated, and, 364 of his men being captured and about
20 killed or wounded, the fugitive remnant returned to Hoopstad.
De Wet, whom General Beyers had been prevented from join-
ing by the activity of the loyalist forces, had gathered together
in the northern districts of the Orange Free State a poorly
organized body of soldiers, but sufficient in numbers to cause
the South African Government some anxiety. Negotiations
between the Free State leaders and De Wet postponed for a
time any military action by the Government, but the old guerrilla
captain was not to be pacified. There had been a rivalry between
him and Botha in the Boer war, and he seemed anxious to
measure strength now with a soldier whom he considered his
inferior.
De Wet*s name was a power in the land, especially among
the "poor whites" and the squatter class, who without much
intelligence or education had not prospered under new conditions
in the Union. They were without hope for the future and felt
that they were being crowded out by the more active spirits in
the country. They saw in the rebellion a chance to improve
their economic position. There was little to lose and much
might be won. A new Afrikander Republic would bring back
the old days for which they had never ceased to long for. It
was from this class of malcontents that De Wet drew the bulk
of his men. The rest were religious fanatics, disgruntled
politicians, wastrels and adventurers.
76 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
We have said previously that De Wet's recruits were poorly
organized. It was a weakness of this brilliant guerrilla fighter
that he could not maintain discipline when handling a large
body of men, and the sort of troops he was working with in
the rebellion called for the sternest kind of authority to make
them effective soldiers. He only enjoyed a month of free-
dom and covered considerable territory, but he accomplished
very little from a military point of view. He could not follow
the same tactics that he had employed in the Boer war with
equal success now. At home on the back of a horse, it was
impossible for him to slip through the enemy's lines as of old
when there were motor cars to pursue. He began his campaign
with an action at Winburg where he defeated a small loyalist
commando under Cronje, and where one of his sons was killed.
A battle of considerable importance was fought on November
12, 1914, at Marquard to the east of Winburg. General Botha
and his Transvaal commando by a forced night march had
reached Winburg the day before and getting in touch with De
Wet's forces encircled them on the east and northeast. Colonel
Brandt at the same time led his commando from Winburg within
easy reach of De Wet, while General Lukin and Colonel Brits
moving forward from the west completed the hemming in of the
enemy. General Botha's commando attacked De Wet's forces
sand defeated them with great loss. If General Lukin and
Colonel Brits had not been delayed in taking up their positions
all the rebels would have been captured. The victory was
especially of far-reaching importance because it discouraged De
Wet's hopes and strengthened the loyalist cause. All of De
Wet's stores of food and ammunition were taken, and a hundred
carts, wagons and motor cars, while the prisoners numbered
about 250.
De Wet, with a Boer commando in pursuit, now fled up the
Vet River, then turning south at Boshof , divided his decreasing
force into two divisions. Leading one of these he turned again
north, reaching the Vaal River with only 25 men remaining of
the 2,000 he had fought with at Marquard.
Beaten back by a loyal outpost he succeeded in crossing the
REBELLION IN UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 77
Vaal on November 21, 1914, closely pursued by Commandant
Dutoit and a motor car contingent from Witwatersrand. De
Wet's followers had gradually deserted, and he had only four
men with him when he succeeded in joining a small commando of
fugitives gathered at Schweizer Renek. The heavy rainstorms
at this time favored him as he started with this force to follow
Colonel Kemp and join Maritz in German Southwest Africa,
for the motor cars in pursuit could make small progress over
the heavy roads. Crossing Bechuanaland on November 25, 1914,
De Wet was pursued by another loyalist force under Colonel
Brits who in two days captured half of the fugitives.
On December 1, 1914, at a farm at Waterburg, about a hundred
miles from Mafeking, De Wet and his party of 52 men sur-
rendered to Colonel Jordaan without firing a shot, and the one-
time Commander in Chief of the Orange Free State forces was
imprisoned at Johannesburg to await his trial for high treason.
In the Orange Free State, General Beyers and about seventy
men harried by loyal commandos divided his party, and leading
one group made a dash for the Vaal River pursued by Captain
Uys and Cornet Deneker with a small force. Trapped at day-
break on December 9, 1914, near the Vaal, Beyers and a few
men tried to swim the river to the Transvaal under a fierce fire.
Beyers was seen to fall from his horse, and was heard to cry
for help, but was drowned before anyone could come to- the
rescue.
General Botha's operations in the northern district of the
Orange Free State were made difficult because of the heavy fogs,
but early in December, 1914, the rebels were in sore straits, 500
being captured while 200 surrendered to Commandant Kloppers
a loyalist, who had been taken a prisoner and was afterwards
released.
General Maritz, Colonel Kemp, and the "Prophet" Litchten-
burg had fled west, and after some fighting at Kurumun, and
two minor successes, surprising two posts at Langklip and
Onydas which they were forced to abandon on the arrival of
reenforcements, they retired toward the German frontier where
they were penned in by the Union forces.
78 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On January 24, 1915, the rebels made their last sally, attacking:
Colonel Van der Venter at Upington. The rebel force, about 1,200
strong and led by Maritz and Kemp, was easily repulsed. On
February 3, 1915, Maritz, having fled to German territory,
Colonel Kemp and his commando of 43 officers and 486 men in-
cluding the "Prophet" Lichtenburg surrendered.
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PART IV— THE WESTERN FRONT
CHAPTER XIII
PREPARATIONS FOR AN OFFENSIVE
DURING the greater part of the winter of 1914-15, the fighting
along the western front had been almost constant, but had
resulted in little that either side could justly assert to be a suc-
cess. The rigors inevitable in such a mode of wa,rfare had be-
come almost beyond human endurance, and commanders on both
sides looked forward to a more active campaign.
An immense amount of ammunition had been stored by the
French in and around Perthes in anticipation of a forward
movement ; and, by the second week of February, a quarter of a
n/illion men of the French army had been assembled near that
place. They were opposite a section of the German trenches
which was about twelve miles long, extending from Ville-sur-
Tourbe in the Argonne to the village of Souain. Early in the year
this section had been held by only two divisions of Rhinelanders.
These two divisions had suffered severely from the heavy gun
fire which the French had directed against them by means of the
successful work of the French aviators. The French infantry
also had done effective work in the short rush which they had
been making, gaining on an average about twelve yards a day.
Following the concentration of French troops, the German com-
manders brought up reenforcements to the number of 80,000.
Some of these were taken from La Bassee, and others from a con-
tingent which had been intended for a northern offensive move-
ment.
Because of the chalk formation of the soil in this section of the
front, the excessive moisture of this season of the year drained
79 6— War St. 3
m THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
rapidly, leaving exposed an undulating section on which were
small forests of fir trees. The nature of the ground made it an
easy matter to move troops even in winter. General Joffre took
advantage of this fact, and assembled a quarter of a million men
against the German lines in Champagne. This caused the Ger-
man commanders to mass troops just in front of Perthes. The
concentration continued until there were 220,000 German sol-
diers packed there in close formation. The French attacked, and
quickly a rain of more than a hundred thousand shells fell upon
the Germans.
The Germans sought to reply by bringing up twenty-two bat-
teries of heavy guns and sixty-four field batteries ; but the French
gunners kept command of the field. In the twenty days* battle —
from February 16 to March 7, 1915 — ^the French won scarcely a
mile of ground ; but they found and buried 10,000 German dead.
The French staff estimated that 60,000 German soldiers had been
put out of action. The German staff admitted they had lost more
men in this action than in the campaign in East Prussia against
the Russians, where fourteen German army corps were engaged.
The French lost less than 10,000 men.
In the last week of February, 1915, it had been learned by
General Joffre that General von Falkenhayn of the German forces
had withdrawn from Neuve Chapelle, and the section north of
La Bassee six batteries of field artillery, six battalions of the
Prussian Guard, and two heavy batteries of the Prussian Guard.
These had been withdrawn for the purpose of checking the sup-
posed French advance at Perthes, as already narrated. Hence
it was known that the English, in command of Sir Douglas Haig,
at Neuve Chapelle, were opposed by a thin line of German troops
who were making a demonstration of force for the purpose of
concealing the weakness of their line.
The British officers in the region of Neuve Chapelle received
complete instructions on March 8, 1915, in regard to an offensive
which they were to start on the 10th. These instructions were
supplemental to a communication which had been sent on Febru-
ary 19 by the British commander in chief to Sir Douglas Haig, the
commander of the First Army. Neuve Chapelle was to be the
PREPARATIONS FOR AN OFFENSIVE
81
FRONTIER LINE^
FORT'b
IHEAVY BLACK LlfXE &HOW*
JBATn^ UNC ONJAN. I. 19IS
THE WESTERN BATTLE LINE, JANUARY 1, 1915
82 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
immediate objective of the prospective engagement. This place is
about four miles north of La Bassee at the junction of main roads,
one leading southward to La Bassee, and another from Bethune
on the west to Armentieres on the northeast. It is about eleven
miles west of Lille. These roads formed an irregular diamond-
shaped figure with the village at the apex of the eastern sides,
along which the German troops were stationed. The British held
the western sides of this figure.
The land in this part of France is marshy and crossed by
dykes ; but, to the eastward, the ground rises slowly to a ridge, on
the western border of which are two spurs. Aubers is at the
apex of one ; and lilies at the apex of the other. Both of these
villages were held by the Germans. The ridge extends north-
east, beyond the junction of the spurs, from Fournes to within
two miles southwest of Lille. Along the ridge is the road to
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, all of which are among the chief
manufacturing towns of France. The occupation of the ridge
was a necessary step to the taking of Lille ; and Neuve Chapelle
was at the gateway to the ridge. If the Allies could take Lille
they would then be in a position to move against their enemy be-
tween that point and the sea.
The River Des Layes runs behind Neuve Chapelle to the south-
east ; and, behind the river, a half mile from the straggling vil-
lage, is a wood known as the Bois du Biez. Almost at right
angles to the river, on the west, the main road from Estaires to
La Bassee skirts Neuve Chapelle. There is a triangle of roads
north of the village where there were a few large houses with
walls, gardens, and orchards. At this point the Germans had
fortified themselves to flank the approaches to the village from
that section. These trenches were only about a hundred yards
from those of the British. The Germans had machine guns at &
bridge over the river ; and they had another post established a
little farther up at the Pietre mill. Farther down the stream,
where the road into the village joins the main road to La Bassee,
the Germans had fortified a group of ruined buildings which was
known as Port Arthur. From there was a great network of
trenches which extended northwestward to the Pietre mill. There
BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS 83
were also German troops in the Bois du Biez, and in the ruined
houses along the border of the wood.
The German trenches were in excellent positions, but were oc-
cupied by only a comparatively few soldiers ; it was the German
plan to keep large bodies of troops in reserve, so that they might
be sent to any sector where the need seemed most likely. They
have asserted they had only four battalions in the front line here ;
but that statement is denied by the British.
The British plan of attack embraced a heavy bombardment to
demoralize their enemy and prevent reenforcement. This was to
be followed by an infantry attack. It was expected that the Ger-
mans would be surprised to such an extent it would be impossible
for them to make much resistance. Units of the First Army were
to make the main attack, supported by the Second Army. The
support included a division of cavalry. Among the large force of
heavy artillery for the opening bombardment were a number of
French guns manned by French artillerymen.
CHAPTER XIV
BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS
THREE hundred and fifty guns at short range began a most
terrific bombardment March 10, 1915, at 7.30 a. m. It is said
that the discharges of the artillery was so frequent that it seemed
as if some gigantic machine gun was in action. Shortly after this
bombardment started, the German trenches were covered by a
great cloud of smoke and dust and a pall of green lyddite fumes.
The first line of German trenches, against which the fire was di-
rected, became great shapeless furrows and craters filled with
the dead and^ dying.
This was the condition all along the line except on the extreme
northern end where the artillery fire was less effective, owing, it
was said, to a lack of proper preparation by the British staff.
This terrific artillery fire was continued for thirty-five minutes ;
84 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
and then the range was changed from the first line of German
trenches to the village of Neuve Chapelle itself. Thereupon the
British infantry advanced and made prisoners of the few Ger-
mans left alive in the first line. The men found unwounded were
so dazed by the onslaught which the guns had made upon their
position that they offered no resistance. The bombardment had
swept away the wire entanglements ; and the British had only the
greasy mud with which to contend, when they made their dash
forward.
Where the wire entanglements had been swept away, the
Second Lincolnshire and the Berkshire regiments were the first
to reach the German trenches. These regiments then turned to
the right and left, and thus permitted the Royal Irish Rifles and
the Rifle Brigade to go on toward the village.
In order to understand the infantry attack in detail it is neces-
sary to know the manner in which the British troops were dis-
tributed before they made their dash at the ruined trenches of
the Germans. Two brigades of the Eighth Division, the Twenty-
fifth to the right and the Twenty-third to the left, were due west
of Neuve Chapelle. On a front a mile and a half long to the
south of them was the Meerut Division, supported by the Lahore
Division. The Garhwal Brigade was on the left and the Dehra
Dun Brigade was on its right. In the first attack the Twenty-
third dashed to the northeast comer of the village, the Twenty-
fifth against the village itself ; and the Garhwal Brigade charged
on the southwest corner.
The trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth were taken with prac-
tically no fighting. The Germans who had manned them were
either killed or too dazed to offer resistance. As has already
been told, the Second Royal Berkshires and the Second Lincolns
took the first line of trenches in front of them, and opened the
middle of their line to permit the Second Rifle Brigade and the
First Irish Rifles to dash on to the village. The British artillery
range was lengthened, thereby preventing the German supports
from interference with the well-defined plan of the British.
Into the wrecked streets of Neuve Chapelle swung two battal-
ions of the Twenty-fifth Brigade. The few of their enemy who
I
BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS 85
offered resistance were soon overpowered — being captured or
slain.
These men of the Twenty-fifth Brigade found terrible scenes of
destruction. The village had been knocked literally into a rubbish
heap. Even the dead in the village churchyard had been plowed
from their graves by the terrific bombardment.
The Garhwal Brigade captured the first line of trenches on the
right, and the Third Gurkhas, on the southern outskirts of the
village, met the Rifle Brigade. Then it dashed on to the Bois du
Biez, passing another rubbish heap which once had been the
hamlet known as Port Arthur.
The attack on the left, however, resulted less successfully for
the British forces. As indicated above, the preparation for the
bombardment at this part of the line had been inadequate for the
purpose which the general in command had sought to achieve.
Thus on the northeast corner of Neuve Chapelle the German
trenches and the wire entanglements in front of them had been
damaged but little. The British forces on this part of the line
included the Second Devons, the Second West Yorks, the Second
Scottish Rifles, and the Second Middlesex, known as the Twenty-
third Brigade. The Scottish Rifles charged against intact wire
entanglements which halted them in the range of a murderous
rifle and machine-gun fire. With daring bravery the Scots sought
to tear down the wire with their hands; but were forced to fall
back and lie in the fire-swept zone until one company forced its
way through an opening and destroyed the barrier. The regi-
ment, as a result of this mishap to the plans of the commanding
general, lost its commander. Colonel Bliss, and fourteen other
fficers.
The Middlesex, on the right, met with the same obstruction
nd lost many of its men and officers while waiting for the British
artillery to smash a way through for them. This the artillery
did when word had been carried back telling of the plight of the
infantry.
The Twenty-fifth Brigade, to the south, had the good fortune
to turn the flank of the Germans north of Neuve Chapelle. Then
the entire Twenty-third Brigade forced its way to the orchard
86 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
northeast of the village, where it met the Twenty-fourth Brigade,
which included the First Worcesters, Second East Lancashires,
First Sherwood Foresters, and the Second Northamptons. The
Twenty-fourth Brigade had fought its way through from the
Neuve Chapelle-Armentieres road. As soon as this had been
accomplished by the British, their artillery proceeded to send
such a rain of shrapnel fire between the village and the Germans
that a counterattack was quite impossible. This gave the victors
an opportunity to intrench themselves practically at their leisure.
The plans of the British commander had embraced a forward
movement when the troops had reached this point, but they had
not included a means of keeping communication with the various
units intact. The telegraph and telephone wires had been cut by
the shot and shell of both sides ; and there was no opportunity to
repair them until it was too late to take advantage of the de-
moralization of the Germans. Moreover, the delay of the Twenty-
third Brigade had so disarranged the plans of the British that it
is doubtful if they would not have failed in part even if the means
of communication had not been destroyed. Nevertheless, Sir
John French wrote : "I am of the opinion that this delay would
not have occurred had the clearly expressed orders of the general
officer commanding the First Army been more carefully ob-
served."
There was also an additional delay in bringing up the reserves
of the Fourth Corps. Thus it was not until 3.30 p. m. that three
brigades of the Seventh Division, the Twentieth, Twenty-first,
and Twenty-second Brigades were in their places on the left of
the Twenty-fourth Brigade. Then the left moved southward
toward Aubers. At the same time the Indian Corps, composed of
the Garhwal Brigade and the Dehra Dun Brigade, forced its
way through the Bois du Biez toward the ridge. Strong opposi-
tion was met with to such an extent, however, that the Thirty-
ninth Garhwals and the Second Leicesters suffered severe losses
on reaching a German position which had practically escaped the
heavy artillery fire. A German outpost at the bridge held the
Dehra Dun Brigade, which was supported by the Jullundur
Brigade of the Lahore Division, in its attack farther to the south
BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS 87
on the line of the River Des Layes. The First Brigade of the
First Corps was rushed forward by Sir Douglas Haig ; but it was
dark before these troops arrived. Another fortified bridge,
farther to the left, checked the Twenty-fifth Brigade; and ma-
chine-gun fire stopped the Twenty-fourth Brigade, this fire being
from the German troops at the crossroads northwest of Pietre
village. The Seventh Division was held by the line of the Des
Layes, and the defense of the Pietre mill.
By evening the British had gone forward as far as their artil'-
lery fire had been effective ; and it was found necessary for them
to stop to strengthen the new line which they had estab-
lished. They had won Neuve Chapelle. They had advanced
a mile. They had straightened their line, but they could go
no farther.
On the following day, March 11, 1915, the British artillery was
directed against the Bois du Biez and the trenches in the neigh-
borhood of Pietre. The Germans, however, had recovered from
the surprise of the great bombardment, and they made several
counterattacks. Little progress was made on that day by either
side. On that night, March 11, the Bavarian and Saxon reserves
arrived from Tourcoing, and on the morning of March 12 the
counterattack extended along the British front. Because of the
heavy mist, and the lack of proper communications, it was im-
possible for the British artillery to do much damage. The de-
fense of the bridges across the Des Layes kept the British forces
from the ridges and the capture of Aubers. The best that the
British seemed to be able to do was to prevent the German
counterattack from being successful.
An attempt to use the British cavalry was unsuccessful on
March 12. The Second Cavalry Division, in command of Gen-
eral Hubert Gough, with a brigade of the North Midland Divi-
sion, was ordered to support the infantry offensive, it being
believed that the cavalry might penetrate the German lines.
When the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, under command of Sir Philip
Chetwode, arrived in the Rue Bacquerot at 4 p. m.. Sir Henry
Rawlinson reported the German positions intact, and the
cavalry retired to Estaires.
88
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
I 2
=HrR/Ml-ROAO«b
^S^ BRITISH GAIN AT
<<:^ NEUVE CHAPEULE
THE BATTLE AT NEUVE CHAPELLE
BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS 89
The attack of the Seventh Division against the Pietre Fort
continued all the day of March 12, as did the attempt to take
the Des Layes bridges from the Germans, who were valiantly
defending their second line of trenches in the Bois du Biez. Prob-
ably the fiercest fighting of that day fell to the lot of the Twen-
tieth Brigade, composed of the First Grenadiers, the Second Scots
Guards, the Second Border Regiment, and the Second Gordons,
with the Sixth Gordons, a Territorial battalion. This brigade
fought valiantly around Pietre Mill. Position after position was
taken by them, but their efforts could not remain effective with-
out the aid of artillery, which was lacking. The Second Rifle
Brigade carried a section of the German trenches farther south
that afternoon, but an enfilading fire drove the British back to
their former position.
It was evident by the night of March 12 that the British could
not gain command of the ridge and that the Germans could not
retake Neuve Chapelle. Hence Sir John French ordered Sir
Douglas Haig to hold and consolidate the ground which had been
taken by the Fourth and Indian Corps, and suspend further
offensive operations for the present. In his report General
French set forth that the three days' fighting had cost the Brit-
ish 190 officers and 2,337 other ranks killed; 359 officers and
8,174 other ranks wounded, and 23 officers and 1,728 other ranks
missing. He claimed German losses of over 12,000.
The British soldiers who had been engaged in the fighting
about Neuve Chapelle spent all of March 13, 1915, in digging
trenches in the wet meadows that border the Des Layes. On the
following day the two corps that had fought so valiantly were
sent back to the reserve.
The German commanders, in the meantime, had been prepar-
ing for a vigorous counterattack. They planned to make their
greatest effort fifteen miles north of Neuve Chapelle, at the vil-
lage of St. Eloi, and trained a large section of their artillery
against a part of the British front, which was held by the
Twenty-seventh Division. The preparation of the Germans was
well concealed on March 14 by the heavy mist that covered the
low country. The bombardment started at 5 p. m., the begin-
90 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ning of which was immediately followed by the explosion of two
mines which were under a hillock that was a part of the British
front at the southeast of St. Eloi. The artillery attack was fol-
lowed by such an avalanche of German infantry that the British
were driven from their trenches. This German success was fol-
lowed up by the enfilading of the British lines to the right and
left, with the result that that entire section of the British front
was forced back.
That night a counterattack was prepared. It was made at
2 a. m., on March 15, by the Eighty-second Brigade, which had
the Eightieth Brigade as its support. The Eighty-second Brigade
drove the Germans from the village and the trenches on the east.
The Eightieth Brigade finished the task of regaining all of the
ground that had been lost except the crater caused by the explo-
sion of the mines. Among the regiments that made a most envi-
able record for themselves in this action were Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry, the Fourth Rifle Brigade, the First
Leinsters, the Second Cornwalls, and the Second Royal Irish
Fusiliers. The "Princess Pat's," as the Canadian troops were
known in the home land, were the first colonial soldiers to take
part in a battle of such magnitude in this war. Their valor and
their ability as fighting men were causes of great pride to the
British.
Before leaving the Neuve Chapelle engagement and what im-
mediately followed it, it is well to give a brief survey of the
actions along the line that supported it. To prevent the Ger-
mans from taking troops from various points and massing them
against the main British attack; the British soldiers all along
that part of the front found plenty of work to do in their imme-
diate vicinity. Thus, on March 10, 1915, the First Corps attacked
the Germans from Givenchy, but there had been but little artil-
lery fire on the part of the British there, and the wire entangle-
ments stopped them from more than keeping the German troops
in the position which they had held. The Second Corps, on
March 12, was to have advanced at 10 a. m. southwest of Wyt-
schaete. The fog that prevailed on that day, however, prevented
a movement until 4 p. m. Then the First Wiltshires and the
BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS 91
Third Worcesters of the Seventh Brigade began a movement
which had to be abandoned when the weather thickened and
night fell.
The attack on L'Epinette, a hamlet southeast of Armentieres,
was much more successful on the same day. The Seventeenth
Brigade of the Fourth Division of the Third Corps advanced at
noon, with the Eighteenth Brigade ^s its support. It advanced
300 yards on a front a half mile in length, carrying the village,
which it retained in spite of all the counterattacks.
The work of the artillery was not confined to the main attack,
for it was very effective in shelling the Quesnoy railway station
east of Armentieres, where German reenforcements were board-
ing a train for the front. The British artillery fire was effec-
tive as far as Aubers, where it demolished a tall church spire.
The work of the aviators, from March 10 to 12 inclusive, de-
serves special mention. Owing to the adverse weather condi-
tions, it was necessary for them to fly as low as from 100 to
150 feet above the object of their attack in order to be sure of
their aim. Nevertheless they destroyed one of the piers of the
bridge over the Lys at Menin. This bridge carried the railroad
over the river. They also wrecked the railway stations at Douai,
Don, and Courtrai. The daring of the British aviators even took
them over Lille, where they dropped bombs on one of the German
headquarters.
To summarize the fighting about Neuve Chapelle, it may be
said that the British had advanced something more than a mile
on a three-mile front, replacing the sag which had existed in
their line by a sag in that of the Germans. The British had
not won the ridges which were the key to Lille, but they had
advanced their trenches close to those ridges. The entire moral
effect was a gain for the British ; but even that and the gain in
advancing the front had been obtained at a too great sacrifice
of the life of their men. The words of the Germans in char-
acterizing the tremendous bombardment of the British were:
"That is not war ; it is murder."
The belief in the supposed superiority of the German artil-
lery was so shaken in the minds of the General Staff as a result
92 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the fighting on the Neuve Chapelle front that they shortly
after issued an order to try a series of experiments on animals
with asphyxiating gases.
CHAPTER XV
OPERATIONS FOLLOWING NEUVE
CHAPELLE
THERE was very little activity on the western front after the
fighting at Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi until the beginning of
a renewal of the campaign between La Bassee and the sea. The
importance of success in this region was appreciated by both
sides. The Germans north of the Lys planned to cross the
Comines-Ypres, Yperlee, and Yser Canals, capture Ypres, take
all of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats, and then continue west
and take Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. The Allies in their plan
included an advance south of the Lys on two sides of Lille, the
taking of the Aubers Ridge, and the turning from the north
the German salient at La Bassee. This much of the Allies' plan
was to be executed by the British. The work of the French was
to drive the Germans from the vicinity of Lens and threaten
La Bassee from the south and west. The reasons for making
these plans are obvious. The German salient was a source of
much danger to the joining of the British and French armies,
and the possibility of the Germans forcing their way through
to Boulogne meant a possibility of a cutting off of the entire
British army and the French and Belgian forces between Ypres
and the sea near Nieuport. However, if La Bassee was isolated
and the Aubers Ridge taken by the British, the chances that the
Germans could retain Lille were materially lessened ; and if the
British got Lille they might start to drive their enemy from
Belgium.
During the lull in the fighting on land, to which reference has
been made, there was much activity in the air. Reconnaissances
OPERATIONS FOLLOWING NEUVE CHAPELLE 93
and raids were of almost daily occurrence. A Zeppelin dropped
twenty bombs on Calais, slaying seven workmen at the railroad
station on March 18, 1915. Three days later another, or pos-
sibly the same Zeppelin, flew over the town, but this time it was
driven away before it could do any harm. "Taubes" bombarded
the railroad junction of St. Omer and made a similar attack on
Estaires on March 23. Four days after another attack was made
on Estaires, and on the same day, March 27, the German airmen
did some damage to Sailly, Calais, and Dunkirk. The next day
a 'Taube" made an attack on Calais, Estaires, and Hazebrouck.
A Zeppelin closed the month's warfare in the air for the Germans
by making a dash over Bailleul.
Aviators of the Allies, too, were busy. One of their aerial
squadrons proceeded along the coast on March 16 and attacked
the military posts at Ostend and Knocke. These aviators had
as one of their main objective points the German coast batteries
at the latter place. But the squadron was seen from a German
observation balloon at Zeebrugge, and a flock of "Taubes*' made
a dash for their enemy's craft. The Germans were not as skill-
ful airmen, however, and they found it necessary to retire. Five
British aviators made an attack on the German submarine base
at Hoboken, southwest of Antwerp, and destroyed a submarine
and wrecked two others. This raid was made without injury
to the aviators, the only accident being the necessity of one of
the aircraft to descend, which it did, only to find it hadjanded
on Dutch territory and must be interned. The excellence of the
Allies' flying was not confined to the English. Belgian and
French airmen, as well as British, flew almost constantly over
Ostend, Zeebrugge, Roulers, Aubers, and such other places as
German soldiers and their supplies were in evidence. The Bel-
gian airmen dropped bombs on the aviation field at Ghistelles on
March 27, and on the following day a Zeppelin hangar was de-
stroyed at Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, near Brussels. On March 30,
1915, ten British and some French aviators flew along the coast
from Nieuport to Zeebrugge and dropped bombs on magazines
and submarine bases. The last day of the month saw the de-
struction of the German captive balloon at Zeebrugge and the
94 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
death of its two observers. The Belgian aviators on the same
day threw bombs on the aviation field at Handzaeme and the
railroad junction at Cortemarck, and, south of Dixmude, the
famous birdman, Garros, fought a successful duel in the air with
a German aviator.
An aviator of the Allies flew over the aerodrome at Lille on
April 1, 1915, and dropped a football. The Germans hastened to
cover. When the ball bounced prodigiously as a result of being
dropped from such a height, the Teutons thought it was some
new kind of death dealer, and remained in their places of
safety. In fact, they remained there quite a few minutes after
the football had ceased to bounce. When they finally emerged
most cautiously and approached the object of their terror,
they read this inscription on it: "April Fool — Gott strafe
England."
Though the antiaircraft guns, or "Archibalds," as the soldiers
called them, were not especially effective except in keeping the
flyers at such a height that it was not easy for them to make
effective observations, a "Taube" was brought down at Pervyse,
and near Ypres another was damaged on April 8. But on April
12 a German flyer inflicted some loss on the Allies* lines and
escaped without being even hit. On the following day, presuma-
bly emboldened by that success, German aeroplanes threw flares
and smoke balls over the British trenches east of Ypres, with
the result that the soldiers of King George were subjected to a
severe bombardment. All things considered, however, the Allies
had ground for their belief that they more than held their own
in the air.
Afloat the Allies continued to maintain the supremacy which
had been theirs. The French and British battleships held the
left of the Allies' line. Their great guns proved their effective-
ness on the Germans who were advancing from Ostend on Nieu-
port. They repeatedly bombarded the position of the kaiser's
men at Westende, east of Nieuport. The Germans had trained
one of their mammoth pieces of artillery against that town pre-
sumably because it held the sluices and locks which regulated
the overflowing of the Yser territory. If the means of flooding
OPERATIONS FOLLOWING NEUVE CHAPELLB 95
the land could not be seized, the next best thing to do was to
wreck them.
The Belgians, in the meantime, assumed the offensive, their
left being protected by the Allied fleet and the French forces in
the neighborhood of Nieuport. These troops captured one of the
smaller forts east of Lombartzyde on March 11, 1915. There was
also fighting at Schoorbakke, north of the Yser loop, where the
German trenches were shelled by French artillery. This was
on the eastern border of the inundated section. After destroy-
ing the German front in the graveyard at Dixmude, the French
artillerists battered a German convoy on its way between Dix-
mude and Essen on March 17, 1915. By March 23 the east bank
of the Yser held a Belgian division. In fact, from Dixmude to
the sea the Allied troops were advancing.
The Germans, however, advanced south of Dixmude. On
April 1, 1915, they shelled the farms and villages west of the
Yser and the Yperlee Canals, and took the Driegrachten farm.
Thereupon the Germans crossed the canal with three machine
guns. Their plan was to proceed along the border of the inun-
dated district to Furnes. But the French balked the plan by
shelling the farm, and the Belgians finished the work by driving
the Germans back to Mercken on April 6, 1915.
In the meantime, from March 15 to April 17, 1915, the bom-
bardment of Ypres was continued, destroying most of the re-
maining buildings there. Engagements of importance had not
as yet started on the British front. The British had a supply
of shrapnel, and the British and French cannon, as well as the
rifle- and machine-gun fire, held the Germans in check until they
had time to perfect their plans for a vigorous offensive. Never-
theless the British needed a much larger supply of ammunition
before they could start on a determined campaign, which was so
much desired by the troops. One of the German headquarters,
however, was shelled effectively by the British on April 1, 1915,
and on the following day mortars in the trenches did consider-
able damage in the Wood of Ploegsteert. A mine blew up a
hundred yards of the trenches that were opposite Quinchy, a
village to the south of Givenchy, on April 3, 1915. To offset this
7— War St. 3
96 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Germans bombarded the British line at that point. They also
shelled Fleurbaix, which is three miles southwest of Armentieres,
on April 5, 1915. The British on the same day wrecked a new
trench mortar south of there. On April 6, 1915, the German
artillery began to be more active both north and south of the
Lys, and the British retaliated by shelling the railway triangle
that was near Quinchy. German soldiers were slain and others
wounded when a mine was exploded at Le Touquet, on
the north bank of the Lys. One of the kaiser's ammunition
depots was blown up near Quinchy on April 9, 1915, and his
men were driven from their trenches in front of Givenchy by
mortar fire.
The comparative quiet along the front was broken by the fight
for the possession of Hill 60, which became famous because of
the rival claims as to victory. The mound, for it was little more,
getting its name on account of its height — sixty meters — was of
importance only because it screened the German artillery which
was shelling Ypres from the bridge to the west of Zandvoord.
British trenches had been driven close to this hill by the Bed-
fords, whose sappers tunneled under the mound and there pre-
pared three mines. At the same time the Germans were tunnel-
ing to plant mines under the Bedfords' trench. In this under-
ground race the Bedfords won on the night of April 17, 1915,
when they blew three big craters in the hill, killing almost to
a man all of the 150 Germans who were on the little rise of
ground. The Bedfords then dashed forward to the three craters
they had opened up and took a quarter of a mile of the German
trenches.
The Germans were apparently unprepared for the attack which
followed the explosion of the British mines, with the result that
the British had to overcome little resistance, and had ample
opportunity to prepare a defense from the bombardment that
followed. The next morning, April 18, 1915, the German in-
fantry in close formation advanced on the hill. This infantry
was composed of Saxons, who continued on for a bayonet charge
in spite of the downpour of lead that the British rained upon
them. But the Bedfords had been reenforced by the West Rents
OPERATIONS FOLLOWING NEUVE CHAPELLE 97
and about thirty motor machine guns. The machine guns raked
the charging Saxons in front, and shrapnel tore their flank.
Only their dead and dying remained on the hill; but the Ger-»
man commanders continued to send their men against the British
there, who were subjected to a murderous cross-fire, the hill
forming a salient. As a result of their persistence the German
troops managed to get a foothold on the southern part of the hill
by 6 p. m. In the meantime a battalion of Highlanders and the
Duke of Wellington's regiment had been sent to reenforce the
Bedfords and the West Rents. The Highlanders made a des-
perate charge, using bayonets and hand grenades on the Ger-
mans who had gained the southern edge of the hill. The Ger-
mans were driven back.
The Duke of Wurttemberg, the German commander, presum-
ably believing his troops had not only held what they had taken,
but had advanced, announced that another German victory had
been gained in the capture of Hill 60. Sir John French also
sent out a message, but in his report he set forth that Hill 60
was held by the British. Because there had been similar con-
flict in official reports all too frequently, it seemed as if a tacit
agreement was made among the neUtrals to determine who was
telling the truth. This resulted in making what was a compara-
tively unimportant engagement one of the most celebrated battles
of the war. As soon as Duke Albrecht of Wurttemberg discov-
ered his mistake he did what he could to make good his state-
ment by attempting to take Hill 60 without regard to sacrificing
his men. Sir John French was just as determined to hold the
hill. So he moved large numbers of troops toward the shattered
mound, the British artillery was reenforced, and the hastily con-
structed sandbag breastworks were improved with all possible
speed.
The Germans then attacked with gas bombs. Projectiles filled
with gas were hurled upon the British from three sides. The
East Surrey Regiment, which defended the hill in the latter part
of the battle for it, suffered severely. Faces and arms became
shiny and gray-black. Membranes in the throats thickened, and
lungs seemed to be eaten by the chlorine 7>oison. Yet the men
98 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
fought on until exhausted, and then fell to suffer through a death
struggle which continued from twenty-four hours to three days
of suffocating agony.
The German artillery kept up its almost incessant pounding
of the British. In short lulls of the big gun's work the German
infantry hurled itself against the trenches on the hill, using
hand grenades and bombs. The fight continued until the morn-
ing of May 5, 1915, when the wind blew at about four miles an
hour from the German trenches. Then a greenish-yellow fog
of poisonous gas was released, and soon encompassed the hill.
The East Surreys, who were holding the hill, were driven back
by the gas, but as soon as the gas passed they charged the Ger-
mans who had followed the gas and had taken possession of the
hill. Notwithstanding the machine-gun fire which the Germans
poured upon them, many of the trenches were retaken by the
Surrey soldiers in their first frenzied rush to regain what they
had lost because of the gas. The battle ended when there was
no hill left. The bombardment and the mines had leveled the
mound by distributing it over the surrounding territory. The
British, however, were accorded the victory, as they had trenches
near where the hill was and made them a part of the base of the
salient about Ypres.
That town has been likened to the hub of a wheel whose spokes
are the roads which lead eastward. It is true that one impor-
tant road went over the canal at Steenstraate, but practically
all of the highways of consequence went through Ypres. Thus
the spokes of the wheel, whose rim was the outline of the salient,
were the roads to Menin, Gheluvelt, Zonnebeke, Poelcapelle,
Langemarck, and Pilkem. And the railroad to Roulers was also
a spoke. Hence all of the supplies for the troops on the salient
must pass through Ypres, which made it most desirable for the
Germans to take the town. It will be remembered that they had
won a place for their artillery early in November, 1914, which
gave them an opportunity to bombard Ypres through the winter.
On February 1, 1915, a portion of the French troops which had
held the salient were withdrawn and their places taken by Gen-
eral Bulfin's Twenty-eighth Division. Thus, by April 20, 1915,
BEGINNING OF SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES 99
that part of the Allies' front was held as follows : From the canal
to east of Langemarck was the Forty-fifth Division of the French
army, consisting of colonial infantry. One the French right, to
the northeast of Zonnebeke, was the Canadian division, under
the command of General Alderson, consisting of the Third
Brigade, under General Turner, on the left, and the Second
Brigade, under General Currie, on the right. The Twenty-
eighth Division extended from the Canadian right to the south-
east comer of the Polygon Wood. This division comprised the
Eighty-third, Eighty-fourth, and Eighty-fifth Brigades in order
from right to left. The next section of the salient was held by
Princess Patricia's Regiment of the Twenty-seventh Division,
which division, under the command of General Snow, guarded
the front to the east of Veldhoek along the ridge to within a
short distance of Hill 60, where the Fifth Division, under the
command of General Morland, held the line. The greater part
of the German troops opposite the salient were from Wurttem-
berg and Saxony.
CHAPTER XVI
BEGINNING OF SECOND BATTLE OP
YPRES
WHAT is called the second battle of Ypres began with a bom-
bardment of the little city on April 20, 1915. The rain of
shells continued on through April 22, 1915, on the evening of
which the British artillery observers reported a strange green
vapor moving over the French trenches. The wind was blow-
ing steadily from the northeast. Soon the French troops were
staggering back from the front, blinded and choking from the
deadly German gas. Many of their comrades had been unable to
leave the spot where they were overtaken by the fumes. Those
who fled in terror rushed madly across the canal, choking the
road to Viamertinghe. A part of the Zouaves and Turcos ran
south toward the Langemarck road, finally reaching the reserve
100 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
battalions of the Canadians. Ere long the Canadians caught
the deadly odor also.
But the work of the gas did a much more valuable thing for
the German troops than causing the agonizing death of many
hundreds and sending thousands in headlong flight. It made
a four-mile-wide opening in the front of the Allies. And the
Germans were quick to take advantage of that opening. They
followed the gas, and were aided in their advance by artillery
fire. The French were forced back on the canal from Steen-
straate to Boesinghe. The Canadians had not suffered so much
from the gas as the French soldiers, but their flank was too
exposed for them to do much effective work against the onrush-
ing Teutons. The attempt to rally the Turcos failed. The Third
Brigade could not withstand the attack of four divisions, and was
forced inward from a point south of Poelcappelle until its
left rested on the wood east of St. Julien. There was a gap
beyond it, and the Germans were forcing their way around its
flank. Because the entire First Brigade of Canadians had been
held in reserve it could not be brought up in time to save the
situation. Two of the battalions, the Sixteenth and Tenth, were
in the gap by midnight. They charged and recovered the
northern edge, and the guns of the Second London Division,
which had been supporting the French in the wood east of St.
Julien. But the British could not hold all they retook, and were
forced to abandon the guns because the artillery horses were
miles away. So parts of the guns were made useless before the
Germans had them again.
Then another counterattack was made by the First and Fourth
Ontarios of General Mercer's First Brigade. The Fourth Ontario
captured the German shelter trenches and held them for two
days, when they were relieved. The Third Canadian Brigade
held its position in spite of being opposed by many times their
numbers and almost overcome by the gas fumes. The Forty-
eighth Highlanders, who had had to withstand the gas, ral-
lied after their retreat and regained their former place in the
front. The Royal Highlanders kept their original position. Yet
there was every indication of a rout. The roads were clogged by
I
BEGINNING OF SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES 101
the night supply trains going forward and the rush of men trying
to escape from the deadly gas. The staff officers found it impos-
sible to straighten out the tangle, and the various regiments had
to act almost as independent bodies. It was not until early the
following morning, April 23, 1915, that the first reenforcements
of British soldiers appeared to fill the breach. These men, for
the most part, were from the Twenty-eighth Division, and had
been east of Zonnebeke to the southeast corner of Polygon Wood.
So great was the pressure at the section where the break had
been made in the line that troops were taken from wherever
available, so that the units in the gap varied from day to day.
For the men had to be returned to their original positions, such
as remained available, as soon as possible. This composite body
of troops has been called Geddes's Detachment.
The Germans had captured Lizerne and Het Sas, and Steen-
straate was threatened by them. They bombarded with heavy
artillery, located on the Passchendaele ridge, the front held by
the Canadians, the Twenty-eighth Division, and Geddes's Detach-
ment, on April 23, 1915. The severest fighting was on that part
of the front held by the Third Brigade of Canadians. Many men
had been killed or wounded in this brigade, and those who sur-
vived were ill from the effects of the gas. Furthermore, no food
could be taken to them for twenty-four hours. Moreover, they
were subjected to a fire from three sides, with the result that
they were forced to a new position on a line running through
St. Julien. Finally the Germans forced their way around to the
left of the Third Brigade, establishing their machine guns be-
hind it.
A terrific artillery attack was started by the Germans on the
morning of April 24, 1915, and this was followed by a second
rush of gas from their trenches. It rose in a cloud seven feet
high and was making its attack on the British in two minutes
after it started. It was thickest near the ground, being pumped
from cylinders. And it worked with the same deadly effect. The
Third Brigade, receiving its second attack of this sort before it
had recovered from the first, retreated to the southwest of St.
Julien, but soon after regained most of their lost position. The
102 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Second Brigade had to bend its left south. Colonel Lipsett's
Eighth Battalion, however, held fast on the Grafenstafel ridge,
remaining in their position two days in spite of the gas of which
they got a plentiful supply.
By noon of April 24, 1915, the Germans made an attack on the
village of St. Julien and that part of the allied front to the east
of the village. Thereupon the Third Brigade retreated about 700
yards to a new front south of the village and north of the hamlet
of Fortuin. But what remained of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Battalions was forced by circumstances to remain in the St.
Julien line until late that night. Colonel Lipsett's Eighth Battalion
at Grafenstafel, in spite of its left being unsupported, held its
position which was of great importance to the British front. For,
had that part of the front been lost, the Germans in an hour could
have worked their way back of the Twenty-eighth Division and
the entire eastern sector.
In the meantime the French on the western section of the
front made a counterattack from the canal with partial success ;
but were unable to drive the German troops from the sector en-
tirely. The Teutons took Steenstraate ; but their victory there
was marred by the fact that the Belgian artillery smashed the
bridge behind them. By this time the British reenforcements be-
gan to arrive in fairly large numbers. The Thirteenth Brigade
of the Fifth Division was placed to the west of Geddes's De-
tachment, between the Pilkem road and the canal. Territorials
who had arrived from England only three days before, the Dur-
ham and York Brigades of the Northumbrian Division, supported
the Thirteenth Brigade. The Tenth Brigade of the Fourth Di-
vision were rushed to support the Third Brigade of Canadians
who were south of St. Julien. Other British troops were sent to
relieve the tense situation at Grafenstafel.
An attempt to retake St. Julien was made early on Sunday
morning, April 25, 1915, by General Hull's Tenth Brigade and
two battalions of the Durham and York Brigade. The British
worked their way to the few Canadians who had continued on the
former front when the main British force had been driven back.
There they were checked by the German machine gun fire. The
BEGINNING OF SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES 103
British lost many men here and the efforts to save the day
resulted in such a mixture of fighting units that there were
fifteen battalions under General Hull, as well as the Canadian
artillery.
At Grafenstafel the Eighth Battalion of the Durham Brigade
were bombarded with asphyxiating shells before the German in-
fantry attack. The fighting on this section of the front was fierce
throughout the afternoon, but finally the British were forced tc
retire. At Broodseinde, the extreme eastern point of the allied
front, the Germans made a desperate attempt to take the salient,
using asphyxiating and other bombs again and again on the men
of the Twenty-eighth Division of the British. King George's
men, however, repelled the attacks with severe loss to the Teu-
tons, taking many prisoners.
The French on the left, beyond the Yperlee Canal, prevented
the advance of the German troops; and, farther to the left, the
Belgians checked three attacks in which asphyxiating gas was
used, south of Dixmude. Thus it may be seen that the Germans
had met with no success worth while, when Sunday, April 25,
1915, closed, so far as the ends of the salient were concerned ; but
in the center the British situation was so critical that the Second
Canadian Brigade, reduced to less than 1,000 men, was once
more called into action on the following day. On the same day,
April 26, 1915, the Lahore Division of the Indian army was
marched north of Ypres. The point of the salient was pushed in
on that day at Broodseinde, but the German success there was
short-lived. The brigade holding Grafenstafel was attacked
fiercely by the Germans. The Durham Light Infantry was forced
from Fortuin behind the Haanabeek River. The Teutons made
several attacks from the St. Julien district against the section
between the Yperlee Canal and the southern part of the village.
By this time Geddes's Detachment was almost exhausted, they,
with the Canadians, having withstood the heaviest fighting at the
beginning of the battle ; and most likely saved the Allies a most
disastrous defeat. The detachment could stand no more, and the
various units of which it was composed were returned to their
respective commands.
104 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
But the salient was growing smaller as a result of the repeated
hammering of the Germans ; and that exposed the allied troops
to a more deadly fire from three sides. It was evident that the
Allies must make a counterattack. General Riddell's Bri-
gade was sent to Fortuin and with the Lahore Division on its left
was told to retake St. Julien and the woods to the west of the
village. Beyond the Yperlee Canal, on the left, the French made
an assault on Lizeme, supported by the Belgian artillery ; while
the French colonial soldiers poured on Pilkem from the sector
about Boesinghe. On the right the allied troops were lined up
as follows : the Connaught Rangers, Fifty-seventh Wilde's Rifles,
the Ferozepore Brigade, the 129th Baluchis, the Jullundur Bri-
gade, and General RiddelFs battalions. The Sirhind Brigade was
held in reserve.
The German artillerymen apparently knew the distances and
topography of the entire region and poured a leaden hail upon
the allied troops. The Indians and the British in their immediate
neighborhood charged in short rushes, losing many men in the at-
tempt to reach the German trenches. Before the Germans were
in any danger of a hand-to-hand struggle, they sent one of their
gas clouds from their trenches and the attack was abandoned, the
British and Indians getting back to their trenches as best they
could. In this action the British gave great praise to their com-
rades from India. RiddelFs Brigade was stopped in its attack
on St. Julien by wire entanglements ; and, though the outlaying
sections of St. Julien were captured, the brigade was unable to
hold them; and the Germans continued to hold the woods west
of the village. Nevertheless the British front had been pushed
forward from 600 to 700 yards in some places.
By that night, the night of April 26, 1915, the allied front ex-
tended from the north of Zonnebeke to the eastern boundary of
the Graf enstaf el ridge ; thence southwest along the southern side
of the Haanabeek to a point a half mile east of St. Julien ; thence,
bending around that village, it ran to Vamhuele— called the "shell
trap" — farm on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road. Next it proceeded
to Boesinghe and crossed the Yperlee Canal, passing northward
of Lizerne after which were the French and the Belgians.
BEGINNING OF SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES 105
The work of the allied aviators on April 26, 1915, deserves
more than passing consideration in the record of that day's fight-
ing. They dropped bombs on the stations of Courtrai, Roubaix,
Thielt, and Staden. They discovered near Langemarck an
armored train with the result that it was shelled and thus forced
to return. And they forced a German aviator to the ground at
Roulers.
The Lahore Division with the French on their left attacked the
Germans on April 27, 1915, but they met with little success be-
cause of the gas which the Teutons sent into the ranks of the at-
tacking party. But the German troops had lost so heavily that
they did not seem to be inclined to follow up their apparent ad-
vantage. Incidentally the Allies needed a rest as well. Hence
there was little fighting the next two days. On April 30, 1915,
however. General Putz attacked the Germans with so much force
that they were hurled back an appreciable distance near Pilkem.
Seven machine guns and 200 prisoners were taken, and the 214th,
215th, and 216th German regiments lost more than 1,000 men.
On the same day the London Rifle Brigade, further east, drove
back a German forward movement from St. Julien.
West of the Yperlee Canal, however, it soon became known to
the commanders of the allied forces that the Germans were in
such a strong position that it would be impossible to dislodge
their enemy until much greater preparations had been made. In
the meantime the communications of the Allies were in danger.
Hence Sir John French on May 1, 1915, ordered Sir Herbert
Plumer to retreat. The wisdom of this order, the execution of
which contracted the southern portion of the salient, was seen
when the Germans again attempted to force their way through
the allied front by the use of gas. The attempt this time was
made between Zonnebeke, on the Ypres-Roulers railroad, and
Boesinghe on the Yperlee Canal on Sunday, May 2, 1915. Though
the British had been supplied with respirators of a sort, these
means of defense were not as effective as they should have been
nor as adequate as what was provided later. The Germans, how-
ever, suffered large losses in this attack because, as soon as the
wall of gas began to approach the British trenches, the men there
106 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
fired into it, well knowing from past experience that the Germans
were following the gas. In this manner many of the Teutons
were slain. The Allies adopted other tactics which were quite as
effective. On seeing the gas approaching, the soldiers in some
parts of the line proceeded to execute a flank movement, thereby
getting away from the gas and subjecting the Germans to a
deadly fire from a direction least expected.
Between Fortuin and Zonnebeke and south of St. Julien the
allied line broke, but the supports with two cavalry regiments
were rushed from Potijze, a mile and a half from Ypres on the
Zonnebeke Road, and regained the lost ground. By night the
Germans decided to discontinue their attempt to advance and left
their dead and wounded on the field.
CHAPTER XVII
THE STRUGGLE RENEWED
THE Germans had only stopped the struggle for a breathing
spell. On the following morning, Monday, May 3, they made
an attempt to force the allied position back again. This attempt
was made on the British left, west of the Bois des Cuisenirs, be-
tween Pilkem and St. Julien. The Germans cut their wire en-
tanglements and, leaving their trenches and lying down in front
of those protecting places, they were ready to advance ; but, be-
fore they could start forward, the artillery of their enemy did
such effective work that the Teutons returned to their trenches,
and gave up an attack at that point. But they made an assault
against the northern side of the salient which had by this time
become very narrow. A German bomb wrecked a section of the
British trenches, and the defenders of that part of the line had to
go back of a wood that was a little to the northwest of Grafen-
stafel, where they were able to stop the German onrush.
The Belgians were bombarded with asphyxiating gas bombs
beyond the French lines south of Dixmude. The Germans charged
THE STRUGGLE RENEWED 107
the Belgian trenches only to be cut down by machine-gun fire.
That night, the night of May 3, 1915, an attack was made on the
British front ; but it was stopped by the artillery.
Sir Herbert Plumer in the meantime had been executing the
order he had received from Sir John French, and shortened his
lines so they were three miles less in length than before starting
the movement. The new line extended from the French position
west of the Ypres-Langemarck Road and proceeded through
"shell-trap" farm to the Haanebeek and the eastern part of the
Frezenberg ridge where it turned south, covering Bellewaarde
Lake and Hooge and bent around Hill 60. This resulted in leav-
ing to the Germans the Veldhoek, Bosche, and Polygon Woods,
and Fortuin and Zonnebeke. This new front protected all of the
roads to Ypres, and, at the same time, it was not necessary to
employ as many soldiers to hold this line. Moreover the de-
fenders of it could not be fired upon from three sides as long
as they held it. In some places the British and German trenches
had been no more than ten yards apart, but the difficulty of
evacuating the British position was completed in safety on the
night of May 3, 1915. The work included the taking with them
780 wounded. Sharpshooters were left in the trenches, however,
and they maintained such an appearance of activity and alertness
that the Germans kept on shelling the trenches all of the follow-
ing day.
The attempt of General Putz to force the Germans back across
the Yperlee Canal on May 4, 1915, was stopped by a combination
of machine guns, asphyxiating gas and fog. Then the French spent
the next ten days in tunneling to Steenstraate. Their tunnels
toward their objective point were through that territory between
Boesinghe and Lizerne. On May 5, 1915 the Germans made a
careful advance on the British front under the cover of fog and
a heavy bombardment, to find only that the British position had
been changed. But they intrenched opposite the new alignment,
and brought up their big guns. Then they used poisonous gas
again with the result that the British retreated and the Teutons
followed, in spite of tlie many men who fell because of the accu-
rate work of the British artillery. The greater part of this action
108 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
took place around Hill 60, and some of the British trenches to the
north of the hill were captured by the Germans. They then pene-
trated toward Zillebeke to the supporting line. Up to midnight
the Germans seemed to be victorious ; then, however, the British
drove them from the hill only to be driven away in turn by the
use of asphyxiating gas. On the following day the Teutons held
Hill 60 and some of the trenches north of it.
Asphyxiating gas also had been used in an attempt to break
the British front on the left, on both the north and south sides of
the Ypres-Roulers railroad. Though this attack failed, the Teu-
tons were ready to make as near superhuman efforts as possible
because they knew that the French were getting ready for a de-
cisive action in the Arras territory, which would have the aid of
a British attack south of the Lys. Hence it was to the advan-
tage of the Germans to force Sir John French and General Foch
to retain most of the British and French soldiers north of
the Lys. On May 8, 1915, they turned their artillery on that
part of the British front that was near Frezenberg. It de-
stroyed the trenches and killed or wounded hundreds of the de-
fenders. After three hours of this, the Germans commenced an
attack on that part of the British front between the Ypres-Menin
and the Ypres-Poelcappelle highways, the greatest pressure being
brought to bear along both sides of the Ypres-Roulers railroad.
The British fought bravely, but it was impossible for them to
hold out against the avalanche of lead. First the right of a
brigade went to pieces and then its center and the left of an-
other brigade south of it were forced back. Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry held fast. The Second Essex Regiment
also made some little success for their side by annihilating a
small detachment of Germans ; but that was more than offset by
the breaking of the center of another brigade, after which the
First Suffolks were surrounded and put out of the fight. Finally
the Germans pushed their way on to Frezenberg. Sir Herbert
Plumer realized by the middle of the afternoon that a counter-
attack was necessary. He had held two battalions in reserve
along the Ypres-Menin Road. He also had five battalions with
him and reenf orcements in the form of a brigade of infantry had
THE STRUGGLE RENEWED 109
arrived at Vlamertinghe Chateau, back of Ypres. He sent the
First Royal Warwickshires, the Second Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
the Second Surreys, the Third Middlesex, and the First York and
Lancaster Regiments into the break in the line with the result
that Frezenberg was retaken. This victory was short-lived, how-
ever ; for the German machine-gun fire was too fierce for the men
to withstand. The British retired to a new front which ran north
and south through Verlorenhoek. The Twelfth London Regiment^
on the left, though it lost many men, managed to get to the
original line of trenches. Next the British were menaced from
the north and east. Great bodies of Teutons rushed from the
woods south of the Menin highway, when others rushed down the
Poelcappelle Road and took Wieltje, which is only about two miles
from Ypres.
The fighting continued all night, but shortly after midnight
the British charged with the bayonet and retook Wieltje as well
as most of that section to the north of it which they had lost
Early on May 9, 1915, the fighting was continued, and, in the
afternoon, the Germans charged from the woods in a vain at-
tempt to take Ypres after a severe bombardment of the British
trenches. An attacking party of five hundred was slain north of
the town. On the eastern side of the salient there were five dis-
tinct attacks. An attempt to capture the Chateau Hooge was
made early in the evening, only to result in heaping the ground
with German dead. The day closed with 150 yards of British
trenches in the hands of the Germans ; but they had been taken
tt a fearful cost to the kaiser's men.
The Germans began the next day. May 10, 1915, by shelling
he British north and south of the Ypres-Menin road. They fol-
)wed the cannonade with a cloud of asphyxiating gas. They then
tarted for the opposing trenches. Many of them, the British
liege, wore British uniforms. The British had by now been
equipped with proper respirators and could withstand a gas at-
tack with comparative ease. When the Germans were in close
range they received a rifle and machine-gun fire that mowed them
down almost instantly. Those who had not been shot fell to the
ground to escape the leaden hail. But escape was not for them.
110 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Shrapnel was poured upon them, and nearly all of the attacking
troops perished.
Another gas attack was made between the Ypres-Menin road
and the Ypres-Comines canal. There two batteries of gas cylin-
ders sent forth their deadly fumes for more than a half hour.
The cloud that resulted became so dense that it was impossible
for the British in the opposite trenches to see anything ; so they
were withdrawn temporarily ; but the troops to the left and right
kept the Germans from following up this advantage and the
trenches were saved to the British. When the gas had passed
away the men returned to their former position. North of the
Menin road, however, the Germans were successful in driving
the Fourth Rifle Brigade and the Third King's Royal Rifles to a
new position, the trenches which the British occupied having
been battered by shell fire to such an extent that some of the oc-
cupants were buried alive. Hence the British here retreated to a
new line of trenches west of the Bellewaarde Wood where the
trees had been shelled until they were part of a hopeless entangle-
ment rather than a forest.
The next day, May 11, 1915, was started by the Germans hurl-
ing hundreds of incendiary shells into the already ruined town
of Ypres. They also fired almost countless high-explosive shells
into the British trenches. The British big guns replied with con-
siderable effect. One of the German cannon was rendered use-
less by the fire of the Thirty-first Heavy Battery, and several
howitzers were damaged by the North Midland Heavy Battery.
The German cannonade was especially effective near the Ypres-
St. Julien road. The Teutons, however, did not confine their work
to the artillery, for they made three assaults on the British
trenches south of the Menin road. This part of the line was held
by Scottish regiments, who, though they were forced out of their
trenches, regained them with the aid of other Scots who were sup-
porting them.
By now it was apparent to the British commanding officers
that they must still further lessen the projection of their salient.
So on May 12, 1915, the Twenty-eighth Division was sent to the
reserve. It had experienced continuous fighting since April 22,
THE STRUGGLE RENEWED 111
1915, and had suffered severe losses. It had only one lieutenant
colonel. Captains were in command of most of its battalions.
The First and Third Cavalry Divisions took its place. They
were under the command of General De Lisle. From left to
right the new line was held as follows : The men of the Twelfth
Brigade, the Eleventh Brigade, and a battalion of the Tenth
Brigade of the Fourth Division guarded the new front to a point
northeast of Verlorenhoek. ' Next came the First Cavalry which
held the line to the Roulers railroad. From the railroad to Belle-
waarde Lake the Third Division held the line. From the lake to
Hill 60 the Twenty-seventh Division had its position. The
British admitted that this new position was not strong, because it
lacked natural advantages, and the trenches werq more or less
of hasty construction.
The Germans started a heavy bombardment of the cavalry on
May 13, 1915, when the rain was pouring in torrents and a north
wind was adding to the discomforts of the British. The fiercest
part of this attack was on the Third Division. Some idea of the
fierceness of the bombardment can be gained when it is known
that in a comparatively short space of time more than eight
hundred shells were hurled on a part of the British line which
was not more than a mile in length. In places the British were
buried alive. In spite of the destructive fire, the North Somerset
Yeomanry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Glyn, charged the
Germans who were advancing on their trenches under cover of
the bombardment. The charge was effective, and the Teutons
were driven headlong toward their own trenches. But the Ger-
man artillery had the range of the Seventh Brigade on the right,
and poured upon it such a fire that it retreated several hundred
'-ards, leaving the right of the Sixth Brigade exposed. As soon
IS possible the British made an attempt to remedy the defect in
leir line, and found it necessary to make a counterattack. In
lis counterattack very satisfactory results were obtained by the
ise of the Duke of Westminster's armored motor cars. The
tritish regained the lost ground, but they found it impossible to
itain it, for the Teuton's heavy artillery had the range of the
iition so accurately that no man could live there. The result
8— War St. 3
112 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the day's fighting was a farther pushing back of the line of
the British so that it bent backward from Verlorenhoek and
Bellewaarde Lake. In addition to being forced back, the British
suffered a large loss of men, especially officers.
The infantry on the left had been fiercely attacked on this same
day ; but it managed to keep from being driven from its position.
One of the defenders of this part of the line was a territorial bat-
talion, the London Rifle Brigade. There were only 278 men in the
battalion at the beginning of the day, it having suffered severe
losses previously. By night ninety-one more had been lost. Four
survivors, under command of Sergeant Douglas Belcher, and two
hussars whom the sergeant had added to his squad, held that part
of the line in the face of repeated attacks. These plucky men
not only made the Germans think the front was strongly de-
fended there by using quick-firing methods, but they undoubt-
edly saved the right of the Fourth Division. Another especially
gallant piece of work on the part of the British was done by the
Second Essex, the reserve battalion of the Twelfth Brigade. With
a bayonet charge they drove the Germans from Shelltrap Farm,
which was between the Langemarck and Poelcappelle highways,
and, though it was held by first one side and then the other, the
British had it at the close of the day in spite of the bom-
bardment it received.
The French met with better success on the British left. Under
the command of General Putz they made an attack on Het Sase
and Steenstraate. The sharpshooters of the Zouaves and Alge-
rians took a trench in front of the latter place and entered the
village. They fought on to the canal by the end of that day, which
was May 15, 1915. More than six hundred Teuton dead were
counted after that engagement. At the same time the Zouaveaf
captured Het Sase with great ease, because the artillery had ren-
dered its defenders useless for more fighting. The Germans,
however, were not inclined to give up the town so easily. They
bombarded Het Sase that night, using asphyxiating shells. Noth-
ing daunted, the Zouaves put on their respirators and drove off
with hand grenades and rifle fire the Germans who followed in
the wake of the poisonous shells. On the following day it was
THE STRUGGLE RENEWED
113
HOLLEBEKE
vO^^^'ZANOVOOROe
HOUTHEM
/k -k 2.
GAS BATTLE OF YPRES
114 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
said that the only Germans left alive on the left side of the
Yperlee Canal were either wounded or prisoners. The French
had destroyed three German regiments, taken three redoubts, and
captured four fortified lines and three villages. In this connec-
tion it may not be amiss to note that the French reported that,
on May 15, 1915, the German Marine Fusiliers who were at-
tempting to hold the Yperlee Canal concluded it was the better
part of valor to surrender. Before the Germans could relinquish
their places they were shot down by their comrades in the
rear.
Fighting along the line of the salient continued with more or
less vigor for nearly ten days, but, until May 24, 1915, there were
no engagements that had much out of the ordinary. On that date,
however, the entire front from Belle waarde Lake to Shelltrap, a
line three miles in length, was bombarded with asphyxiating
shells. This was followed by a gas cloud that was sent against the
same extent of trenches. The wind sent the cloud in a south-
westerly direction, so that the deadly fumes got in their work
along nearly five miles of the front. It is asserted that the cloud
was 40 feet in height, and that the Germans continued to renew
the supply of gas for four and a half hours. It had little effect
wherever the British used their respirators, for they managed to
stay in their positions without undue inconvenience. Those who
suffered the most from the gas cloud were the infantry of the
Fourth Division on the left. The cloud which had followed the
asphyxiating shells was in turn followed by a severe bombard-
ment from three sides — the east, northeast, and north. The
principal attacks were made in the neighborhood of Shelltrap,
the British front along the Roulers railroad, and along the
Menin road in the vicinity of Bellewaarde Lake. In those places
the British were pushed back at least temporarily ; but counter-
attacks were delivered before nightfall, and the greater part of
the lost ground regained. Thus, to the disappointment of the
Germans, their extra effort, with all the means of warfare at
their disposal, had resulted only in reducing the salient at an
enormous cost in lives on both sides, but the gain had been for
the most part temporary.
OTHER ACTIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT 115
Before leaving the consideration of the second battle of Yprea
it may be well to estimate what has been gained and lost by both
sides. In the attempt to wear down their opponents one side had
inflicted as much of a blow as the other, to all intents and pur-
poses, for there had been an almost prodigal waste of human life
and ammunition. The distinct advantage that Germany had
gained was in pushing back and almost flattening out the prow
of the British salient, and they had demonstrated the superiority
of their artillery. Britain, on the other hand, had lost no stra-
tegical advantage by the change of her line. The knowledge that
Germany had a superior artillery acted as a stimulant in making
the British provide a better equipment of big guns. But the
British had demonstrated the great superiority of their infantry
over that of Germany. In fact there was comfort to be derived
by the friends of each side as a result of the second battle of Ypres.
The fighting had to stop, as far as being a general engagement
was concerned. There were other parts of the front in western
Europe which were becoming by far too active for either the
Germans or the British to neglect them. Hence it is necessary to
leave Ypres and the brave men who fell there, and consider what
was being done elsewhere.
CHAPTER XVIII
OTHER ACTIONS ON THE WESTERN
FRONT
^URING the time in which the foregoing actions had been tak-
ing place, there was activity on the part of the Allies and the
rermans in other sections of the great western front. It is true
[that not much was accomplished in Alsace in either April or
[ay; for the fighting in the plains had been for the most part
rhat may be termed trench warfare. The most important en-
gagement had been the effort to take and hold Hartmannsweiler-
[kopf , the spur of the Molkenrain massif, which controls the union
116 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the Thur and the 111. The top of this rise of ground, it will be
remembered, had been won by the Germans on January 21, 1915;
but the heights west of it and their slopes were in the possession
of the French, who desired to add the spur to their possessions.
For this purpose the French artillery bombarded it on March 25,
1915, and continued their work on the following day, March 26,
1915, when the Chasseurs stormed the height, and, after fighting
for six hours, gained the top and captured 400 prisoners. But
the Germans had no intention of giving their opponents such a
hold on the control of the valley of the 111, so there were many
counterattacks.
While the Germans were attempting to retake the summit, the
French were making desperate efforts to drive the Teutons from
the eastern slopes. The Germans were temporarily successful,
but their success was short-lived, for the French retook the top
on April 28, 1915. During the next month. May, both sides made
claims of success; but what each actually possessed was as fol-
lows: The French had the top and all of the western portion;
the Germans possessed the summit ridge, and the east and north-
east portions. But, until the French held the entire mountain,
they could make little use of it in controlling the 111 Valley.
The fighting in the other part of the Vosges had to do prin-
cipally with the valley of the Fecht. The stream runs from
Schlucht and Bramont east, and proceeds past Mtinster and Met-
zeral. On its right bank is the railroad from Colmar to Metzeral.
The heights in the upper part of the valley were held by the
Chasseurs Alpins; and they desired to take both towns.
Throughout the month of April the French were fairly success-
ful on both banks of the river. The spur above Metzeral to the
northwest was taken by them. The ridge between the two
valleys was captured by the French on April 17, 1915. The fight-
ing here was continued throughout May, 1915.
The next scene of activity was north, where there was a wooded
plateau between the Moselle and the Meuse. Here the Germans^
had a salient which was long and quite narrow. The point of this|
salient was at St. Mihiel, the other side of the Meuse. This]
point was well protected by the artillery siX Camp des Romains,;
OTHER ACTIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT 117
which controlled the section for ten miles in any direction. To
the north of the salient there was a railroad from Etain to Metz.
There was another line twenty miles to the south. This ran from
Metz to Thiaucourt by the Rupt de Mad. The village of
Vigneulles was about in the center of the narrow part of the
salient, and on the road to St. Mihiel. There was a better road
to the south through Apremont A strategic railroad had been
built from Thiaucourt by Vigneulles to St. Mihiel, down the Gap
of Spada, which is an opening between the hills of the Meuse
Valley. The plateau of Les Eparges is north of Vigneulles. The
plateau is approximately 1,000 feet above the sea level, and forms
the eastern border of the heights of the Meuse. There was high
land on the southern side of the salient, along which ran the
main road from Commercy to Pont-a-Mousson. Within the
salient the land was rough and, to a considerable extent, covered
with wood.
The French did not plan to make an attack on the salient at its
apex. The artillery at Camp des Remains would be too effective.
The French plan was to press in the sides of the salient and
finally control the St. Mihiel communications. The southeastern
side of the salient, at the beginning of April, 1915, extended from
St. Mihiel to Camp des Remains, thence to Bois d'Ailly, Apre-
mont, Boudonville, Regnieville, and finally to the Moselle, three
miles north of Pont-a-Mousson. The northwestern side was
marked by an imaginary line drawn from Etain in the north past
Fresnes, over the Les Eparges Heights, and thence by Lamor-
ville and Spada to St. Mihiel. The place of most importance,
from a military point of view, was the Les Eparges plateau,
which controlled the greater part of the northern section of the
ilient. The taking of this plateau would naturally be the first
Jtep in capturing Vigneulles. But the Germans had converted
ies Eparges into what had the appearance of being an impreg-
lable fort, when they took it on September 21, 1914. Their
•enches lined the slopes, and everji^hing had been made secure
for a possible siege. The French in February and March, 1915,
Lowever, had taken the village of Les Eparges and a portion of
le steep side on the northwest. But of necessity they made
118 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
progress slowly, because they were in such an exposed position
whenever they sought the top. They had planned an assault for
April 5, 1915, and, in a heavy rain, with the slope a great mass of
deep mud, the French gained some territory. This they were
unable to hold when the Germans made a counterattack on the
following morning, April 6, 1915. That night the soldiers of the
republic forced their way up with the bayonet, taking 1,500 yards
of trenches, by the morning of April 7, 1915. Thereupon the
Germans brought up reenforcements, which were rendered use-
less by the French artillery, which prevented them from going
forward to the battle line. The German artillery used the same
tactics, with the result that the French reenforcements were kept
out of the fight. After the cannons had completed their work,
both sides were apparently willing to rest for the remainder of
the day. But on the morning of April 8, 1915, two regiments of
infantry and a battalion of Chasseurs forced their way to the
top, which they took after an hour*s hard fighting. That pushed
the Germans back to the eastern slope. Then the battle was
fought on during the remainder of the day, which found the
French, at its close, in possession of all except a little triangle in
the eastern section.
Some idea of the conditions confronting those who attempted
the ascent may be gained when it is learned that fourteen hours
were required by the hardy French troops to go up to relieve
their comrades who gained the top. This relief was not sent until
the following day, April 9, 1915. On that day the Germans in the
little triangle were driven off or slain. One of the sudden and
dense fogs of the region appeared later and made a cover for a
German counterattack. The French were at a disadvantage,
but they quickly rallied, and, the fog suddenly lifting, they em-
ployed a bayonet charge with such good effect that the Germans
were driven off with large losses. The importance of this
achievement to the Allies is not likely to be overestimated. The
height of Les Eparges dominated the Woevre district, and its:
capture by the French was one of the most heroic feats of the
war. The Germans placed as high a value on the height for
military purposes ai? the French. They had spent the winter in
OTHER ACTIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT 119
O I 2 S 4
HEAVY BLACK UI»«E
SHOWS BATTLE FRONT
MARCH ^9*9
THE FIGHTING IN ALSACE — HARTMANNSWEILERKOPF
120 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
adding to what nature had made nearly perfect — ^the impregna-
bility of the entire sector. They intrusted its defense, when an
attack seemed likely, only to first-line troops, the Tenth Division
of the Fifth Corps from Posen holding it when the French made
their successful attack. To gain the height it was necessary for
the French to climb the slimy sides, which were swept by machine-
gun fire. The Germans knew the exact range of every square
foot of the slopes. There was no place that offered even a slight
shelter for the attacking force. The weather was at its worst.
Yet, in spite of the many difficulties which seemed insurmount-
able, the French soldiers had won the most decisive engagement
in this part of the campaign.
It is true the Teutons occupied the lesser spur of Combres;
but that gave them little or no advantage, for no attack could be
made from it without subjecting the attacking party to a leaden
hail from St. Remy and Les Eparges. But the German sahent
still remained, and the French continued their pressure on it.
They pushed forward in the north to Etain, and took the hills on
the right bank of the Orne, which hampered their enemy in his
use of the Etain-Conflans railroad. They closed in on the re-
entrant of the salient to the north — Gussainville ; and they used
the same tactics in regard to Lamorville, because it dominated the
Gap of Spada ; and to the north of it they exerted a pressure on
the Bois de la Selouse. The engagements on the south of the
salient were fought desperately. The part of the top which falls
away to the Rupt de Mad was held by the French. That section
is covered with a low wood, which develops into presentable for-
ests in the region toward the Moselle Valley to the east. The
Teutons had taken every advantage of the ground in construct-
ing their fortifications, and the French found a hard task before
them. They proceeded against their opponents in the Bois
d^Ailly, the Forest of Apremont, the Bois de Mont-Mare, the
village of Regnieville, and the Bois le Pretre. Though each suc-
cess was not large, the entire effort was effective in pushing in
the southern side of the salient. This brought the soldiers of the
republic to within about four miles of Thiaucourt, which, with the
control of Les Eparges, threatened St. Mihiel.
i
CAMPAIGN IN ARTOIS REGION 121
The French heavy artillery shelled the southern front of the
trenches at Metz on May 1, 1915. The great desire to take Alsace
and Lorraine, however, was set aside early in the month. The
plight of Russia at this time made it imperative for the Allies to
make a great movement on the western front to prevent as much
as possible the pressure on the czar's line. Hence the campaign
which seemed to be planned by the French was abandoned for a
larger opportunity. This was the advance of the Tenth Army in
the Artois over the plain of the Scheldt in the direction of Douai
and Valenciennes, thereby threatening the communications of the
entire Teuton line from Soissons to Lille. Hence the French
started a vigorous movement against Lens, while the British
sought to take Lille.
CHAPTER XIX
CAMPAIGN IN ARTOIS REGION
TO understand properly the campaign in the Artois, it is neces-
sary to have at least a fair knowledge of the geography
and the topography of the territory between La Bassee and
Arras.
The valley of the Scarpe is held in on the south by low hills, and
on the north by a low plateau, which descends in long ridges to
the valley of the Lys and the plains about Lens. The greatest alti-
tude in this section is the ridge known as Notre-Dame de Lorette,
running east and west, and containing numerous ravines. To the
south of it, in a little valley, is the town of Albain St. Nazaire.
Carency is opposite on the next ridge. Next is the Bois de
Berthonval in the middle of a wide depression. Beyond, the land
ascends to Mont St. Eloi. The valley of the Lys is to the north of
the Lorette ridge. To the east the land descends to the long,
; narrow valley in which is the highway between Arras and
Bethune. La Targette and Souchez are along the way. Again
the land rolls upward to the hills of Vimy with the Lens-Arras
highway beyond them.
122 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The Teutons held a saUent in this region at the beginning of
May, 1915. The Hne which bounded this saUent ran east of Loos
over the Bethune-Lens road, east of Aix-Noulette, and appeared
on the Lorette plateau considerably to the west of its tallest spur,
where was situated the Chapel of Our Lady ; running out to the
prow of the salient, it took in Albain; and then proceeded to
Carency ; bending closely, it ran east of the Bois de Berthonval,
taking in La Targette and the Arras-Bethune highway. That
part of the German line was called by the French the "White
Works," on account of the chalk with which the breastworks were
constructed. To the southeast of it was a section known as the
Labyrinth. Ecurie was inside the line which finally ran back east
of Arras. The salient was constructed for the guarding of Lens,
which was considered the entrance to the upper valley of the
Scheldt and the lowlands in the direction of Douai and Valen-
ciennes. Of more importance than Lens itself was the railroad
back of this front, the capture of which would naturally be a
source of great danger to the Germans.
The French had won some ground in the region of the Lorette
plateau early in 1915. The Tenth Army in the Artois received
enough additional men to give it seven corps. More than 1,100
pieces of artillery, of varying caliber, were taken to this region
by the French. The entire preparation for the campaign was
under the personal direction of General Foch. In the meantime
the Germans, becoming aware that their enemy was becoming
more and more active, proceeded to strengthen the front by the
addition of three divisions which were known as "divisions of
assault." The men composing these additions were from Bavaria,
Saxony, and Baden. Even this reenforcement left the Teutons
outnumbered, and with less artillery than their opponents; but
they held a position which was considered more impregnable than
any other on either front. The Germans here had a chain of
forts linked together by an elaborate series of trenches, these
latter so arranged that the taking of one of the series placed its
captors within the zone of fire of several others. Moreover there
was an elaborate series of underground works, including mines
and wolf pits, the latter being covered over with a thin layer of
CAMPAIGN IN ARTOIS REGION 123
turf and thickly studded with stakes whose points awaited the
charging French.
General Foch was ready on Sunday morning, May 9, 1915,
and his artillery began one of the heaviest bombardments
in history. The 1,100 French cannon hurled 300,000 shells
on the German fortifications that day. The reverberations
were deafening and terrifying. They startled the British en-
gaged at the Aubers Ridge. The deluge of projectiles crashed
their way through the supposedly impregnable work of engineer-
ing that the Germans had erected, and buried their mangled de-
fenders in chaotic ruins. The preliminary work of the artillery
was continued for three hours, accompanied by the plaudits of
the French infantrymen. Then the infantry were sent to take
the wrecks of what had been the pride of the German engineers.
They took what was still in existence at La Targette, and the im-
portant crossroads there. They waged a fierce fight in and around
the village of Neuville St. Vaast, which was stoutly defended by
German machine guns. Here there was house-to-house fighting.
The French center, farther north, charged over the remnants of
the White Works, and went on beyond the Arras-Bethune road.
This section of the advance took more than two and a half miles
of trenches in an hour and a half. On the left the French were
unable to maintain such speed, because of the many ravines.
They took the outlying sections of Carency, and worked their way
eastward, cutting the road to Souchez. At the end of the first
lay the French had to their credit three lines of German trenches
m a five-mile front, 3,000 prisoners, 10 field guns, and 50 machine
ms.
The bombardment was continued all night by the French gun-
lers, while the men who had taken the trenches did their best to
lake such repairs as were necessary for the protection of the
ictors. On the morning of the following day. May 10, 1915, the
joldiers of the republic had forced their way into the center of the
German position. North of the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette
feint attack was made to hold the German reserves. When
le first French line was about to dash forward to complete their
^ork of the day before, they suddenly received an order to re*
124 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
main where they were and seek all cover possible. One of the
French aviators had seen a German counterattack getting under
way near the sugar factory at Souchez. Preparatory to the
Teuton advance the German artillery hurled hundreds of high-
explosive shells on the section where the French would have been
had they not received the order to keep under cover. To be ex-
posed under such conditions would have meant annihilation. Be-
lieving their plans for the counterattack were working favorably,
the Germans advanced, only to be mowed down by the French
guns. Then the French infantry charged and gained another
trench line. So eager were the younger French soldiers that
some of those who charged from the south were not content
with taking the trench which was their objective point, but
dashed on into a ravine that extended in the direction of Ablain.
There they killed or made prisoners of the Germans they found.
This dash was extremely hazardous in the face of a possible
German counterattack, which luckily for the French did not
occur as the Teutons retired to Souchez in confusion and were
unable to rally for any counterattack. A summary of the day's
fighting includes the taking of all of the German trenches across
the Bethune-Loos road; the attack on the fortified chapel of
Notre Dame de Lorette, and the gaining of the trenches to the
south of it, these connecting with Ablain and Souchez ; the cap-
ture of the cemetery of Neuville St. Vaast ; and the defeat of the
German reserves who were rushed in motor cars from Lens
and Douai. The trenches and approaches being too narrow and
deep to allow freedom of action in using rifle and bayonet, the
rifle is generally slung on the man's back in bandolier, and the
fighting within the trenches is done with short weapons, espe-
cially with hand grenades, hence the new military expressions
**bombing" and "bombing parties," as the squads are called that
are especially detailed for bomb work during the charges.
The fighting continued fiercely throughout May 11, 1915. Late
in the day the French took the lower part of the Arabs' Spur. An
unsuccessful counterattack was made that night from the Spur of
the White Way. But the French were harried by the artillery in
Angres and the machine guns in Ablain, and their discomforts
CAMPAIGN IN ARTOIS REGION 125
were added to by the work of the bursting shells which
opened the graves of soldiers who had been slain in previous
months.
Carency, surrounded on the east, south and west, and wrecked
by the 20,000 shells which had been fired upon it, surrendered on
the afternoon of May 12, 1915. The Germans captured there
made a total of more than 5,000 prisoners taken by the French.
Notre Dame de Lorette with its chapel and fort was also
taken this same day, as was Ablain which was in flames when
it was surrendered. Thus all of the highland to the west of
Souchez was held by the French except a few fortins on eastern
ridges.
A north wind and a heavy rain added to the discomforts of
the soldiers on May 13, 1915. But physical discomforts were
not all that made for more or less unhappiness. The Germans
had little reason to be happy ; but the French had the edge taken
from their elation, because of their victory, by the fact that it
seemed as if it must be won again before it would be of use to
them. According to the rules of the war game the German line
had been broken and the French had made for themselves a right
of way; but there were many instances in this war where the
rules were not followed ; and this was one of the exceptions. It
is true the German line had been smashed, but it had not fallen
back. Instead the remnants of the line had collected themselves
in the series of independent redoubts which had seemingly been
prepared for just such an emergency. They were so situated
that it was well-nigh impossible to destroy them at long range;
>ut it was impossible to make any forward movement which
'•ould not be enfiladed by them. Hence it became necessary for
the French, if they were to be really victorious, to reduce each
separate redoubt. The most prominent of these were the sugar
factory at Souchez, the cemetery at Ablain, the White Road on
spur of the Lorette, the eastern portion of Neuville St. Vaast,
id the Labyrinth. The last named was so called because it
was an elaborate system ot trenches and redoubts in an angle
between two roads. The White Road surrendered on May 21,
1915. Ablain was taken on May 29, 1915. The Souchez sugar
126
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
THE BATTLES IN ARTOIS
CAMPAIGN IN ARTOIS REGION 127
factory fell on May 31, 1915. Neuville St. Vaast was cap-
tured on June 8, 1915. The Labyrinth, however, remained under
German control. Part of it was fifty feet below the surface
of the earth, much of the fighting there being carried on in un-
derground galleries and by means of mines. It finally was
entirely in the hands of the French on June 19, 1915, after being
taken to a considerable extent foot by foot. The last of the
fighting there was in what was known as the Eulenburg Pas-
sage, where the entire 161st German Regiment, consisting of
4,000 men, were slain and a Bavarian regiment suffered a
heavy loss in killed and wounded. The French took 1,000
prisoners; and only 2,000 of their own men were unable to
answer roll call after the fight, of whom many were only slightly
wounded.
In concluding the account of the battle of the Artois it may
be admitted that the French had won what has been called a
brilliant victory, but it had not been a complete success. They
had made an end of the German salient ; and only the last defense
of Lens remained. How much they had reduced the pressure on
Russia is problematical; but there is little doubt they had pre-
vented the Germans from continuing the offensive on the Ypres
front. They estimated the German loss at 60,000; and, by a
peculiar coincidence, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, whose armies
they fought, estimated the French loss at the same figure —
60,000. It is known they lost many men in the hand-to-hand
struggles; but their great forward movement was so well pro-
tected by their artillery that the French loss there was com-
paratively slight. Some idea can be gained from the fact that
[one French division killed 2,600 of their enemy and captured
8,000 prisoners with a loss of only 250 slain and 1,250 wounded.
[But the greatest gain to the French was probably the fact that
[the battle of the Artois had proved to the soldiers of the republic
[that their artillery was the equal of the German, which had
ibeen the arm in which the Teutons excelled. It also proved that
the Germans could not intrench themselves in any manner that
[was impregnable to the French; for they had taken the Laby-
jrinth, a most complicated series of military engineering feats
9— War St. 3
128 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
which were supposed to be able to withstand any assault. And
lastly, and perhaps of most importance to the French, the belief
in the superiority of the German soldier, as a result of 1870-
was shattered in the mind of the Frenchman.
CHAPTER XX
BRITISH FORWARD MOVEMENT — BATTLE
OFFESTUBERT
TO aid the French in the Artois, the British made a forward
movement in the Festubert region in May, 1915. Its purpose
was to prevent the Seventh German Corps from sending troops
and artillery to reenforce Lens. Moreover the British, if they
succeeded, would take the Aubers ridge, which they had tried to
gain in the battle of Neuve Chapelle. If they could capture the
Aubers ridge, the way would be opened to Lille and La Bassee.
The action began on Sunday morning. May 9, 1915, in the region
between Bois Grenier and Festubert, and was a part of the for-
ward movement of the British from Armentieres to La Bassee.
Part of the First Corps and the Indian Corps marched forward
on the right from the Rue du Bois toward the southern part of
the Bois du Biez, where there had been much fighting before.
The principal attack was made by the Eighth Division on Rouges
Bancs, not far from Fromelles and the Aubers ridge, near where
the British had been stopped in the battle of Neuve Chapelle.
At approximately the same time that General Sir Douglas Haig
with the British First Army reached the slightly elevated plateau
in front of Lille, General Foch with a large body of French
troops made a desperate attack on the Germans on their front
from La Bassee to Arras. The French and British had joined
their efforts here, not only to relieve the pressure which was
being exerted on Ypres and to take Lille, which dominated a
region rich in coal, but also for the purpose of keeping the Ger-
mans so busy on the western front that none could be sent to the
BRITISH FORWARD MOVEMENT 129
eastern front and further embarrass Russia. The artillery of both
the British and French attempted to wreck the German trenches
before their infantry should be sent against their foe. In this
effort the British, using principally shrapnel, made little head-
way; but their ally, using high-explosive shells, such as they
had been hurEng at the Germans for weeks at the rate of a
hundred thousand a day, was successful. Soon the Teutons'
front was screened by clouds of yellow, green, black and white
smoke. But this was not to be a one-sided artillery engagement,
and the Germans soon had their artillery in action. They trained
it on their enemies' trenches, believing from the size of the
bombardment that an assault was soon to be made and that the
trenches would be filled with troops. Their surmise was correct,
but the Allies had suspected their opponents would reason thus,
so the French and British infantry were in covered positions.
Of course the Germans did not know how well their opponents
were protected, so they sent thousands of shells against the
allied positions. And again the allied artillerists replied in
kind. This time they caught the German reenforcements, with
the result that many of them were slain before they could reach
their own front. In this work the British shrapnel was more
effective than the French high-explosive shells.
The bombardment was continued vigorously for three-quarters
of an hour. That the allied range finders had been doing ac-
curate work was evidenced by the appearance of the German
trenches when the British and French fire was turned against
the supporting German trenches ; but the Teutons' wire entangle-
ments remained intact. Heretofore the big guns had been able
to sweep such obstructions away. When the infantry reached
the barbed wire, it found the Germans had improved this partic-
ular method of defense by using specially manufactured wire
cable, well barbed, which was from one and one-half to two
inches in diameter. And, to protect their cable entanglements, the
Germans had built parapets in front of the entanglements. Their
enemy's charging infantry coming upon such an obstruction
could not cut it, and the only means of circumventing this new
device was for the attacking force to throw their overcoats on
130 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the entanglements and crawl across the wire in the face of
rifle and machine-gun Are.
For a considerable distance along this part of the front the
distance between the German and British trenches was not more
than two hundred yards. At not a few sections the opposing
trenches were near enough to permit the soldiers to converse
with their opponents. The trenches for the most part were built
on the marshland with sandbags, those of the British being
khaki-colored, and the German being black and white. When the
inevitable order to charge was given, the British artillery shifted
its range to the German rear and the Eighth Division dashed
over the black and white sandbags behind which the Germans
were crouching. Beyond them was a ridge, in horseshoe for-
mation, which was the last barrier that lay between the Allies
and the plains that led to Lille. This ridge trails off in a north-
easterly direction at Rouges Bancs. Near the hamlet there was
a small wood which had been taken by the Pathans and Gurkhas
before the cannonade started. Among the regiments that led the
attack of the Eighth Division were the Kensington Battalion of
the London Regiment, the First Gloucesters, the Second Sussex,
and the Northamptons. They were supported by the Liver-
pool Territorials, the First North Lancashires, the Second
King's Royal Rifles, and the Sussex Territorials. The Germans
had large bodies of reenforcements held at Lille, but they were
unavailing; and the British took the first line of trenches though
it required fifteen and a half hours to do it. Then they went on
until they were on the slope of the ridge. Beyond that, however,
it seemed impossible to proceed, for the Germans had such an
array of Aiachine guns trained on the approach to their second
line of trenches that no human being could live in the face of
their deadly fire. The British needed an equipment with which
to bombard their enemy with high-explosive shells. Such an
equipment they did not possess.
The German commander played a clever trick on the British
when their First Army Corps and their Indian Division
attempted to make progress in the triangle to the west of La
Bassee. He evacuated his first two lines of trenches while the
BRITISH FORWARD MOVEMENT 131
artillery was doing what it could to demolish his parapets ; but
his men were drawn up in the third line of trenches waiting for
the inevitable advance of the British. This third line of trenches
was protected with armor plate and concrete. Moreover he had
planted a large number of machine guns in the brickfield near
La Bassee. The British dashed forward until they were in range
of the machine guns. Then they suffered such severe losses that
they were forced to retreat, even though they had almost taken
the inviting German trenches. The Highlanders and the Bed-
fords had made a gallant charge and felt especially humiliated
to have to withdraw when victory was about to perch on their
banners. They believed that a lack of reenforcements was re-
sponsible for their nonsuccess.
The day's fighting ended with the First Army of the British
driven back except in the center. There the Kensington Terri-
torial Battalion made a remarkable record for itself. In the
morning when the British artillery ceased firing, the Kensington
men dashed from their trenches and captured three lines of the
German trenches at the point of the bayonet. A part of the bat-
taUon, in its eagerness to win the day, went on up the ridge. At
the same time one of its companies turned to the left and another
to the right, and with bayonet and bomb drove the Germans
from the trenches for a distance of 200 yards. The Kensingtons
were doing the work that had been set for them to do ; but two
regular battalions, one to their left and the other to their right,
were not as able to comply with the orders they had received. The
regulars were stopped by wire entanglements that the artillery
had failed to smash, and, at the same time, they were raked by
machine-gun fire. Hence they were unable to keep up with the
Territorials. In fact the regulars never got up to the Kensington
men; but were forced to retire. This left the Territorials in a
most precarious condition. They had gained such an important
point on the German line that a heavy fire was directed against
them. But the British would not give up what they had taken.
Instead of retiring, they sent for reenforcements which were
promised to them. In the meantime the Germans gave up trying
to blow the Kensingtons out of their position and made a counter-
1S2 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
attack. The left wing of the plucky Territorial battalion used
bombs effectively to hold their enemy at bay. The right wing at
the same time was kept busy in its attempt to prevent being en-
veloped. In spite of all the Germans could do with their artillery
and their repeated counterattacks the West London men main-
tained their small wedge in the Teuton front. Finally trench
mortars were brought against them. Then the Kensington bat-
talion, or what was left of it, received the order to retire. To do
that necessitated fighting their way back through the thickening
line of their enemy. Those British Territorials had held their
peculiar position several hours, and had suffered severely in con-
sequence ; but their loss was undoubtedly much larger when re-
tiring to their former line. They fought the greater part of the
afternoon and well into the evening in endeavoring to get back ;
and finally a comparatively few of them succeeded. The last dash
to the British trenches was made over a barren piece of ground
which was so flat that there was no opportunity for concealment.
And here the Germans raked what was left of the battalion with
rifle and machine-gun fire. Ultimately, however, a portion of
the brave band returned to the British trenches. Previous to
withdrawing the survivors from the front, General Sir Henry
Rawlinson told them that their gaining the position which they
took and holding it as long as they did had not only relieved the
pressure on Ypres but had aided General Foch's army to advance
between Arras and La Bassee. In conclusion he said : "It was a
feat of arms surpassed by no battalion in this great war."
The Sussex and Northampton troops made a desperate effort
to get into the German trenches on the morning in which this
action start;ed, but they never got nearer than forty yards, being
stopped by the deluge of shrapnel, rifle, and machine-gun fire to
which they were subjected. When they were ordered to return
to the British trenches, those who remained able to make the at-
tempt found it quite as dangerous as trying to go forward. That
afternoon the Black Watch and the First Cameronians charged
where the Sussex and Northamptons had been repulsed, but the
Scotchmen had but little more success. It is true some of the men
from the land of the heather got into the German trenches ; but
BRITISH FORWARD MOVEMENT 133
they did not survive. The determination of the British was shown
when men, who had been wounded in the first charge and been
unable to return to their own line, joined the Scots in their mad
rush to death. Those men had lain under fire twelve hours be-
fore making their dying assault on the German trenches. It had
been expected the Scotchmen would get into the opposing trenches
and bomb and bayonet the Teutons out. Then reenforcements
would be sent from the British line. But the artillery of King
George was unable to check the devastating work of the kaiser's
big guns and give the reenforcements a clear field through which
to go to the aid of the attacking force. The result was that the
Germans continued such a leaden hail between the lines that it
was sending soldiers to certain death to order them to cross the
zone of fire. The remnant of the Scottish regiments was recalled,
and it lost as many men on its return as it had in its desperate
struggle to reach the German trenches.
Both the Kensingtons and the Scots found groups of German
machine guns, doing most destructive work, that could have been
rendered useless if the British had had a supply of high-explosive
shells. Under the circumstances there was nothing for Sir Douglas
Haig to do but to order his men all along the line to retire.
They obeyed the order sullenly, and many of them were slain in
their attempt to get back to their own trenches. But their com-
rades felt they had not died wholly in vain ; for the woeful lack
of lyddite shells thus became known in England and the indigna-
tion thus aroused resulted in the appointment of a minister of
munitions who organized the manufacture of the necessary ex-
plosives on a scale heretofore unattempted by the British. A
lesson had been learned, but at a fearful cost to life.
The same lesson was being taught the British public at an-
other section of the battle front. Its soldiers not only were unable
to maintain a successful artillery fire, but the fact became so im-
pressed on the German mind that the Teutons in the Ypres and
Lille regions felt assured that their infantry had the British at
their mercy. Sir John French, however, had a clever knowledge
of human nature. He began his efforts to remedy the difficulty
by telling the war correspondents his troubles. They spread
134 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the news. Then he secretly collected all of the available artillery
in the Ypres region, together with his limited supply of shells, and
was ready to deal such a blow to the Duke of Wurttemberg's
army when it marched on Ypres the latter part of May, 1915,
that it was necessary for the Germans to get reenf orcements
through Belgium. This was a great surprise to the Teutons and
cost them dearly.
CHAPTER XXI
SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A
SURPRISE
THE operation of this plan of Sir John French had an excellent
effect in the Ypres region, but it had the opposite effect on the
British who were trying to take Lille. Moreover it was necessary
for the British to continue to occupy the attention of the left
wing of the German army, under the command of the Crown
Prince of Bavaria, in order to keep him from using his men
against General Foch, who was attempting to push his way be-
tween Arras and Lille. Inasmuch as the British artillery had
proved ineffective because of its lack of enough and the proper
kind of ammunition. Sir John French planned another surprise
for the Germans. This time he selected the weapon which the
Teutons seemed most to fear when it was in the hands of the
British — ^the bayonet. The salient on the German front at Festu-
bert, between La Bassee and Neuve Chapelle, was chosen for the
proposed military feat. The territory occupied by the Teutons
had the appearance, to the casual observer, of being lowlands
on which were wrecked homes, farms, and trees. The actual con-
ditions of this section of the country were much more serious for
any body of troops which planned to make an attack. The ground
was moist and muddy, in many places being crossed by treach-
erous ditches filled with slimy water. Moreover the exact range
of practically every square foot of it was known to the German
artillerymen, whose guns were on the high ground to the west of
SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A SURPRISE 135
the lowlands. The British were in trenches from seventy to three
hundred yards from those of their enemy. If the men there could
dash across the intervening space and get into the German
trenches before being annihilated by the kaiser's cannon, they
would use the bayonet with deadly effect, and, from past ex-
periences, have reasonable hope of gaining a victory. It was de-
cided to make such an attempt first on that part of the line be-
tween Richebourg on the left and Festubert on the right.
The British Seventh Division was sent south to support the at-
tack which was to have been made on May 12, 1915. On that day
it was too foggy for the aviators to see with any degree of ac
curacy; so the movement was delayed. This gave time for the
Canadian Division to be sent south and add their strength to the
support. The German trenches, at this point where the attack
was to be made, were occupied by the Seventh Westphalian Army
Corps. This corps had lost many of its men at Neuve Chapelle ;
and their places had been taken by youths who had not reached
the development of manhood and whose immaturity and lack of
military training greatly lessened the efficiency of this famous
body of troops.
Finally, on Saturday night. May 15, 1915, all conditions for the
attack seemed favorable to the British. There was no moon and
the sky was dark, though there was not that inky blackness that
occasionally occurs under similar weather conditions. The Indian
Corps stole from their trenches and began to go forward from
Richebourg TAvoue. But the Germans were alert, and they il-
lumined the movement with innumerable flares which made the
Indians easy targets for the machine guns and rifles of the Teutons
that part of the line. So quick was the work to repel the attack
lat many of the Indians were slain as they were climbing out of
leir own trenches. As a surprise attack at night, the British
rere not making much of a success of their plan, but as a method
»f gaining ground and keeping their enemy busy on that particu-
ir part of the line the men of their Second Division were effec-
ive. They dashed into the first line of German trenches and
leared them out with the bayonet and hand grenade. The furor
)f the attack took them on into the second line. By dawn the
136 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
soldiers of the Second Division had driven a wedge into the
German line.
This wedge was widened and driven in harder by Sir Douglas
Haig's old command^ — ^the First Corps. This corps had suffered
heavy losses at the first battle of Ypres ; but the men who filled
the gaps in the line were hardy young men who made excellent
soldiers from the start. Added to their enthusiasm was a desire
to show their ability as fighters, with the result that the British
right wing was so effective that it, in a great measure, made up
for the failure of the Indian troops. The center and the right,
with bomb and bayonet, drove the Germans from the trenches ;
and then together they forced their way into the Teutons* posi-
tion 600 yards along a front 800 yards in length. Early the next
morning, before daylight on May 16, 1915, the British Seventh
Division forced its way into the German salient at Festubert. In
the meantime the Germans were making hasty preparations for
a counterattack. Sir John French's plan, however, had proved
effective. It would have required a large supply of high-explosive
Shells to have made much of an impression on the excellent de-
fenses which the German soldiers had constructed on this part of
the front. The British had no such supply of ammunition, and,
even if they had had it, it is doubtful if they would have been able
to demolish the formidable wire entanglements. Yet in this night
attack with the bayonet the British troops had accomplished all
they could have done if supplied with proper ammunition. In the
desperate charge which they made no wire entanglement could
stop the British soldiers. They threw their overcoats or blankets
over the barbed wire and then climbed across the obstruction.
The Seventh Division took three lines of trenches in this manner,
until it was 12,000 yards back of the original line of its enemy.
There were now two wedges driven into the German front, and
the British desired to join them and make what might be termed
a countersalient, or a salient running into the original salient of
the Germans. But the space between the two horns of the British
force was a network of trenches. The horns might prod and ir-
ritate the Teutons, but they needed artillery again to rid the Ger-
man breastworks of machine guns and demolish the obstructions
SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A SURPRISE 137
which would cost too many lives to take in the same manner in
which the British success had been won in its night attack.
Nevertheless the British started in to bomb their way toward
Festubert, and they even gained forty yards in this hazardous un-
dertaking before they were forced to stop. If they had seemed to
be an irresistible force, they had met what had every appearance
of being an immovable body — and there was a limit to human
endurance.
By May 17, 1915, the British concluded that their most advisa-
ble offensive was to clear the space between their two wedges by
cutting off the Germans who held that part of their line. To do
this the British attempted to cut off the German communication
to the north from La Quinque Rue ; but, by that time, the Teutons
had received reenf orcements ; and they rained such a shower of
lead on the attacking force that the attempt had to be abandoned;
but not until many heroic efforts had been made by the British
ta succeed in their purpose.
Many Germans were made prisoners at all stages of the fight-
ing. The British bayonet seemed to strike them with terror, and
the bombs were more potent in scattering them than were the
orders of their commanders to repel the attacking force. Between
Richebourg TAvoue and Le Quinque Rue is the farm Cour de
TAvoue. In front of this farm the remains of a battalion of
Saxons attempted to surrender. They had arrived on the line as
reenf orcements to the Westphalians, and had been fighting val-
iantly until their numbers were so decreased that they were un-
able to hold out against their foes longer. Whether their com-
manding officer ordered them to surrender or a common impulse
dictated their action, they left their position and advanced toward
the British. Not understanding their action, the attacking force
ired upon the Saxons who were sufficiently numerous to give the
[impression that they might be leading a counterattack. There-
upon the Saxons dropped their guns and the firing from the Brit-
iish side ceased, only to be taken up on the German side by the
[Westphalians. This was followed by an attack on the would-be
[prisoners by the German artillery until every soldier in the sur-
rendering party was slain. This action horrified the British, but
138 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Germans considered it a means of discipline which would
have a salutary effect on any who might prefer the comforts of
a prison camp to dying for the Fatherland.
The British Seventh Division at Festubert continued to work
south along the German trenches. Its bayonets and bombs cleared
the way before it. The plan was for them to continue toward
Rue d'Ouvert, Chapelle St. Roch, and Canteleux. In the mean-
time the Second Division, on the left of the Seventh Division, was
to fight its way to Rue du Marais and Violaines. The Indian con-
tingent had received orders to keep in touch with the Third Di-
V^ision. The Fifty-first Division was sent to Estaires to act as a
support to the First Army. By the night of May 17, 1915, the
British held all of the first line of German trenches from the
south of Festubert to Richebourg TAvoue. For a part of that dis-
tance the second and third lines of trenches had been taken and
held; and still farther forward the British possessed many
important points. Moreover the British soldiers were so in-
spired with their success that they desired to press on in spite
of the fact that the nature of the country was such that they were
wet through and covered with mud. It was not all enthusiasm,
however. Mingled with the desire for victory was a desire for
revenge. The British on this part of the line were enraged by
the use of gas at Ypres and the sinking of the Lusitania.
On the night of May 17, 1915, the Fourth Cameron High-
landers, a Territorial battalion, met with disaster. The men com-
posing this unit were from Inverness-shire, Skye, and the Outer
Islands. Many of them had been gamekeepers and hence were
accustomed to outdoor life and the handling of guns, all of which
aided them in saving the remnant of their command. They had
been ordered to take some cottages, occupied by German soldiers
as a makeshift fortification. The Cameronians on the way to the
attack fell into a ditch which was both deep and wide. It was
necessary for them to swim to get across the ditch in some places.
In the meantime Highlanders were being slain by German shells
and the rifle fire that the men in the cottages rained upon the
Scots. One company was annihilated. Another company lost its
way. The rear end of a German communicating trench was
SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A SURPRISE 139
reached by a third company. Long before midnight this company
was almost without ammunition. Two platoons reenforced it at
midnight; but the reenforcements had no machine guns, which
would have given at least temporary relief. Under the circum-
stances the only thing for the Territorials to do was to retreat.
The Germans made that quite as perilous a venture as the ad-
vance had been. Only half of those who started for the cottages
returned. Among the slain was the commander, and twelve other
officers were also killed.
The British, in spite of a cold rain, pushed on 1,200 yards north
of the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road ; and took a defense 300
yards to the southeast of the hamlet. Two farms west of the
road and south of Richebourg rAvou§, the farm du Bois and the
farm of the Cour de TAvoue, in front of which latter the sur-
rendering Saxons were slain, had been held by the Germans
with numerous machine guns. The British took both farms by
nightfall and found, on counting their prisoners, that they then
had a total of 608 as well as several machine guns.
The Second and Seventh Divisions were withdrawn by Sir
Douglas Haig on the following day, Wednesday, May 19, 1915.
The Fifty-first Division and the Canadians took the places of the
men who w^ere sadly in need of relief from active duty. Lieu-
tenant General Alderson received the command of both divisions
together with the artillery of both the Second and Seventh Di-
visions. The cold, wet weather hampered operations and there
was comparatively little activity, though hostilities by no means
altogether ceased. Each side needed a little rest and time to fill
jn gaps in their respective lines. Hence it was not until Sunday,
[ay 23, that any fighting on a large scale took place. On that day
le Seventh Prussian Army Corps made a desperate effort to
)reak through that part of the British line held by the Canadians
lear Festubert. The Prussians used their old tactics with the
jult that the British shrapnel, rifle, and machine-gun fire
>Iowed great holes in their ranks. The Teutons in this instance
rere without adequate artillery support, for many of their bat-
jries had been made useless by the British. From then on to
[ay 25, 1915, there were several small engagements in which the
140 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
British made gains. Then Sir John French concluded to end the
activity of his men on this part of the front. In that connection
he made the following statement: "I had now reasons to con-
sjider that the battle which was commenced by the First Army on
May 9 and renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment
the immediate object I had in view, should not be further
actively proceeded with.
"In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a posi-
tion which was strongly intrenched and fortified, and ground
was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600
yards."
CHAPTER XXII
ATTACKS AT LA B A S S ift E
THE British had discovered the futility of attempting to smash
through the German lines without an adequate supply of
high-explosive shells with which to destroy the heavy wire
entanglements. Moreover, in maintaining a curtain of fire be-
tween the German lines and potential reenforcements, it was
necessary to increase the artillery arm of the service. At this
time the Germans could fire four shells to one by the British. An-
other very essential equipment in which the British were lacking
was machine guns. The German army had developed machine-
gun warfare apparently to its highest power. They not only
used it to increase their volume of fire, but also as a means of
saving their infantry. When, for any reason, it was found ex-
pedient to move infantry, a few machine-gun crews would take
the place of the soldiers with the rifle and maintain a fire which
would be almost as effective in checking the British advance as
the infantry had been. The British had no such number of ma-
chine guns. They lacked this necessary part of their equipment
just as they lacked shells, cannon, aircraft, and other war ma-
terial which the Germans had developed and accumulated in large
quantities under the supervision of the German General Staff.
ATTACKS AT LA BASSEE 141:
The German munition factories had been making and storing
enormous supplies for an army of several millions of men. On
the other hand the British had believed in the excellence of their
comparatively small army to such an extent that it required
all of the fighting from the time their troops landed on the
Continent up to Festubert to convince them that they must make
and maintain a military machine at least equal, if not superior,
to the one her foes possessed. It is true the British needed
more men in the ranks, but what was needed more was
large additions to the supply of machine guns, artillery^ and
ammunition.
For those reasons the British generals avoided clashes with
the Germans after the battle of Festubert, except when it was
necessary to hold as many of the Germans as possible to the
British part of the western front. This plan was maintained
throughout the summer of 1915. In the meantime the Germans
were constructing, beyond their trenches, the most elaborate
series of field fortifications in the history of warfare. The Ger-
man staff realized that the time was coming when the British
would again take the offensive. When that time arrived the
Germans would thus be prepared to make every foot of ground
gained as costly as possible to their foes. In fact they had reason
for believing that it would be almost impossible for their oppo-
nents to gain ground where it was held by such seemingly im-
pregnable works.
An attack at La Bassee in the first weeks in June, 1915, started
with the British Second Army making a pretended advance in
^the Ypres region. The British in the forest of Ploegsteert drove
mine into the German lines and blew it up. The explosion fol-
>wed by a British charge, which resulted in the taking of a part
)f the German trenches. This forest extended northwest of
lille and south of Messines. Under the ground in this section the
ippers had built a city, whose streets were named for the
loroughfare of London. Thus there was "Regent Street,"
''Piccadilly Circus," "Leicester Square," and many others. There
^as also a "Kensington Garden," in which grew wild flowers
transplanted from the forest by the soldiers.
142 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The Germans had been driven out of the forest in the fall of
1914 when they made their dash to reach Calais ; but their
trenches were only about 400 yards beyond the eastern edge.
The earth here was especially adaptable for mines, and both
sides made many attempts to work destruction by tunneling for-
ward. In this activity it was soon found necessary to Jiave men
in advanced positions in the tunnels to listen to the mining
operations of their opponents. As soon as such operations were
discovered, a countertunnel was driven in that direction and a
mine exploded, thereby destroying the enemy's tunnel and burying
his sappers. Sometimes, however, the men in the countertunnel
cut through to the other excavation and engaged in a hand-to »
hand conflict beneath the surface of the earth. Then primitive
methods were used. Though mining had taken place on other
sections of the western front, as at Hill 60, it was in this forest
area that it was probably brought to its highest development.
The British mine here, as noted above, on June 6, 1915, blew up
the German trenches, and the British charged into the crater and
drove the Germans out with bayonet and bomb. A similar crater
was the result of the mining at La Bassee. Five mines at the
end of tunnels constructed by the Germans did not go far enough
toward the British trenches, and when the explosions occurred
the trenches remained intact.
The sappers, however, had other things to contend with ; this
was the case when a tunnel was driven toward the German
trenches between Rue du Bois and Rue d'Ouvert, near the La
Bassee Canal. Water was found below the German intrench-
ments. The British managed to keep the water out of the tunnel
by using sandbags. Then they planted enough dynamite to
blow up a large part of the German force. The two trench lines
were very close together on this part of the front ; and, to prevent
accidents, the British left their trenches near the mine before it
was fired.
On the night of June 6, 1915, the mine tore open the trenches
of both sides, and buried one of the British magazines which
was filled with hand grenades and killed several British bomb
throwers. At about the same moment another supply of British
ATTACKS AT LA BASSEE 143
bombs was exploded when it was struck by a shell from a Ger-
man howitzer. This occurred at a place on the line called Duck's
Bill, and resulted in the British being without an adequate supply
of hand grenades. The British troops in this action were the
soldiers of a British division and a Canadian brigade. The latter
included the First Ontario Regiment, the Second and Fourth
Canadian Battalions, the Third Toronto Regiment, and the East
Yorkshires.
The Ontario regiment was directed against a fortified part of
the German line which was called Stony Mountain. To the south
of Stony Mountain, about 150 yards, was another fortified posi-
tion called Dorchester. This also was to be taken by the Ontario
men. If they succeeded in their work the right flank of the
British division would be protected. But it was Stony Mountain
that was of most importance to the British. Its machine guns
and its northern defenses menaced the route which the British
must take to make an advance. In order to prevent the Germans
from giving their undivided attention to the Canadians, the
British division on the left made an advance against the Teutons
north of Stony Mountain. The British artillery had been shell-
ing this part of the German line day and night many days as a
preparation for this advance. Its projectiles crashed into the
brick fields near La Bassee, and in front of the wrecked village
of Quinchy.
The German machine-gun crews were hidden behind the brick
stacks which were square blocks of burned clay upon which the
British shells burst without perceptible effect. The shells that
went over the stacks, however, did much damage. Beyond the
brick field to the north were the ruins of farm buildings which
were also hiding places for the Germans and their machine guns.
All the buildings back of the German line had been turned into
fortresses whose underground works were concreted and con-
nected with their headquarters by telephone. While the British
artillery was attempting to destroy these fortresses it was also
hurling lyddite shells into the trenches.
The German artillery fire greatly exceeded the British in
volume. Nevertheless the British forces were in the more com-
10— War St. 8
144 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
fortable position. They had comparatively little to do except
wait until they were needed, which would be when their artillery
had completed the preparation for the inevitable charge. On the
other hand the German soldier had a nerve-racking part to play*
He knew from the preparation that an attack in force was about
to be made ; but he did not know when it would occur nor where.
Hence it was necessary for him to be constantly on the alert.
Many of the Germans were under arms at all hours of the day and
night. In fact few of them on that part of their line got any reaJ
rest during the week in which the bombardment continued. The
section between the two lines of trenches was illuminated at night,
and the cannonade kept up so that there was no opportunity
for the Germans to repair the havoc made by the British shells.
The suspense was terminated on the evening of June 15, 1915,
by an additional flight of projectiles from the British guns.
Every piece of British ordnance on that part of the line was
worked at top speed. The Germans, knowing that this immedi-
ately preceded an infantry charge, used their artillery to stop it.
But the British charge formed in their trenches, with the Cana-
dians on their right. In addition to the shrapnel the Germans
made breaks in the lines of their foes by the use of machine guns,
but the breaks were quickly filled. On some parts of the front
the British and Canadians were successful and reached the
trenches. In all the captured trenches extended from Rue du
Bois to Rue d'Ouvert.
In the meantime those Canadians who had been directed
against Stony Mountain and Dorchester were doing heroic work.
The First Company of the Ontario Regiment charged through
the debris of the mine explosion, only to run into the deadly hail
sent at them by the machine guns. But the Canadians were
determined to complete their task, and they took Dorchester
and the connecting trench. The fire was too heavy for them to
reach Stony Mountain. A group of bombers made a dash for-
ward, but were shot down before they could get near enough to
use their weapons.
The second and third companies rushed forward, suffering
severely from the deluge of lead, but some of their men got into
ATTACKS AT LA BASSEE 145
the German second line and then began to bomb theii way to
right and left. The captured first trench was utilized by the
attacking force. From that vantage the advance was led by a
machine gun which was followed by a group of bomb throwers.
In working forward the machine-gun base became lost when the
man who had it was slain. Thereupon a Canadian "lumberjack"
named Vincent became the base, the machine gun being fired
from his back. But the German bomb throwers drove the attack-
ing force out of the trench. The Germans kept a rain of lead
between the Canadians and the British line of trenches with the
result that it was almost suicide for a man to attempt to return
for bombs. Nevertheless many braved the ordeal. Only one was
successful. He, Private Smith of Southampton, Ontario, seemed
to bear a charmed life, for he made the trip five times. The Third
Canadian Battalion was sent forward to reenforce the Ontario
Regiment which had lost most of its officers, but such a pressure
^of German forces were brought to bear on the Canadians that
!the reenforcements were unavailing, and the Canadians were
forced to relinquish all they had gained, and return to their own
ptrenches that night.
The retreat was a desperate undertaking; the Germans then
:had the Canadians in the open and added heavily to the Cana-
'dian's death roll. On the other side of Stony Mountain the
'British had met with no better success than the Canadians.
^Having started their enemies back, the Germans massed for a
counterattack and drove them back a mile, but not without a
jrrific struggle. The battle field was lighted by the peculiar
[fireworks used for such purposes and bursting of shells. Jets of
lame shot forth from machine guns and rifles. In many places
the intermittent light disclosed deadly hand-to-hand conflicts.
luddenly the Germans concentrated their fire on a portion of
leir lost first line of trenches, and the trenches of their ene-
[mies who held them were no more. Having the British and
Canadians defeated, as they believed, the Germans proceeded
^to add to their victory by storming the British and Canadian
inches. They met with resistance, however, that drove them
back.
146 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
At daybreak on June 16, 1915, the artillery on both sides re-
sumed firing on a large scale. Suddenly, in the afternoon, the
British fire increased preparatory to another charge. This time
the British commander had selected a smaller section for his
attack. This was at Rue d'Ouvert, and the men who had been
selected to make the charge were the Territorials and the Liver-
pool Irish. They got into the first line of German trenches
which the Teutons shelled to such an extent that the remnant of
the attacking force had to retreat. Then the Second Gordon
Highlanders and other Scotch soldiers made a gallant charge at
the same place, Rue d'Ouvert, on June 18, 1915, but were forced
to retire to their own trenches.
These attacks on this part of the German front resulted in
repulses for those who made them; but, at the same time, they
helped the Allies win victories elsewhere by keeping the German
troops on that part of the line from going to reenf orce those who
were being hard pressed by the French. In this manner the
British and Canadians, who fought so valiantly and with so little
apparent success at Stony Mountain and Rue d'Ouvert, were in a
measure responsible for the French victories at Angres, Souchez,
and the Labyrinth. The Crown Prince of Bavaria could not hold
out against both the French and British, but he believed it was
more important for him to check the British, because a victory
for them would threaten Lille to a greater extent.
CHAPTER XXIII
OPERATIONS AROUND HOOGE
THE next action of importance on the British front occurred
at the Chateau of Hooge on the Menin road about three miles
east of Ypres. Here had been the headquarters of Sir John
French and Sir Douglas Haig at the first battle of Ypres. From
the Chateau Sir John French had seen the British line break at
Gheluvelt, thereby opening the road for the Germans to Calais.
OPERATIONS AROUND HOOGE 147
That opening, however, had been closed by the Worcesters.
After the Germans began to use their deadly gas in the spring of
1915 they again took possession of Hooge, and used the Menin
road for a forward movement which threatened what was left
of Ypres.
The Duke of Wurttemberg was in command of that part of the
line opposed to the British, and his forces extended from near
Pilkem in the north to near Hill 60 in the south, in the form of
a crescent. He made use of the asphyxiating gas cloud and gas
bombs so frequently on this part of the front that the British
soldiers became expert in donning their hoodlike masks and in
using respirators. Moreover, the British were constantly on the
alert for the appearance of the poison gas. So that this method
of attack was much less effective. Before the Germans dis-
covered how well the British had prepared themselves against
the gas, they met with disaster twice when using it. On both
occasions they had followed their gas cloud expecting to find
their foes writhing on the ground in choking agony — an easy
prey for an attack.
But the British had put on their curious-appearing headgear,
and were waiting for the men whom they knew would be f ollow*
ing the cloud at a safe distance. As soon as the Germans were
near enough the British turned loose everything that would hurl
a projectile large or small. By the time the gas cloud had
cleared, or, to be more accurate, passed on to the rear of the
British line and spent itself, the only Germans to be seen were
in the piles of dead and wounded in front of the British most
advanced trenches. The first time this occurred did not teach the
Germans its lesson sufficiently well. A second time the Germans
did not follow their gas cloud so closely. The gas-filled shells,
however, the British found more difficult. They did not give
warning of their coming as did the appearance of the com-
paratively slow-moving gas cloud. Thus in the first week of
May, 1915, Hill 60 was taken by the Germans in a bombardment
of asphyxiating shells. The bombardment had been immediately
followed by a charge of bomb throwers who made an assault on
the hill from three sides at once. That forced the British to
148 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
retreat to a trench line at the foot of the hill, and gave the top of
the hill to the Germans who immediately set up a lookout post
for their artillery back of the Zandvoord ridge.
This part of the British line was under the command of Sir
Herbert Plumer. His troops occupied themselves from the first
week in May to the middle of August, 1915, in fighting in the
Hooge district. Most of this fighting was important only be-
cause it kept the Germans busy on that section of the line, and
prevented them from being able to reenforce the Crown Prince
of Bavaria or adding men to the force that was driving the
Russians eastward.
The men, fresh from the training camps, fought alongside of
hardened veterans and learned much from them. From being
what amounted to auxiliaries in these actions the new troops
became hardened to actual fighting conditions. For this reason
the personnel of the British troops on this part of the line was
changed frequently. This was especially true at Hooge. Prin-
cess Patricia's Canadian Regiment occupied the Chateau and
village of Hooge on May 8, 1915. The "Princess Pats," as they
were known at home, turned over their quarters to the Ninth
Lancers who were followed by the Fifteenth Hussars and the
Second Camerons.
On May 24, 1915, the Germans made a great gas attack. They
had placed along the line from St. Julien to Hooge a great num-
ber of gas tanks. They then started a bombardment with as-
phyxiating shells. When the bombardment was well under way
the tanks were opened. The ensuing cloud was five miles long
and forty feet high ; and it floated over the British trenches from
3 a. m. to 7 a. m. The cloud was followed by three columns of
infantry, who dashed forward under the protection of the shells
of their artillery. But the Germans made gains in only two
places — at Hooge and to the north of Wieltje. For the most
part the British regained by counterattacks what they lost; but
they were unable to retake the Chateau of Hooge, though the
Ninth Lancers and the Fifteenth Hussars made a heroic attempt
to regain it. Thereupon the Third Dragoons received orders to
attempt to retake the Chateau of Hooge. They went into th^
OPERATIONS AROUND HOOGE 149
second line of the British trenches to the south of the Menin
road on May 29, 1915. The Germans bombarded the trenches
with high-explosive shells while from the German trenches a
torrent of small arms fire poured. In spite of the continued hail
of lead, the Dragoons held to their position though their trenches
were wrecked.
Early in the morning of May 31, the British charged and drove
their enemy from the ruins of the Chateau and its stables. The
Germans turned all of their artillery on that part of the line
against Hooge, and when the bombardment was finished there
was only a heap of ruins left. The British withdrew from the
Chateau, but only for a short distance.
The bombardment was renewed on June 1; on that day the
iGerman infantry tried to dislodge the Dragoons, but the attempt
rwas unsuccessful. Again, on June 2, the artillery was used,
|the German shells being hurled a part of the time at the rate
f,of twenty a minute. Under the cover of this terrific bombard-
ment a part of the German infantry charged from the Belle-
iwaarde Lake region. They got to the Chateau before a British
[battery opened fire on them. Again they entered the ruins and
made a dash out on the opposite side, where they were met by
jmore machine-gun fire. Three times they tried to escape, but
^practically all of them were slain. Other attempts were made
[by the Germans that afternoon, but none of them was successful.
The Dragoons were relieved on June 3, 1915, and their places
[were taken by a much larger force. It included the Third
IWorcesters, the First Wiltshires, the First Northumberland
[Fusiliers, the First Lincolnshires, the Royal Fusiliers, the Royal
Scots Fusiliers, and the Liverpool Scottish, a territorial organ-
nation.
The British artillery was concentrated in the neighborhood of
[ooge and started a bombardment on June 16. After a fairly
idequate preparation by cannonade, the infantry charged
le German line for a thousand yards near the Chateau, and
)k a part of the second line of trenches. Again the British
>ayonet and bomb had won, though in this attack the greater
jredit must be given to the bomb. The Germans made an attempt
150 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to retrieve the day by battering the British out of the trenches
they had won. To do this the German artillery used a plentiful
supply of high-explosive shells. They continued the attempt for
twenty-four hours ; but all they succeeded in doing was driving
the British back to the first line of German trenches where they
waited for the inevitable attack of the infantry which was re-
pulsed. Finally the Germans seemed inclined to give up trying
to accomplish much on this part of their front.
In the first week of July, 1915, the British took two hundred
yards of German trenches, eighty prisoners and three trench
mortars. The German commander now turned once more to
Hooge. An additional reason for his renewed interest in that
place was the fact that the British engineers, on July 20, blew
up a mine west of the Chateau, thereby making a great crater
in which the British infantry made themselves comparatively
secure. The crater was one hundred and fifty feet wide and
fifty feet deep.
The Germans made an unsuccessful attempt to take the crater
on July 21, 1915; and tried again on July 24. The Duke of
Wiirttemberg found his men making comparatively little prog-
ress. It is true that the British had not made much more. The
gas attacks had gained ground before the British had learned
how to avoid the more severe effects of the poison. The result
of experience brought into existence a new device. It has been
called a flame projector, and has been described as a portable
tank which is filled with a highly inflammable coal-tar product.
The contents of the tank were pumped through a nozzle at the
end of which was a lighting arrangement. The flame could be
thrown approximately forty yards.
A large supply of these flame projectors arrived in the Ger-
man trenches on July 30, 1915. The action began with the
usual bombardment of high-explosive shells. Other shells filled
with the burning liquid were also used. At the height of the
bombardment, the British lines were flame swept. No prepara-
tion had been made for such an attack ; and the only thing that
the British could do was to get out of the way of the flame.
Thus they lost their trenches in the crater and at the Chateau
FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS 151
and village of Hooge. The method of attack so infuriated the
British that they made a desperate counterattack with the result
that they regained most of what they lost with the exception of
about five hundred yards of trenches.
CHAPTER XXIV
FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS ALONG
THE FRONT
WE have thus far dealt chiefly with the British operations
in the western front, but it must not be assumed that the
French, in the meantime, were idle. On the contrary, their
operations, covering the far greater territory, were proportion-
ally more important than those of their allies.
During the winter months artillery duels along the entire
Franco-German front were kept up without intercession. These
were varied by assaults on exposed points which were in many
cases repeatedly taken and lost by the opposing forces.
The French staff applied itself with the utmost vigor to the
accumulation of large stacks of munitions and supplies for the
production of active movements when weather conditions should
permit. For the most part, however, the Franco-German
operations were desultory movements occurring in various por-
tions of the long line. Actions of the first importance began
r with the attacks in the St. Mihiel salient in April, 1915.
§0n the night of February 6, 1915, Germans exploded three
ines at La Boisselle in front of the houses in the village which
le French occupied, but the attempt of the Germans to advance
as checked after a small amount of ground had been gained.
The next day a counterattack carried out by a French company
retook this ground, and inflicted a loss of 200 men. The French
seized a wood north of Mesnil-les-Hurles on the night of
February 7. Here the Germans had strongly established them-
selves.
152 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
During the first part of February, 1915, the Germans made a
series of assaults on the Marie Therese works in the Argonne.
Their force comprised about a brigade ; but the French repulsed
all attacks. Both sides suffered severe losses. On the night of
February 9, there was an infantry engagement at La Fontenelle
in the Ban de Sapt. Two battalions of Germans took part in
the action and gained some ground which the French regained
by counterattacks on the following day.
Actions in the Vosges continued in spite of heavy snow. The
French carried Hill 937, eight hundred meters northwest of the
farm of Sudelle, in the region north of Hartmannsweilerkopf.
About February 9, 1915, there was considerable activity on the
part of the German artillery in Champagne, especially before
Rheims. The city being again bombarded. There was also a lively
cannonade in the region of Lens, around Albert, between the
Avre and Oise, in the neighborhood of Soissons, and at Vemeuil,
northeast of Vailly. In Lorraine the Germans, after having
pushed back the French main guard, succeeded in occupying the
height of the Xon beacon and the hamlet of Norroy. The Ger-
mans were repulsed by a counterattack as far as the slopes
north of the beacon.
The French on February 18 made some progress in the region
of Boureuilles on Hill No. 263. They also gained a wood south
of the Vois de Cheppy. At the same time French troops took
four hundred meters of trenches north of Malancourt and about
as much south of the Bois de Forges. The Germans made five
unsuccessful counterattacks, near Bolincourt, to retake the
trenches which the French had captured. On the same day, the
French recaptured the village of Norroy. In the Vosges, the
French repulsed two infantry attacks north of Wisembach, in
the region of the Col de Bonhomme, and consolidated their posi-
tions, progressing methodically north and south of the farm of
Sudelle. The bombardment of Rheims was continued during
these days. On the heights of the Meuse, at Les Eparges,
three German counterattacks on the trenches which tha French
had won on February 17 were stopped by the French artil-
lery fire.
FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS 153
In the Vosges, between Lusse and Wisembach, in the Bon-
homme region, the Germans, after succeeding in getting a foot-
ing on Hill 607, were dislodged on the morning of February 19,
1915. The French held their position on the height notwith-
standing the violent efforts to dislodge them. An attack by the
Germans on Le Sattel north of the Sudelle farm was also
repulsed.
In the evening of February 19, 1915, the Germans delivered
their fourth counterattack against the trenches which the French
took at Les Eparges, but the French artillery again beat them
back. The Germans were also unsuccessful in a counterattack
on Hill 607, at Sattel, south of the FecKt. They succeeded in
gaining a footing on the eastern spur of Reichsackerkopf .
After having repulsed a sixth counterattack by the Germans
at Les Eparges, the French on February 10, 1915, delivered a
fresh attack which enabled them to enlarge and complete the
progress they made on the day before. They took three machine
guns, two trench mortars, and made two hundred prisoners,
among whom were several officers.
They also repulsed a counterattack of the Germans and then
took all of their trenches to the north and east of the wood which
had been captured by the French on the day before. Two other
counterattacks were repulsed, and the French made fresh prog--
ress, particularly to the north of Mesnil, where they captured
two machine guns and one hundred prisoners. The Germans
made their seventh unsuccessful counterattack on Les Eparges
on February 21. The French advanced posts fell back on the
main line in Alsace on both banks of the Fecht; but the main
line was strongly held, and the Germans, attacking in serriec?
and deep formations, suffered heavy losses.
On the Belgian front the French batteries demolished one of
I the German heavy guns near Lombaertzyde on February 22,
1915. On the same day the French artillery dispersed German
troops and convoys between the Lys and the Aisne. The French
imade progress on the Souain-Beausejour front, taking a line of
^ trenches and two woods, and repulsed two particularly violent
counterattacks. Many prisoners were taken by the French in
154 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
this action. In the Argonne the French artillery and infantry
had the better of the almost continuous fighting. This was
especially true near Fontaine-aux-Charmes and Marie Therese,
as well as at the Bois Bolante.
The bombardment of Rheims continued on February 22,
lasting for a first period of six hours, and a second period of
five hours. One thousand five hundred shells were fired into
all quarters of the town. The cathedral was made a special
target and suffered severely. The interior of the vaulted root
which had resisted up to this time, fell. Twenty houses were
set on fire and twenty of the civilian population were killed.
The French captured more trenches in the region of Beause-
jour and held their gains of previous fighting, on February 23,
1915. Their batteries blew up a German ammunition store to
the northwest of Verdun at Drillancourt, in the region of the
Bois de Forges, on the same day, February 23, 1915, and stopped
an attempted German attack in Alsace from the village of Stoss-
weiler.
There was an action of some importance in the Wood of Mal-
ancourt, on February 26, 1915, when the Germans sprayed the
French advanced trenches with burning liquid. The French
troops evacuated them, the soldiers being severely burned before
they could escape. A counterattack was immediately made.
This checked the German advance. On the same day, in the
region of Verdun and on the heights of the Meuse, the French
heavy artillery enveloped with its fire the German artillery,
wrecked some guns, exploded about twenty wagons or depots,
annihilated a detachment, and destroyed an entire encampment.
In Champagne the French on the night of February 26, 19lS,
captured five hundred meters of German trenches to the north
of Mesnil-Ies-Hurles.
On February 28, 1915, Rheims was again bombarded and still
again on March 2, 1915. About fifty shells fell on the town. In
the Argonne, on March 2, 1915, in the Bagatelle-Marie Therese
sector, there was mine and infantry fighting in an advanced
trench which the French reoccupied after they had been forced
to abandon it. At the same time in the region of Vauquois, the
FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS 155
French made some progress and held the ground captured in
spite of the counterattacks of the Germans. The French also
took some prisoners. In the Vosges, at La Chapelotte, they cap-
tured trenches and gained three hundred meters of ground.
The bombardment of Rheims was continued on March 4, 1915,
and lasted all day, a shell falling about every three minutes.
While the bombardment was in progress the Germans captured
an advanced trench from the French to the north of Arras, near
Notre Dame de Lorette; but in the Argonne the French made
fresh progress in the region of Vauquois. On the following
day, March 5, however, the French made successful counter-
attacks in the region of Notre Dame de Lorette. The Germans
lost the advanced positions which they had taken from the
French and held them for two days. At Hartmannsweilerkopf,
in Alsace, the French captured a trench, a small fort, and two
machine guns. They also repulsed a counterattack opposite
Uffholz, and blew up an ammunition store at Cernay. On the
same night, the French drove back the German advanced posts
which were trying to establish themselves on the Sillakerkopf, a
spur east of Hohneck.
The French continued to gain ground, on March 7, to the
north of Arras in the region of Notre Dame de Lorette, where
their attacks carried some German trenches. The German losses
were considerable. During this first week in March, 1915, the
French carried successively, to the west of Miinster, the two
summits of the Little and the Great Reichaelerkopf. The Ger-
^mans made two counterattacks starting from Muhlbach and
Itossweiler ; but they were unsuccessful. On the right bank of
le Fecht the French captured Imburg, one kilometer south-
ist of Sultzern. This success was completed farther to th^
lorth by the capture of Hill 856 to the south of the Hutes
'utles. Finally, at Hartmannsweilerkopf the French repelled a
counterattack delivered by a German battalion which suffered
leavy losses and left numerous prisoners in the hands of the
French.
On March 8, 1915, the French gained two hundred meters
on the ridge northeast pf Mesnil which they added to tHe gains
156 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the previous day. Here the French carried a German reaoubt,
took a revolver gun and three machine guns, and made some
prisoners. The Germans had armored shelters supplied with
revolver guns and very deep subterranean chambers. In the
Argonne, between Four-de-Paris and Bolante, the French de-
livered an attack which made them masters of the first line of
German trenches of more than two hundred meters in length.
To the north of Rheims in front of the Bois de Luxembourg,
the Germans attempted, on March 14, to carry one of the French
advanced trenches, but were repulsed. On the same day, be-
tween Four-de-Paris and Bolante in the Argonne, the French
gained three hundred meters of trenches, and took some
prisoners. Two counterattacks which the Germans made were
unsuccessful.
In the region of Lombaertzyde on March 15, the French artil-
lery very effectively bombarded the German works. When the
Germans attempted to recapture the small fort which was taken
from them on the night of March 1 they were repulsed and left
fifty dead. The French losses were small. To the north of
Arras, a brilliant attack by the French infantry enabled them to
capture, by a single effort, three lines of trenches on the spur
of Notre Dame de Lorette, and to reach the edge of the plateau.
The French captured one hundred prisoners including several
officers. They also destroyed two machine guns and blew up
an ammunition store. Farther to the south, in the region of
Eeurie-Roclincourt, near the road from Lille, they blew up
several German trenches and prevented their reconstruction. In
Champagne the French made fresh progress. They gained
ground in the woods to the northeast of Souain and to the north-
west of Perthes. They also repulsed two German counterattacks
in front of Ridge 196, northeast of Mesnil, and extended their
position in that sector. In the region of Bagatelle in the Argonne
two German counterattacks were repulsed. The French de-
molished a blockhouse there, "and established themselves on the
site of it. Between Four-de-Paris and Bolante the Germans at-
tempted two counterattacks which failed. At Vauquois the
French infantry delivered an attack which gave it possession of
FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS 157
the western part of the village. Here they made prisoners. At
the Bois-le-Pretre, northeast of Pont-a-Mousson, the Germans
blew up with a mine four of the French advanced trenches which
were completely destroyed. The Germans gained a footing
there, but the French retook the first two trenches and a half of
the third. Between the Bois-le-Pretre and Pont-a-Mousson, in
the Haut de Rupt, the Germans made an attack which was
repulsed.
In Champagne, before Hill 196, northeast of Mesnil, on March
19, 1915, the Germans, after violently bombarding the French
position, made an infantry attack which was repulsed with
heavy losses.
In the Woevre, in the Bois Mortmore, on March 20, 1915, the
French artillery destroyed a blockhouse and blew up several
ammunition wagons and stores. At La Boisselle, northeast of
Albert, the Germans, after a violent bombardment, attempted a
night attack which was repulsed with large losses.
The Germans bombarded the Cathedral of Soissons again on
March 21, 1915, firing twenty-seven shells and causing severe
damage to the structure. On the same day Rheims was bom-
barded, fifty shells falling there.
Near Bagatelle the French, on March 22, blew up three mines ;
and two companies of their troops stormed a German trench
in which they maintained their position in spite of a strong
counterattack. Five hundred yards from there, the Germans,
after exploding two mines, and bombarding the French trenches,
rushed to an attack on a front of about two hundred and fifty
yards. After some very hot hand-to-hand fighting the assailants
were hurled back in spite of the arrival of their reenforcements.
le French artillery caught them under its fire as they were
tiling back, and inflicted very heavy losses.
The French then retreated some fifteen meters at Vauquois
b March 23, 1915, when the Germans sprayed one of their
'enches with inflammable liquid.
158 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXV
CAMPAIGN IN ARGONNE AND AROUND
ARRAS
THERE were some weak places in the French line from
Switzerland to the North Sea ; and one of them was that part
in the region between the Forest of the Argonne and Rheims.
G^eral Langle de Gary was in command of the army which held
this section. It requires no military genius to comprehend that the
French colter and the right wing from Belfort to Verdun were
not safe until the Germans had been forced back across the Aisne
at every place. The French general had made an effort to drive
the Germans under General von Einem from Champagne Pouil-
leuse. The preliminary effort had been to stop the Germans from
using the railroad which ran from near the Nort to Varennes
through the Forest of the Argonne and across the upper Aisne
to Bazancourt.
After the battle of the Marne, the crown prince's army, severely
handled by the Third French Army under General Sarrail,
pushed hastily toward the north and established itself on a line
running perpendicularly through the Argonne Forest, at about
ten or fifteen kilometers from the road connecting Ste. Menehould
with Verdun. Almost immediately there developed a series of
fights that lasted during a whole year and were really among the
bloodiest and most murderous combats of the war. The German
army in the Argonne, commanded by the crown prince, whose
headquarters had long been established at Stenay, consisted of
the finest German troops, including, among others, the famous
Sixteenth Corps from Metz, which, with the Fifteenth Corps
from Strassburg, is considered the cream of the Germanic forces.
This corps was commanded by the former governor of Metz,
General von Mudra, an expert in all branches of warfare relating
to fortresses and mines. Specially reenforced by battalions of
sharpshooters and a division of Wurttembergers, the Twenty-
Seventh, accustomed to forest warfare, this corps made the most
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CAMPAIGN IN ARGONNE 159
violent efforts from the end of September, 1914, to throw the
French troops back to the south and seize the road to Verdun.
The crown prince evidently meant to sever this route and the
adjoining highway, leading from Verdun to Ste. Menehould. The
road then turns to the south and joins at Revigny, the main line
of Bar-le-Duc to Paris via Chalons, forming, in fact, the only
possible line of communication for the fortress of Verdun. The
other line, running from Verdun to St. Mihiel, was rendered use-
less after the Germans had fixed themselves at St. Mihiel in
September, 1914.
Up to the first months of 1916 there was only a small local rail-
way that could be used between Revigny and Ste. Menehould by
Triaucourt. Of the two big lines, one was cut by the Germans,
and the other was exposed to the fire of their heavy artillery.
The violence of the German attacks in the Argonne prove that
so long ago as September, 1914, they already dreamt of taking
Verdun. Their aim was to force the French troops against Ste.
Menehould and invest the fortress on three sides to bring about
its fall.
These Argonne battles were invested with a particular interest
and originality. They were in progress for a whole year, in a
thick forest of almost impenetrable brushwood, split with numer-
ous deep ravines and abrupt, slippery precipices. The humidity
of the forest is excessive, the waters pouring down from high
promontories. The soldiers who struggled here practically spent
two winters in the water.
One can hardly imagine the courage and heroism necessary to
bear the terrible hardships of fighting under such conditions.
All the German soldiers made prisoners by the French describe
life in the Argonne as a hideous nightmare.
From the end of September, 1914, the Germans delivered day
and night attacks, generally lasting ten days. These attacks were
made with forces of three or four battalions up to a division or
a division and a half. In each attack the Germans aimed at a
very limited objective — ^to capture the first or second line of
trenches, to seize some particular fortified point. That object
once attained, the Germans held on there, consolidated the occu-
ll—War St. 3
160 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
pied terrain, fortified their new positions and prepared for
another push forward. It was thus by a process of nibbling the
French trenches bit by bit that the Germans hoped to attain
the Verdun-Ste. Menehould line.
The tactics employed in these combats were those suited to
forest fighting; sapping operations methodically and minutely
carried out to bring the German trenches as near as possible
to the French; laying small mines to be exploded at a certain
hour. Two or three hours before an attack the French positions
were bombarded by trench mortars and especially heavy mintf
throwers.
At the short distances the effect would naturally be to cause
considerable damage; trenches and their parapets were demol-
ished, shelters, screening reserves, were torn open. At that
moment when the attack is to be launched, the German artillery
drops the "fire curtain'' behind the enemy trenches to prevent
reenf orcements from arriving. Such are the tactics almost con-
stantly employed by the Germans.
Despite their most furious efforts during the winter of 1914
and the spring and summer of 1915, in at least forty different
attacks, the German gains were very insignificant, and if one
considers the line they held after the battle of the Mame and
compares it with their present position, one may gather some
idea of how little progress they have made.
It was in June and July, 1915, that the Germans displayed
their main efforts in the Argonne. Their three great attacks
were made with greater forces than ever before (two or three
divisions), but the results w«ere as profitless as their prede-
cessors. The heroism of the French barred the way.
At Arras in June, there was almost as much activity as at
Ypres. During the last part of the campaign in the Artois,
General d'Urbal began an advance between Hebuterne and Serre.
The former had been held by the French and the latter by the
Germans. The two villages were each on a small hill and not
quite two miles apart. There were two lines of German trenches
in front of the farm of Tout Vent which was halfway between
the villages.
CAMPAIGN IN ARGONNE 161
The trenches were held by the Seventeenth Baden Regiment
which was attacked by the French on June 7, 1915. The French
troops consisted of Bretons, Vendeans, and soldiers from Savoy
and Dauphine. The work of the infantry was preceded by a
hesLvy bombardment to which the German artillery replied.
Then the French charged with a dash that seemed irresistible.
On the following day, June 8, 1915, the French gained more
ground to the north in spite of the activity of the German artil-
lery. June 9, 1915, saw desperate fighting in the German com-
municating trenches, and on June 10, 1915, several hundred
yards of trenches to the south were taken. The Seventeenth
Baden Regiment was only a name and a memory when the fight-
ing ceased ; and two German battalions had fared but little bet-
ter. Of the five hundred and eighty prisoners taken ten were
ofl^icers. ;t
General de Castelnau, on the day before the fighting at Hebu-
terne, made a break in the German line east of Forest of TAlgle
which is a continuation of the Forest of Compiegne but is sepa-
rated from it by the Aisne. Within the French lines were the
farms of Ecaffaut and Quennevieres. The Germans held Les
Loges and Tout Vent. There was a German salient opposite
Quennevieres with a small fort at the peak of the salient. De-
fenses had been built also where the northern and southern sides
of the salient rested on the main line of trenches. There were
two lines of trenches on the arc of the salient with three lines
on a portion of the arc. An indented trench held the chord of the
arc. The Germans had placed several guns in a ravine which ran
down toward Tout Vent. Four companies of the Eighty-sixth
^^^Regiment had held the salient.
^B On June 5, 1915, the reserve troops were taken from the Tout
^KVent ravine for reenforcements. Their places were occupied then
^Bby other German troops. The French artillery bombarded the
^»f ort at the peak of the salient, and all of the trenches and defenses
^Bof the Germans in that neighborhood and the French infantry
^Kkept up a rifle and machine-gun fire which was an aid in prevent-
^Bing the Germans from repairing the damage done their defenses.
162 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
in volume and intensity on the morning of June 6, 1915. Then it
was continued intermittently. A mine under the fort at the peak
of the salient blew up. The Germans who sought refuge in their
dugouts found them unavailing. The shells had blown the roofs
from those places of supposed safety. In many instances their
occupants had been buried in the debris and suffocated. The
French artillery lengthened its range and made a curtain of fire
between the Germans on the front and the German supports in
the rear. Then the French infantry charged. The men had
dispensed with knapsack that they might not be hampered with
unnecessary weight. All had three rations and two hundred and
fifty rounds of anmiunition. They were also provided with two
hand grenades and a sack. The last was to be filled with earth.
The filled sacks were sufficient to form breastworks with which
any place taken might be held. With a cheer the French infantry
ran across the two hundred yards between the two lines. The
German infantry's nerves had been so badly shaken by the
bombardment that only a scattering fire, badly directed, greeted
the French. It was but the work of minutes to take the first line
of German trenches. The two hundred and fifty survivors of
two German battalions were made prisoners. The German re-
serves in the ravine on the Tout Vent farm made a dash to aid
their fire line; but the French artillery shells accounted for
them before the reserves ever reached those whom they would
have relieved. Thus in less than an hour 2,000 Germans were
put out of the fight. The French who had been selected for this
work included Bretons, Zouaves, and chasseurs.
The Zouaves then made a dash for the ravine on the Tout
Vent front. There they came upon a field work equipped with
three guns. This work was protected by wire entanglements.
The German artillerymen retreated to their dugouts, but the
Zouaves captured them and their fortification. At that stage
of the fighting the French aviators saw German reenforcements
on their way to take part in the battle. The aviators signaled to
their troops this information. Two German battalions were be-
ing hurried in motor cars from Roye to the east of the Oise ; but
before they reached the scene of the fighting the Germans man-
CAMPAIGN IN ARGONNE 163
aged to mass for a counterattack. It was ill-planned and exe-
cuted. French shrapnel and machine guns annihilated those
making the counterattack. In the meantime the French sap-
pers were fortifying with sacks of earth the ends of the salient;
so that by night the French were in a position to hold what
they had gained. The precautions which the French had made
were shown to be extremely timely, for that night the reenforce-
ments from Roye made eight desperate attacks.
The lack of success throughout the night did not prevent
the Germans from making a reckless attack on the French
works at both ends of the salient on the morning of June 7.
The Germans made their advance along the lines of the communi-
cating trenches. They were greeted with a shower of hand
grenades. By nightfall the Germans seemed to have wearied
of the attacks. The total German loss in killed in this engage-
ment was three thousand. The French had lost only two hun-
dred and fifty killed and fifteen hundred wounded. They captured
a large amount of equipage and ammunition, besides twenty
machine guns.
The French front south of Pont-a-Mousson, on the Moselle,
through the gap of Nancy to the tops of the Vosges experienced
only slight changes during the spring and summer of 1915. The
Germans assumed the offensive in the region of La Fontenelle,
in the Ban-de-Sapt, in April and June. The French engineers
had built a redoubt to the east of La Fontenelle on Hill 627. The
Germans found they could not take it by an assault; so their
sappers went to work to tunnel under it; but they had to bore
through very hard rock and the work was necessarily slow. The
French, learning of the mining operations of their foes, started a
countereffort with the result that there was a succession of fierce
skirmishes under the surface of the earth. Finally the German
sappers were lured into a communicating tunnel which had been
mined for the purpose and they all perished. The greatest activ-
ity of the sappers was between April 6 and April 13, 1915. On
the night of the latter date the officers of the Germans tried to
rally their men for further operations, but their soldiers had had
enough and refused to renew their work.
164 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The Germans, however, did not give up in their attempts to
take Hill 627, which they called Ban-de-Sapt, and in an assault
they made upon it on June 22 they took the hill. Thereupon
the general in command of the Thirtieth Bavarian Division made
the following announcement :
"I have confidence that the height of Ban-de-Sapt will be
transformed with the least possible delay into an impregnable
fortification and that the efforts of the French to retake it will be
bloodily repulsed."
On the night of July 8 the French began a bombardment which
was followed by an infantry charge which forced its way through
five lines of trenches and gained the redoubt on the top of the hill,
in spite of its corrugated iron and gun-shield defenses to which
had been added logs and tree trunks. At the same time the
French made an attack on the German trenches on the left and
surrounded the hill from the eastward. The Germans on the
right flank of the French were kept busy by another attack.
In this battle two battalions of the Fifth Bavarian Ersatz Bri-
gade were taken from the German ranks either by death or as
prisoners. The French captured eight hundred and eighty-one,
of whom twenty-one were officers, who, for the most part, were
men of more than ordinary education.
The principal work of the French troops at this time was in
the valley of the Fecht and the neighboring mountains. They
planned to go down through the valley to Miinster and take the
railroad to which the mountain railroads were tributaries. In
connection with this campaign in the mountains the achievement
of a company of French Chasseurs serves to illustrate the heroic
and hardy character of these men. They were surrounded by
German troops on June 14, 1915, but refused to surrender. In-
stead they built a square camp which they prepared to hold as
long as one of them remained alive. When their ammunition
began to give out, they rolled rocks down on their enemy and
hurled large stones at the advancing foe. At the same time the
French artillery aided them by raining shells on the Germans,
though the artillery was miles from the scene of action. Thus
the Chasseurfj w^re able to hold their position until they were re-
CAMPAIGN IN ARGONNE 165
lieved on June 17, 1915. In the meantime the French proceeded
down the valley of the Fecht and up the mountains overlooking
the valley. An assault was made on the top of Braunkopf and an
attack was made on Anlass on June 15 and 16, 1915. The French
captured Metzeral on June 19, 1915, the Germans having set fire
to it before being driven out. The soldiers of the republic then
began to bombard Munster with such success that they destroyed
a German ammunition depot there. The Sondernach ridge was
held by the French about the middle of July, 1915, and they con-
tinued to gain ground so that they were near Munster by the
end of July, 1915. In these actions the French mountaineers
were pitting their skill against the mountaineers from Bavaria.
By midsummer the lines on both sides of the western front
were an elaborate series of field fortifications. The shallow
trenches of the preceding fall were practically things of the past.
And these fortifications extended from the Vosges to the North
Sea. They naturally varied with the nature of the region in
which they were built. The marshy character of the soil along
the Yser and about the Ypres salient made it impossible to go
down very deep. Hence it was necessary to build up parapets
which were easy marks for the artillery. The Germans had the
better places on the higher levels from Ypres to Armenti^res;
but the British line opposing them showed remarkable engineer-
ing skill. The advances of the Allies had resulted in making the
first line of trenches somewhat temporary in character in the
sections about Festubert, La Bassee, and the Artois ; but in these
'egions there were strong fortifications in the rear of both lines,
'he condition of the ground from Arras to Compiegne was ex-
jellent for fortification purposes. The Teutons had the better
position in the chalky region along the Aisne, though the chalk
formation did not add to the comfort of the men. In the north-
fern part of Champagne trench life was more bearable. The
Forests in the Argonne, the Woevre, and the Vosges made the
trenches the best of all on the western front. The greater part
►f these so-called trenches, the like of which had never before
m constructed, could not be taken without a bombardment by
heavy artillery. And, in the rear of each line there was a series
166 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of other fortifications quite as impregnable. This condition was
a gradual growth which had developed as a result of the in-
creasingly new methods of attack. As new means of taking life
were invented, new means of protection came into existence,
until, for the present, the inventive genius of man seemed to be
at a standstill. But all this activity and preparation at the
front meant a greater activity in the rear of the opposing lines.
Fighting men were a necessity ; but, under existing conditions of
warfare, they were useless unless they were kept supplied by an
army of artisans and another army of men to transport muni-
tions to the soldiers on the firing line. In fact it was being
forced on the minds of the commanding officers that the war
could be won in the workshop and laboratory rather than on
the battle field.
CHAPTER XXVI
BELGO-GERMAN OPERATIONS
FOR the most part the activity of the Belgian army in Febru-
. ary, 1915, consisted of a continuous succession of advanced-
post encounters, in which detachments of from thirty to forty
soldiers fought with the Germans on the narrow strips of land
which remained inundated, while the artillery of the contending
forces bombarded the trenches and the machine-gun forts. The
intermittent artillery duel continued through the forepart of
February, 1915, and on February 14, 1915, the Germans bom-
barded Nieuport, Bains and the Dune trenches, and continued the
bombardment on February 15, 1915, and again on February
20, 1915.
Near Dixmude on February 28, 1915, the Belgian artillery
demolished two of the German trenches, and their infantry oc-
cupied a farm on the right bank of the Yser. One of their
aviators dropped bombs on the harbor station at Ostend.
By the beginning of March, 1915, strips of dry land began to
be seen in the flooded region ; and, along these, the Belgians ad-
BELGO-GERMAN OPERATIONS 167
vanced at Dixmude and the bend of the Yser. They won addi-
tional bridgeheads on the northern bank of the river. By the
middle of the month, March, 1915, the Belgians had obtained a
strategical point by possessing Oudstuyvenkerke on the Schoor-
bakke highway. From there they could force the Germans back
until they were in a position that would prevent any German
action against the Dixmude bridgehead.
On March 18, 1915, the Belgian army continued its progress
on the Yser, and on March 23, 1915, the artillery destroyed sev-
eral German observation points. A division of the Belgian army
made some progress on the right bank of the Yser on March 24,
1915; while another was taking a German trench on the left
bank. The almost continuous artillery fighting was more active
in the Nieuport region on March 26, 1915 ; and farther south a
farm north of St. Georges in advance of the allied lines was taken
and held.
But the Belgian army was unable to take any decisive action
against the left wing of the German army during the spring and
summer of 1915, both on account of the wetness of the land and
the activity of the German artillery. Yet it harassed the Ger-
mans by so much activity that the Teutons continued to add to
their heavy howitzers and large cahber naval guns. Neverthe-
less the Belgian strategy gained for its little army many ad-
vantages of tactical importance. It seemed to be a part of the
plan of the Belgian generals to give their new troops, which were
filling up the previously thinned ranks, a training under heavy
bombardments without risking the lives or liberty of many of
their men. They held the old cobbled roads which remained
about the waters, using an almost innumerable number of
trenches for that purpose.
iThe Germans sought to obviate this check to their activities
by approaching on rafts on which were machine guns, from
which attempts were made to pour an enfilading fire on the
trenches. Thereupon the Belgian sharpshooters became espe-
cially active and exterminated the machine-gun crews before
the Germans could take advantage of the position they had
gained by using the rafts.
168 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Finally the waters subsided and the mud which remained
dried. As soon as the ground became firm enough to support
troops the Belgians became so active that the Germans desired
more men, but their soldiers were also needed in many other
sections of the western front, and for the time being none could
be sent against the Belgians. Hence King Albert's troops con-
tinued to make progress.
The Germans made an attack between Nieuport and the sea on
May 9, 1915, but were repulsed. To the north of Dixmude the
Belgians were violently attacked during the night of May 10,
1915, by three German battalions. They were repulsed and
suffered large losses.
On the night of May 16, 1915, the Germans threatened with
complete envelopment by the successful attacks of preceding
days, evacuated the positions which they had occupied to the
west of the Yser Canal, and they gained nothing on the eastern
bank. The Germans left about two thousand dead and many
rifles when they were forced from the western bank. On the
following night. May 17, 1915, the positions on the eastern bank
were consolidated, and a German counterattack, which was pre-
ceded by a bombardment, was repulsed. The Germans gained a
footing in the trenches to the east of the Yser Canal in an attack
made on the night of May 20, 1915, but they were driven out and
lost some of the ground they had held before making the attack.
The Germans made a violent attack on the edge of the Belgian
front at Nieuport in order to prevent the Belgians from aiding
in the defense of Ypres, but the Belgians defended Nieuport
with one army corps and made an advance on Dixmude with
another corps, with the result that they assisted the Zouaves in
taking the German bridgeheads on the western bank of the canal
above Ypres. These bridgeheads were protected by forts manned
by machine guns, and the approaches were commanded by heavy
artillery fire, but defense was destroyed in the middle of May,
1915.
The Germans concentrated their efforts against the Belgians
at one point between Ypres and Dixmude. They bombarded the
trenches, using bombs filled vith poisonous gas. When they
BELGO-GERMAN OPERATIONS lg9
believed the Belgians had been overcome by the gas the German
infantry charged. The Belgians, however, had kept their faces
close to the ground, thus escaping most of the fumes from the
shells. When the Germans arrived within easy range they were
greeted with machine-gun fire to such an extent that the com-
panies leading the charge were slain.
A battalion of Belgian troops on June 14, 1915, gained the
east bank of the Yser south of the Dixmude railroad bridge, and
established themselves there. The Belgians also destroyed a
German blockhouse in the vicinity of the Chateau of Dixmude.
The Belgian troops, south of St. Georges, captured a German
trench, all the defenders of which were killed or made prisoners
on June 22, 1915.
After the canal line was won, and the Belgians were in posi-
tion to hold it, they could make little headway eastward. Their
advance was checked by a series of batteries which were con-
cealed in the Forest of Houthulst. These batteries, containing
many guns of large caliber, continued to shell the Belgian
trenches to such an extent that it was necessary for their in-
habitants to keep close to the bomb-proof chambers with which
the trenches were liberally supplied. But the Belgians kept so
many of the German troops occupied that, in this way, they gave
great aid to their allies, and enabled the French and British to
regain much of the territory which was lost in the first attack
which the Germans made with poisonous gas. The remainder
of the summer was occupied with intermittent artillery duels
and minor engagements between the opposing trench lines. In
the meantime the Belgian army was adding to the number of it?
troops and gathering munitions for an aggressive movements
PART V— NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHAPTER XXVII
THE WAR ZONE
THE war on the seas, with the long-expected battle between
the fleets of the great nations, developed during the second
six months of the war into a strange series of adventures. The
fleets of the British and the Germans stood like huge phantoms
— ^the first enshrouded in mystery somewhere in the Irish and
North Seas; the second held in leash behind the Kiel Canal,
awaiting the opportune moment to make its escape.
These tense, waiting days were broken by sensational and
spectacular incidents — ^not so much through the sea fights of
great modem warships as through the adventures of the raiders
on the seven seas, the exploits of the submarines, and the daring
attempt of the allied fleets to batter down the mighty forts in
the Dardanelles and bombard their way toward Constantinople
— ^the coveted stronghold of the Ottoman Empire. The several
phases of these naval operations are described in special chap-
ters in this volume, therefore We will now confine ourselves to
the general naval developments.
In the spring of 1915 the threat made by Admiral von Tirpitz
that Germany would carry on war against British and allied
shipping by sinking their vessels with submarines, was made
effective. The submersible craft began to appear on all the
coasts of the British Isles. It infested the Irish Sea to such an
extent that shipping between England and Ireland was seriously
menaced.
A particularly daring raid took place on the night of
February 1, 1915, when a number of submarines tried to
170
THE WAR ZONE 171
scuttle ships lying at Dover. The attack failed, but drew fire
from the guns of the fort here.*
On the 5th of February, 1915, the German Naval Staff an-
nounced that beginning February 18, 1915, the waters around
Great Britain would be considered a "war zone." This was in
retaliation for the blockade maintained against Germany by the
British navy. The proclamation read as follows:
'The waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the
whole of the English Channel, are herewith proclaimed a war
region.
'*0n and after February 18, 1915, every enemy merchant
vessel found in this war region will be destroyed without its
always being possible to warn the crew or passengers of the
dangers threatening.
"Neutral ships will also incur danger in the war region, where,
in view of the misuse of the neutral flags ordered by the British
Government and incidents inevitable in sea warfare, attacks
intended for hostile ships may affect neutral ships also.
"The sea passage to the north of the Shetland Islands and the
eastern region of the North Sea in a zone of at least thirty miles
along the Netherlands coast is not menaced by any danger.
"(Signed) Berlin, February 4, 1915, Chief of Naval Staff,
Von Pohl."
The effect of this proclamation, which was in truth nothing
more than official sanction for the work that the submarines had
been doing for some weeks, and which they continued to do, wa»
to bring Germany into diplomatic controversy with neutral
countries, particularly the United States; such controversy is
taken up in a different chapter of this history. In connection
with the naval history of the Great War it suffices to say that
such a proclamation constituted a precedent in naval history.
The submarine had heretofore been an untried form of war
craft. The rule had formerly been that a merchantman stopped
by an enemy's warship was subject to search and seizure, and,
if it offered no resistance, was taken to one of the enemy's ports
* See chapter on "Exploits of the Submarines."
172
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
SCACH OFMtUE«»
500
SHADED PORTION
INDICATES THE
WAR zorsE
PROC«-A«MED BY
GERMANY FEB.\8.l<9l?
^^ . ', I \S^ETL*\NO >*.
4
THE GERMAN SUBMARINE WAR ZONE
THE WAR ZONE 173
as a prize. If it offered resistance it might be summarily sunk.
But it was impossible for submarines to take ships into port on
account of the patrols of allied warships ; and the limited quar-
ters of submarines made it impossible to take aboard them the
crews of ships which they sank.
Reference made to the use of neutral flags quoted in the Ger-
man proclamation had been induced by the fact that certain of
the British merchant ships, after Germany had begun to send
them to the bottom whenever one of its submarines caught up
with them had gone through the waters where the submarines
operated flying the flag of the United States and other neutral
powers in order to deceive the commanders of the submarines.
The latter had little time to do more than take a brief observa-
tion of merchantmen which they sank, and one of the first things
they sought was the nationality of the flag that the intended
victims carried; unless they could be sure of the identity of a
ship through familiarity with the lines of her hull, they ran the
risk, in attacking a ship flying a neutral flag, of sinking a vessel
belonging to a neutral power.
Here was another matter that opened up diplomatic exchanges
between Germany and the United States, and between the United
States and England. It suffices here to give not only the con-
troversy or the points involved, but the record of events. The
first use of the flag of a neutral country by a ship belonging to
one of the belligerents in the Great War occurred on January 31,
1915, when the Cunard liner Orduna carried the American flag
at her forepeak in journeying from Liverpool to Queenstown.
She again did so on February 1, 1915, when she left the latter
>ort for New York. And another notable instance was on
'ebruary 11, 1915, when the Liisitania, another Cunard liner,
irrived at Liverpool flying the American flag in obedience to
orders issued by the British admiralty. It was only the prom-
lence of these vessels which gave them notoriety in this regard ;
le same practice was indulged in by many smaller ships.
"What will happen after the 18th?'' was the one important
[uestion asked during February, 1915, by the public of the
leutral as well as belligerent countries.
174 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
February 18, 1915, arrived and saw Von Pohl's proclamation
go into effect, and from that date onward the toll of ships sunk,
both of neutral and belligerent countries, grew longer daily.
But before the German submarines could begin the new cam-
paign, those of the British navy became active, and it was ad-
mitted in Berlin on February 15, 1915, that British submarines
had made their way into the Baltic, through the sound between
Sweden and Denmark, where they attacked the German cruiser
Gazelle unsuccessfully.
Nor was the British navy inactive in other ways, though it
had been greatly discredited by the fact that the German sub-
marines were playing havoc with British shipping right at
England's door. A fleet of two battleships and several cruisers
drew up off Westende and bombarded the German trenches on
the 4th of February, 1915.
Only one day after the war-zone proclamation went into effect
the Allies brought out their trump card for the spring of 1915.
CHAPTER XXVIII
ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES
BY the middle of February, 1915, the Allies completed the
arrangement for the naval attack on the Dardanelles. The
military part of the campaign in these regions is treated in the
chapter on the "Campaign in the Dardanelles" ; hence we must
confine ourselves at present to the general naval affairs. The
naval operations began with the concentration in the adjacent
waters of a powerful fleet consisting of both French and British
ships.
The ships engaged were the Queen Elizabeth, with her main
battery of 15-inch guns, the Inflexible, veteran of the fight off
the Falkland Islands, the Agamemnon, Cornwallis, Triumph,
and Vengeance. In addition to these British ships there were
the French battleships Suffren, Gaulois, and Bouvet, and a fleet
ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES 175
of destroyers. The senior British officer was Vice Admiral
Sackville Garden, and the French commander was Admiral
Guepratte. A new "mother ship*' for a squadron of seaplanes
was also part of the naval force; this was the ship Ark Royal.
At eight in the morning on February 19, 1915, this powerful
fleet started "The Great Attempt."
After bombarding the Turkish forts till three in the afternoon
without receiving a single reply from the guns of the forts, the
warships ceased firing and went in closer to the shore, the allied
commanders believing that the forts had not replied because
they all had been put out of action. The fallacy of this belief
was discovered when, at the shortened range, shells began to
fall about the ships. None was hit; when dusk came on they
retired.
Stormy weather prevented further action on the part of the
warships for almost a week, but on February 25, 1915, they
resumed their bombardment. The Irresistible and Albion had
by then joined the other British ships, and the Charlemagne had
augmented the French force.
At ten o'clock in the morning of February 25, 1915, the Queen
Elizabeth, Gaulois, Irresistible, and Agamemnon began to fire
on the forts Sedd-el-Bahr, Orkanieh, Kum Kale, and Cape Hellas
— ^the outer forts — at long range, and drew replies from the
Turkish guns. It was out of all compliance with naval tradition
for warships to stand and engage land fortifications, for lessons
learned by naval authorities from the Spanish- American and
i Russo-Japanese wars had established precedents; which pro-
hibited it. But here the larger warships were carrying heavier
^ns than those in the forts. Whereas the Queen Elizabeth car-
ried 15-inch guns, the largest of the Turkish guns measured only
p.2 inches.
At 11.30 o'clock in the morning of February 25, 1915, the
Agamemnon was hit with a shell which had traveled six miles,
but it did not damage her beyond repair. Meanwhile the Queen
Elizabeth had silenced Cape Hellas, firing from a distance far
beyond the range of the forts' guns. And then, just before noon,
and after the larger ship had silenced the main battery at Cape
12_War St. 3
176 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Hellas, the ships Vengeance and Cornwallis dashed in at shorter
range and destroyed the minor batteries there. The Suffren and
Charlemagne also took part in this phase of the engagement,
and later, in the afternoon, the Triumph and Albion concen-
trated fire on Sedd-el-Bahr, silencing its last guns by five o'clock
in the evening.
The larger ships needed the respite during the night of
February 25, 1915, while trawlers, which had been brought down
from the North Sea for the purpose, began to sweep the entrance
to the forts for mines, and cleared enough of them out by thf
morning of the 26th to enable the Majestic — which had by then
joined the fleet — and the Albion and Vengeance to steam in be-
tween the flanking shores and fire at the forts on the Asiatic side.
It was known by the allied commanders that they might expect
return fire from Fort Dardanos, but this they did not fear, for
they knew that its heaviest gun measured but 5.9 inches. But
they had a surprise when concealed batteries near by, the pres-
ence of which had not been suspected, suddenly began to fire.
Believing now that the Turks were abandoning the forts at the
entrance, the allied ships covered the landing of parties of
marines.
Long-range firing had by the end of February 26, 1915, en-
abled the allied fleets to silence the outer forts and to clear their
way to the straits. They now had to take up the task of destroy-
ing the real defenses of the Dardanelles — ^the forts at the Nar-
rows, and this was a harder task, for long-range firing was no
longer possible. The guns of the forts and those of the ships
would be meeting on a more equal basis.
But this was not to be essayed at once, for more rough weather
kept the fleets from using their guns effectively, their trawlers
continued to sweep the waters for mines near the Narrows. By
March 3, 1915, however, the commanders were ready to resume
operations. The Lord Nelson and the Ocean had by then also
arrived on the scene, and in the subsequent operations were hit
a number of times by the Turkish guns ; and the Canopus, Swift-
sure, Prince George, and Sapphire, though they did not report
being hit, were also known to have been present.
ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES 177
The new "eyes" of the fleets located new and concealed bat-
teries placed in position by the Turks, and at two o'clock in the
afternoon of February 3, 1915, they ascended to direct the fire
of the ships' guns by signal. The bombardment was kept up till
darkness fell, but it was resumed on the next day.
On March 4, 1915, the Queen Elizabeth, so great was the range
of her guns, was able to reach the forts Hamadieh I, Tabia, and
Hamadieh II, firing across the Gallipoli Peninsula. Three times
she was hit by shells from field pieces lying between her and her
target, but no great damage was done to her. While her guns
roared out, the Suffren, Albion, Prince George, Vengeance, and
Majestic went inside the straits and had attacked the forts at
Soundere, Mount Dardanos, and Rumili Medjidieh Tabia, and
were fired upon by Turkish guns from the forts and from con-
cealed batteries which struck these ships, but not a man was
killed or a ship put out of action.
March 7, 1915, the Agamemnon and Lord Nelson attacked the
forts at the Narrows, their bombardment being covered by
the four French battleships. All of the ships were struck, but
again none of them was put out of action. After heavy
shelling forts Rumili Medjidieh Tabia and Hamadieh I were
silenced.
While these operations were going on, another British fleet,
consisting of battleships and cruisers, on March 5, 1915, began
an attack on Smyrna. For two hours, and in fine, clear weather,
Fort Yeni Kale was damaged after being subjected to heavy
bombardment, but it was not silenced when dusk interrupted the
attack.
Little was accomplished for some days afterward. Some of
the forts which had been reported silenced were getting ready
to resume firing; their silence had been due to the fact that the
defenders often had to leave their guns while the gases generated
by the firing cleared off, and they had also thought it wiser to
conserve ammunition rather than fire ineffective shots. Sedd-el-
Bahr and Kum Kale were able to resume firing in a few days, for
though the shells of the allied fleets had damaged the structural
parts of these defenses, they had not landed troop.^ out to occupy
178 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
them, with the result that the Turks were enabled to intrench
near the ruins and there reset their guns.
On the morning of March 15, 1915, the small British cruiser
Amethyst made a dash into the Narrows, which when reported
led the British and French public to believe that the defense had
been forced, but, as a matter of fact, this exploit was a bit of
stratagem, being only designed to draw the fire of concealed
batteries.
On March 18, 1915, "The Great Effort" was made to force the
defenses with naval operations, all previous work having been
preliminary. The battleships Agamemnon, Prince George,
Queen Elizabeth, Lord Nelson, Triumph, and Inflexible steamed
right up to the Narrows. Four of them bombarded Chanak and
a battery which lay opposite it, and the forts at Saghandere,
Kephez Point, and Dardanos were kept busy by the Triumph
and the Prince George, After the fleet had been at it for an hour
and a half they received the support of the four French ships
which steamed in close and attacked the forts at a shorter range.
When the forts ceased firing the six battleships Ocean, Swift-
sure, Majestic, Albion, Irresistible, and Vengeance came in and
tried to carry the attack further. While the French squadron
maneuvered to allow freedom of action for this newer British
squadron the Turkish guns resumed fire. Then came the first
of a series of disasters. Three shells struck the Bouvet, and she
soon began to keel over. When the underwater part of her hull
came into view it was seen that she had been hit underneath,
probably by one of the mines which the Turks had floated toward
the crowded ships. She sank almost immediately, carrying the
greater part of her crew down with her. Only two hours later
r.nother mine did damage to the Irresistible, and she left the
line, listing heavily. While she floated and while she was under
heavy fire from Turkish guns a destroyer took off her crew. She
sank just before six o'clock. Not fifteen minutes later the Ocean
became the third victim of a floating mine, and she also went to
the bottom. Destroyers rescued many of her crew from the
water. The guns from the forts were also able to do damage ; the
Gaulois had been hit again and again, with the result that
GERMAN RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES 179
she had a hole in her hull and her upper works were damaged
badly. Fire had broken out on the Inflexible, and a number of
her officers and crew had been either killed or wounded. The
day ended with the forts still able to return a lively fire to all
attacks, and "The Great Attempt" on the part of the allied fleets
had failed.
On the other end of the passage there had also been some naval
operations, when, on March 28, 1915, the Black Sea Fleet of the
Russian navy had bombarded the forts on the Bosphorous.
Smyrna was again attacked on April 6, 1915. The operations of
allied submarines were the next phases of the attack on the
Dardanelles to be reported. The E-5 grounded near Kephez
Point on April 17, 1915, but before she could be captured by the
Turks picket boats from the allied fleet rescued her crew and then
destroyed her. It was just two months now since the naval
operations had begun at the Dardanelles ; it was seen then that
all attempts to take them by naval operations alone must fail as
did the attack of March 18, 1915.
CHAPTER XXIX
GERMAN RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES
THE next important event in the naval history of the war oc-
curred in far-distant waters. On March 10, 1915, there ended
the wonderful career of the German auxiliary cruiser Prinz
Eitel Friedrich, Captain Thierichens, which on that date put in
at the American port of Newport News, Va., for repairs, after
making the harbor in spite of the watch kept on it by Britislr
cruisers. She brought with her more than 500 persons, 200 of
them being her own crew, and the remainder being passengers
and crews of French, British, Russian, and American ships that
had been her victims in her roving over 30,000 miles of the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans since leaving Tsing,-tau seven months
before.
180 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
She had sent eight merchant ships to the bottom, one of them
being the William P, Frye, an American vessel carrying wheat,
three British ships, three flying the French flag, and one Russian
ship. Their total tonnage came to 18,245. The fact that she
had sunk an American ship on the high seas opened up still
another diplomatic controversy between Germany and the
United States, which cannot be treated here.
When she left Tsing-tau she took as her crew the men from
the German gunboats Tiger and Luchs, and had their four 4.1-inch
and some of their one-pounder guns as her armament. Soon
afterward she stopped the British ship Schargost and expected
to refill her coal bunkers from those of the merchantman, but in
this she was disappointed, for those of the latter were almost
empty. Her next victim was a French sailing vessel, Jean, and
on board this was found a pleasant surprise for the German
raider, for the vessel was laden with coal. Captain Thierichens
had her towed 1,500 miles, to Easter Island, where the coal was
transferred to the bunkers of the Eitel Friedrich, and the crews
of her first three victims were put ashore. These marooned men
were burdens to the white inhabitants of the island, for there
was not too much food for the extra forty-eight mouths. Finally,
on February 26, 1915, the Swedish ship Nordic saw them signal-
ing from the island and took them off, landing them at Panama
on the day after the Prinz Eitel Friedrich entered Newport
News.
By the beginning of December, 1914, the German raider was
in the South Atlantic, and while there heard wireless messages
exchanged between the ships of the British fleet that took part
in the battle off the Falkland Islands. The bark Isabella Browne,
flying the Russian flag, was the next ship overtaken by the Eitel
Friedrich, on January 26, 1915. She was boarded and all of her
provisions and stores were removed to the German ship; after
her crew and their personal effects were taken aboard the Ger-
man ship she was dynamited and sank. On that same morning
the French ship Pierre Loti was sighted, and while the Prinz
Eitel Friedrich put an end to her, after first taking off her crew,
the captive crew of the Isabella Browne was sent below, but was
GERMAN RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES 181
allowed to come on deck to watch the sinking of the French ship.
The American ship William P. Frye was sunk soon afterward,
and her crew, also, was made part of the party on board the
raider. After sinking the French bark Jacobsen the Prinz Eitel
Friedrich stopped the Thalasia on February 8, 1915, and let her
go on her way, but on February 18 the British ships Cindracoe
and Mary Ada Scott were sunk. On the 19th the French steamer
Floride was overtaken off the coast of Brazil ; all persons aboard
her were transferred to the German ship and most of her pro-
visions were also taken aboard the latter ; the Floride, the largest
steamer destroyed by the German ship, v^as set afire and left to
bum. On February 20, 1915, the British ship Willerby was over-
taken and nearly sank the Prinz Eitel Friedrich before being
boarded. As the German ship passed across the stern of the
other at a short distance the British captain, knowing that the
end of his own ship was near, decided to take his captor down
with him. He tried to ram the German ship with the stern of his
ship, but failed in the attempt.
On the evening of February 20, 1915, the wireless operator of
the Prinz Eitel Friedrich heard British cruisers "talking" with
each other, one of them being the Berwick, The German cap-
tain now saw that his long raiding cruise was up, for though he
could replenish his stores and bunkers from captured ships he
could not make the many repairs which his vessel needed. To
put them off at a neutral port or to let them go in one of the ships
he captured would mean that his position would be reported to
British ships within a week. He therefore decided to end his
raiding and put in at Newport News. His vessel was interned
I in the American port.
We may now return to the story of the blockade against Ger-
many and the retaliation she sought. The Allies were now stop-
ping as much shipping on its way to Germany as they dared
without bringing on trouble with neutral powers. The Dacia,
formerly a German merchantman, was taken over, after the
outbreak of the war, by an American citizen and sailed from New
Orleans for Rotterdam with a cargo of cotton on February 12,
1915. She was stopped by a French warship and taken to a
i
182 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
French port February 27, 1915, and there held till the matter of
the validity of her transfer of registry could be settled.
On the other hand the German submarine exploits continued
and found among their victims a British warship, along with the
many merchantmen. On March 11, 1915, the British auxiliary
cruiser Bayano, while on patrol duty became the victim of a
German torpedo off the Scotch coast. She went down almost
immediately, carrying with her the greater part of her crew.
But not always were the submarines immune. Only the day
before the British destroyer Ariel rammed the German sub-
marine U-12 and sent her to the bottom, after rescuing her
crew. She was of an older type, built in 1911, of submarine, and
had played an active part in the raiding in British waters. On
February 21, 1915, she had sunk the Irish coasting steamer
Downshire in the Irish Sea, and her destruction was particu-
larly welcome in British shipping circles.
Once more an incident in the naval warfare of the Great War
was to involve diplomatic exchanges between the belligerents
and the United States. The African liner Falaba, a British ship
on her way from Liverpool to Lisbon, was torpedoed in St.
George's Channel on the afternoon of March 28, 1915. She had
as one of her passengers an American, L. C. Thrasher, who lost
his life when the ship sank.
The naval warfare was proceeding like a game of checkers.
When on March 14, 1915, there came the end of still another of
the German raiding cruisers, the Dresden. She was a cruiser
built in 1907 and having a displacement of 3,544 tons. Her
speed was good — 24.5 knots — and her armament of ten 4.1-inch
guns and eight 5-pounder guns made her quite a match for
enemy warships of her class and superior as for merchant-
men. She was a sister ship to that other famous raider the
Emden. In 1909 she had taken her place among the other
foreign warships in the line in the Hudson River, participating
in the Hudson-Fulton Celebration. In the spring of 1914 she
was in the neighborhood of Central America and rescued a
number of foreign refugees who fled from Mexico, and also took
Senor Huerta from Puerto Mexico.
t
I fr,
GERMAN RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES 183
She was still in that neighborhood when the war broke out,
and was immediately sought after by British and French war-
ships which were near by. She managed to get away from these
pursuers and sank the British steamers Hyades and Holmwood
off the Brazilian coast during the latter part of August, 1914.
She then went south, rounded the Horn and joined the other
ships under command of Admiral Von Spee, taking part in the
battle off Coronel, on November 1, 1914.
She remained with that squadron and took part in a second
battle — that off the Falkland Islands — on December 8, 1914.
When Admiral von Spee saw that he had little chance of winning
the battle he gave orders that the lighter ships should leave the
line and seek safety in flight. The Dresden was one of the
ships which escaped, to the chagrin of the British Admiral. She
then turned "raider."
Five days later, on December 13, 1914, she had appeared off
Punta Arenas, in the Straits of Magellan, stopped at that port
long enough to take on some provisions and put to sea again,
with British and Japanese warships on her trail. She was too
closely hunted to be able to sink many ships, but during the week
of March 12, 1915, she sank the British steamer Conway Casfle,
off the coast of Chile, and took coal and provisions from the>
two German steamers Alda and Sierra Cordoba.
On March 14, 1915, she was sighted by the British cruisers
Glasgow, Kent and Orama near Juan Fernandez Island. What
then ensued is in doubt, owing to conflicting reports made by
the senior British officer and by the captain of the German
cruiser. The latter insisted that, seeing his ship was at the end
of her career, he ordered his men to leave her and then blew
her up. The former declared that shots were exchanged, that
e was set afire and was otherwise badly damaged by the
ritish fire. At any rate, she was destroyed, and all of her men
were saved. It was estimated that the amount of damage she
flicted on allied trade amounted to $1,250,000.
Thus at the end of March, 1915, only the Karlsruhe and Kron-
rinz Wilhelm, of the eleven German warships that were detached
from the main German fleet in the North Sea at the outbreak of
184 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the war, and of the few ships which slipped out of various ports
as converted auxiliary cruisers, were still at large on the high
seas.
Naval activity in the northern waters of Europe did not abate.
The British admiralty on March 25, 1915, had announced that
the German submarine U-29, one of the most improved craft of
the type in use, had been sunk. This loss was admitted by the
German admiralty on April 7, 1915. It was a serious loss to
the German navy, for its commander was Otto von Weddigen,
he who, in the Z7-P, had sent the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue to
the bottom in September, 1914.
The naval warfare at the Dardanelles proceeded in the same
desultory fashion. A Turkish torpedo boat caught up with the
British transport Manitou, and opened fire on her, killing some
twenty of the soldiers on board.
In answer to calls for help from the Manitou the British cruiser
Minerva and some torpedo boats went to the scene and attacked
the Turkish craft on April 7, 1915, driving it ashore off Chios
and destroyed it as it lay beached. But during April, 1915, it
seemed as though there would be another pitched fight between
British and German warships in the North Sea. On April 23,
1915, the German admiralty announced that "the German High
Sea Fleet has recently cruised repeatedly in the North Sea, ad-
vancing into English waters without meeting the sea forces
of Great Britain." The British admiralty had undoubtedly
been aware of this activity on the part of their enemy, but
for reasons of their own did not choose to send British ships
to meet the German fleet, and the expected battle did not take
place.
France, on April 26, 1915, was to sustain a severe loss to her
navy; she had up to this time not lost as many ships as her
ally, England, or her enemy, Germany, but her navy was so much
smaller than either of them that the sinking of the Leon
Gamhetta on that date was a matter of weight. The Gam-
betta was an armored cruiser, built in 1904, and carrying four
7.6-inch guns, sixteen 6.4-inch guns and a number of smaller
caliber. She had a speed of twenty-three knots. While doing
GERMAN RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES 185
patrol duty in the Strait of Otranto she was made the victim of
the Austrian submarine U-5, and sank, carrying with her 552
men.
On April 28, 1915, there occurred another incident which gave
rise to diplomatic exchanges between Germany and the United
States. On that date a German seaplane attacked the American
merchantman in broad daylight in the North Sea, but fortunately
for its crew the ship was not sent to the bottom. The first
American ship to be struck by a torpedo in the war zone
established by the German admiralty's proclamation of February
5, 1915, was the GmI flight This tank steamer was hit by a
torpedo fired by a German submarine off the Scilly Islands, on
the 1st of May, 1915.
But of more importance, because of the number of American
lives lost, the standing of the matter in international law and the
prominence of the vessel, was the sinking of the Cunard liner
Lusitania, on May 7, 1915. This is fully described in the chapter
on submarines, and in the diplomatic developments discussed in
the chapter on the United States and the War. The Lusitania had
left New York for Liverpool on the 1st of May, 1915. She was
one of. the fastest ships plying between the Eastern and Western
Hemispheres. Larger than any warship afloat at the time, she
was able to make the trip from Liverpool to New York in a little
under five days. On her last crossing she carried 2,160 persons,
including passengers and crew, many of the former being Ameri-
cans, some of them of great prominence. While off Old Head
of Kinsale, on the southeastern end of Ireland, at about half
past two, on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, with a calm sea and
no wind, she was hit by one or more torpedoes from a German
submarine without wanring.
Those on board immediately went to the life boats, but it was
only twenty minutes after she had first been hit that she sank,
and not enough of the small craft could be gotten over her side
in that time to rescue all those on board. Out of the 2,160
souls aboard at least 1,398 were lost. Of these 107 were Ameri-
can citizens. Small boats in the neighborhood of the disaster
hurried to the scene and rescued those whom they could reach in
186 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the water and brought them to Queenstown. The sacks of mail
which the liner carried and which went down with her were the
first American mail sacks ever lost at sea as a result of war. The
controversies which this disaster gave rise to between England,
Germany and the United States are given elsewhere.
Against British warships the submarine warfare was also
effective during the month of May, 1915. On the 1st day of
that month the old British destroyer Recruit was sent to the
bottom of the North Sea by a German submarine, but the two
German destroyers which had accompanied the submarine that
did this were pursued immediately by British destroyers and
were sunk. On the same day that the Lusitania went down a
German mine ended the career of the British destroyer Maori,
CHAPTER XXX
ITALIAN PARTICIPATION — OPERATIONS
IN MANY WATERS
THE month of May, 1915, saw new characters enter the
theatres of naval warfare. Italy had now entered the war and
brought to the naval strength of the Allies a minor naval unit.
At the time Italy entered the war she possessed six dread-
noughts, the Caio Duilio and the Andrea Doria, completed in
1915, the Conte di Cavour, Giulio Cesare, and Leonardo da Vinci,
completed in 1914, and the Dante Alighieri, completed in 1912.
Each of these dreadnoughts had a speed of 23 knots. The Dante
Alighieri displaced 19,400 tons and had a main battery of twelve
12-inch guns, and a complement of 987 men. Each of the other
five had thirteen 12-inch guns and a complement of 1,000 men.
The displacement of vessels of the 1914 type was 22,340 tons;
that of the 1915 type 23,025 tons. There were many lesser craft
flying the Italian flag, but these larger ships were the most
important additions to the naval forces of the Allies in southern
waters.
ITALIAN PARTICIPATION 187
The chief operations of the Italian navy were directed against
Austria. On May 28, 1915, the Italian admiralty announced
the damage inflicted on Austrian maritime strength up to that
date. On May 24, 1915, the Austrian torpedo boat S-20 ap-
proached the canal at Porto Corsini, but drew a very heavy fire
from concealed and unsuspected batteries which forced her to
leave immediately. The Austrian torpedo boat destroyer Scharf-
schiltze, the scout ship Novara and the destroyer Ozepel, all of
the Austrian navy, came to the assistance of the S-20 and also
received salvos from the Italian land batteries. But on the same
day the Italian destroyer Turbine, while scouting gave chase to
an Austrian destroyer and the Austrian cruiser Helgoland, The
strength of these Austrian ships was too much for the Turbine
and she put on speed with the intention of escaping from
their fire, but she was severely damaged by Austrian shells, and
not having enough ammunition aboard to give a good account
of herself, she was scuttled by her own crew.
It is now necessary to take up again the story of the German
raiding ships at large on the high seas. As has been told above,
after the Prinz Eitel Friedrich ended her career by putting in
at Newport News the only German ships of the kind remaining
at large were the Karlsruhe and Kronprinz Wilhelm, But on
the 1st of April, 1915, the Macedonia, a converted liner which
since November, 1914, had been interned at Las Palmas,
Canary Islands, succeeded in slipping out of the harbor laden
with provisions and supplies for use of warships and
made her way to South American waters in spite of the
fact that she had run through lines patrolled by British
cruisers.
The Kronprinz Wilhelm' s career as a raider ended on April 11,
1915, when, like the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, she succeeded in get-
ting past the British cruisers and slipped into Newport News,
Virginia. How this former Hamburg- American liner had slipped
out of the harbor of New York on the night of August 3,. 1914,
with her bunkers and even her cabins filled with coal and pro-
visions, with all lights out and with canvas covering her port
holes has already been told. From that date until she again put
188 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
in at an American port she captured numerous merchant ships,
taking 960 prisoners and doing damage amounting to more than
$7,000,000. She kept herself provisioned from her captives, and
it was only the poor condition of her plates and boilers that
made her captain give up raiding when he did. Her movements
had been mysterious during all the time she was at large. She
was known to have reprovisioned the cruiser Dresden and to
have taken an almost stationary position in the South Atlantic in
order to act as a "wireless station" for the squadron of Admiral
von Spee. But when the latter was defeated off the Falkland
Islands, she resumed operations as a raider of commerce. When
she came into Newport News more than 60 per cent of her crew
Were suffering from what was thought to be beri-beri; she had
but twenty-one tons of coal in her bunkers and almost no am-
munition.
The total damage inflicted on the commerce of the Allies by
the Emden, Karlsruhe, Kronprinz Wilhelm, Prinz Eitel Fried-
rich, Konigsherg, Dresden an^ Leipzig amounted, by the end of
May, 1915, to $35,000,000. Sixty-seven vessels had been cap-
tured and sunk by them.
In the Dardanelles the naval operations were resumed, to
some extent, during the month of May, 1915. For a number of
weeks after the allied fleet had made the great attempt to force
the Dardanelles on March 19, 1915, their commanders attempted
no maneuvers with the larger ships, but the submarines were
given work to do. On April 27, 1915, the British submarine
E-14', under command of Lieutenant Commander Boyle, dived
and went under the Turkish mine fields, reaching the waters
of the Sea of Marmora. In spite of the fact that Turkish de-
stroyers knew of its presence and hourly watched for it in the
hope of sinking it, this submarine was able to operate brilliantly
for some days, sinking two Turkish gunboats and a laden trans-
port. Similar exploits were performed by Lieutenant Com-
mander Nasmith with the British submarine E-11, which even
damaged wharves at the Turkish capital.
But when the military operations were getting under way dur-
ing May, 1915, the larger ships of the fleets were again used.
ITALIAN PARTICIPATION 189
The Germans realizing that these great ships, moving as they did
slowly and deliberately while they fired on the land forts, would
be good targets for torpedoes, sent some of their newest sub-
marines from the bases in the North Sea, down along the coasts
of France and Spain, through the passage at Gibraltar and to
the Dardanelles. Destroyers accompanying the allied fleets kept
diligent watch for attacks from them. The Goeben, one of the
German battle cruisers that had escaped British and French
fleets in the Mediterranean during the first weeks of the war,
and which was now a part of the Turkish navy, was brought to
the scene and aided the Turkish forts in their bombardment of
the hostile warships.
On May 12, 1915, the British battleship Goliath, of old design
and displacing some 12,000 tons, was sunk by a torpedo. This
ship had been protecting a part of the French fleet from flank
attack inside the straits, and under the cover of darkness had
been approached by a Turkish destroyer which fired the fatal
torpedo. It sank almost immediately.
The submarines of the German navy which had made the long
journey to participate in the action near the Dardanelles got in
their first work on May 26, 1915, when a torpedo fired by one
of them struck the British battleship Triumph and sent her to
the bottom. Of interest to naval authorities all over the world
was the fact that this ship at the time she was struck had out
torpedo nets which were supposed to be torpedo-proof; but the
German missile tore through them and reached the hull.' A hunt
was made for the hostile submarine by the British destroyers,
but she was found by the British battleship Majestic; but before
the British ship could fire a shot at the German submarine, the
latter fired a torpedo that caught the battleship near her stern
and sank her immediately. Apprehension was now felt for the
IHbiore formidable ships such as the Queen Elizabeth and others
^Bf her class which were in those waters ; inasmuch as the opera-
^ftons at the Dardanelles assumed more and more a military
^Bather than a naval character, the British admiralty thought it
!^*iv^iser to keep the Queen Elizabeth in safer waters ; she was con-
sequently called back to England. Only old battleships and
190 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
cruisers were left to cooperate with the troops operating on
the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Naval warfare in southern waters was continued against
British warships by the Austrian navy. On June 9, 1915, the
Austrian admiralty announced that a cruiser of the type of the
Liverpool had been struck by a torpedo fired by an Austrian
submarine while the former was off San Giovanni di Medua,
near the Albanian coast. Reports of the incident issued
by the Austrian and British naval authorities differed, the
former claiming that the cruiser had sunk, and the latter
that it had remained afloat and had been towed to an Adriatic
port.
Most unique was an engagement between the Italian submarine
Medusa and a similar craft flying the Austrian flag on June 17,
1915. This was the first time that two submarines had ever
fought with each other. On that day the two submarines, the
presence of each unknown to the other, lay submerged, not a
great distance apart. The Medusa, after some hours, came up,
allowing only her periscope to show ; seeing no enemy about, her
commander brought the rest of her out of the water. She had
not emerged many moments before the Austrian vessel also
came up for a look around and the commander of the latter espied
the Italian submarine through his periscope. He immediately
ordered a torpedo fired; it found a mark in the hull of the
Medusa and she was sent to the bottom. One of her officers
and four of her men were rescued by the Austrian submarine
and made prisoners.
Italy's navy was not to continue to act as a separate naval
unit in the southern naval theatre of war, for on June 18, 1915,
the Minister of Marine of France announced that the "Anglo-
French forces in the Mediterranean were cooperating with the
Italian fleet, whose participation made possible a more effective
patrol of the Adriatic. Warships of the Allies were engaged in
finding and destroying oil depots from which the enemy's sub-
marines had been replenishing their supplies." This effective
patrol did not, however, prevent an Austrian submarine from
sinking an Italian torpedo boat on June 21, 1915.
I
ITALIAN PARTICIPATION 191
In the Baltic Sea the naval activity had at no time during the
first year of the war been great, but during the month of June,
1915, there was a minor naval engagement at the mouth of the
Gulf of Riga, during which the Germans lost a transport and
the Russians an auxiliary cruiser. In the other northern waters
the Germans lost the submarine f7-i-4, which was sunk on June 9,
1915. The crew were brought to England as prisoners. Three
days later the British admiralty admitted that two torpedo boats,
the No, 10 and the No. 12 had been lost. The loss of two such
small boats did not worry Britain as much as did the loss of many
merchant ships in the war zone right through the spring and
summer of 1915, and to show that British warships were not
immune from submarine attack, in spite of the fact that many
of the underwater craft of Germany were meeting with disaster,
the British cruiser Roxburgh was struck by a torpedo on June 20,
1915, but was able to get away under her own steam. The rest
of the month saw small losses to nearly all of the fleets engaged
in the war, but none of these were of importance.
The twelfth month of the first year of war was not particularly
eventful in so far as naval history was concerned. On July 1,
1915, the Germans maneuvered in the Baltic Sea with a small
fleet which accompanied transports bearing men who were to
try to land on the northern shores of Russia. The port of Win-
dau was the point at which the German bombardment was
directed, but Russian torpedo boats and destroyers fought off the
invading German fleet — ^which must have been small — and suc-
ceeded in chasing the German mine-layer Albatross, making it
necessary for her captain to beach her on the Swedish island of
Gothland, where the crew was interned on July 2, 1915. On the
same day a German predreadnought battleship, believed to have
been the Pommem, was sunk at the mouth of Danzig Bay by a
torpedo from a British submarine.
In the Adriatic Austria lost a submarine, the U-ll, through a
unique action. The submersible was sighted on July 1, 1915,
by a French aeroplane. The aviator dropped two bombs which
found their mark on the deck of the submarine and sank her.
Austria had, during that month, made an attempt to capture
13— War St. 3
192 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Austrian island of Pelagosa, which had been occupied
by the Italians on July 26, 1915. But July 29, 1915, the fleet of
Austrian cruisers and destroyers, which made the attack,
was driven off by unnamed units of the Italian navy. But a loss
by the latter had been incurred on July 7, 1915, when the armored
cruiser Amalfi, while scouting in the upper waters of the Adriatic
Sea, was sighted and tori>edoed by an Austrian submarine. She
sank, but most of her men were saved. Another Austrian sub-
marine had the same success on July 17, 1915, when it fired a
torpedo at the Italian cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi, and saw her
go down fifteen minutes later. Italy endeavored to imitate the
actions of Germany when, on July 6, 1915, she proclaimed that
the entire Adriatic Sea was a war zone and that the Strait of
Otranto was in a state of blockade. All the ports of Dalmatia
were closed to every kind of commerce.
Near the coasts of Turkey, toward the end of the first year
of war, there was fought the second duel between submarines.
This time the vanquished vessel was the French submarine
Mariotte, which, on July 26, 1915, was sunk by a torpedo from
a German submarine in the waters right near the entrance to
the Dardanelles. Britain ended the first year of naval warfare
by destroying the German cruiser Konigsberg, which, since the
fall of the year before, had been lying up the Rufiji River in Ger-
man East Africa, after having been chased thence by a British
cruiser. It was decided to destroy her in order that she might
not get by the sunken hulls that the British had placed at the
mouth of the river in order to "bottle her up." Consequently, on
the morning of July 4, 1915, after her position had been noted
by an aviator, two British river monitors, Severn and Mersey,
aided by a cruiser and minor vessels, began to fire upon the
stationary vessel. Their fire was directed by the aviator who ha(?
discovered her, but it was at first almost ineffective because she
lay so well concealed by the vegetation of the surrounding jungle.
She answered their fire and succeeded in damaging the Mersey/
but after being bombarded for six hours she was set on fire. When
the British monitors had finished with her she was a total wreck.
STORY OF THE "EMDEN" 19?
CHAPTER XXXI
WE now return to the exploits of the Emden, its mysterious
disappearance and the narrative of its heroes — a great epic
of the sea.
When in Volume III the story of the sinking of the Ger-
man cruiser Emden was related, mention was made of the
escape of the landing party belonging to that ship from Cocos
Island. This party consisted of fifty men, headed by Captain
Mucke, and from the time their ship went down on November
9, 1914, until they reported for duty again at Damascus, Syria,
in May, 1915, they had a series of adventures as thrilling as
those encountered by the heroes in any of the Renaissance
epics.
Before the Emden met the Australian cruiser Sydney, and had
been sunk by the latter, she had picked up three officers from
German steamers which she had met. This proved to be a piece
of good fortune, for extra officers were needed to board and com-
mand the prize crews of captured vessels. The story of the raid-
ing of the Emden has already been given ; but here the story of
the landing party is given as told by Captain Mucke himself on
May 10, 1915, at Damascus:
"On November 9, 1914," he said, "I left the Emden in order
to destroy the wireless plant on Cocos Island. I had fifty men,
four machine guns, about thirty rifles. Just as we were about to
destroy the apparatus it reported, 'Careful ; Emden near.' The
work of destruction went smoothly. The wireless operators
said: Thank God. It's been like being under arrest day and
night lately.' Presently the Emden signaled us, 'Hurry up.' I
packed up, but simultaneously the Emden's siren wailed. I hur-
ried to the bridge and saw the flag *Anna' go up. That meant
•Weigh anchor.' We ran like mad to our boat, but already the
Emden's pennant was up, the battle flag was raised, and they
began to fire from the starboard."
194 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"The enemy," explained Captain Mucke, "was concealed by the
island and therefore not to be seen, but I saw the shells strike
the water. To follow and catch the Emden was out of the ques-
tion, as she was going at twenty knots, and I only four with my
steam pinnace. Therefore I turned back to land, raised the flag,
declared German laws of war in force, seized all arms, set up
my machine guns on shore in order to guard against a hostile
landing. Then I ran out again in order to observe the fight.
From the splash of the shells it looked as though the enemy
had 15-centimeter guns, bigger, therefore, than the Emden' s.
He fired rapidly but poorly. It was the Australian cruiser
Sydney/*
According to the account of the Englishmen who saw the first
part of the engagement from the shore, the Emden was cut up
rapidly. Her forward smokestack lay across the deck, and was
already burning fiercely aft. Behind the mainmast several shells
struck home.
"We saw the high flame," continued Captain Miicke, "whether
circular fighting or a running fight now followed, I don't know,
because I again had to look to my land defenses. Later, I looked
on from the roof of a house. Now the Emden again stood out to
sea about 4,000 to 5,000 yards, still burning. As she again turned
toward the enemy, the forward mast was shot away. On the
enemy no "outward damage was apparent, but columns of smoke
showed where shots had struck home. Then the Emden took a
northerly course, likewise the enemy, and I had to stand there
helpless, gritting my teeth and thinking; *Damn it; the Emden
is burning and you aren't aboard !' "
Captain Miicke, in relating his thrilling adventure, then ex-
plained: "The ships, still fighting, disappeared behind the hori-
zon. I thought that an unlucky outcome for the Emden was pos-
sible, also a landing by the enemy on the Keeling Island, at least
for the purpose of landing the wounded and taking on provisions.
As there were other ships in the neighborhood, according to the
statements of the Englishmen, I saw myself faced with the cer-
tainty of having soon to surrender because of a lack of ammuni-
tion. But for no price did I and my men want to get into English
STORY OF THE "EMDEN''
195
196 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
imprisonment. As I was thinking about all this, the masts again
appeared on the horizon, the Emden steaming easterly, but very
much slower. All at once the enemy, at high speed, shot by, ap-
parently quite close to the Emden. A high white waterspout
showed amidst the black smoke of the enemy. That was a
torpedo. I saw*how the two opponents withdrew, the distance
growing greater and greater between them ; how they separated,
till they disappeared in the darkness. The fight had lasted ten
hours.
"I had made up my mind to leave the island as quickly as pos-
sible. The E'mden was gone ; the danger for us growing. In the
harbor I had noticed a three-master, the schooner Ayesha, Mr.
Ross, the owner of the ship and of the island, had warned me
that the boat was leaky, but I found it quite a seaworthy tub.
Now provisions for eight weeks, and water for four, were quickly
taken on board. The Englishmen very kindly showed us the best
water and gave us clothing and utensils. They declared this was
their thanks for our 'moderation' and 'generosity.* Then they
collected the autographs of our men, photographed them and
gave three cheers as our last boat put off. It was evening, nearly
dark, when we sailed away.
'The Ayesha proved to be a really splendid boat. We had only
one sextant and two chronometers on board, but a chronometer
journal was lacking. Luckily I found an 'Old Indian Ocean Di-
rectory' of 1882 on board; its information went back to the
year 1780.
'*I had said : 'We are going to East Africa.' Therefore I sailed
at first westward, then northward. There followed the monsoons,
but then also, long periods of dead calm. Only two neutral ports
came seriously under consideration; Batavia and Padang. A1
Keeling I had cautiously asked about Tsing-tau, of which I had
naturally thought first, and so quite by chance I learned that it
had fallen. Now I decided for Padang, because I knew I would be
more apt to meet the Emden there, also because there was a
German consul there, because my schooner was unknown there
and because I hoped to find German ships there, and learn some
news. 'It'll take you six to eight days to reach Batavia' a captain
STORY OF THE "EMDEN" 197
had told me at Keeling. Now we needed eighteen days to reach
Padang, the weather was so rottenly still."
The suffering of the crew of the Emden on their perilous voy-
age is here told in the captain^s words: "We had an excellent
cook aboard; he had deserted from the French Foreign Legion.
We had to go sparingly with our water; each man received but
three glasses daily. When it rained, all possible receptacles were
placed on deck and the main sail was spread over the cabin roof
to catch the rain.
"At length as we came in the neighborhood of Padang, on the
26th of November, 1915, a ship appeared for the first time and
looked for our name. But the name had been painted over, be-
cause it was the former English name. As I thought, 'You're rid
of the fellow' the ship came up again in the evening, and steamed
within a hundred yards of us. I sent all my men below deck, and
I promenaded the deck as the solitary skipper. Through Morse
signals the stranger gave her identity. She proved to be the
Hollandish torpedo boat Lynx, I asked by signals, 'Why do you
follow me?' No answer. The next morning I found myself in
Hollandish waters, so I raised pennant and war flag. Now the
Lynx came at top speed past us. As it passed I had my men line
up on deck, and gave a greeting. The greeting was answered.
Then, before the harbor at Padang, I went aboard the Lynx in
my well and carefully preserved uniform and declared my inten-
tions. The commandant opined that I could run into the harbor,
but whether I might come out again was doubtful.
"Three German ships were in the harbor at Padang," con-
tinues Captain Miicke. "The harbor authorities demanded the
certification for pennant and war flag, also papers to prove that
I was the commander of this warship. For that, I answered, I
was only responsible to my superior officer. Now they advised
me most insistently to allow ourselves to be interned peacefully.
They said it wasn't at all pleasant in the neighborhood. We'd
fall into the hands of the Japanese or the English. As a matter
of fact, we again had great luck. On the day before a Japanese
warship had been cruising around here. Naturally, I rejected all
the well-meant and kindly advice, and did th^s in the presence of
198 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
my lieutenants. I demanded provisions, water, sails, tackle, and
clothing. They replied we could take on board everything which
we had formerly had on board, but nothing which would mean
an increase in our naval strength.
"First thing, I wanted to improve our wardrobe, for I had
only one sock, a pair of shoes, and one clean shirt, which had
become rather threadbare. My comrades had even less. But the
master of the port declined to let us have, not only charts, but
also clothing and toothbrushes, on the ground that these would be
an increase in armament. Nobody could come aboard, nobody
could leave the ship without permission. I requested that the
consul be allowed to come aboard. The consul, Herr Schild, as
also did the brothers Baumer, gave us assistance in the friend-
liest fashion. From the German steamers boats could come along-
side and talk with us. Finally, we were allowed to have German
papers. They were, to be sure, from August only. From then
until March, 1915, we saw no papers.
"Hardly had we been towed out of the harbor again after
twenty-four hours, on the evening of the 28th of November, 1914,
when a searchlight flashed before us. I thought, 'Better interned
than prisoner.' I put out all lights and withdrew to the shelter
of the island. But they were Hollanders and didn't do anything
to us. Then for two weeks more we drifted around, lying still
for days. The weather was alternately still, rainy, and blowy.
At length a ship, a freighter, came in sight. It saw us and made
a big curve around us. I made everything hastily 'clear for bat-
tle.' Then one of our officers recognized her for the Choising.
She showed the German flag. I sent up light rockets, although
it was broad day, and went with all sails set, that were still set-
able, toward her. The Choising was a coaster from Hongkong
to Siam. She was at Singapore when the war broke out, then
went to Batavia, was chartered, loaded with coal for the enemy,
and had put into Padang in need, because the coal in the hold
had caught fire. There we had met her.
"Great was our joy now. I had all my men come on deck and
line up for review. The fellows hadn't a rag on. Thus, in nature's
garb, we gave three cheers for the German flag on the Choising,
STORY OF THE "EMDEN'* I99
The men of the Choising told us afterward *We couldn't make out
what that meant, those stark-naked fellows all cheering.' The sea
was too high, and we had to wait two days before we could board
the Choising on December 16, 1914. We took very little with us ;
the schooner was taken in tow. In the afternoon we sank the
Ayesha and were all very sad. The good old Ayesha had served
us faithfully for six weeks. The log showed that we had made
1,709 sea miles under sail since leaving Keeling. She wasn't at
all rotten and unseaworthy, as they had told me, but nice and
white and dry inside. I had grown fond of the boat, on which
I could practice my old sailing maneuvers. The only trouble was
that the sails would go to pieces every now and then, because they
were so old.
"But anyway, she went down quite properly. We had bored a
hole in her ; she filled slowly and then all of a sudden disappeared.
That was the saddest day of the whole month. We gave her three
cheers, and my next yacht at Kiel will be named Ayesha, that is
sure.
"To the captain of the Choising I had said, when I hailed him,
*I do not know what will happen to the ship. The war situation
may make it necessary for me to strand it.' He did not want to
undertake the responsibility. I proposed that we work together,
and I would take the responsibility. Then we traveled together
for three weeks, from Padang to Hodeida. The Choising was
some ninety meters long, and had a speed of nine miles, though
sometimes only four. If she had not accidentally arrived I had
intended to cruise along the west coast of Sumatra to the region
of the northern monsoon. I came about six degrees north, then
over toward Aden to the Arabian coast. In the Red Sea the north-
eastern monsoon, which here blows southeast, could bring us to
D Jidda. I had heard in Padang that Turkey was still allied with
Germany, so we would be able to get safely through Arabia to
Germany.
"I next waited for information through ships, but the Choising
did not know anything definite, either. By way of the Luchs, the
Konigsberg and Kormoran the reports were uncertain. Besides,
according to newspapers at Aden, the Arabs were said to have
200 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
fought with the English; therein there seemed to be offered an
opportunity near at hand to damage the enemy. I therefore
sailed with the Choising in the direction of Aden. Lieutenant
Cordts of the Choising had heard that the Arabian railway al-
ready went almost to Hodeida, near the Perin Strait. The ship's
surgeon there, Docounlang, found confirmation of this in Meyer's
Traveling Handbook. This railway could not have been taken
over by the Englishmen, who always dreamt of it. By doing
this they would have further and completely wrought up the
Mohammedans by making more difficult the journey to Mecca.
Best of all, we thought, *We*ll simply step into the express train
and whizz nicely away to the North Sea.' Certainly there would
be safe journeying homeward through Arabia. To be sure, we
had maps of the Red Sea; but it was the shortest way to the
foe whether in Aden or in Germany.
"On the 7th of January, 1915, between nine and ten o'clock
in the evening, we sneaked through the Strait of Perin. It lay
swarming full of Englishmen. We steered along the African
coast, close past an English cable layer. That was my greatest
delight — how the Englishmen will be vexed when they learn that
we passed safely by Perin. On the next evening we saw on the
coast a few lights near the water. We thought that must be
the pier of Hodeida. But when we measured the distance by
night, three thousand meters, I began to think that must be
something else. At dawn I made out two masts and four smoke-
stacks; that was an enemy ship and, what is more, an armored
French cruiser. I therefore ordered the Choising to put to sea,
and to return at night.
"The next day and night the same; then we put out four
boats — ^these we pulled to shore at sunrise under the eyes of the
unsuspecting Frenchmen. The sea reeds were thick. A few
Arabs came close to us ; then there ensued a difficult negotiation
with the Arabian coast guards. For we did not even know
whether Hodeida was in English or French hands. We waved
to them, laid aside our arms, and made signs to them. The
Arabs, gathering together, began to rub two fingers together;
that means *We are friends.' We thought it meant 'We are going
STORY OF THE "EMDEN" 201
to rub against you and are hostile.* I therefore said: 'Boom-
boom' and pointed to the warship. At all events, I set up my
machine guns and made preparations for a skirmish. But, thank
God, one of the Arabs understood the word 'Germans' ; that was
good.
"Soon a hundred Arabs came and helped us and as we marched
into Hodeida the Turkish soldiers who had been called out
against us saluted us as Allies and friends. To be sure, there was
not a trace of a railway, but we were received very well and they
assured us we could get through by land. Therefore, I gave red-
star signals at night, telling the Choising to sail away, since the
enemy was near by. Inquiries and deliberations concerning a
safe journey by land proceeded. I also heard that in the interior
about six days' journey away, there was healthy highland where
our fever invalids could recuperate. I therefore determined to
journey next to Sana. On the kaiser's birthday we held a great
parade in common with the Turkish troops — all this under the
noses of the Frenchmen. On the same day we marched away
from Hodeida to the highland.
"Two months later we again put to sea. The time spent in the
highland of Sana passed in lengthy inquiries and discussions that
dually resulted in our foregoing the journey by land through
Arabia, for religious reasons. But the time was not altogether
lost. The men who were sick with malaria had, for most part,
recuperated in the highland air.
"The Turkish Government placed at our disposal two sambuks
(sailing ships), of about twenty-five tons, fifteen meters long
and four wide. But, in fear of English spies, we sailed from
Jebaua, ten miles north of Hodeida. That was on March 14, 1915.
At first we sailed at a considerable distance apart, so that we
would not both be captured if an English gunboat caught us.
Therefore, we always had to sail in coastal water. That is full
iof coral reefs, however."
Captain Miicke had charge of the first sambuk. Everything
went well for three days. On the third day the order was given
for the sambuks to keep near together because the pilot of the
202 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the twilight the men in the second sambuk felt a shock, then an-
other, and a third. The water poured into it rapidly. It had
run upon the reef of a small island, where the smaller sambuk
had been able to pass on account of its lighter draft. Soon the
stranded boat began to list over, and the twenty-eight men
aboard had to sit on the gunwale.
"We could scarcely move," narrated Lieutenant Gerdts, who
commanded the stranded boat. "The other boat was nowhere
in sight. Now it grew dark. At this stage I began to build a raft
of spars and old pieces of wood that might keep us afloat. But
soon the first boat came into sight again. The commander
turned about and sent over his little canoe; in this and in our
own canoe, in which two men could sit at each trip, we first trans-
ferred the sick. Now the Arabs began to help us. But just then
the tropical helmet of our doctor suddenly appeared above the
water in which he was standing up to his ears. Thereupon the
Arabs withdrew: We were Christians, and they did not know
that we were friends. Now the other sambuk was so near that
we could have swum to it in half an hour, but the seas were too
high. At each trip a good swimmer trailed along, hanging to the
painter of the canoe. When it became altogether dark we could
not see the boat any more, for over there they were prevented by
the wind from keeping any light burning. My men asked: *In
what direction shall we swim?' I answered: *Swim in the direc-
tion of this or that star ; that must be about the direction of the
boat.' Finally a torch flared up over there — one of the torches
that was still left from the Emden. But we had suffered con-
siderably through submersion. One sailor cried out : 'Oh, psha !
It's all up with us now, that's a searchlight.' About ten o'clock
we were all safe aboard, but one of our typhus patients wore
himself out completely by exertion and died a week later. On
the next morning we went over again to the wreck in order to
seek the weapons that had fallen into the water. You see, the
Arabs dive so well; they fetched up a considerable lot — ^both
machine guns, all but ten of the rifles, though these were, to be
sure, all full of water. Later they frequently failed to go off
when they were used in firing.
STORY OF THE "EMDEN" 203
"Now we numbered, together with the Arabs, seventy men on
the little boat. Then we anchored before Konfida and met Sami
Bey. He had shown himself useful, even before, in the service
of the Turkish Government, and had done good service as a
guide in the last months of the adventure. He procured for us
a larger boat of fifty-four tons. We sailed from the 20th of
March, 1915, to the 24th, unmolested to Lith. There Sami Bey
announced that three English ships were cruising about in order
to intercept us. I therefore advised traveling a bit overland.
I disliked leaving the sea a second time, but it had to be done."
Captain Mucke explained that Lith is nothing but desert,
and therefore it was very difficult to get up a caravan at once.
They marched away on March 28, 1915, with only a vague suspi-
cion that the English might have agents here also. They could
travel only at night, and when they slept or camped around a
spring, there was only a tent for the sick men. Two days' march
from Jeddah, the Turkish Government having received word
about the crew, sent sixteen good camels.
"Suddenly, on the night of April 1, 1915, things became un-
easy," said Captain Mucke. "I was riding at the head of the
column. All our shooting implements were cleared for action,
because there was danger of an attack from Bedouins, whom
the English had bribed. When it began to grow a bit light I
thought: * We're through for to-day'; for we were tired — had
been riding eighteen hours. Suddenly I saw a line flash up before
me, and shots whizzed over our heads. Down from the camels !
iWe formed a fighting line. You know how quickly it becomes
lylight there. The whole space around the desert hillock was
jcupied. Now we had to take up our guns. We rushed at the
lemy. They fled, but returned again, this time from all sides.
Several of the gendarmes that had been given to us as an escort
rere wounded; the machine-gun operator fell, killed by a shot
trough the heart; another was wounded. Lieutenant Schmidt
^as mortally wounded. He received a bullet in the chest and
Another in the abdomen.
'Suddenly, they waved white cloths. The sheik, to whom a
part of our camels belonged, went over to them to negotiate, then
204 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Sami Bey and his wife. In the interim we quickly built a sort
of wagon barricade, a circular camp of camel saddles, of rice and
coffee sacks, all of which we filled with sand. We had no shovels,
and had to dig with our bayonets, plates, and hands. The whole
barricade had a diameter of fifty meters. Behind it were dug
trenches, which we deepened even during the skirmish. The
camels inside had to lie down, and thus served very well as cover
for the rear of the trenches. Then an inner wall was constructed,
behind which we carried the sick men. In the very center we
buried two jars of water, to guard us against thirst. In addition
we had ten petroleum cans full of water; all told, a supply for
four days. Late in the evening Sami*s wife came back from the
futile negotiations, alone. She had unveiled for the first and
only time on this day of the skirmish, had distributed cartridges
and had acted faultlessly.
"Soon we were able to ascertain the number of the enemy.
There were about 300 men ; we numbered fifty, with twenty-nine
machine guns. In the night Lieutenant Schmidt died. We had
to dig his grave with our hands and with our bayonets, and to
eliminate every trace above it, in order to protect the body.
Rademacher had been buried immediately after the skirmish
with all honors.
"The wounded had a hard time of it. We had lost our
medicine chest in the wreck; we had only little packages of
bandages for skirmishes ; but no probing instrument, no scissors,
were at hand. On the next day our men came up with thick
tongues, feverish, and crying : *Water, water !* But each one re- ,
ceived only a little cupful three times each day. If our water
supply became exhausted we would have to sally forth from
our camp and fight our way through. At night we always
dragged out the dead camels that had served as cover and had
been shot.
"This continued about three days. On the third day there
were new negotiations. Now the Bedouins demanded arms no
longer, but only money. This time the negotiations took place
across the camp wall. When I declined the Bedouin said, *Lots
of fight.' I said, Tlease go to it.'
STORY OF THE "EMDEN" 205
"We had only a little ammunition left, and very little water.
Now it really looked as if we would soon be dispatched. The
mood of the men was pretty dismal. Suddenly, at about ten
o'clock in the morning, there bobbed up in the north two riders
on camels, waving white cloths. Soon afterward there appeared,
coming from the same direction, far back, a long row of camel
troops, about a hundred ; they drew rapidly nearer, rode singing
toward us, in a picturesque train. They were the messengers
and the troops of the Emir of Mecca.
"Sami Bey's wife, it developed, had in the course of the first
negotiations, dispatched an Arab boy to Jeddah. From that
place the governor had telegraphed to the emir. The latter at
once sent camel troops with his two sons and his personal sur-
geon; the elder, Abdullah, conducted the negotiations, and the
surgeon acted as interpreter in French. Now things proceeded
in one-two-three order, and the whole Bedouin band speedily dis-
appeared. From what I learned later I know definitely that they
had been corrupted with bribes by the English. They knew when
and where we would pass, and they had made all preparations.
Now our first act was a rush for water; then we cleared up our
camp, but had to harness our camels ourselves, for the camel
drivers had fled at the very beginning of the skirmish.
"Then, under the safe protection of Turkish troops, we got to
Jeddah. There the authorities and the populace received us very
well. From there we proceeded in nineteen days by sail boat to
Elwesh, and under abundant guard with the Suleiman Pasha,
in a five-day caravan journeyed to El Ula."
"Have I received the Iron Cross?*' was the first question Cap-
tain Mucke asked when he got to that place, and old newspapers
which he found there told him that he had. A few days later the
)arty was on train, riding toward Germany.
206 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXXII
SUMMARY OP THE FIRST YEAR OP
NAVAL WARFARE
THE first year of the war came to an end in August, 1915,
with the naval situation much the same as it stood at the end
of the first six months. The navy of practically every belligerent
was intact; the Allies enjoyed the freedom of the seas, but the
fact that a German fleet lay intact in the North Sea, and an
Austrian fleet lay intact in the Adriatic Sea, indicated only the
naval supremacy of the Allies, but not that they had won de-
cisive naval victories.
As there had been no victory there had been no defeat, yet
there had been losses to all concerned. The mine and the sub-
marine had changed somewhat the methods of naval warfare —
the enemies "nibbled" at their opponents' fleets. Battleships
were lost, though the first year of the Great War had seen no
pitched battle between ships of that class.
During the second six months of the war England lost the five
old battleships Irresistible, Ocean, Goliath, Triumph, and Ma-
jestic; the destroyers Recruit and Maori; and the submarine E-15
and another unidentified; and the auxiliary cruisers Clan Mc-
Naughton, Bayano, and Princess Irene. Her ally France had
lost, during the same period, the old battleship Bouvet, the
cruiser Leon Gambetta, the destroyer Dague, and the submarines
Joule, Mariotte, and one unidentified.
The losses on the other side were confined to the German navy,
with the exception of the Turkish cruiser Medjidieh. Germany
lost the battleship Pommern; the cruisers Dresden and Konigs-
berg; the submarines U-12, U-29, U-8, one of the type of the U-2,
and another unidentified; two unidentified torpedo boats; and
the auxiliary cruisers Prinz Eitel Friedrich (interned) , Holger,
Kronprinz Wilhelm (interned), and Macedonia. Also the de-
stroyer G'196, the mine layer Albatross, and the auxiliary cruiser
Meteor.
FIRST YEAR OF NAVAL WARFARE 207
In retaliation for having her flag swept from the seas, Ger-
many's submarines, during the second six months of the war,
had sunk a total of 153 merchant ships, including those belong-
ing to neutral countries as well as to her enemies. The total
tonnage of these was about 500,000 tons ; 1,643 persons died in
going down with these ships.
Not of the least importance were the precedents that were
established, or attempted to be established, by Germany in con-
ducting naval warfare with her submarine craft. In a note
delivered to the United States Government, the German Govern-
ment declared that British merchant vessels were not only armed
and instructed to resist or even attack submarines, but often dis-
guised as to nationality. Under such circumstances it was
assumed to be impossible for a submarine commander to conform
to the established custom of visit and search. Accordingly,
vessels of neutral nations were urgently warned not to enter the
submarine war zone. The war zone which she proclaimed about
Great Britain had no precedent in history, and it immediately
brought to her door a number of controversies with neutrals,
particularly the United States. The sinking of liners carrying
passengers claiming citizenship in neutral countries was another
precedent, which had the same effect with regard to diplomatic
exchanges.
Predictions that had been made long before the war came
were found to be worthless ; there were those who had predicted
that Germany in the event of war with England would give
imediate battle with her largest ships ; but twelve months went
)y without an actual battle between superdreadnoughts. "Der
'ag" had not come. There were those who had predicted that
le British navy would force the German ships out of their pro-
jted harbors. 'We shall dig the rats out of their holes," said
>. Winston Churchill, British Secretary of State for the Navy
the early months of the war. Mr. Churchill was removed
from his position, and twelve months passed by with the German
ships still in their **holes."
Certain lessons had been taught naval authorities of all nations
through the actual use of the modem battleship in war. The
14— War St. a
208 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
first year showed that the largest ships must have very high
speed and long gun range. To some extent the fact that the
fighting ships of nearly all of the belligerent countries were thus
equipped changed battle tactics.
When the allied fleets had started their bombardment of the
Turkish forts at the Dardanelles they were breaking certain
well-defined rules which had been axiomatic with naval author-
ities. The greatest of modern battleships were designed to fight
with craft of their like, but not to take issue with land fortifica-
tions. For weeks, while the fleets succeeded in silencing for a
time some of the Turkish forts, it was thought that this rule no
longer held good. But when, after March 19, 1915, the fleets
ceased attempting to take the passage without military coopera-
tion, the worth of the rule was reestablished. The ease with which
the bombarding ships were made victims of hostile submarines
was greatly instrumental in making the rule again an axiom.
The naval supremacy of the allied powers brought them cer-
tain advantages — advantages which they had without winning
a decisive victory. Germany and Austria were cut off from the
Western Hemisphere, and were troubled, in consequence, by
shortage in food for their civilian populations to a greater or
lesser degree. This was perhaps a negative benefit derived by
the Allies from their naval supremacy; the affirmative benefit
was that their own communications with the Western Hemi-
sphere were maintained, enabling them not only to get food for
their civilian populations, but arms and munitions for their
armies ; and even financial arrangements, which, if their emis-
saries could not pass back and forth freely could not have been
made, depended on their control of the high seas.
They were able to keep the Channel clear of submarines long
enough to permit the passage of the troops, which England from
time to time during the first year of the war sent to the Con"
tinent, and permitted the participation of the troops of the
British overseas dominions, the troops from Canada joining
those in France, and the troops from New Zealand and Australia
taking their places in the trenches along the Suez Canal and on
the Gallipoli Peninsula. Thus, to a certain extent, the advantage
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES 209
of continuous railroad communication which was enjoyed by the
Teutonic allies "inside" the arena of military operations was
offset by the naval communication maintained by the Entente
Powers "outside" the arena of military operations.
CHAPTER XXXIII
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES
WHEN, on the 5th of February, 1915, the German admiralty
proclaimed a "war zone" around the British Isles and
announced that it would fight the sea power of the Allies with
submarines, a new era in naval warfare had opened. In all
previous wars, and in the earlier months of the Great War,
submarines were employed as auxiliaries to the larger naval
units. The Germans were the first to use them as separate units.
The idea of sending a fleet of submarines out on to the high
seas was a new one, and had been impossible in the last war in
which they had been used — ^that between Russia and Japan. But
the improvements which had been made in their design and
equipment since then had made an actual cruising submarine
possible, and made possible the new phase of naval warfare in-
augurated by the German admiralty.
While Germany was the last great sea power to adopt the sub-
Iiarine as a weapon, both England and Germany, in the years
nmediately preceding the war, had spent the same amounts of
loney on this sort of craft — about $18,000,000 — but while the
lermans had later given as much attention to them as to any
ther sort of naval craft, the British authorities did not figure
on employing the submarine as a separate offensive tactical unit
being sufficiently equipped in large ships carrying large guns.
And being weaker in capital ships Germany was compelled to
rely upon underwater warfare in her campaign of attrition. Not
only were the naval authorities of the rest of the world unin-
formed about the improvements that German submarines carried,
210 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
but they were fooled even as to the actual number which Ger-
many had built.
The most modem of the German submarines at the time had
a length of 213 feet and a beam of twenty feet, these dimensions
giving them sufficient deck space to mount thereon two rapid-
fire guns, one of 3.5 inches and another of 1.4 inches. Their dis-
placement was 900 tons, and they could make a speed of 18
knots when traveling "light** (above water) , and 12 knots when
traveling submerged. These speeds made it possible for them
to overtake all but the fastest merchantmen, though not fast
enough to run away from destroyers, gunboats, and fast cruisers.
Their range of operation was 2,000 miles, and in the early
months of 1915, it was possible for Germany to send two or
three of them from their base in the North Sea to the Mediter-
ranean. Germany was at the same time experimenting with a
larger type, with a displacement of 1,200 tons and an operating
distance of 5,000 miles.
The ordinary submarine in service at the beginning of the
war could remain below the surface for twenty-four hours at
least. Reserve amounts of air for breathing were carried in
tanks under pressure, and in the German type there were also
chemical improvements for regenerating air. Contrary to the
opinion of laymen, submerging was accomplished both by let-
ting water into ballast tanks, and also by properly deflecting a
set of rudders ; every submarine had two sets of rudders, one of
which worked in vertical planes and pointed the prow of the ship
either to the left or the right ; the other pair worked in horizontal
planes and turned the prow either upward or downward. A
pair of iins on the sides of the hull assisted action in both rising
and diving. The action of water against the fins and rudders
when the ship was in motion was exactly the same as that of the
air against the planes of a kite ; to submerge one of the craft it
was necessary to have it in motion and to have its horizontal
rudders so placed that the resistance of the water would drive the
ship downward ; the reverse operation drove it upward. And here
lay a danger, for if the engines of a diving submarine stopped
she was bound to come to the surface. Her presence, while
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES 211
moving entirely submerged could be detected by a peculiar swell
which traveled on the water above; if submerged only so much
as to leave the tip of her periscope still showing, the latter left
an easily discernible wake.
The periscope was merely a tube in which there were arranged
mirrors so that anjrthing reflected in the first mirror, the one
above the surface of the water, was again reflected till it showed
in a mirror at the bottom of the tube, within the hull of the
vessel, where its commander could observe it safely. A crew
of about twenty-five men was necessary to operate one of these
crafts, and theirs was an unpleasant duty, first because of the
danger that accompanied each submergence of their vessel; second
because of the discomforts abroad. The explosive engines which
drove the craft, whether burning oil or the lighter refinements
such as gasoline, gave off gases that caused headaches and
throbbing across the forehead ; and it was almost impossible to
heat the interior of the craft.
Though merchantmen had gone to the bottom as victims of
German submarines before the proclamation of a "war zone" was
issued they were individual cases; the first instance of a mer-
chant ship being sunk as a result of the new policy of the Ger-
man admiralty was the sinking of the British steamer Camhark
on the 20th of February, 1915. This ship was bound for Liver-
pool, from Huelva, Spain. While off the north coast of Wales, on
the morning of the 20th, the periscope of a hostile submarine was;
sighted only 200 yards ahead. The engines of the steamship
were immediately reversed, but she had no time to make off,
for a torpedo caught her amidships and she started to sink im-
[mediately. Her crew managed to get off in small boats, but
(all of their personal belongings were lost.
The small Irish coasting steamer Downshire was made a victim
[on the 21st of February, 1915, but instead of sending a torpedo
[into her hull, the commander of the U-12, the submarine which
^overhauled her, resorted to boarding. After trying to elude the
[submarine by steering a zigzag course, the Downshire was finally
[overtaken. The crew was ordered to take to the small boats,
^hile nineteen men of the submarine, which had come above
212 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
water, watched the operations from the deck. A crew from the
submarine took one of the small boats of the steamship and
rowed toward her. They placed a bomb in a vital spot and set
it off, sinking the merchantman. In this way the submariners
commander had saved a torpedo. A conversation which took
place between the captains of the two craft revealed the methods
by which the submarine commanders were able, not only to
steal up on their intended victims, but to elude being sighted
by the patrolling British warships. Some fishing smacks had
been in the vicinity while the Downshire was sunk, and the
British captain asked the German captain why they had not
been attacked. The latter hinted that his plans worked best
if the fishing boats were unmolested. When asked whether
he had hidden behind one these little boats he changed the sub-
ject, but it was learned later that the commanders of the sub-
marines made a practice of coming to the surface right neaf
fishing boats and bade them act as screens while they lay in
wait for victims. By keeping the small boats covered with a
deck gun or by putting a boarding crew aboard, it was possible
for the commanders of the submarines to keep their persicop^s
or the hulls of their vessels behind the sails of the fishing boats,
unobservable to lookouts on larger ships.
By the 23d of February, 1915, the success of German sub-
marines had been so marked that the insurance rates on mer-
chantmen went up. Lloyd's underwriters announced that the rate
on transatlantic passage had gone up nearly one per cent. And
on the same day it was announced that the British Government
would thereafter regulate steamship traffic in the Irish Sea.
Certain areas of the Irish Sea were closed to all kinds of traffic ;
lines of passage were defined and had to be followed by all mer-
chantmen, and vessels of all descriptions were ordered to keep
away from certain parts of the coast from sunset to sunrise.
The comparatively small size of the submarines made it pos-
sible for the German admiralty to load them on to trains in
sections and transport them where needed, and in this manner
some were sent from the German ports on the North Sea to
Zeebrugge, there assembled and launched. Others were sent to
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES 213
the Adriatic, arriving at Pola on the 25th of February, 1915.
These were intended for use in the Mediterranean as well as
in the Adriatic Sea.
Neutral ships, in order to escape attack by German submarines
had to resort to unusual methods of self-identification. The
use of flags belonging to neutral countries by the merchantmen of
belligerent powers made the usual identification by colors almost
impossible, the German admiralty claiming that the commanders
of submarines were unable to wait long enough, after stopping
a vessel, to ascertain whether she had a right to fly one flag
or another. Consequently the ships belonging to Dutch and
American lines had their names painted with large lettering
along their sides. At night, streamers of electric lights were hung
over the sides to illuminate these letterings; and on the decks
of many of the neutral ships their names and nationalities wer:e
painted in large letters so that they might be identified by air-
craft. Owing to such precautions the Dutch steamship Prinzes
Juliana escaped being sunk by a torpedo on the 3d of March,
1915. A submarine ran a parallel course to that followed by
the Dutch ship, but after examining the lettering on her sides
the commander of the German craft saw that she was not legit-
imate game and turned off.
Not always did the German submarines themselves succeed in
escaping unharmed in their raiding of allied merchantmen. Re-
wards were offered in Great Britain for the sinking of German
submersibles by the commanders of British merchantmen. In-
structions were issued in the British shipping periodicals, show-
ing how a submarine might be sunk by being rammed. It was
officially announced on the 5th of March, 1915, by the British
admiralty, that the U-S had been rammed and sunk by a British
rarship. The crew of twenty-nine was rescued and brought to
iover. For the British this was a stroke of good fortune, for
^hile the TJ-8 was of an earlier type it was a dangerous craft,
Lving a total displacement of 300 tons, a radius of operation of
[,200 miles, a speed of 13 knots when traveling "light" and a
>eed of 8 knots when submerged. On the same day the French
linister of marine announced that a FrencJh warship had come
214 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
upon a German submarine of the type of the U-2 in the North
Sea and that after firing at the hull of the vessel and hitting it
three times it was seen to sink and did not reappear.
During the last week of February and the first week of March,
1915, bad weather on the waters surrounding the British Isles
hampered the operations of German submarines to an extent
which led the British public to believe that the submarine war-
fare on merchantmen had been abandoned, but they were disil-
lusioned when on the 9th of March, 1915, three British ships were
sunk by the underwater craft. The steamship Tangistan was
torpedoed off Scarborough, the Blackwood off Hastings and the
Princess Victoria near Liverpool. Part of this was believed to
be the work of the 17-16.
In the three days beginning March 10, 1915, eight ships were
made victims of German submarines in the waters about the
British Isles. Most novel was the experience of a crowd gathered
on the shore of one of the Scilly Islands on March 12, 1915,
when two of these eight ships, the Indian City and the Head-
lands, were torpedoed. At about eight in the morning the
islanders on St. Mary's Island saw a German submarine over-
take the former and sink her. The German vessel then remained
in the adjacent waters to watch for the approach of another
victim, while two patrol boats near by put out and opened fire
on her. The crowd saw the enemies exchange shots at a distance
of ten miles off shore. But neither side put in any effective shots,
and the combat ended when the submarine dived and retired.
The steamship Headlands was then sighted by the commander
of the submarine and he immediately started to pursue her. The
steamship steered a zigzag course, but the submarine got in a
position to launch a torpedo, and at about half past ten in the
morning the crowd on the shore saw steam escaping from her in
large quantities. Some time after they saw a large volume of
black smoke and debris fly upward and they knew that another
torpedo had found its mark. She then settled, her crew and the
men from the Indian City reaching St. Mary's in small boats.
To keep British harbors free from the German submarines the
British admiralty had to set their engineers to work to devise
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES ' 215
some method of trapping the underwater craft automatically,
for there seemed to be no sort of patrol which they could not
elude. Steel traps, not unlike the gill nets used by fishermen,
were finally hit upon as the best thing to use against the sub-
marines, and by March 13, 1915, a number of these were installed
at entrances to some of the British harbors. They were made
of malleable iron frames, ten feet square, used in sets of threes,
so arranged that they might hold a submarine by the sides and
have the third of the set buckle against its bottom. They were
suspended by buoys about thirty feet below the surface of the
water. When a submarine entered one of these it was held
fast, for the frame which came up from the bottom caught the
propeller and made it impossible for the submarine to work
itself loose. The disadavantage to the submarine was that,
while traveling under water, it traveled "blind" ; the periscopes
in use were good only for observation when the top of them
were above water; when submerged the commander of a sub-
marine had to steer by chart. By the end of March, 1915, a
dozen submarines had been caught in nets of this kind.
I By the 18th of March, 1915, three more British ships had been
made the victims of German torpedoes. The Atlanta was sunk
©ff the west coast of Ireland only a day before the Fingal was
sunk off Northumberland. And the Leeuwarden was sunk by
being hit from the deck guns of a German submarine off the coast
of Holland. There was no loss of life except during the sinking
of the Fingal, some of whose men were drowned when she
dragged a lifeboat full of men down with her.
By way of variety the Germans attempted to sink a British
ship in the "war zone" with bombs dropped from an airship,
the news of which was brought to England by the crew and
captain of the Blonde when they reached shore on March 18,
1915. This ship had been German originally, but being in a
British port when the war started was taken over and run by
a British crew. Two or three mornings before the men landed
they had noticed a Taube aeroplane circling over their ship at
about 500 feet altitude. It then swept downward and took a
close look at the vessel. Two bombs which fell into the water
216 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
near the ship, were dropped by the German aviator. The captain
of the Blonde ordered that the rudder of his ship be fastened so
that she might drive in a circle and her engines were set at full
speed, with the intention of making a more difficult target for
the airship's bombs. The whistle of the ship was set going and
continued to blow in the hope of attracting help from other ships.
More bombs were near the vessel, but none of them found its
mark. After one more attempt, when only 300 feet above the
ship's deck, the aviator let go with his last supply, but again
being unsuccessful he veered off to the north and allowed the
Blonde to escape.
The naval attack on the Dardanelles is told in another chapter,
but the work of the Allies' submarines there included the use
of French submarines, which is not narrated elsewhere. On the
19th of March, 1915, Rear Admiral Guepratte of the French
navy reported that one of his submarines had attempted, without
success, to run through the Dardanelles. The object of the
attempt was to sink the Turkish battle cruiser Sultan Selim,
formerly the Goeben. The submarine submerged and got as far
as Nagara. But she had to travel *'blind" and her captain, being
unfamiliar with those waters, struck some rocks near the shore
and immediately brought her to the surface. She became a
target for the land guns of the Turks at once and was sunk, only
a few of her men, who were taken prisoners, escaping death.
On the 19th of March, 1915, the British admiralty reported
that the three British ships, Hyndford, Bluejacket, and Glen-
artney had been torpedoed in the "war zone" without warning,
with the loss of only one man. Beachy Head in the British Chan-
nel had been the scene of most of the operations of German sub-
marines against British ships, and consequently, when on the
21st of March, 1915, the collier Cairntorr was torpedoed in that
region, no unusual comment was made by the admiralty. Here-
tofore the scene of the latest attack had been thought worthy of
mention on account of the unusual and unexpected places that
submarines chose for action.
A new phase of the submarines' activities was opened on
March 21, 1915, when two Dutch ships Batavier V and Zaaiv-
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES 217
stroom were held up and captured. The U-28 had for some days
been hiding near the Maas Lightship, and had been taking shots
with torpedoes at every ship which came within range. The
Batavier V had left the Hook of Holland on March 18, 1915. At
about five o'clock that morning she came near the Maas Lightship
on her way to England, whence she was carrying provisions and
a register of fifty-seven persons, including passengers and crew ;
among the former there were a number of women and children.
Suddenly a submarine appeared off her port bow, and her cap-
tain was ordered to stop his ship. This he did readily, for he had
been thus stopped before, only to be allowed to proceed. But this
time the commander of the submarine, the U-28, shouted to him
through a megaphone : "I am going to confiscate your ship and
take it to Zeebrugge."
While the two commanders were arguing over the illegality of
this, the Zaanstroom was sighted, and was immediately overtaken
by the submarine. An officer and a sailor from the submarine
had been placed on the Batavier V, and this prevented her escap-
ing while the pursuit of the Zaanstroom was on. A similar detail
was now placed on the latter, and her captain was ordered to
follow the U-28 which returned to the Batavier V. "Follow me
to Zeebrugge" was the order which the commander of the sub-
marine gave the two ships, and their captains obeyed. They
arrived at Zeebrugge at noon, and were immediately un-
loaded. Those of the passengers and crews who were citizens
of neutral countries were sent to Ghent and there released,
while all those aboard, such as Belgians and Frenchmen, wer*
detained.
When possible, the commanders of the German submarines
saved their costly torpedoes and used shell fire instead to sink
their victims. This was done in the case of the steamship Vosges,
which was sunk on March 28, 1915. For two hours, while the
engines of the steamship were run at full speed in an attempt to
get away from the submarine, she was under fire from two deck
guns on board the submersible. Though the latter made off at
the approach of another vessel, her shells did enough damage to
cause the Vosges to sink a few hours later
218 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Up to the middle of March, 1915, all the ships which had be-
come victims of German submarines had been of the slower coast-
ing variety. There had been numerous unconfirmed reports that
the faster transatlantic ships had been chased, but no credence
had been given to them. On the 27th of March, 1915, however,
when the Arabic arrived at Liverpool it was reported by those on
board that she had given a submarine a lively chase and had
gotten away safely. At about nine o'clock the evening before the
submarine was sighted off Holyhead. She was only 200 yards
ahead, and while her commander jockeyed for a position from
which he could successfully launch a torpedo, the commander of
the Arabic gave the order "Full speed ahead." His passengers
lined the rail of the ship to watch the maneuvers. Soon the
steamship had up a speed of 18 knots, which was a bit too fast
for the submarine, and she fell to the rearward. Her chance for
launching a torpedo was gone, but she brought her deck guns into
action, firing two shots which went wild. The Arabic proceeded
to port unmolested.
At times even the cost of shell fire was figured by the com-
manders of German submarines, and pistol and rifles were used
instead. This was done in the case of the Delmira on the 26th of
March, 1915. This steamship was sunk off Boulogne. Ten
minutes were given by the crew of the submarine to the crew of
the steamship for them to get off. The submarine had come up
off the bow of the Delmira, and men standing on the deck of the
former had fired shots toward the bridge of the latter to make
her captain bring her to a stop. The latter ordered his engines
started again at full speed, with the intention of ramming the
enemy, but his Chinese stokers refused to obey the order, and
his ship did not move. The crew of the steamship got into their
small boats, and for an hour and a half these were towed by the
submarine so that their row to shore would not be so long. Though
torpedoed, the Delmira did not sink, and was last seen in a burn-
ing condition off the French coast near Cape de la Hogue.
The sinking of the steamship Falaba, which is mentioned,
though not narrated in full, in another chapter, was the last act
of German submarines during the month of March, 1915. This
A
K
ft-
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES 219
ship on the 29th of March, 1915, was overtaken by a German
submarine in St. George's Channel. She was engaged in the
African trade, voyaging between the African ports and Liver-
pool. On her last journey she carried a crew of 90 men and some
160 passengers, many of the latter being women and children.
The commander of the submarine brought his craft to the sur-
face off the bow of the Falaba, and gave the captain of the steam-
ship five minutes in which to put his crew and passengers into
lifeboats. A torpedo was sent against her hull and found the
engine room, causing a tremendous explosion. One hundred and
eleven persons lost their lives because they had not been able to
get off in time, or because they were too near the liner when she
went down. This was the most important merchantman which
had been sent to the bottom by a submarine since the proclama"
tion of February 15, 1915.
The next two victims of this sort of warfare were the steam-
ships Flaminian and the Crown of Castile, one of which was
sunk by the U-28, and the other by an unidentified submarine on
April 1, 1915. They went down off the west coast of England
with no loss of life, though the Crown of Castile was torpedoed
before her crew could get off. The Flaminian had tried to get
away, but had to stop under fire from deck guns on the sub-
arine. The shells did not hit her in vital spots, however, and
it was necessary to send a torpedo into her hull to sink her.
The ease with which submarines had been able to bob up in un-
expected places and to sink British merchantmen, in spite of the
patrols maintained by British warships, caused the captains of
merchant vessels to petition the British Government to be allowed
to arm their vessels on April 1, 1915. This was not granted, be-
use their being armed would have made the steamship legiti-
mate prey for the submarines, nor was any attention paid to the
demand made by the British press that the crews and officers of
aptured German submarines be treated, not as prisoners of war,
ut as pirates. Reprisals on the part of the Germans was feared.
Beachy Head on the 1st of April, 1915, was again the scene of
o successful attacks on merchantmen by submarines. On that
ay the French steamship Emma, after being torpedoed, went to
220 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the bottom with all of the nineteen men in her crew. The same
submarine sank the British steamer Seven Seas, causing the
deaths of eleven of her men.
In order to indicate the amount of harm which the submarine
warfare caused British shipping, the admiralty on April 1, 1915,
announced that though five merchantmen had been sent to the
bottom and one had been only partially damaged by submarines
during the week ending March 31, 1915, some 1,559 vessels
entered and sailed from British ports during the same period.
Efforts were made to damage the base, from which many of
the German submarines had been putting out at Zeebrugge, with
aircraft. On the 1st of April, 1915, the British Government's
press bureau announced that bombs had been dropped, with un-
known success, on two German submarines lying there, and that
on the same day a British airman had flown over Hoboken and
had seen submarines in building there.
The steamship Lockwood, while off Start Point in Devonshire,
was hit abaft the engine room by a German torpedo on the morn-
ing of April 2, 1915, and though she went down almost immedi-
ately, her crew was able to get off in small boats and were picked
up by fishing travelers.
The U-28, which had done such effective work for the Germans
during the month of March, 1915, was relieved of duty near the
British Isles during the first week of April by the U.-Sl, which
sank the Russian bark Hermes and the British steamship Olivine
off the coast of Wales on April 5, 1915,
The British admiralty decided in April, 1915, to use some other
means besides the employment of torpedo boats and destroyers
to keep watch for German submarines, and innocent-looking fish-
ing trawlers were used for the purpose. While these could give
no fight against a submarine, it was intended that they would
carefully make for land to report after sighting one of the hostile
craft. The Germans, discovering this strategy, then began to
sink trawlers when they found them. On the morning of April
5, 1915, one of these small craft was sighted and chased by the
'U'20, After a pursuit of an hour or more the German ship was
near enough for members of her crew to fire on the trawler with
FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES 221
rifles. Her crew got into the small boat and were picked up later
by a steamer. The trawler was sent to the bottom.
The U-20 still kept up her raiding. On the 5th of April, 1915,
she overtook the steamer Northland, a 2,000-ton ship, and tor-
pedoed her off Beachy Head. The crew of the steamer were able
to escape, although their ship went down only ten minutes after
the submarine caught up with it.
The use of nets to catch submarines was vindicated, when on
the 6th of April, 1915, one of these vessels became entangled in
a steel net near Dover and was held fast. The loss of the 11-29,
which was commanded by the famous Otto von Weddigen, who
commanded the U-9 when she sank the Hogue, Cressy, and
Aboukir in September, 1914, was confirmed by a report issued
by the German admiralty on April 7, 1915, after rumors of her
loss had circulated throughout England and France for a num-
ber of weeks.
In order to encourage resistance on the part of crews of British
vessels attacked by German submarines, the British Govern-
ment rewarded the crew of the steamship Vosges. It was an-
nounced on April 9, 1915, that the captain had been given a com-
mission as a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve and the Dis-
tinguished Service Cross ; the remaining officers were given gold
watches, and the crew were given $15 per man.
Rumors had reached the outside world that the German sub-
marines were using hidden spots to store fuel and provisions so
that they might go about their raiding without having to return
German ports for reprovisioning Neutral nations, such as
he Netherlands and Norway, found it necessary, to maintain
their neutrality, to keep watch for such action. On the 9th of
pril, 1915, Norwegian airmen reported to their Government
at such a cache had been discovered by them behind the cliif s in
i^Bergen Bay. Submarines found there were ordered to intern or
^Ko leave immediately, and chose to do the latter.
^B Certain acts of the commanders of German submarines seemed
^Bo make it evident that their intention was to sink ships of every
^Blescription, no matter where found, in order to make the "war
zone" a reality, and to make it shunned by neutral as well as
th(
222 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
belligerent ships. Thus the Dutch steamship Katwyk, which lay
at anchor seven miles west of the North Hinder Lightship off the
Dutch coast, was sunk. This lightship was maintained by the
Netherlands Government and stood at the mouth of the River
Scheldt, forty-five miles northwest of Flushing. The Katwyk
was stationary there on the night of April 14, 1915, when the
crew felt a great shock and saw that their ship was rapidly tak-
ing water. They managed to reach the lightship in their life-
boats just as their vessel sank. The same submarine sank the
British steamer Ptarmigan only a few hours later.
Among victims flying the flags of neutral nations the next ship
was of American register. This was the tank steamship Gulf-
light, which was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands on the 29th of
May, 1915. The hole made in her hull was not large enough to
cause her to sink, and she was able to get to port. But during the
excitement of the attack her captain died of heart failure and two
of her crew jumped into the sea and were drowned. Three days
later the French steamship Europe and the British ship Fulgent
were sent to the bottom, probably by the same submarine.
The month of May, 1915, had opened with greater activity on
the part of German submarines than had been shown for many
weeks previous. Between the 1st and the 3d of that month seven
ships were torpedoed, four of them being British, one Swedish,
and two Norwegian. By the 5th of May, 1915, ten British
trawlers had been sunk ; some of these were armed for attack on
either German submarines or torpedo boats.
CHAPTER XXXIV
SINKING OP THE "LUSITANIA**
ON the 7th of May, 1915, came the most sensational act com-
mitted by German submarines since the war had started — the
sinking of the Cunard liner Lusitania, The vessel which did this
was one of the V-39 class. In her last hours above water the
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I
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SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA'* 223
giant liner was nearing Queenstown on a sunny day in a calm sea.
When about five miles off shore, near Old Head of Kinsale, on the
soutiieastem coast of Ireland, a few minutes after two o'clock,
while many of the passengers were at lunch and a few of them
on deck, there came a violent shock.
Five or six persons who had been on deck had noticed, a few
moments before, the wake of something that was moving rapidly
toward the ship. The moving object was a torpedo, which struck
the hull to the forward on 1*ie starboard side and passed clean
through the ship's engine room. She began to settle by the bows
immediately, and the passengers, though cool, made rushes for
lifebelts and for the small boats. The list of the boat made the
launching of some of these impossible.
The scenes on the decks of the sinking liner were heartrending.
Members of families had become separated and ran wildly about
seeking their relatives. The women and children were put into
the lifeboats — ^being given preference.
"I was on the deck about two o'clock," narrated one of the sur-
vivors, "the weather was fine and bright and the sea calm. Sud-
denly I heard a terrific explosion, followed by another, and the cry.
went up that the ship had been torpedoed. She began to list at
once, and her angle was so great that many of the boats on the
port side could not be launched. A lot of people made a rush for
the boats, but I went down to my cabin, took off my coat and
vest and donned a lifebelt. On getting up again I found the
decks awash and the boat going down fast by the head. I slipped
lown a rope into the sea and was picked up by one of the life^
)ats. Some of the boats, owing to the position of the vessel, got
jwamped, and I saw one turn over no less than three times, but
eventually it was righted."
Not all of the women and children got off the liner into the
lall boats. "Women and children, under the protection of men,
id clustered in lines on the port side of the ship," reported an-
other survivor. "As the ship made her plunge down by the head,
she finally took an angle of ninety degrees, and I saw this little
army slide down toward the starboard side, dashing themselves
against each other as they went, until they were engulfed."
16— War St. 3
224 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Even under the stress of avoiding death the sight of the sink-
ing hull was one that held the attention of those in the water.
One of the sailors said afterward : "Her great hull rose into the
air and neared the perpendicular. As the form of the vessel rose
she seemed to shorten, and just as a duck dives so she disap-
peared. She went almost noiselessly. Fortunately her propellers
had stopped, for had these been going, the vortex of her four
screws would have dragged down many of those whose lives were
saved. She seemed to divide the water as smoothly as a knife
would do it."
Twenty minutes after the torpedo had struck the ship she had
disappeared beneath the surface of the sea. "Above the spot
where she had gone down," said one of the men who escaped
death, "there was nothing but a nondescript mass of float-
ing wreckage. Everywhere one looked there was a sea of
waving hands and arms, belonging to the struggling men
and frantic women and children in agonizing efforts to
keep afloat. That was the most horrible memory and sight
of all."
Fishing boats and coasting steamers picked up many of the
survivors some hours after the disaster. The frightened people
in the small boaTs pulled for the shore after picking up as many
persons as they dared without swamping their boats. Some
floated about in the waters for three and four hours, kept up by
their lifebelts. Some, who were good swimmers, managed to
keep above water till help came; others became exhausted and
sank.
Probably the best story, covering the entire period from the
time the ship was hit till the survivors were landed at Queena-
town, was told by Dr. Daniel V. Moore, an American physician :
"After the explosion," said Dr. Moore, "quiet and order were soon
accomplished by assurances from the stewards. I proceeded to
the deck promenade for observation, and saw only that the ship
was fast leaning to the starboard. I hurried toward my cabin
below for a lifebelt, and turned back because of the difficulty in
keeping upright. I struggled to D deck and forward to the first-
class cabin, where I saw a Catholic priest.
SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA" 225
•*I could find no belts, and returned again toward E deck and
aaw a stewardess struggling to dislodge a belt. I helped her with
hers and secured one for myself. I then rushed to D deck and
noticed one woman perched on the gunwale, watching a lowering
lifeboat ten feet away. I pushed her down and into the boat, then
I jumped in. The stem of the lifeboat continued to lower, but the
bow stuck fast. A stoker cut the bow ropes with a hatchet, and
we dropped in a vertical position.
"A girl whom we had heard sing at a concert was struggling,
and I caught her by the ankle and pulled her in. A man I
grasped by the shoulders and I landed him safe. He was the
barber of the first-class cabin, and a more manly man I never met.
"We pushed away hard to avoid the suck, but our boat was fast
filling, and we bailed fast with one bucket and the women's hats.
The man with the bucket became exhausted, and I relieved him.
In a few minutes she was filled level full. Then a keg floated up,
and I pitched it about ten feet away and followed it. After
reaching the keg I turned to see what had been the fate of our
boat. She had capsized. Now a young steward. Freeman, ap-
proached me, clinging to a deck chair. I urged him to grab the
other side of the keg several times. He grew faint, but harsh
speaking roused him. Once he said : 'I am going to go.' But I
ridiculed this, and it gave him strength.
"The good boat Brock and her splendid officers and men took
us aboard.
"At the scene of the catastrophe the surface of the water
I seemed dotted with bodies. Only a few of the lifeboats seemed
to be doing any good. The cries of *My God!' 'Save us!' and
'Help!' gradually grew weaker from all sides, and finally a low
weeping, wailing, inarticulate sound, mingled with coughing
and gargling, made me heartsick. I saw many men die. Some
appeared to be sleepy and worn out just before they went
down."
[ Officials of the Cunard Line claimed afterward that three sub-
marines had been engaged in the attack on the liner, but, after
all evidence had been sifted, the claim made by the Germans that
only one had been present was found to be true. The com-
226 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
mander of the submarine had evidently been well informed as to
just what route the liner would take. Trouble with her engines,
which developed after she had left New York, had brought her
speed down to 18 knots, a circumstance which was in favor of
the attacking vessel, for it could not have done much damage
with a torpedo had she been going at her highest speed ; it would
have given her a chance to cross the path of the torpedo as it ap-
proached. No sign of the submarine was noticed by the lookout
or by any of the passengers on the Lusitania until it was too late
to maneuver her to a position of safety. A few moments before
the white wake of the approaching torpedo was espied, the peri-
scope had been seen as it came to the surface of the water. From
that moment onward the Hner was doomed.
The German admiralty report of the actual sinking of the ship,
which was issued on the 14th of May, 1915, was brief. It read :
"A submarine sighted the steamship Licsitania, which showed no
flag, May 7, 2.20 Central European time, afternoon, on the south-
east coast of Ireland, in fine, clear weather.
"At 3.10 o'clock one torpedo was fired at the Liisitania, which
hit her starboard side below the captain's bridge. The detonation
of the torpedo was followed immediately by a further explosion
of extremely strong effect. The ship quickly listed to starboard
and began to sink.
"The second explosion must be traced back to the ignition of
quantities of ammunition inside the ship."
One of the effects of the sinking of the Lttsitania was to cut
down the number of passengers sailing to and from America to
Europe on ships flying flags of belligerent nations. Attacks by
submarines on neutral ships did not abate, however, for on the
15th of May, 1915, the Danish steamer Martha was torpedoed in
broad daylight and in view of crowds ashore off the coast of
Aberdeen Bay.
The sinking of ships in the "war zone" continued in spite of
rumors that the German admiralty was expected to discontinue
operations of the submarines against merchantmen on account of
the unfriendly feeling aroused in neutral nations, particularly the
United States. On the 19th of May, 1915, came the news that
SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA" 227
the British steamship Dumcree had been torpedoed off a point in
the English Channel. A torpedo fired into her hull failed to sink
her immediately, and a Norwegian ship came to her aid, passing
her a cable and attempting to tow her to port. But the sub-
marine returned, ahd fearing attack, the Norwegian ship made
off. A second torpedo fired at the Dumcree had better effect than
the first one, and she began to settle. When the submarine left
the scene the Norwegian steamship again returned to the JDwm-
cree and managed to take off all of her crew and passengers.
Three trawlers, one of them French, were sunk in the same neigh-
borhood during the next forty-eight hours.
As soon as Italy entered the war an attempt was made by the
Teutonic Powers to establish the same sort of submarine blockade
in the Adriatic which obtained in the waters around Great
Britain. This was evinced when the captain of the Italian steam-
ship Marsala reported on May 21, 1915, that his ship had been
stopped by an Austrian submarine, but the latter not wishing to
disclose its location to the Italian navy, allowed his ship to pro-
ceed unharmed.
The suspicion that the German admiralty maintained bases for
their submarines right on the coasts of Great Britain where the
submersible craft could obtain oil for driving their engines, as
well as supplies of compressed air and of food for the crew, was
confirmed on the 14th of May, 1915, when it was reported that
agents of the British admiralty had discovered caches of the kind
at various points in the Orkney Islands, in the Bay of Biscay,
and on the north and west coasts of Ireland.
In order to damage shipping in the "war zone" by having ships
go wrong through having no guiding lights an attack was made
by a German submarine on the lighthouse at Fastnet, on the
southern coast of Ireland, on the night of May 25, 1915. Shortly
^_ after nine in the evening the submarine was sighted in the waters
^Knear the lighthouse by persons on shore. She was about ten miles
^Wrom Fastnet, near Barley Cove. When she came near enough to
^Hthe lighthouse to use her deck guns, men on shore opened fire on
^Rher with rifles, and she submerged, not to reappear in that neigh-
rborhood again.
228 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
But this same submarine managed to do other damage. The
American steamship Nebraskan was in the neighborhood on its
way to New York. The sea was calm and the ship was traveling
at 12 knots, when some time near nine o'clock in the evening a
shock was felt aboard. A second later there came a terrific ex-
plosion, and a subsequent investigation showed that a large hole,
20 feet square, had been torn in her starboard bow, not far from
the water line. When she began to settle the captain ordered
all hands into the small boats. They stayed near the dam-
aged ship for an hour and saw that she was not going to sink.
When they got aboard again they found that a bulkhead was
keeping out the water sufficiently to allow her to proceed under
her own steam. In crippled condition she made for port, being
convoyed later by two British warships which answered her calls
for help.
In spite of the sharp diplomatic representations which were
at the time passing back and forth between Germany and the
United States over the matter of the German submarine warfare,
the craft kept up as active a campaign against merchant ships
as they did before the issues became pointed. On May 28, 1916,
there came the news that three more ships had been sent to the
bottom. The Spennymoor, a new ship, was chased and torpedoed
off Start Point, near the Orkney Islands. Some of her crew were
drowned when the lifeboat in which they were getting away
capsized, carrying them down. On the same day the large liner
Argyllshire was chased and fired upon by the deck guns of a
hostile submarine, but she managed to get away. Not so fortu-
nate, however, was the steamship Cadesby, While off the Scilly
Islands on the afternoon of May 28, 1915, a German submarine
hailed her, firing a shot from a deck gun across her bows as a
signal to halt. Time was given for the crew and passengers to
get into small boats, and when these were at a distance from
the ship the deck guns of the submarine were again brought
into action, and after firing thirty shots into her hull they
«ank her. The third victim was the Swedish ship RoosvalL
She was stopped and boarded off Malmoe by the crew of a
German submarine. After examining her papers they per-
SINKING OF THE 'XUSITANIA" 229
mitted her to proceed, but later sent a torpedo Into her, sink-
ing her.
A new raider, the U'S4, made its appearance in the English
Channel during the last week in May, 1915. On the twenty-
eighth of the month this submarine sank the liner Ethiope. The
captain of the steamship attempted some clever maneuvering,
which did not accomplish its object. He paid no attention to a
shot from the deck guns of the submarine which passed across
his bow. The hostile craft then began to circle around the
liner, while the rudder of the latter was put at a wide angle in
an effort to keep either stem or bow of tlie ship toward the sub-
marine, thus making a poor target for a torpedo. But the com-
mander of the submarine saw through the movement and ordered
fire with his deck guns. After shells had taken away the ship's
bridge and had punctured her hull near the stem the crew and
passengers were ordered into the small boats. They had hardly
gotten twenty feet from their ship when she was rent by a violent
explosion and went down.
The transatlantic liner Megantic had better luck, for she man-
aged to escape a pursuing submarine on May 29, 1915, as she was
nearing Queenstown, Ireland, homeward bound. A notable
change in the methods adopted by the commanders of submarines
as a result of orders issued by the German admiralty in answer
to the protests throughout the press of the neutral nations after
the sinking of the Licsitania was the giving of warning to in-
tended victims. By the end of May, 1915, in almost every in-
I stance where a German submarine stopped and sank a merchant-
man the crew was given time to get off their ship and the sub-
marine did not hesitate to show itself. In fact, warning to stop
"was generally given when the submarine's deck was above water
and the gun mounted there had the victim "covered." This was
done in the case of the British steamship Tullochmoor, which
was torpedoed off Ushant near the most westerly islands of Brit-
tany, France.
On the 1st of June, 1915, there came the news of the sinking
of the British ship Dixiana, near Ushant, by a German submarine
which approached by aid of a clever disguise. The crew managed
230 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to get off the ship in time ; when they landed on shore they re-
ported that the submarine had been seen and on account of sails
which she carried was thought to be an innocent fishing boat. The
disguise was penetrated too late for the Dixiana to make its
escape.
The clear and calm weather which came with June, 1915, made
greater activity on the part of German submarines possible. On
the 4th of June, 1915, it was reported by the British admiralty
that six more ships had been made victims, three of them being
those of neutral countries. In the next twenty-four hours the
number was increased by eleven, and eight more were added by
the 9th of June, 1915.
On that date Mr. Balfour, Secretary of the British admiralty,
announced that a German submarine had been sunk, though he
did not state what had been the scene of the action. At the sam^
time he announced that Great Britain would henceforth treat the
captured crew of submarines in the same manner as were treated
other war prisoners, and that the policy of separating these men
from the others and of giving them harsher treatment would
be abandoned.
On the 20th of June, 1915, the day's reports of losses due to
the operations of German submarines, issued by the British Gov-
ernment, contained the news of the sinking of the two British
torpedo boats, the No. 10 and the No, 20, No details were made
public concerning just how they went down.
On the same day the Italian admiralty announced that a cache
maintained to supply submarines belonging to the Teutonic
Powers and operating in the Mediterranean, had been discovered
on a lonely part of the coast near Kalimno, an island off the
southwest coast of Asia Minor. Ninety-six barrels of benzine
and fifteen hundred barrels of other fuel were found and de-
stroyed. It was believed that this supply had been shipped as
kerosene from Saloniki to Piraeus. How submarines belonging
to Germany had reached the southern theatre of naval warfare
had been a matter of speculation for the outside world. But on
the 6th of June, 1915, Captain Otto Hersing made public the
manner in which he took the 17-51 on a 3,000 mile trip from Wil-
SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA" 231
helmshaven on the North Sea to Constantinople. He was the
commander who managed to torpedo the British battleships
Triumph and Majestic.
He received his orders to sail on the 25th of April, 1915, and
immediately began to stock his ship with extra amounts of fuel
and provisions, allowing only his first officer and chief engineer
to know the destination of their craft. He traveled on the sur-
face of the water as soon as he had passed the guard of British
warships near the German coast ; traveling "light" allowed him to
make six or seven knots more in speed. As he passed through
the "war zone" he kept watch for merchantmen which might be
made victims of his torpedo tubes. His craft was sighted by a
British destroyer, however, off the English coast and he had to
submerge to escape the fire of the destroyer's guns. He then pro-
ceeded cautiously down the coast of France, encountering no
hostile ships. When within one hundred miles of Gibraltar he was
again discovered by British destroyers, but again managed to
escape by submerging his craft.
Passage through the Strait of Gibraltar was made in the early
morning hours, while a mist hung near the surface of the water
and permitted no one at the fort to see the wake of the U-51*8
periscope. Once inside the Mediterranean he headed for the
south of Greece, escaping attack from a French destroyer and
proceeding through the -^gean Sea to the Dardanelles. The
journey ended on the 25th of May, just one month after leaving
Wilhelmshaven.
The British ships Triumph and Majestic were sighted early
in the morning, but attack upon them was difficult on account of
the destroyers which circled about them ; one of the destroyers
passed right over the U-51 while she was submerged. Captaia
Hersing brought her to the surface soon afterward and let go the
torpedo which sank the Triumph, For the next two days thr
submarine lay submerged, but came up on the following day and
found itself right in the midst of the allied fleet. This time the
Majestic was taken as the target for a torpedo and she went
[down. Again submerging his vessel Captain Hersing kept it down
for another day, and when he again came to the surface he saw
232 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
that the fleets had moved away. He then returned to Constanti-
nople.
On the 23d of June, 1915, the British cruiser Roxborough, an
older ship, was hit by a torpedo fired by a German submarine in
the North Sea, but the damage inflicted was not enough to pre-
vent her from making port under her own steam.
The deaths of a number of Americans occurred on the 28th of
June, 1916, when the Leyland liner Armenian, carrying horses
for the allied armies, was torpedoed by the U-38, twenty miles
west by north of Trevose Head in Cornwall. According to the
story of the captain of the vessel, the submarine fired two shots
to signal him to stop. When he put on all speed in an attempt to
get away from the raider her guns opened on his ship with
ahrapnel, badly riddling it. She had caught fire and was burning
in three places before he signaled that he would surrender.
Thirteen men had meanwhile been killed by the shrapnel. Some
of the lifeboats had also been riddled by the firing from the sub-
marine's deck guns, making it more difficult for the crew to leave
the ship. The German commander gave him ample time to get
his boats off.
To offset the advantage which the Germans had with their
submarines the British admiralty commissioned ten such craft
during the week of June 28, 1915. These vessels were of Ameri-
can build and design and were assembled in Canada. During the
week mentioned they were manned by men sent for the purpose
from England. Each was manned by four officers and eighteen
men, to take them across the Atlantic. Never before in history
had so many submarines undertaken a voyage as great. They got
under way from Quebec on July 2, 1915, and proceeded in column
two abreast, a big auxiliary cruiser, which acted as their escort
steaming in the center.
The next large liner which had an encounter with the German
submarine US9 was the Anglo-Calif ornian. She came into Queenak
town on the morning of July 5, 1915, with nine dead sailors lying
on the deck, nine wounded men in their bunks, and holes in her
Bides made by shot and shell. She had withstood attack from a
German submarine for four hours. Her escape from destruction
SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA"
23a
was accomplished through only the spirit of the captain and his
crew, combined with the fact that patrol vessels came to her aid
forcing the submarine to submerge.
A variety in the methods used by the commanders of German
submarines was revealed in the stopping of the Norwegian ship
Vega which was stopped on the 15th of July, while voyaging
from Bergen to Newcastle. The submarine came alongside the
steamship at night and the commander of the submarine super-
vised the jettisoning of her cargo of 200 tons of salmon, 800 cases
of butter, and 4,000 cases of sardines, which was done at his
command under threat of sinking his victim.
The week of July 15, 1915, was unique in that not one British
vessel was made the victim of a German submarine during that
period, though two Russian vessels had been sunk. Figures com-
piled by the British admiralty and issued on the 22d of July,
1915, gave out the following information concerning the attacks
on merchantmen by German submarines since the German ad-
miralty's proclamation of a "war zone" around Great Britain
went into effect on the 18th of February, 1915.
The official figures were as follows :
Week ending Vessels lost Lives lost
Feb. 25, 1915 11 9
March 4, " 1 None
March 11, " 7 • 38
March 18, " 6 13
March 25, " 7 2
April 1, " 13 165
April 8, ** 8 13
April 15, " 4 None
April 22, " 3 10
April 29, " 3 None
May 6, " 24 5
May 13, " 2 1,260
May 20, " 7 13
May 27, " 7 7
June 3, " 36 21
234
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Week ending
June 10, 1915
June 17,
June 24,
July 1,
July 8,
July 15,
July 22,
)15
Vessels lost
36
Lives lost
21
«
19
19
«
3
1
«
9
29
ft
15
2
it
12
13
«
2
None
235
1,641
The first year of the Great War came to an end with the Ger-
man submarines as active in the "war zone" as they had been
during any part of it. On the 28th of July, 1915, the anniversary
of the commencement of the war, there was reported the sink-
ing of nine vessels. These were the Swedish steamer Emma, the
three Danish schooners Maria, NeptunU, and Lena, the British
steamer Mangara, the trawlers lemii and Salaoia, the Westward
Ho, and the Swedish bark Sagnadalen. No lives were lost with
any of these vessels.
The first year of the war closed with a cloud gathered over
the heads of the members of the German admiralty raised by the
irritation the submarine attacks in the "war zone" had caused.
Germany's enemies protested against the illegality of these at-
tacks; neutral nations protested because they held that their
rights had been overridden. But the German press showed the
feeling of the German public on the matter — at the end of July,
1915, it was as anxious as ever to have the attacks continued.
Conflicting claims were issued in Germany and England. In thi
former country it was claimed that the attacks had seriously
damaged commerce ; in the latter it was claimed that the damaj
was of little account.
PART VI — THE EASTERN FRONT— AUSTRO-
RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER XXXV
THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN — REVIEW
OP THE SITUATION
TN the beginning of 1915 comparative calm reigned over the
•*• Austro-Russian theatre of war, so far as actual hostilities were
concerned. But it was not altogether the variable climatic con-
ditions of alternate frost and thaw — ^the latter converting road
and valley into impassable quagmires — ^that caused the lull. It
was a short winter pause during which the opposing forces — on
one side at least — ^were preparing and gathering the requisite
momentum for the coming storm.
During January, 1915, the Russian armies were in a decidedly
favorable position. In their own invaded territory of Poland, as
we have seen, they held an advanced position in front of the
Vistula, which circumstance enabled them to utilize that river
as a line of communication, while barring the way to Warsaw
against Von Hindenburg. Lemberg, the capital of Galicia,
which they had captured in September, 1914, was still in their
hands. Sixty miles away to the west there lay the great fortress
of Przemysl, invested by the Russians under General Selivanoff,
and completely cut off from the outer world since November 12,
1914. At least 150,000 troops and enormous quantities of stores
and munitions were locked up in the town and outlying forts,
together with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, mostly Polish.
In addition to these material advantages, the Russians held all the
Carpathian passes leading from GaHcia into the vast plains of
235
236 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Hungary, and a strong advanced position on the Dunajec in the
west, which, besides threatening Cracow, the capital of Austrian
Poland, served also as a screen to the mountain operations.
Finally, to the far east of the range, they had occupied nearly the
whole of the Bukowina right up to the Rumanian frontier.
Such, briefly, was the situation on the Austro-Russian front
when the second winter campaign opened. For Austria the
situation was extremely critical. Her armies, broken and scat-
tered after a series of disastrous reverses, could scarcely hop© by
their own efforts to stem the threatened invasion of Hungary.
General Brussilov, however, made no serious attempt to pour
his troops through the passes into the plain below ; although what
was probably a reconnaissance emerged from the Uzsok Pass
and penetrated as far as Munkacs, some thirty miles south, while
on several occasions small bands of Cossacks descended from the
Dukla and Delatjoi (Jablonitza) passes to raid Hungarian vil-
lages. General Brussilov evidently regarded it inadvisable to
risk an invasion of the plain, especially as he did not hold con-
trol of the southern exits from the passes, beyond which he would
be exposed to attack from all sides and liable to encounter
superior forces. The main Austrian anxiety for the moment was
the precarious position of Przemysl, to relieve which it was first
essential to dislodge Brussilov or to pierce his line. Again, in
the hour of her extremity, Austria's powerful ally came to the
rescue.
Under the command of the Archduke Eugene the Austrian
troops — all that were available — were formed into three
separate armies. For convenience sake we will designate them
A, B, and C. Army A, under General Boehm-Ermolli, was
ordered to the section from the Dukla Pass to the Uzsog. It was
charged with the task of cutting a way through to relieve
Przemysl. Army B, under the German General von Linsingen,
who also had some German troops with him, was to assail the
next section eastward, from the Uzsog to the Wyszkow Pass ; and
Army C, under the Austrian General von Pflanzer-Baltin, like-
wise suppHed with a good "stiffening" of German soldiers, was
accredited to the far-eastern section — ^the Pruth Valley and th«
THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN
237
238 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Bukowina. These three armies represented the fighting ma-
chine with which Austria hoped to retrieve the misfortunes of
war and recover at the same time her military prestige and her
invaded territories. We have no reliable information to enable
us to estimate the exact strength of these armies, but there is
every reason to believe that it was considerable, having regard
to the urgency of the situation and the bitter experience of the
recent past. Hence the figure of 400,000 men is probably approxi-
mately correct. Somewhere about January 23, 1914, after a
period of thaw and mud the weather settled down to snow and
hard frost. Then the machine began to move. A snow-clad
mountain rampart lay spread before; over 200 miles of its
length embraced the area of the projected operations. Here we
may leave this army for a while in order to review some of the
political and strategic considerations underlying the campaign,
which is the scope of this chapter.
The Russian occupation of the Bukowina, which was under-
taken and accomplished by a force far too small to oppose any
serious resistance, appears to have been carried out with the
definite political object of favorably impressing Rumania, and
to guide her into the arms of the Allies. From her geographical
position Rumania commands nearly the whole western frontier
of the Dual Monarchy. Her fertile soil supplied the Central
Powers with grain, dairy produce, and oil. Furthermore, Ru-
mania's foreign policy leaned to the side of Italy, and the general
European impression was, after the death of King Carol, October
10, 1914, that if one of the two countries entered the war, the
other would follow suit. As subsequent events have shown,
however, that expectation was not realized. Rumania, too, had
aspirations in the direction of recovering lost territories, but her
grievance in this respect was equally divided between Russia and
Austria, for, while the one had despoiled her of Bessarabia, the
other had annexed Transylvania (Siebenburgen). Hence the
Russian tentative conquest and occupation of the Bukowina
paved the way for Rumania, should she decide on intervention.
The road was clear for her to step in and occupy the Bukowina
(which Russia was prepared to hand over), and probably
01
THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN 239
Transylvania as well, which latter the proximity of a Russian
force might — at the time — ^have enabled her to do. But the bait
failed, no doubt for weighty reasons. Even if Rumania had
favored the Triple Entente, which there is strong ground to
presume she would, by entering the war, haye found herself in
as perilous a position as Serbia, with her Black Sea littoral ex-
posed to hostile Turkey and her whole southern boundary
flanked by a neighbor — Bulgaria — whose intentions were as yet
unknown. However, on January 27, 1915, the Bank of England
arranged a $25,000,000 loan to Rumania — an event which further
heightened the probability of her entry into the arena.
We may safely take it for granted that these considerations
were not overlooked by the German staff, in addition to the
patent fact that the Russians were persistently gaining ground
against the Austrians. German officers and men were therefore
rushed from the eastern and western fronts to the south of the
Carpathians to form the three armies we have labeled A, B,and C.
The points of attack for which they were intended have already
been stated ; but the roundabout manner in which they traveled
to their respective sections is both interesting and worthy of
notice. At this stage a new spirit seemed to dominate Austro-
Hungarian military affairs ; we suddenly encounter greater pre-
cision, sounder strategy, and deeper plans: a master mind ap-
pears to have taken matters in hand. It is the cool, calculating,
mathematical composite brain of the German General Staff. As
the formation and dispatching of three great armies can hardly
be kept a secret, especially where hawk-eyed spies abound, a
really astute piece of stage management was resorted to. Wild
rumors were set afloat to the effect that the Austrian Government
had decided to undertake a great offensive — for the third time —
against Serbia, and erase her from the map, with the assist-
ance of four German army corps. The concentration one for
operations against either Serbia or the Russian front in the
arpathians was naturally in the central plains of Hungary,
ut to cover the real object of Austro-German concentration
ctive demonstrations were made on the Serb border in the form
of bombardments of Belgrade, and occupation of Danube islands.
16— War St. 3
240 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
These demonstrations made plausible the Teutonic assertion that
the concentration of troops was being carried out with a
view to an invasion of Serbia. So successful was the ruse, and
so well had the secret been kept that on February 1, 1914, a
Petrograd "official" gravely announced to an eagerly listening
world: "The statement is confirmed that the new Austro-Ger-
man southern army, intended for the third invasion of Serbia^
consists of six Austrian and two German corps or 400,000 men,
under the command of the Archduke Eugene (!)*' At the very
time this appeared the new Austro-German "southern*' army had
been already, for quite a week, making its presence severely
felt in the eastern and central sections of the Carpathians, and
still the Russian authorities had not recognized the identity of
the forces operating there.
A brief description of the battle ground will enable the reader
to follow more easily the course of the struggle. Imagine that
length of the Carpathian chain which forms the boundary be-
tween Galicia and Hungary as a huge, elongated arch of,
roughly, 300 miles. (The whole of the range stretches as a con-
tinuous rampart for a distance of 900 miles, completely shutting
in Hungary from the northwest to the east and south, separating
it from Moravia [Mahren], Galicia, the Bukowina, and Ru-
mania.) Through the curve of this arch run a number of passes.
Beginning as far west as is here necessary, the names of the
chief passes eastward leading from Hungary are : into Galicia —
Beskid, Tarnow, Tilicz, Dukla, Lupkow, Rostoki, Uzsok, Vereczke
(or Tucholka), Beskid* (or Volocz), Wyszkow, Jablonitza (or
Delatyn) ; into the Bukowina — Strol, Kirlibaba, Rodna ; into
Rumania — Borgo. In parts the range is 100 miles in width, and
from under 2,000 to 8,000 feet high. The western and central
Carpathians are much more accessible than the eastern, and
therefore comprise the main and easiest routes across. The
Hun and Tartar invasions flooded Europe centuries ago by this
way, and the Delatyn is still called the "Magyar route." The
passes vary in height from under a thousand to over four thou-
sand feet. The Dukla and Uzsok passes were to be the main ob-
* There are two passes named Beskid.
BATTLE OF THE PASSES 241
jective, as through them lay the straightest roads to Lemberg
and Przemysl. The former is crossed by railway from Tokay
to Przemysl, and the latter by rail and road from Ungvar to
Sambor. A railroad also runs through the Vereczke from
Munkacs to Lemberg, and another through Delatjoi from De-
breczen to Kolomea. So far as concerned means of communica-
tion, matters were nearly equal, but geographical advantage lay
with the Russians, as the way from Galicia to Hungary is by far
an easier one than vice versa.
CHAPTER XXXVI
BATTLE OP THE PASSES
BEFORE proceeding with the opening of the second winter
campaign in the Carpathians, the reader should remember
that, as stated in the beginning of this narrative, a Russian army
under General Radko Dmitrieff (a Bulgarian), held an advanced
position on the Dunajec-Biala line, extending from the Vistula to
Zmigrod, northwest of Dukla. This force was consequently be-
yond the zone of the Austro-German offensive, but, as events
proved, it had not been overlooked, for it was here that the
heaviest blow was finally to fall. It is also important to bear in
j^^nind that the Russian armies occupying Galicia and the northern
^^Hlopes of the Carpathians were not conducting an isolated cam-
^^Kaign on their own account ; they formed an integral part of the
^^■ar-fiung battle line that reached from the shores of the Baltic
I^Baown to the Rumanian frontier, a distance of nearly 800 miles.
Dmitrieff 's force represented a medial link of the chain — and the
weakest.
Over the slushy roads of the valleys and into the snow-laden
passes the Germanic armies advanced, each of the widely de-
ployed columns with a definite objective: From Dukla, Lupkow,
and Rostoki to relieve Przefnysl ; from Uzsok through the valley
of the Upper San to Sambor; through Beskid and Vereczke
242 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
northward to Stryj, thence westward also to Sambor; over
Wyszkow to Dolina; via Jablonitza to Delatyn; and across
Kirlibaba and Doma Vatra into the Bukowina. Opposed to them
were the Russian Generals Brussilov, Ivanoff, and Alexieff,
respectively.
Correspondents with the Teutonic troops in these weeks wrote
in wonderment of the scenes of the slowly forward toiling
advance into the mountains which they had seen. On every
road leading into Galicia there was the same picture of a flood
rolling steadily on. Everywhere could be seen the German and
Austro-Hungarian troops on the move, men going into the
firing line to fight for days, day after day, with the shed-
ding of much blood, among the peaks and valleys, under chang-
ing skies.
Here is a word picture of the supply columns winding upward
into the Carpathians to the support of the Teutonic troops
furnished by a German correspondent :
"Truly fantastic is the appearance of one of these modern
supply caravans, stretching in zigzag, with numerous sharp
corners and turns, upward to the heights of the passes and down
on the opposite side. Here we see in stages, one above the other
and moving in opposite directions, the queerest mixture of men,
vehicles, machines and animals, all subordinated to a common
military purpose and organization by military leadership, mov-
ing continually and regularly along. The drivers have been
drummed up from all parts of the monarchy, Serbs, Ruthenians,
Poles, Croats, Rumanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Austrians,
and turbaned Mohammedans from Bosnia. Everyone is shouting
to his animals and cursing in his own language. The whole
mix-up is a traveling exhibition of most variegated characteris-
tic costumes, for the most part, of course, extremely the worse
for wear. Common to all these are the little wagons adapted to
mountain travel, elastic and tough, which carry only half loads
and are drawn by little ponylike, ambitious horses. In between
are great German draft horses, stamping along with their
broad high-wheeled baggage and ammunition wagons, as
though they belonged to a nation of giants.
BATTLE OF THE PASSES 243
**Gravely, with a kind of sullen dignity, slow-stepping steers
drag at their yokes heavily laden sledges. They are a powerful
white breed, with broad-spreading horns a yard long. These
are followed in endless rows by carefully stepping pack animals,
small and large horses, mules and donkeys. On the wooden pack-
saddles on their backs are the carefully weighed bales of hay or
ammunition boxes or other war materials. Walking gingerly
by the edges of the mountain ridges they avoid pitfalls and
rocks and walk round the stiff, distended bodies of their com-
rades that have broken down on the way. At times there ambles
along a long row of working animals a colt, curious and rest-
lessly sniffing. In the midst of this movement of the legs of
animals, of waving arms, of creaking and swaying loaded
vehicles of manifold origin, there climbs upward the weighty
iron of an Austrian motor battery, with an almost incomprehen-
sible inevitableness, flattening out the broken roads like a steam
roller.
"From the first pass the baggage train sinks down into the
depths, again to climb upward on the next ridge, to continue
striving upward ever toward higher passages, slowly pushing
forward toward its objective against the resistance of number-
less obstacles.
"The road to the battle field of to-day crosses the battle field of
recent weeks and months. Here there once stood a village, but
only the stone foundations of the hearths are left as traces of
the houses that have been burned down. Sometimes falling
shots or the terrors of a brief battle in the streets have reduced
to ruins only a part of a village. The roofs of houses have been
patched with canvas and boards to some extent, and now serve
as quarters for troops or as stables. In the narrow valleys the
level places by the sides of streams have been utilized for en-
campments. Here stand in order wagons of a resting column
and the goulash cannons shedding their fragrance far and wide,
or the tireless ovens of a field bakery. Frequently barracks,
hospital buildings, and shelters for men and animals have been
built into the mountain sides. Here and there simple huts have
been erected, made of a few poles and fir twigs. Often they
244 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
are placed in long rows, which, when their inmates are warming
themselves by the fire at night turn the dark mountain road
into a romantic night encampment, and everywhere fresh crosses,
ornamented at times in a manner suggestive of the work of
children, remind us of our brothers now forever silenced, who,
but a short time before went the same road, withstood just such
weather and such hardships, talked perhaps in these same huts
of the war, and dreamt of peace.
"The saddest spectacle, however, were the lightly wounded,
poor fellows, who might under ordinary conditions have readily
walked the distance from the first aid station to the central
gathering point, but who here on account of the ice or muddy
roads require double and three times the usual time."
CHAPTER XXXVII
BATTLE OF KOZIOWA — OPERATIONS IN
THE BUKOWINA
OWING to the topographical conditions under which fighting
must be carried on in the central Carpathians, some weeks
might be expected to elapse before a general engagement devel-
oped along the entire front. Lateral communication or coopera-
tion between the advancing columns was out of the question ; the
passes were like so many parallel tunnels, each of which must
first be negotiated before a reunion can take place at the northern
exits.
We will follow the achievements of the three groups in separate
order. Army A, under Boehm-Ermolli, crossed Uzsok and
Rostoki, and forced part of the Russian line back upon Baligrod,
but Brussilov held it fast on Dukla and Lupkow, strongly sup-
ported by Dmitrieff on his right. Here the attack failed with
severe losses; the Germanic forces were thrown back into Hun-
gary, and the Russians commanded the southern ends of the
passes around Dukla. The Uzsok Pass was of small strategical
BATTLE OF KOZIOWA 245
value to the Austrians now that they had it. It is extremely
vulnerable at every point; steep, narrow, and winding roads
traverse its course nearly 3,000 feet high, with thickly wooded
mountains up to 4,500 feet overlooking the scene from a close
circle. Regarded merely as a short cut to Przemysl and Lem-
berg, the Uzsok was a useful possession provided always that
the northern debouchment could be cleared and an exit forced.
But the Russians held these debouchments with a firm grip, and
the pass was consequently of no use to the Austrians. About
February 7, 1915, the Russians attempted to outflank the Aus-
trian position in the Lupkow Pass from the eastern branch of
the Dukla by pushing forward in the direction of Mezo-Laborc
on the Hungarian side. The movement partially succeeded ; they
took over 10,000 prisoners, but failed to dislodge the Austrians
from the heights east of the pass. Severe fighting raged round
this district for over a month, the Russians finally capturing
Lupkow, as well as Smolnik at the southern exit of Rostoki. Had
the Russians succeeded in getting between Uzsok and the Aus-
trian line of communication, as was undoubtedly their aim, the
Austrians would have been compelled to relinquish the pass with-
out even a fight. However, General Boehm-Ermolli's mission
proved a failure.
Army B, under Von Linsingen, succeeded in traversing all the
passes in its appointed section. Crossing by the railway pass
of Beskid and the two roads leading through Vereczke and
Wyszkow, they pushed forward in the direction of Stryj and
Lemberg, but never reached their destination. Barely through
the passes, the Germans struck upon Lysa Gora, over 3,300 feet
high. This mountain range is barren of all vegetation — no shel-
tering trees or shrubs adorn its slopes. The route of the Germans
crossed Lysa Gora south and in front of the ridge of Koziowa,
where the Russian lines, under General Ivanoff, lay in waiting.
Passing down the bald slopes of Lysa Gora toward the valley of
the Orava River, the advancing German columns presented a
conspicuous target for the Russians on the opposite slopes of
Koziowa, screened by thick forests. Here one of the most des-
perate battles of the campaign ensued on February 6, 1915, be-
246 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tween Von Linsingen's Austro-German army and Brussilov's
center. ^
In close formation an^ with well-drilled precision the Germans
attempted to storm the position at the point of the bayonet.
Again and again they returned to the charge, only to be repulsed
with severe losses. As many as twenty-two furious bayonet
charges were made in one day, February 7. Wherever a footing
was gained in the Russian lines, there a few minutes ferocious
hand-to-hand melee developed — Saxon and Slav at death grips —
the intruders were expelled or hacked down. Great masses of
Austro-German dead and wounded were strewn over the lower
slopes of Koziowa. For five weeks Von Linsingen hammered at
the Russian front without being able to break through. So long
as the Russians held the heights it was impossible for their enemy
to emerge from the passes. These two, Vereczke and Beskid, so
close together, may literally be described as twin tunnels. Owing
to the highland between them, the two columns moving through
could not cooperate ; if one side needed reenf orcements from the
other, they had to be taken back over the range into Hungary to
the junction where the roads diverged. It was sound strategy
on the Russian side to select Koziowa as the point from which to
check the Germanic advance. For the time being, with Dukla
and Lupkow in their hands and the exits of Uzsok and Rostoki
strongly guarded, the defense of Koziowa held Galicia safe from
reconquest. The attacks against Koziowa continued beyond the
middle of March, 1915. On the 16th of that month the Russians
captured a place called Oravcyk, about four miles westward,
from where they could threaten the German left, which had the
effect of keeping Von Linsingen still closer to his mountain pas-
sages. The fighting in this region represents one of the impor-
tant phases of the war, for it prevented the relief of Przemysl;
temporarily saved Stryj and Lemberg for the Russians; en-
abled them to send reenforcements into the Bukowina, and,
finally, inspired the German General Staff to plan the great
and decisive Galician campaign, which was to achieve the
task wherein Boehm-Ermolli and Von Linsingen had both
failed.
BATTLE OF KOZIOWA 247
Meanwhile, what had Von Pflanzer-Baltin accomplished
with Army C — the third column? His path lay through
Jablonitza, Kirlibaba, and Dorna Vatra ; his task was to clear the
Russians out of the Bukowina, and either to force them back
across their own frontiers, or to turn the extreme end of their
left flank. We have seen that the Russian occupation of the
Bukowina was more in the nature of a political experiment than
a serious military undertaking, and that their forces in the
province were not strong enough to indulge in great strategical
operations. Hence we may expect the Austrian generaFs prog-
ress to be less difficult than that of his colleagues in the western
and central Carpathians. To some extent this presumption is
correct, for on February 18, 1915, after launching out from the
southern corner of the Bukowina at Kimpolung and via the Ja-
blonitza Pass down the Pruth Valley, they captured Czernowitz,
and after that Kolomea, whence the railway runs to Lemberg.
Within three days they reached Stanislawow, another important
railway center, defended by a small Russian force, and a big
battle ensued. Altogether, the Germanic troops in the Bukowina
were reported at 50,000 in number, though these were split up
into two columns, one of which was making but slow progress
farther east.
Russian reenforcements were thrown into the town, and the
struggle for the railway, which lasted a week, appears to have
been of a seesaw nature, for no official reports of the fighting
were issued by either side. Still the Austrians pushed westward
in the hope of reaching the railways which supplied those Rus-
sian armies which were barring the advance through the central
passes. The Russians were forced to withdraw from Stanis-
lawow, and their opponents now held possession of the line run-
ning to Stryj and Przemysl — a serious menace to the Russian
main communications. This meant that Von Pflanzer-Baltin had
succeeded in getting to the rear of the Russians. But assistance
came unexpectedly from the center, whence Ivanoff was able to
send reenforcements to his colleague. General Alexeieff, who was
continually falling back before the Austrians. Furious counter-
attacks were delivered by the Russians at Halicz and Jezupol, the
248
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
»
FALL OF PRZEMYSL - 249
bridgeheads of the southern bank of the Dniester. If the Aus-
trians could not force a victory at these points, their position in
Stanislawow would be untenable, since the Russians still had a
clear road to pour reenforcements into the fighting area between
the Dniester and the Carpathians. On March 1, 1915, the Aus-
trians were defeated at Halicz in a pitched battle, and on the
4th the Russians reentered Stanislawow. According to their
official communique the Russians captured nearly 19,000 pris-
oners, 5 guns, 62 machine guns, and a quantity of stores and
munitions. About March 16 the opposing forces came again into
touch southeast of Stanislawow on the road to Ottynia, but noth-
ing of importance appears to have happened. To sum up the
results of the Germanic offensive, we must remember what the
objectives were. Of the latter, none was attained. The Russians
had not been expelled from Galicia ; Przemysl was no nearer to
relief than before, and Lemberg had not been retaken. With the
exception of Dukla and Lupkow, all the passes were in Austrian
hands ; but the Russians dominated the northern debouchments of
all of them excepting Jablonitza.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
FALL OP PRZEMYSL
THE town and fortress of Przemysl formally surrendered to
the Russian General Selivanoff on Monday, March 22, 1915.
The first investment began at the early stages of the war in
September, 1914. On the 27th of that month the Russian gen-
eralissimo announced that all communications had been cut off.
By October 15, 1914, the Russian investment had been broken
again, and for a matter of three weeks, while the road was open,
more troops, provisions, arms, and munitions were rushed to the
spot. As we have seen, however, the Russians recovered their
lost advantage, for, after the fall of Jaroslav, the fortress to the
north of Przemysl, their troops were hurried up from east, north|
250 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
and west, and within a few days the Austrians were sent back
along the whole front. From the region of Przemysl three rail-
roads cross the Carpathians to Budapest, along all of which the
Russians had pushed vigorously, besides advancing on the west.
As regarded railroad communications, the fate of Przemysl was
sealed by the capture of Chyrow, an important junction about
twenty miles south of the fortress. Przemysl itself was impor-
tant as a road junction and as a connecting link with the Uzsok
and Lupkow passes. The garrison prepared to make a stubborn
resistance with the object of checking the Russian pursuit. A
week later the Russians had broken up their heavy artillery and
had begun a steady bombardment. By November 12, 1914,
Przemysl was once more completely besieged by General Seli-
vanoff with not more than 100,000 troops.
Przemysl is one of the oldest towns of Galicia, said to have been
founded in the eighth century. It was once the capital of a large
independent principality. In the fourteenth century Casimir the
Great and other Polish princes endowed it with special civic
privileges, and the town attained a high degree of commercial
prosperity. In the seventeenth century its importance was de-
stroyed by inroads of Tatars, Cossacks, and Swedes. Przemysl
is situated on the River San, and was considered one of the
strongest fortresses of Europe.
The original strategic idea embodied in the purpose of the
fortress was purely defensive; in the event of war with Russia
only the line of the San and Dniester was intended to be held
at all costs, while the whole northeastern portion of Galicia was
to be abandoned. With the fortress of Cracow guarding the
west, Przemysl was meant to be the first defense between the
two rivers and to hold the easiest roads to Hungary through the
Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok passes. Within the last ten years,
however, the Austrian War Staff altered its plans and decided
upon a vigorous offensive against Russia should occasion offer,
and that Eastern Galicia was not to be sacrificed. Hence a net-
work of strategic railways was constructed with a view to at-
tacking the prospective enemy on a wide front extending from
the Vistula near Cracow on the west to the Bug on the east,
FALL OF PRZEMYSL 251
where the latter flows into Austrian territory and cuts off a
comer of eastern Galicia. The plan does not appear to have
worked successfully, for, before the war was many days old, the
Russians had taken Lemberg, swept across the Dniester at Halicz,
across the San at Jaroslav, just north of Przemysl, and had
already besieged the fortress, which at no time imposed any
serious obstacle in the path of their progress. Perhaps the only
useful purpose that Przemysl served was that it restrained the
Russians from attempting an invasion of Hungary on a big scale,
by holding out for nearly seven months. Not having sufficient
siege artillery at their disposal, the Russians made no attempt
to storm the place. General Selivanoff surrounded the forts
with a wide circle of counterdefenses, which were so strongly
fortified that the garrison would have found it an almost hope-
less task to attempt a rush through the enemy's lines. The
Austrian artillery was naturally well acquainted with the range
of every point and position that lay within reach of their guns ;
and Selivanoff wisely offered them little opportunity for effective
practice. Considering it too expensive to attack by the overland
route, he worked his way gradually toward the forts by means
of underground operations. To sap a position is slow work,
but much more economical in the expenditure of lives and
munitions. The weakness of Przemysl lay in the fact that its
garrison was far too large for its needs, and that provisions
were running short. In the early part of the campaign the Ger-
manic armies operating in the San region had drawn freely on
Przemysl for supplies, and before these could be adequately re-
placed the Russians had again forged an iron ring around the
place. The Russian commander, moreover, was aware that a
coming scarcity threatened the town, and that he had only to
bide his time to starve it into submission. Whilst he was simply
waiting and ever strengthening his lines, the Austrians found
it incumbent on them to assume the offensive. Several desperate
sorties were made by the garrison to break through the wall,
only to end in complete disaster. General Herman von Kus-
manek, the commander in chief of the fortress, organized a
special force, composed largely of Hungarians, for "sortie duty,"
252 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
under the command of a Hungarian, General von Tamassy.
These sorties had been carried out during November and Decem-
ber, 1914, especially during the latter month, when the Austro-
German armies were pouring across the mountains. So critical
W^as the Russian position at the time that the relief of Przemysl
was hourly expected. According to an officer of General Seliva-
noff's staff, "The Austrians in the fortress were already con-
versing with the Austrians on the Carpathians by means of their
searchlights. The guns of Przemysl could be heard by the
Austrian field artillery. The situation was serious, and General
Selivanoff took prompt measures. He brought up fresh troops
to the point of danger and drove the sortie detachments back to
the fortress." It is stated from the Austrian side that one of
the sortie detachments had succeeded in breaking through the
Russian lines and marching to a point fifteen miles beyond the
outer lines of the forts. A Russian official announcement states
that during two months of the siege the Austrian captures
amounted only to 4 machine guns and about 60 prisoners, which
occurred in an engagement where two Honved regiments fell on
a Russian company which had advanced too far to be reenforced
in time. On their part in repulsing sorties by the garrison, fre-
quently made by considerable forces, the Russians made
prisoners 27 officers and 1,906 soldiers, and captured 7 ma-
chine guns, 1,500,000 cartridges, and a large quantity of
arms. In two sorties the garrison in the region of Bircza
had more than 2,000 killed and wounded, among them being
many officers. No further sorties were undertaken in that
particular region. During January and February, 1915, very
little fighting took place around Przemysl; sorties were useless
as there was no Austro-German force anywhere near the fortress,
and the Russians were tightening the pressure around it. The
only means of communication with the outer world was by aero-
plane, so that, despite the rigid investment, the Austro-German
war staff were kept fully informed of the straits in which
Przemysl found itself. General Boehm-Ermolli, with Army A,
was making desperate efforts to extricate himself from the
Russian grip round Uzsok, Lupkow, and Dukla; he did not
FALL OF PRZEMYSL 253
get beyond Baligrod, as the crow flies, thirty miles south of
Przemysl.
On March 13, 1915, the Russians stormed and captured the vil-
lage of Malkovise, on the northeast, breaking through the outer
line of the defense. From this position they began to bombard
parts of the inner ring. About the beginning of the third week in
March, 1915, a new spirit of activity appeared to seize the
beleaguered garrison: they commenced a terrific cannonade
which, however, elicited no response. It was but the energy of
despair : they were firing to get rid of their ammunition, hoping
at the same time to hit something or somebody. The end was
at hand.
On March 18, 1915, a Petrograd "official" laconically reports
that : "In the Przemysl sector the fortress guns continue to fire
more than a thousand heavy projectiles daily, but our troops
besieging the fortress lose only about ten men every day." It
is also on March 18 that General von Kusmanek issued the fol-
lowing manifesto to the defenders of Przemysl: — "Heroes, I
announce to you my last summons. The honor of our country
and our army demands it. I shall lead you to pierce with your
points of steel the iron circles of the enemy, and then march
ever farther onward, sparing no efforts, until we rejoin our
army, which, after heavy fighting, is now near us."
Just before the surrender two Austrian officers escaped from
the fortress in an aeroplane. These reported concerning the
last days of the siege :
"On the 18th of March the last provisions had been dealt out
and at the same time the last attempt at breaking through the
line of the besiegers had been ordered. This was carried out
on the night of the 19th of March. It was shattered, however,
against the unbreakable manifold ring of the Russian inclosing
lines and against the superior forces which were brought in
time to the threatened points. Our men were so weakened by
their long fasting that it took them fully seven hours to make
the march of seven kilometers, and even in this short stretch
many of them had to lie down from exhaustion, yet they fought
well and were bravely led by their offi/cers.
254 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"In spite of all this," Captain Lehmann, one of the escaped
officers, reported, "the heroic garrison fought on, after their last
sortie, for fully forty-eight hours, against assaults of the Rus-
sians which now set in with terrific violence. The men of the
fortress were fully informed of the situation by an announce-
ment of the commander. They knew that the provisions were
at an end and this very knowledge spurred them on to make
their last sacrifice. Practically all the nations of the monarchy
were represented in the fortress. Tyrolese Landsturm held the
south, Hungarians the west, Ruthenians and Poles the north, and
lower Austrians the east. To this last battle the troops marched
out singing, striving thus to master their weakness. On this,
occasion the above mentioned notice had fallen into the hands
of the Russians and the prospect had thus been opened to them
to seize the fortress with little effort. For two days and nights
all the works of Przemysl were taken under an uninterrupted
terrible artillery fire, including that of modern howitzers of all
calibers, up to eighteen centimeters. Then followed an assault
at night on the east front, which, however, was again bloodily
repelled."
Starvation is conducive neither to good feeling nor heroism,
especially when it is superimposed upon an unbroken series of
more or less disastrous experiences. Misfortune and the so-
called "tradition of defeat" had dogged the steps of Austria's
troops from the beginning of the war; unlucky generals —
Dankl, Auffenberg, and others — ^had been relieved of their com-
mands and replaced by "new blood" — Boehm-Ermolli, Boro-
yevitch von Bojna, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin. Of these three,
two had as yet failed in carrying to success the German plans
which had taken the place of those of their own strategists.
Hence it is not at all improbable that the reports of dissensions
among the garrison, which leaked out at the time, were sub-
stantially accurate. That jealousies broke out among the numer-
ous races forming the Austrian Army — especially between the
Slavonic and Germanic elements — is supported by strong
evidence. The sentiments of the Slav subjects of Austria leaned
more toward Russia than the empire of which they formed
FALL OF PRZEMYSL 258
a considerable portion, while there was never any love lost
between them and the Magyars. However that may be, the
Slav regiments were reported to have refused obedience to the
general's order for the last sortie, which was eventually under-
taken by a force composed of the Twenty-third Hungarian Honved
Division, a regiment of Hussars, and a Landwehr brigade, alto-
gether about 30,000 men. Everything depended upon the
venture, for not only were all their food supplies used up, but
they had already eaten most of their horses. Instead, therefore,
of making southward to where their comrades were fighting
hard to tear themselves away from the Carpathian passes, the
sortie turned toward the east, in the direction of Mosciska,
twenty miles off, which was supposed to be the Russian supply
base. This attempted foraging expedition — for it was nothing
else — can only be defended on the broad general principle that
it is better to do something than nothing as a last resort. Sup-
plies were essential before any more could be undertaken to cut
a passage through the strong double set of Russian lines that
lay between the Carpathians and Przemysl ; but that these sup-
plies were stored at Mosciska was a pure speculation. Further,
considering that the whole country was in their opponents* hands,
a strength of 30,000 men was insufficient to attempt so hazard-
ous an adventure. Even if they succeeded in breaking through,
their return to the fortress was not assured. In that case, if
they could not get back, they would have to go forward : east-
ward lay Lemberg, held by the Russians; northward was the
Russian frontier, and southward stood the Russian forces hold-
ing the passes. Thus, in any case, however successful the
expedition might prove, it meant breaking at least twice through
les which the enemy had spent months in strengthening or
fortifying. Undeterred by the almost certain possibility of
lilure, the expedition of the "forlorn hope" set out across the
>lain of the San — and speedily came to grief. They had to pass
the strongest Russian artillery position, which was stationed
the low hollow through which the railway runs to Lemberg.
[ere a terrific hail of shells burst over their heads ; rattle of ma-
dne guns and rifle fire tore great holes in their ranks; the
17_War St. 3
256 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
stoutest courage and bravest hearts were unavailing against
an enemy who could not be reached nor even seen. The number
of killed and wounded in that fatal sortie has not been made
public ; that it was an enormous figure is certain. The Russians
took 4,000 prisoners of those who survived the ordeal, and cap-
tured the forts on the western side directly after the struggling
remnants had regained their starting place. Generalvon Kus-
manek issued his manifesto in the morning, and by the same
night the sortie ended in disaster. Like the misdirected charge
of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854, it was ^'brilliant, but
it wasn't war."
One more attempt was made on Saturday, March 20, 1915,
toward Oikovice, but it was easily frustrated by the vigilant
Russians. On Sunday and Monday, the 21st and 22d of March,
a number of explosions were heard in and around Przemysl.
The Austrians were destroying ever3rthing possible previous to
surrendering. Large quantities of explosives were thrown in
the river ; all kinds of arms were destroyed or rendered useless ;
three bridges were crippled; the few remaining horses were
shot, and a railway bridge over the Wiar, which possessed no
strategic value, was also destroyed. These tactics of destroying
approaches naturally isolated the town more than ever, and
made it exceedingly difficult afterward to convey food supplies
to the starving population.
On Monday morning, March 22, 1915, the Austrian chief of
staff appeared outside the lines of Przemysl under a flag of
truce. He was blindfolded, driven by automobile to Russian
headquarters, and ushered into the presence of General Seliva-
noff. When the bandage had been removed from his eyes, the
Austrian officer handed over a letter of capitulation from
General von Kusmanek, which ran as follows :
"In consequence of the exhaustion of provisions and stores,
and in compliance with instructions received from my supreme
chief, I am compelled to surrender the Imperial and Royal
Fortress of Przemysl to the Imperial Russian Army."
The Russians took charge without any triumphal display.
Some officers were sent to receive the surrender and take stock
FALL OP PRZEMYSL 257
df ttie spoils. General von Kusmanek himself supplied the in-
ventory, in which were listed 9 generals, 93 superior officers,
2,500 "Offlziere und Beamten" (subalterns and officials), and
117,000 rank and file, besides 1,000 pieces of ordnance, mostly
useless, and a large quantity of shells and rifle cartridges.
Greneral Artamoff was appointed military governor and to
superintend the process of dispatching the prisoners into Rus-
sian territory, which was carried out at the rate of 10,000 a day.
Extensive arrangements were set on foot to supply the inhab-
itants with food, drink, and other necessaries of life. As the
RufMsians had not bombarded the town, its natural and artificial
beauties had suffered no damage beyond that which the Aus-
trians had themselves inflicted ; only the outskirts and the forti-
fications had been injured by fire and explosion.
Thus fell, on March 22, 1915, Przemysl, "by its own momen-
tum like an overripe fruit," and with a garrison twice as large
as would have been adequate to defend it. To Austria the blow
was a severe one, for it cost her about four army corps ; the im-
mediate advantage it brought to the Russians was the release
of Selivanoff's army of 100,000 men, who were urgently re-
quired elsewhere. It was only a week earlier that the com-
mander in chief of all the Austro-Hungarian armies, the
Archduke Frederick, had granted an interview to an American
journalist (Dr. J. T. Roche), in the course of which he stated:
"We have only recently reached the point where we are really
prepared ,to carry on a campaign as it should be carried under
modem conditions of warfare. Now that our organization has
been completed and all branches of the service are working
harmoniously, we entertain no doubts as to our ability to hold
the enemy at all points and to drive him back from that section
of Galicia which is still in his possession."
258 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXXIX
NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE — AUSTRO*
GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE
THREE days before the fall of Przemysl the Russians aban»
ddned the defensive and commenced a vigorous attack on
the Carpathian front. Active preparations for the advance had
been completed when the capitulation of the fortress was to be
expected any hour. Having so far held the Germanic armies
in check, it was necessary for the Russians to regain complete
control of the Carpathians and the passes before the snow should
begin to melt, especially if they decided on an invasion of
Hungary. On the other hand, before any offensive could be
undertaken against the Germans in Poland, or the Austrians
at Cracow, it was imperative to secure the southern flank in
Galicia. They had by this time partially grasped one particular
feature of German strategy, namely, to parry a blow from one
direction by striking in another. A further consideration may
have been the absolute certainty that Germany would dispatch
more reenforcements to the aid of her ally. Selivanoff 's siege
army was distributed between Dmitrieff, Brussilov, and Ivanoff,
but they could not be employed to full advantage owing to the
restricted area presented by the Germanic front. Being largely
composed of siege artillery as well as cavalry, a considerable
portion of Selivanoff's army was unsuited for mountain warfare.
Cavalry were converted into infantry, but could not be supplied
with the necessary equipment ; they had no bayonets, and most
of the fighting was hand-to-hand.
Great masses of Germanic reserves were concentrating in
northern Hungary, into which the Russians had driven a thin
wedge south of Dukla, where they held an isolated outpost
near Bartfeld. To leave this position undeveloped meant com-
pulsory withdrawal or disaster. With the continual influx of
reenforcements on both sides, the struggle for the main passes
gradually develops into an ever-expanding and unbroken battle
NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 259
front: all the gaps are being filled up. From Dukla westward
to the Dunajec-Biala line and the Carpathian foothills a new
link is formed by the Fourth Austrian Army, commanded by
the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with two and a half army
corps and one German division. In the Central Carpathians
a fifth army, under the command of the Austrian General von
Bojna, appears between the forces of Boehm-Ermolli and those
of Von Linsingen. Right away eastward the purely Aus-
trian army of Von Pflanzer-Baltin was holding the Pruth Val-
ley. The Germanic chain was complete, with every link welded
together.
When the Russian offensive opened on March 19, 1915, the
entire battle line still rested on the northern side of the Car-
pathians, and here the struggle was resumed. The Russian
grand attack was directed between the Lupkow and Uzsok passes,
where great forces of the enemy, concentrated for the purpose of
relieving Przemysl, were stationed. In the western sector, fac-
ing Dmitrieff, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand held the roads
leading from Novy-Sacz and Grybow to Tamow, covering Cra-
cow ; and from south of the range the two roads diverging from
Zboro to Gorlice and Jaslo were in Russian possession, though the
Austrians held their junction at Zboro, eight miles north of
Bartfeld. Of the actual fighting that took place in this region
very few details were published by the Russian official com-
munique. One of these documents, dated April 18, 1915, an-
nounced that on March 23, "our troops had already begun their
principal attack in the direction of Baligrod, enveloping the
enemy positions from the west of the Lupkow Pass and on the
east near the sources of the San. The enemy opposed the most
desperate resistance to the offensive of our troops. They had
brought up every available man on the front from the direction
of Bartfeld as far as the Uzsok Pass, including even German
troops and numerous cavalrymen fighting on foot. The effectives
on this front exceeded 300 battaHons. Moreover, our troops had
to overcome great natural difficulties at every step. In the course
of the day, March 23, 1915, we captured more than 4,000 pris-
oners, a gun, and several dozen machine guns."
260 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On March 24, 1915, the battle was in full progress: "Especially
severe is the fighting for the crest of the mountain south of
Jasliska and to the west of the Lupkow Pass. The forests which
cover these mountains offer special facilities for the construction
of strong fortifications." March 25 : "The woods in the Lupkow
region are a perfect entanglement of barbed wire . . . surrounded
by several layers of trenches, strengthened by deep ditches and
palisades. On this day our troops carried by assault a very im-
portant Austrian position on the great crest of the Beskid
Mountains." The Russian captures for the day amounted to 100
officers, 5,600 men, and a number of machine guns. Advancing
from Jasliska the Russians seriously threatened the Austro-
German position in the Laborcza Valley, to which strong reen-
forcements were sent on March 25. With terrific violence
the battle raged till far into the night of the 27th, the Russians
forcing their way to within seven miles of the Hungarian
frontier.
In eight days they had taken nearly 10,000 prisoners. By the
night of March 28, 1915, the entire line of sixty miles from
Dukla to Uzsok was ablaze — ^the storm was spreading eastward.
Like huge ant hills the mountains swarmed with gray and bluish
specks — each a human being — some to the waist in snow, stab-
bing and hacking at each other ferociously with bayonet, sword,
or lance, others pouring deadly fire from rifle, revolver, machine
gun, and heavy artillery. Over rocks slippery with blood, through
cruel barbed-wire entanglements and into crowded trenches the
human masses dash and scramble. Here, with heavy toll, they
advanced; there, and with costlier sacrifice, they were driven
back. Fiery Magyars, mechanical Teutons and stohd muzhiks
mixed together in an indescribable hellbroth of combative fury
and destructive passion. Screaming shells and spattered shrap-
nel rent the rocks and tore men in pieces by the thousand. Round
the Lupkow Pass the Russians steadily carved their way for-
ward, and at the close of the day, March 29, 1915, they had
taken 76 officers, 5,384 men, 1 trench mortar, and 21 machine
guns. Along the Baligrod-Cisna road the fighting proceeded, up
to March 30, by day and night.
NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 261
Gradually the Russians pushed toward Dvemik and Ustrzyki
south of Lutoviska, threatening the Austrian position in the
Uzsok and lines of communications to the south. German re-
serves were hurried up from the base at Ungvar, but could not
prevent the capture of 80 Austrian officers, over 5,000 men, 14
machine guns, and 4 pieces of cannon. Ivanoff had been careful
to hold his portion of Selivanoff' s army in reserve ; their presence
turned the scale.
On the day and night of March 31, 1915, the Russians stormed
and carried the Austrian positions 4,000 feet high up on the
Poloniny range during a heavy snowstorm. So deep was the
snow in places that movement was impossible ; the trampling of
the charging battalions rushing down over the slopes dislodged
avalanches of snow, overwhelming both attackers and defenders.
By April 1, 1915, the Russians approached Volosate, only twelve
miles from the rear of the Uzsok Pass, from which they were now
separated by a low ridge. Holding full possession of the Poloniny
range farther west, they commanded the road from Dvemik to
Vetllna. From the north other Russian columns captured
Michova on the Smolnik-Cisna railroad, crossed the Carpathians,
and penetrated into the Virava Valley. Occupying the entire loop
of the Sanok-Homona railway north and south of Lupkow, and
Mezo-Laborcz toward Dukla, the Russians now threatened the
Austrian mountain positions between Lupkow and the Vetlina-
Zboj road from the western flank as well. Violent winter storms
raged across the Carpathians on April 2 and 3, 1915; nature
spread a great white pall over the scenes of carnage. While the
elements were battling, the weary human fighting machine rested
and bound its wounds. But not for long. Scarcely had the last
howls of the blizzard faded away when the machine was again
set in motion.
South of Dukla and Lupkow and north of Uzsok fighting was
resumed with intense vigor. Painfully digging through the
snowdrifts the Austrians retired from the Smolnik-Kalnica line,
now no longer tenable. Storm hampered the pursuing enemy,
who captured the Cisna railway station on April 4, 1915, with all
its rolling stock and large stores of munitions.
262 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On April 6, 1915, a Russian communique announced that
"during the period from March 20 to April 3, 1915, we took
prisoners in the Carpathians, on the front from Baligrod to
Uzsok, 378 officers, 11 doctors, and 33,155 men. We captured
17 guns and 101 machine guns. Of these captives 117 officers,
16,928 men, 8 guns, and 59 machine guns were taken on a front
of fifteen versts (10 miles)."
The Russians again advanced along their whole front on April
4, 1915 ; forcing their way along the Rostoki stream, they carried
the village of Rostoki Gorne with the bayonet and penetrated the
snow-bound Rostoki Pass. Their first line arrived at a Hun-
garian village called Orosz-Russka, five miles from Nagy Polena,
at the foot of the pass. The Austrians attempted to drive them
back, but they held their ground.
While fortune was steadily following the efforts of the czar's
troops in the Lupkow-Uzsok sector, the German War Staff were
preparing their plans for the great decisive blow that was soon to
be struck. South of the Carpathians, barely thirty miles away,
formidable reenforcements were collecting; they arrived from
the East Prussian front, from Poland, and even from the west,
where they had faced the French and British. There were also
new formations fresh from Germany. General von der Marwitz
arrived in the Laborcza Valley with a whole German army corps.
These gigantic preparations were not unknown to the Russians ;
they, also, strained every nerve to throw all available reenforce-
ments behind and into the battle line, strengthening every posi-
tion except one. South of the Lupkow the Germanic forces
opened their counteroffensive on April 6, 1915. Official reports
on the first day's fighting differ somewhat. The Russians admit
a slight German advance, but assert that they were able to with-
stand all further attacks. The Germans, on the other hand,
claim great successes and the capture of 6,000 Russian prisoners.
The Germanic armies in this case, however, certainly did ad-
vance, for the Russians withdrew from the Virava Valley, which
they had entered four days earlier. The first object of the
counteroffensive was to save the Austrians who were holding the
frontier south of Lupkow from being enveloped and cut off. But
NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 263
on April 9, 1915, the Russians again moved forward, and recov-
ered part of the Virava Valley. By this day the whole mountain
crest from Dukla to Uzsok, a distance of over seventy miles, had
been conquered by thv; Russians. By the same night they had re-
pulsed a counterattack near the Rostoki and captured a battalion
of Austrian infantry. The Russian report sums up thus : "We
seized Height 909 (909 meters=3,030 feet) with the result that
the enemy was repulsed along the entire length of the principal
chain of the Carpathians in the region of our offensive."
For the next three days Brussilov attempted to work his way
to the rear of the Uzsok position with his right wing from the
Laborcz and Ung valleys, while simultaneously continuing his
frontal attacks against Boehm-Ermolli and Von Bojna. Cutting
through snow sometimes more than six feet deep, the Russians
approached at several points within a distance of three miles
from the Uzsok Valley. But the Austrians still held the Opolonek
mountain group in force. Severe fighting then developed north-
west of the Uzsok on the slopes between Bukoviec and Beniova ;
the Russians captured the village of Wysocko Nizne to the north-
east, which commands the only roads connecting the Munkacz-
Stryj and the Uzsok-Turka lines. Though both sides claimed local
successes, they appear to have fought each other to a deadlock,
for very little fighting occurred in this zone after April 14, 1915.
Henceforth Brussilov directed his main efforts to the Virava and
Cisna-Rostoki sector. From here and Volosate, where there had
been continuous fighting since the early days of April, the Rus-
lians strove desperately for possession of the Uzsok. They were
low only two or three days' march from the Hungarian plains.
Between April 17 and 20, 1915, a vigorous Austrian counter-
attack failed to check the Russian advance. Between Telepovce
id Zuella, two villages south of the Lupkow, the Russians noise-
jssly approached the Austrian barbed-wire entanglements,
>roke through, and after a brief bayonet encounter gained pos-
jssion of two heights and captured the village of Nagy Polena,
little farther to the east. During the night of April 16-17,
[915, the Russians took prisoners 24 officers, 1,116 men, and 3
machine guns.
264 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On April 18, 1915, the Austrians directed several fierce attacks
against the heights south of Telepovce, but were compelled to
evacuate the approaches to their positions. Here, also, an Aus-
trian battalion was cut off and forced to surrender. Meanwhile
the fighting was gradually decreasing in intensity ; the great Car-
pathian campaign had reached the end of another chapter. The
Austro-German offensive had failed in its purpose. From
Uzsok eastward there had been but little fighting after the Rus-
sian recapture of Stanislawow.
CHAPTER XL
CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA —
BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC
WHILE the struggle for the passes was raging in the central
Carpathians an interesting campaign was being conducted
in Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina between Von Pfianzer-
Baltin and Lechitsky. There we left the Russians in possession
of Stanislawow, which they had reoccupied on March 4, 1915.
Two days before, an Austrian detachment of infantry and two
divisions of cavalry attempted a raid into Russian territory near
the Bessarabian frontier. Within forty-eight hours they were
hurled back. Beyond local skirmishes and maneuvering for
positions, nothing of importance happened from March 4 till the
15th, when the Russians attacked the main Austrian forces south-
east of Czernowitz. Crossing the River Pruth opposite Ludi-
horecza, which lies about 600 feet high, and where the Czerno-
witz waterworks are situated, the Russians occupied the place
and threatened the Austrian position in the town, around which
pressed laborers were digging trenches night and day for the
defenders. Along the line between Sadagora and Old Zuczka the
Russians had been settled for over six months. The Austrians
attacked this position on March 21, 1915, with the aid of reen-
forcements and compelled the Russians to evacuate Sadagora.
CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA 265
While falling back in the south the Russians endeavored to ad-
vance in the north, from the direction of Czemiavka, and out-
flank the Austrians. Violent fighting raged for several days,
especially northeast from Czemowitz to beyond Rarancze, with
the result that the Russians were compelled to withdraw toward
Bojan, near their own frontier, on March 27. Three days later
some Hungarian Honved battalions, who had penetrated into
Russian territory near Szylowce, were surrounded by Cossacks
and severely handled. Besides many killed and wounded the
Austrians lost over 1,000 prisoners, and by April 2, 1915, the
Russians had thrown the remainder back across their borders.
On April 10, 1915, the Russians withdrew from Boyan, but re-
turned on the 14th. Here, at the close of April, they concen-
trated large reenforcements and recovered most of the ground
they had lost since the middle of March.
Some twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, sheltered in a
loop of the Dniester, lies an important fortified town called
Zaleszczyki. It had a population of over 76,000, and is a station
on the branch line connecting Czortkow junction with the
Kolomca-Czemowitz railway. From the dense forests east of the
town an Austrian column commanded by Count von Bissingen
had attempted during the night of March 22-23, 1915, to turn
the adjacent Russian positions, held by Cossacks and Siberian
fusiliers. A furious fight developed, and the Austro-Hungarian
column, which included some of the finest troops, was repulsed
with heavy loss. Two other attempts were made here, on April
10 and 17, 1915. On the latter date a detachment of Tyrolese
sharpshooters were trapped in the wire entanglements and
^annihilated.
One more battle on a big scale remains to be chronicled from
the far eastern sector; it may also serve to illustrate the wide
[divergence that not infrequently exists between official com-
gnuniques recording the same event. Early in April, 1915, a
Russian force threw a bridge across the Dniester near the village
)f Filipkowu and moved along the road running from Uscie
[Biskupie via Okna and Kuczurmik on to Czemowitz, the inten-
tion being to turn the A"ai-Wan positions south of Zaleszczyki
266 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
from the rear. We will let the rival communiques relate what
happened :
Austrian Version Russian Version
Annihilated two battalions Annihilated two battalions
of Russian infantry belonging of the Honveds ; captured 21
to the Alexander Regiment; officers, over 1,000 rank and
took 1,400 prisoners, and file, and 8 machine guns,
drove Russians back beyond
the Dniester.
The curtain was about to rise for the next act, wherein will be
played one of the most terrific reversals of fortune ever produced
in military history.
For quite a month it had been an open secret that considerable
masses of German troops were being transported to the Car-
pathian front. What was not known, however, was the mag-
nitude or the plan of these preparations. Never was a greater
concentration of men and machinery more silently and more
speedily accomplished. All along the south of the range, on the
great Hungarian plains, there assembled a gigantic host of
numerous nationalities. But it was away to the west, in that
narrow bottle neck where the Dunajec flows from the Polish
frontier down to the Tarnow Pass, that the mighty thunderbolt
had been forged. Thousands of heavy guns were here planted in
position, and millions of shells conveyed thither under cover of
night. Countless trains carried war materials, tents, pontoons,
cattle, provisions, etc. Finally the troops arrived — from the
different fronts where they could be spared, and new levies from
Germany and Austria-Hungary. Smoothly and silently men
and machines dropped into their respective places: All was
ready; not a detail had been overlooked; German organization
had done its part. The commander was Von Mackensen, nomi-
nally Commander of the Eleventh German Army, but in reality
supreme director of the whole campaign.
During April, 1915, a number of changes had taken place
among the commanding officers of the Austro-German armies;
the new dispositions of groups along the battle line differ con-
CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA 267
siderably from those which obtained during the fighting for the
passes. The line was now enormously strengthened, and more
compact. This applies only to the Germanic side ; there is little
change on the Russian. At this stage the Russian front on the
west of Galicia extended from Opatovie on the Polish frontier
along the Dunajec, Biala, and Ropa Rivers by Tamow, Ciez-
kovice, and Gorlice down to Zboro in Hungary ; from here it runr
eastward past Sztropko, Krasnilbrod, Virava, and Nagy Polena
to the Uzsok Pass, a distance of about 120 miles. Ewarts com-
manded the army on the Nida ; the Dunajec-Biala line was still held
by Dmitrieff , Commander in Chief of the Eighth Russian Army ;
Brussilov still commanded the main army of the Carpathians,
and Lechitsky in the Bukowina in the place of Alexeieff, who
had succeeded General Russky in the northern group. The whole
southern group, from the Nida to the Sereth inclusive, was under
the supreme command of General Ivanoff . Facing Dmitrieff on
the Dunajec front stood now the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army
under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, about five army corps, in-
cluding a German cavalry division under General von Besser;
then the Ninth and Fourteenth Austrian Army Corps; to their
right, several Tyrolese regiments; the Sixth Austro-Hungarian
Army Corps of General Arz von Straussenburg, with the Prussian
Guards on his left and Bavarian troops under Von Emmich
on his right; the Eleventh German Army Corps under Von
Mackensen; the Third Austro-Hungarian Army under General
Boroyevitch von Bojna; the Tenth Army Corps under General
Martiny. This formidable combination now confronted the
Dunajec-Biala positions, which Dmitrieff had held without exer-
tion for four months. Only a mile or two away he still inspected
his trenches and conducted his minor operations, totally uncon-
scious of the brewing storm specially directed against him. The
Laborza district was held by the Archduke Joseph with the
Seventh Army Corps; on his left stood a German corps under
Von Marwitz, and on his right the Tenth Army Corps, north of
Bartfeld, with some additional forces in between. Around the
Lupkow and Uzsok passes the Second Austro-Hungarian Army
under Boehm-Ermolli was stationed where it had been since
268 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
February, 1915. Next, on the right, the Austro-Hungarian
army corps under Von Goglia ; in the Uzsok lay an army under
Von Szurmay, nearly all Magyars, of whom the chief commander
was Von Linsingen. Farther eastward stood a Prussian corps,
embodying a division of Prussian Guards and other regiments
commanded by General Bothmer, a Bavarian, who had been re-
enforced with a Hungarian division under Bartheldy; then fol-
lowed the corps of Generals Hofmann and Fleischman, composed
of all Austrian nationalities, intrenched in the mountain valleys.
More German troops held the next sector, and, finally, came Von
Pflanzer-Baltin's army groups in the Bukowina and Eastern
Galicia. Against this huge iron ring of at least twenty-four
Germanic corps (about 2,000,000 men) and a great store of re-
serves, the Russians could not muster more than about fourteen
of their own corps. As has already been pointed out, the great-
est disparity of strength existed on the Dunajec line, where
Dmitrieff stood opposed to about half of the enemy's entire force
with only five corps of Russian troops. The Austro-German
forces, moreover, were infinitely better equipped with munitions
and heavy artillery. The lack of big guns was undoubtedly the
reason why the Russians had not attempted an invasion of Hun-
gary. Hence they stuck to the mountain passes where their
opponents were unable to carry their artillery, although they
were amply supplied with the same. It is true that the Russians
could have produced an equal — or even greater — ^number of men,
but they had not the arms and accouterments.
Speaking from safe knowledge after the event, it is possible
to indicate with moderate accuracy at least one of the ingenious
stratagems adopted by the Germans to disguise their tremendous
preparations against the Dunajec line. For months the fighting
in this region had never been severe. When, therefore, local
attacks and counterattacks on a small scale started on the Biala,
as far back as April 4, 1915, Dmitrieff and his staff regarded this
activity on the Austrians part as merely a continuation of the
sporadic assaults they had grown accustomed to. Besides hold-
ing his own, Dmitrieff had on several occasions been able to
assist Brussilov on his left. Until the big German drive com-
CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA 269
menced they had only been opposed to three Austro-German
army corps and a Prussian division ; now there were twelve corps
on their front, supplied with enormous resources of artillery,
shells, and cavalry. Most serious of all, Dmitrieff had neglected
to construct second and third lines to which he could retire in an
emergency. Of the rivers that lay behind him — ^the Wisloka, the
Wistok, and the San — ^the first would be useful to cover Brus-
silov's position at the western passes, but beyond that he could
not retreat without imperiling the whole Carpathian right flank.
It was on this very calculation that the German plan— ^simple but
effective — was based. The Russian grip on the Carpathians
could only be released either by forcing a clear road through
any pass into Galicia, or by turning one of the extreme flanks.
Had the Austrians succeeded in breaking through as far as
Jaslo, Dmitrieff would have been cut off and Brussilov forced to
withdraw — followed by the whole line. The same result would
follow if a thrust from the Bukowina succeeded in recapturing
Lemberg. Both methods had been attempted, and both had
failed. Germany's overwhelming superiority in artillery could
not be effectively displayed in mountain warfare, but Dmitrieff's
position on the Dunajec offered an easy avenue of approach.
At the eleventh hour Dmitrieff grasped the situation and
applied to Ivanoff for reenforcements. Owing to some blunder
the appeal never reached the Russian chief, and Dmitrieff had to
do the best he could. Nothing now could save his small force
from those grim lines of gaping muzzles turned against his
positions. The overture began on April 28, 1915, with an ad-
vance on the Upper Biala toward Gorlice, by Von Mackensen's
right. Here some minor attacks had been previously made, and
the gradually increasing pressure did not at first reveal the in-
tent or magnitude of the movement behind it. Meanwhile the
German troops about Ciezkovice and Senkova — respectively
northwest and southeast of Gorlice — were moving by night
nearer to the battle line. The Russian front line extended from
Ciezkovice in a southeasterly direction. Hence it soon became
clear that Gorlice itself was to be the main objective of the attack.
A Russian official announcement of May 2, 1915, boldly states:
270 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"During the nights of April 30 to May 1 strong Austrian forces
opened an offensive in the region of Ciezkovice. Our fire forced
the enemy to intrench 600 paces in front of our trenches."
Furthermore, the Germans at the same time had directed artillery
fire and bayonet attacks against various points on the Rava,
Pilica, Nida, and the Dunajec. These, however, were merely
movements aiming at diversion, meant to mask the intentions of
the main attack and to mislead the Russians. On the evening of
May 1, 1915, the German batteries began experimenting against
the Russian positions. This was kept up all night while the
engineers attempted to destroy the first line of the Russian wire
entanglements. During the same night the Austrians dragged
several heavy howitzers across the road from Gladyszow to
Malastow, and got them into position without the knowledge of
the Russians. In the morning of May 2, 1915, the great batteries
began to roar against the Russian line — a fire such as had per-
haps never been witnessed before. A spectator thus describes
the scene : "In one part the whole area was covered with shells
till trenches and men were leveled out of existence." It was re-
ported that 700,000 shells had been fired in the space of four
hours, for which period this preliminary bombardment lasted.
The Russian line was turned into a spluttering chaos of earth,
stones, trees, and human bodies. The German and Austrian
batteries then proceeded to extend the range, and poured a hur-
ricane of shells behind the enemy's front line. This has the
effect of doubly isolating that line, by which the survivors of the
first bombardment cannot retreat, neither can reenforcements
be sent to them, for no living being could pass through the fire
curtain. Now is the time for the attacker's infantry to charge.
Along the greater part of the Ciezkovice- Walastow line this stage
was reached by ten o'clock in the morning of May 2, 1915.
A German writer tells us that "in this part of the front in-
fantry fighting has given place for the time being to the action
of our heavy artillery, which is subjecting to a terrible fire the
positions of the enemy. These positions had been carefully re-
connoitered during the lull in the fighting which prevailed dur-
ing the last few months. Only after all cover is destroyed, the
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CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA 271
enemy's infantry killed or forced to retire, we take up the attack
against the positions; the elan of our first attack now usually
leads to a favorable result."
At Ciezkovice the Germans pushed bridges across the Biala
under cover of a furious cannonade. Troops were thrown over,
and after a very short struggle the village was taken. The huge
oil tanks soon were in flames and Ciezkovice a heap of smolder-
ing ruins. The Russian defense crumpled up like smoke; their
position blown out of existence. Their guns were toys compared
with those of the Germans and Austrians. North of Ciezkovice
the Prussian Guard and other German troops under General von
Francois fell upon the Russians and forced them to retire toward
the Olpiny-Biecz line. The ground of the Russian positions on
Mount Viatrovka and Mount Pustki in front of Biecz had been
"prepared" by 21-centimeter (7-inch) Krupp howitzers and the
giant Austrian 30.5-centimeter (10-inch) howitzers from the
Skoda-Werke at Pilsen. The shells of the latter weigh nearly
half a ton, and their impact is so terrific that they throw the
earth up 100 feet high. Whatever had remained of the town of
Gorlice in the shape of buildings or human beings was mean-
while being wiped out by a merciless spray of shells. Being the
center of an important oil district, Gorlice possessed oil wells,
great refineries, and a suphuric-acid factory. As the flames
spread from building to building, streets pouring with burning
oil, huge columns of fire stretching heavenward from the oil
wells in full blaze, and, over all, the pitiless hail of iron and ex-
plosives pouring upon them, the horror of the situation in which
the soldiers and civilians found themselves may be faintly
imagined. Gorlice was an inferno in a few hours. When the
German infantry dashed into the town they found the Russians
still in possession. Fighting hand to hand, contesting every step,
the Russians were slowly driven out.
We have mentioned that German troops were moving on
Senkova, southeast of Gorlice, by night. During the last two
days of April the Bavarians captured the Russian position in the
Senkova valley. A further move was made here during the
night of May 1-2, 1915, preparatory to dislodging the Russians
18— War St. 3
272 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
from the ground they still held. At seven o^clock in the morning
the big howitzers started to "prepare" that ground. By ten
o'clock it was deemed that every living thing had perished, when
the "fire curtain" was drawn behind the Russian position.
Infantry were then thrown forward — some Bavarian regiments.
To their intense astonishment they were received with a most
murderous fire from Russian rifles, and machine guns. The first
attack failed and many were killed, few getting beyond the wire
entanglements. Cautiously other troops advanced to the battered
Russian trenches cut off from the rear by the artillery screen
behind. Yet here again they met with strenuous resistance
in the Zamczysko group of hills. The Austrian artillery shelled
the heights, and the Bavarians finally took possession. The
Tenth Austrian Army Corps had meanwhile conquered the
Magora of Malastow and the majority of the heights in the Ostra
Gora group. On Sunday, May 2, 1915, the Austro-German
armies pierced the Dunajec-Biala line in several places, and by
nightfall the Russians were retreating to their last hope — ^the
line of the Wisloka. The operations round Gorlice on that day
resulted in breaking the Russian defenses to a depth of over
two miles on a front of ten or eleven miles. Mr. Stanley Wash-
burn wrote from the battle field at the time: "The Germans
had shot their last bolt, a bolt forged from every resource in
men and munitions that they could muster after months of prep-
aration." Of the Russian army he said, "it was outclassed
in everything except bravery, and neither the German nor any
other army can claim superiority in that respect."
With the center literally cut away, the keystone of the Rus
sian line had been pulled out, and nothing remained but to
retire. Ten miles north of Ciezkovice lies the triangle formed
by the confluence of the Dunajec and Biala rivers and the Zak-
liczyn-Gromnik road. Within this triangle, commanding the
banks of both rivers up to the Cracow-Tarnow line, the Rus-
sians held the three hills marked 402, 419, and 269 which figures
express their height in meters.
During February and March, 1915, the Austrians attempted
to dislodge the enemy, but without success. It was now neces-
CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA 273
sary to take those positions before advance could be made against
Tamow, and the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army, commanded
by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, undertook the task. At six
A. M. on May 2 the Austrian artillery opened fire against Hill
419 from Mount Val (also within the triangle) , and the opposite
bank of the Dunajec. After three hours' bombardment some
regiments of Tyrolese fusiliers, who had crossed the valley
between Mt. Val and 419 and had taken up positions at the foot
of the latter, about 400 yards from the Russian trenches, were
ordered to charge. Dashing up the open, steep slope the fusiliers
were suddenly enfiladed from their right by a spray of machine
gun and rifle fire, killing many and driving back the survivors.
Next day Hill 419 was again fiercely shelled, this time with
deadly effectiveness; but even then the Russians still clung to
their battered ground.
The Austrians now charged the trenches on Hill 412, whence
the fusiliers had been ambushed the previous day. A desperate
hand-to-hand encounter, in which they had to force their way
step by step, finally gave the position to the attackers. The few
Russians still left on 419 could not hold out after the loss of
412. They retired northward on to Height 269, but subsequently
followed the general retreat of the line. Still farther north,
almost at the right flank of Dmitrieff' s line, the Austrians
effected a crossing of the Dunajec opposite Otfinow, thus break-
ing the connection between the West Galician Army of Dmitrieff ,
and the neighboring Russian Army on the Nida — ^the left wing
of the northern groups commanded by Alexeieff .
Just below Tarnow, however, the Russians still held out;
losing the three hills had not quite broken their defense on the
Biala. The right wing of Von Mackensen*s army, which had
smashed the Russian front around Gorlice, rapidly moved east
in an almost straight line to reach the Dukla Pass and cut off
the retreat of the Russian troops stationed south of the range
between Zboro and Nagy Polena, in northwest Hungary. The
left wing, on the other hand, advanced in a northeasterly
direction, ever widening the breach made in the enemy's domain.
This clever move brought the Germans to the rear of Tamow
274 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
and onto the lines of communications of the Russians holding
it. It also prevented reenf orcements from reaching the truncated
end of Dmitrieff's right — or what had been his right — wing.
By pushing on to Dembica and Rzeszow, along which route
assistance could otherwise have been sent to the Russians, Von
Mackensen opened a wide triangle into Western Galicia, by
drawing an almost horizontal line from Gorlice to Radjrmno, be-
tween Jaroslav and Przemysl, and from there perpendicular
down to the Uzsok Pass.
From Uzsok to the Lupkow westward stood the Second Austro-
Hungarian Army under Boehm-Ermolli on the north of the Car-
pathians. To his left, southwest of the Magora of Malastow,
and adjoining the formidable Germanic array facing the
Dunajec-Biala line lay the Third Austro-Hungarian Army under
General Boroyevitch von Bojna. These two armies, it will be
l-emembered, took part in the first offensive in January, and had
been there ever since. Both of these armies now began to
advance into the triangle, and the brilliant simplicity of Von
Mackensen's geometrical strategy becomes clear. Let one
imagine Galicia as a big stone jar with a narrow neck lying on
the table before him, neck pointing toward the left hand, and
he will obtain an approximately accurate idea of the topographi-
cal conditions. That side of the jar resting on the table repre-
sents the Carpathian range, solid indeed, but with numerous
openings: these are the passes. The upper side of the jar
represents the Russian frontier, across which the invaders had
swarmed in and taken possession of the whole inside, lining
themselves right along the mouths of the passes at the bottom
and across the neck upwards.
For months the Austrians vainly endeavored to force an en-
trance through the thickest walls — from the lower edge, and
from the base or bottom of the jar (the Bukowina) , apparently
overlooking the rather obvious proposition that the cork was
the softest part and that was Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala line.
Here at least no mountain range stood in the way. It may
also be regarded as a mathematical axiom that, given sufficient
artillery power, the strongest defense the wit of man could
CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA 275
devise can be smashed. What Mackensen did, therefore, was
to blow a hole through the cork, push in a pair of scissors up to
the rivet, meanwhile opening the blades to an angle of about
forty-five degrees. From the lower or southern shoulder of the
jar the Third Austro-Hungarian Army pushes forward inside,
supported on its right by Boehm-Ermolli, who had been just
inside a long time, but could get no farther. They began to
shepherd the Russian troops around and in the western passes
toward the lower double-edged blade of Von Mackensen's terrible
scissors. The Russian retreat to the Wisloka was a serious
disaster for Dmitrieff ; he had been caught napping, and had to
pay dearly in men and guns for not having created a row of
alternative positions. His force had been a cover for Brussi-
lov's operations on both sides of the western passes as well as
for the whole Russian line in the Carpathians. Now that Von
Mackensen had pried the lid off, Brussilov's men in the south
encountered enormous difficulties in extricating themselves from
the Carpathian foothills, suddenly transformed from compara-
tive strongholds into death-traps and no longer tenable. They
suffered severely, especially the Forty-eighth Division.
Besides the menace from the northwest of Von Mackensen's
swiftly approaching right, a third blade was gradually growing
on the deadly scissors, in the shape of Boehm-Ermolli's and Von
Bojna's forces, threatening to grind them between two relentless
jaws of steel. It is Sunday, the second day of May, 1915; to
all intents and purposes the battle of the Dunajec, as such, was
over, and the initial aim of the Germanic offensive has been
attained. The Russian line was pierced and its defense shat-
tered. Von Mackensen's "Phalanx" was advancing two mighty
tentacles guided by a master mind, remorselessly probing for
the enemy's strongest points. Its formation comprised, in the
northeastern tentacle, the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army
orps and the Prussian Guards ; in the southern, the Bavarians
der Von Emmich and the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army
Corps under General Martiny.
On May 3, 1915, Dmitrieff's troops were falling back farther
every hour, continuously fighting rear-guard actions and com-
^^^n
276 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
pelling the pursuers to conquer every foot of ground. There
was a powerful reason for this stubborn retirement: it was to
gain time for Brussilov to get his men out of their perilous
positions and to join the main line again with Dmitrieff's reced-
ing ranks. If this could be effected, the fatal gap between them
— ^made by Von Mackensen's battering-ram — would be repaired,
and they could once more present a united front to the enemy.
It was mentioned a little farther back that the Austrians had
pierced the Dunajec line at Otfinow, north of Tamow, by which
was cut in two the hitherto unbroken Russian battle front, from
the Baltic to the Rumanian frontier (900 miles) ; the "scissors" at
Gorlice had made it three; if Boehm-Ermolli's drive from the
Uzsok upward along the "triangle line" to Jaroslav succeeds, there
will be four separate pieces of Russian front. But from Tamow
southward to Tuchow, a small twenty-mile salient on the Biala,
the Russians are still in possession on May 4, 1915, defying the
Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army.
CHAPTER XLI
RUSSIAN RETREAT
TT is a matter for speculation whether the numerous successes
J- achieved by the Russians against the Austrians and Germans in
Galicia and the Carpathians during the first seven months of
the war had begotten a spirit of overconfidence among the Rus-
sian commanders, or whether it was not in their power to have
made more effective preparations than they had done. We have
seen that Dmitrieff had not provided himself with those neces-
sary safety exits which were now so badly needed. As no
artificially prepared defenses were at hand, natural ones had
to be found. The first defense was irretrievably lost ; the second
line was a vague, undefined terrain extending across the hills
between Biala in the west and the River Wisloka in the east.
Between Tuchow and Olpiny, the Mountain Dobrotyn formed one
RUSSIAN RETREAT 277
of the chief defensive positions, being 1,800 feet high and thickly
covered with woods.
Southward, the Lipie Mountain, about 1,400 feet, formed an-
other strong point. Just below Biecz, close to the road and rail-
road leading to Gorlice, a mountain of 1,225 feet, called Wilszak,
is the strategical key to the valley of the lower Ropa. Between
Biecz and Bednarka, the line of defense followed the heights of
the Kobylanka, Tatarovka, Lysa Gora, and of the Rekaw ; hence
to the east, as the last defense of the Jaslo-Zmigrod road, lay
the intrenched positions on the Ostra Gora, well within Brussi-
lov's sector. Southward of the Gorlice-Zmigrod line lay the
mountain group of the Valkova, nearly 2,800 feet high, the
last defense of the line of retreat for the Russian forces from
Zboro.
The Wisloka was the third line of defense, only a river, and
without intrenchments. From Dembica to Zihigrod it runs
roughly parallel with the Dunajec-Biala line ; its winding course
separates it in places from fifteen to thirty-five miles from the
latter river. Strong hopes were entertained that the Russians
would be able to stem the Germanic torrent by a firm stand on
the Wisloka.
A fierce battle raged on the third and fourth of May, 1915, for
the possession of the wooded hills between the Biala and the
Wisloka. The Prussian Guard stormed Lipie Mountain and cap-
tured it on the third ; on the fourth they took Olpiny, Szczerzyny
and the neighboring hills at the point of the bayonet.
The Thirty-ninth Hungarian Division, now incorporated in
the Eleventh German Army under the direct command of Von
Mackensen himself, had advanced from Grybow via Gorlice on
the Biecz railway line, and were making a strong attack on the
Russian positions on Wilczak Mountain with a tremendous con-
centration of artillery. It seems the Russians simply refused
to be blown out of their trenches, for it required seven separate
attacks to drive them out. That accomplished, the fate of Biecz
was decided and the road to Jaslo — ^the "key" to the Wisloka
line of defense — ^was practically open to General Arz von Straus-
senburg. Lying at the head of the main roads leading into Hun-
278 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
gary through the Tilicz, Dukla, and Lupkow passes, Jaslo is the
most important railway junction in the whole region between
Tamow and Przemysl. It was at Jaslo that Dmitrieff had held
his headquarters for four months.
Just south of him, barely fifteen miles away, General von
Emmich and General Martiny, with the "Bayonet Bavarians''
and the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, went pounding
and slashing a passage along the Bednarka-Zmigrod road and
the auxiliary road from Malastow to Krempna. They were
striving hard to reach the western passes before Brussilov
had time to withdraw. He began that operation on the fourth.
On the same night Von Emmich and Martiny reached Krempna,
and the last line of retreat for the Russians around Zboro was
imperiled. They have yet to cross the range from Hungary back
into Galicia. So subtly potent and effective was the pressure
on a flank that the whole line — ^be it hundreds of miles long — is
more or less influenced thereby, as witness :
On the same night. May 4, 1915, the retreat spread
like a contagion to the entire west Galician front, compel-
ling the Russians to evacuate northern Hungary up to the
Lupkow Pass; in that pass itself preparations are afoot to
abandon the hard-earned position. It is not fear, nor the pre-
caution of cowardice that prompted this wholesale removal of
fighting men : the inexorable laws of geometry demanded it. The
enemy was at Krempna; as the crow flies the distance from
Krempna to the northern debouchment of Lupkow is eighty
miles; yet Lupkow was threatened, for the "line" or "front" is
pierced — the vital artery of the defense is severed. The strength
of a chain is precisely that of its weakest link.
The course of events become complex ; fighting, advancing and
retreating occurred over a widespread area. Apparently dis-
connected movements by the Austro-Germans or the Russians
fall into their proper places in accordance with the general
scheme or objective either side may have in view. It is necessary
to follow the scattered operations separately. We will therefore
return now to the Tamow-Tucho sector, where we left a small
Russian force holding the last remnant of the Dunajec-Biala
RUSSIAN RETREAT
279
fjtf"noo
280 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
front. Tamow had been the supply base for that front, and
great stores of provisions and munitions still remained in the
town. These the Russians succeeded in removing entirely. The
main forces had already withdrawn in perfect order and fallen
back beyond the Wisloka. During the night of May 4-5, 1915,
two regiments of the Ninth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps
crossed the Biala near Tuchow and moved northward in the
direction of the road leading from Tamow to Pilzno, along
which the remainder of the garrison would have to pass in
order to retreat. On the hills west of Pilzno the Russians still
held a position to protect that road. By the morning of the
sixth everjrthing had gone eastward, and the Austrians had
surrounded the town.
The small cavalry detachment that had been left behind as rear
guard cut through the Austrian lines and rejoined the main
forces on the Wisloka. The Austrians had been bombarding
Tarno for months with their heaviest artillery, destroying parts
of the cathedral and the famous old town hall in the process.
On May 7 the Russians withdrew from the Pilzno district,
and the Dunajec-Biala Russian front had ceased to exist. From
the hour that the Austro-Germans had broken through the line at
Ciezkovice, on May 2, 1915, the Russian retreat on the Wisloka
had begun. Yielding to the terrible pressure the line had increas-
ingly lost its shape as the various component parts fell back,
though it gradually resumed the form of a front on the
Wisloka banks, where most determined fighting continued for
five days.
The Russians lost much of their artillery ; they had to reverse
the customary military practice of an army in retreat. If the
retreating army is well equipped with artillery and munitions,
its guns cover the retreat and are sacrificed to save the men.
During their retreat the Russians had often to sacrifice men in
order to save their guns for a coming greater battle at some
more important strategic point. Many prisoners fell to the Ger-
manic armies; according to their own official reports they took
80,000 in the fighting of May 2-4, 1915. What the Austro-Ger-
man side lost in that time was not made public.
AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST 281
CHAPTER XLII
AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST OP
WESTERN GALICIA
BY the time the retreating Russians had reached the Wisloka
they had to some extent recovered from the first shock of
surprise, and were better able to attempt a determined stand
against the overwhelming onrush of the Austro-Germanic troops.
Ivanoff hurriedly sent reenforcements for Dmitrieff and Ewarts
which included the Caucasian Corps of General Irmanoff from
the Bzura front. The heavy German guns belched forth with
terrible effect, and the Russians could not reply at the same
weight or distance. Bayonets against artillery means giving
odds away, but the attempt was made. With a savage fury that
seems to belong only to Slavs and Mohammedans — fatalists —
the Russians hurled themselves against the powerful batteries
and got to close quarters with the enemy. For nearly twenty
minutes a wild, surging sea of clashing steel — bayonets, swords,
lances and Circassian daggers — ^wielded by fiery mountaineers
and steady, cool, well-disciplined Teutons, roared and flowed
around the big guns, which towered over the lashing waves
like islands in a stormy ocean. A railway collision would seem
mild compared with the impact of 18,000 desperate armed men
against a much greater number of equally desperate and equally
brave, highly-trained fighters. But machinery, numbers and
skillful tactics will overcome mere physical courage. The Rus-
sian avalanche was thrown back with terrific slaughter; the
Caucasian Corps alone lost over 10,000 men, for which, it is
estimated, they killed and wounded quite as many. More re-
markable still was the fact that they captured a big battery and
carried off 7,000 prisoners. For five days the storm raged back-
ward and forward across the river; during the more violent
bombardments the Russians left their trenches to be battered
out of shape and withdrew l»to their shelter dugouts ; when the
enemy infantry advanced to take possession, the Russians had
282 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
returned to face the charge. Whereas cool, machinelike pre*
cision marks the German soldier in battle as on the parade
ground, an imperturbable obstinacy and total disregard of
mortal danger characterizes the Russian.
During the night of May 6-7, 1915, the Austrians sent two
regiments across the Wisloka, north and south of Brzoctek,
about midway between Pilzno and Jaslo, under cover of artillery
posted on a 400-foot hill near Przeczyca on the opposite bank,
i.e., the left. Austrian engineers constructed a bridge across the
river, and on the morning of May 7 the Austrian advance guard
were in possession of the hills north of the town. Infantry
were then thrown across to storm Brzostek. Here, again, they
met with resolute opposition from the Russian rear guards cov-
ering the retreat of the main armies, which had already fallen
back from the Wisloka. Desperate bayonet fighting ensued in
the streets, each of which had to be cleared separately to dis-
lodge the Russians — ^the civilians meanwhile looking out of their
windows watching the animated scenes below. Hungarian troops
in overwhelming masses poured across the river and finally cap-
tured the town. Once more on the backward move, the Russians
established themselves along the western and southern fringe
of the forests by Januszkovice, only eight miles away, and pre-
pared to make another stand. More fighting occurred here, and
during May 7 and 8, 1915, the Russians fell back farther to-
ward Frysztak, on the river Wistok.
We left Von Emmich and General Martiny with the Bavarians
and the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps on their arrival
at Krempna on the night of the 4th, during which time the
Russians were making desperate efforts to evacuate northern
Hungary and the western passes. The main forces of Von Mac-
kensen's "phalanx" were meanwhile pushing on toward Jaslo,
still in Russian possession. On the hills west of the Wisloka the
Russian rear guards had intrenched themselves and held their
positions till nightfall on May 5, 1915, all with the object of
delaying the Germanic advance sufficiently for their comrades
to clear the passes. Then they fell back again and made a
stand near Tarnoviec, about six or seven miles east of Jaslo,
AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST 283
where they dominated an important strategic position. Between
them and Jaslo two railways ran along the valley of the River
Jasliska, forming a serious obstacle to Von Mackensen's advance
so long as the Russians could hold it. It was imperative that
they should be cleared out, but the task of carrying it through
was a difficult one. The undertaking fell to the Hungarian
troops of the Thirty-ninth Honved Division, who advanced to the
attack again and again only to be driven back each time by the
Russian fire from the heights. Big howitzers were called into
play and soon demolished the positions.
The Russians retired east of the Wistok, followed by Von
Mackensen's Austro-Hungarian corps, while the Prussian Guards
moved on toward Frysztak, where the Russian troops from the
Tarnow sector had taken up positions after the retreat from
Brzostek.
On May 7, 1915, the Prussian Guards had passed over the rail-
way at Krosno, and at night fell upon the Russian lines east of
the Wistok. Particularly fierce encounters took place near Odrzy-
kon and Korczina, ten to fourteen miles southeast of Frysztak.
A little farther westward Von Mackensen delivered his main
attack against the railway crossing at Jaslo, which fell on the
same day. May 7. The Russians retreated in confusion with
Von Mackensen close upon their heejs. The whole defense on
the Wisloka collapsed, and nothing apparently could now save
the Dukla and those troops struggling through to escape from
the net that was gradually being tightened around them. Mean-
while, General Ewarts's Army of the Nida, which formed the con-
necting link between the Russian northern and southern armies,
had fallen back above Tarnow to the River Czarna in order to
Keep in touch and conformity with Dmitrieff' s shrinking line,
which was now actually broken by the Wisloka failure. The
Russian position was extremely critical, for it seemed that the
German general would roll up the two halves and thereby inflict
a crushing and decisive defeat. General Ivanoff appears to have
recognized Von Mackensen's intentions in time to devise measures
to counteract the peril and save his left (Brussilov's army) from
disaster. By pushing forward strong columns from Sanok on
284 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Upper San to impose a temporary check upon the advancing
tide, he gained a brief respite for the troops entangled in the
passes. To that sector we will now turn to review the course of
events.
On May 4, 1915, the Russians began to evacuate the positions
they held south of the range when Von Mackensen's extreme
right approached Krempna. Forging along at high speed the
Germans and Austrians occupied the towns of Dukla and Tylava,
and arrived at Rymanow — still farther east — on the following
day. The town of Dukla lies some fifteen miles due north of the
Galician debouchment of the pass of that name, and Rymanow
is about another fifteen miles east of that. Hence the German
strategic plan was to draw a barrier line across the north
of the Carpathians and hem the Russians in between that
barrier and the Austro-Hungarian armies of Boehm-Ermolli and
Von Bojna. It must distinctly be borne in mind that these two
forces are also north of the passes : that of Von Bojna being sta-
tioned at the elbow where the Germanic line turned from the
Carpathians almost due north along the Dunajec-Biala front, or
across the neck of our hypothetical jar. The Dukla and Lupkow
passes were still in Russian hands ; these were the only two thal^
the Germanic offensives of January, February, and March, 1915,
had failed to capture ; all the others, from Rostoki eastward, were
held by the Austrians and Germans. It was through the Dukla
and Lupkow that the Russians obtained their foothold in north-
ern Hungary, and it was the only way open to them now to get
back again. Around the Laborcza district stood the Seventh
Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under the command of the Arch-
duke Joseph, who now began to harass them, aided by the Ger-
man "Beskid Corps" under General von Marwitz. This was the
only section in the range where the Russians held both sides.
Boehm-Ermolli had forced the Rostoki and Uzsok, but hitherto
had been unable to get very far from their northern exits — ^not
beyond Baligrod. During the fighting on the Dunajec these three
armies merely marked time ; it was their object to keep the Rus-
sians in Hungary and in the two passes until Von Mackensen
had thrown the right of his "phalanx" across their only avenue
AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST 285
of escape. That time was now rapidly approaching, and Von
Bojna was gradually squeezing Brussilov from the west, while
Boehm-Ermolli was following from the east and south. It ap-
pears that the commanders of the Twelfth Russian Army Corps
and the Third Russian Army, which stood on Hungarian soil
from Zboro to Nagy Polena, did not grasp the full significance to
them of the Dunajec catastrophe.
Germanic troops were building a wall against their exits be-
fore they had seriously thought of withdrawing. Escape was
impossible for many of them; some had managed to get across
the Dukla in time, while those left behind would either have tc
surrender or fight their way through the lines across their path
in the north. At the same time they would have Von Bojna and
Boehm-Ermolli on their tracks. To make matters worse, they
were also being pressed severely from the Hungarian plains by
the troops which hitherto stood inactive. The Second Austro-
Hungarian Army (Boehm-Ermolli) was fighting on both sides
of the range. Through Rostoki they attempted to separate the
Russians around Zboro from those situated farther east at Nagy
Polena. We have stated elsewhere that the Forty-eighth Divi-
sion was severely handled. They were surrounded in the Dukla
by an overwhelming superior force, but General Komiloff, the
commander, with a desperate effort and no little skill, succeeded
in hacking his way through the enemy's lines and bringing a
large portion of his force safely out of the trap. Inch by inch
the Russian rear guards retreated, fighting tooth and nail to
hold the pass while their comrades escaped. No less brave were
the repeated charges made by the Austrians — clambering over
rocks, around narrow pathways hanging high in the air, dizzy
precipices and mountain torrents underneath. On Varentyzow
Mountain, especially, a fierce hand-to-hand battle was fought
between Hungarians and Cossacks, the latter finally withdraw-
ing in perfect order. To conduct a successful retreat in the face
of disaster is a no less difficult military achievement than the
gaining of a decisive victory, and Brussilov's retreat from the
passes deserves to rank as a masterly example of skillful tactics.
On May 8, 1915, the Third Russian Army and the Forty-eighth
286 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Division had reunited with Brussilov's main army in the neigh-
borhood of Sanok, twenty miles north of the Lupkow. When the
commanders of a retreating army lose their heads the rank and
file will inevitably become demoralized and panic-stricken. The
retreat became a rout, and the possibility of making a stand, and
to some extent retrieving the lost fortune of war, was extremely
remote. A deeper motive than the mere reconquering of Galicia
lay behind Von Mackensen's plan — ^he aimed at nothing less than
the complete overthrow and destruction of the Russian armies.
It was a gigantic effort of the Germanic powers to eliminate at
least one of their most dangerous enemies. Once that was accom-
plished it would release some millions of troops whose services
were needed in the western theatre of war. The original plan
had fallen through of crushing Russia quickly at the beginning
of the war, before she would have had time to get ready, and
then to turn against France in full force. The Austro-German
Galician campaign was planned and undertaken with that specific
object, and now, although defeated and in full retreat, the Rus-
sian troops still formed an army in being, and not a fugitive,
defenseless rabble. So long as an army is not captured or
annihilated, it can be reorganized and again put in the field. It
is on this consideration that so much importance attaches to the
handling of an army in retreat. The Russians did not, of course,
run away; on the contrary, they fought desperately and stub-
bornly throughout the retreat, for their pursuers did not average
more than six miles per day — a fact which testifies to the steady
and orderly character of the Russian retirement. They suffered
from the consequences of inadequate preparation and lack of
foresight on the part of their leaders.
The Russian troops on the Lower Wisloka held their positions
longest, but they also fell back about May 8, 1915, and for the
next two days enlgaged the enemy near some villages southwest
of Sanok. Here a strong force had collected, which not only
offered a powerful resistance, but even attempted a counter-
attack against their pursuers. Over a front of 145 miles, ex-
tending from Szczucin near the Vistula north of Tamow, down
almost to the Uzsok Pass, a fierce battle progressed between
Ik
AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST 287
May 8 and 10, 1915. In the region of Frysztak, where the Rus-
sian line was weakest, the main German offensive was develop-
ing its strongest attack. Reenforcements were on the way, but
could not arrive in time. For the moment disaster was averted
by an aggressive Russian counteroffensive halfway between
Krosno and Sanok, from the Besko-Jacmierz front, by which
move sufficient time was gained to enable the main forces to
retreat. The Russian defense in the Vistok Valley collapsed on
May 10, 1915; the German center had almost arrived within
striking distance of the important railway line from Tamow via
Dembica and Rzeszow to Jaroslav north of Przemysl. At Sanok
the battered remnants of the Russian troops who had escaped
from the passes maintained themselves with the greatest diffi-
culty. Heavy German artillery followed the Bavarians to
Rymanow, five miles from the Russian line at Besko, and were
now playing fiercely upon the positions west of Sanok. The
Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps as well as the Seventh
were making their presence felt from the southwest against
Odrzechova and from the south, whence Von Marwitz with the
German Beskid Corps was rapidly advancing. To the southeast,
Boehm-Ermolli was battering the Baligrod-Lutoviska front,
almost in the same position he occupied at the end of January
in the first attempt to relieve Przemysl.
The battle was practically over by the night of May 10, 1915 ;
the Russians could hold out no longer against the ever-increasing
flood of Austrians and Germans pouring across every road and
pathway against their doomed line. Blasted and scorched by
artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire; standing against incessant
bayonet and cavalry charges; harassed by the Austrians from
the south, the Russians were indeed in sore straits. Yet they had
fought well; in the losing game they were playing they were
exhausting their enemies as well as themselves in men and
munitions — factors which are bound to tell in a long, drawn-out
war. Above all, they still remained an army : they had not yet
found their Sedan. No alternative lay before them — or rather
behind them — other than retreat to the next possible line of
defense — toward Przemysl.
19— War St. 3
288 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Between May 11-12, 1915, the Germanic troops occupied the
districts of Sendziszow, Rzeszow, Dynow, Sanok, Lisko, Lancut,
and Dubiecko. Przevorsk was deserted by the Russians on the
13th. The Seventh Russian Railway BattaUon, under Captain
Ratloff, brought up the rear of the retreat to the Dembica-Jaro-
slav Hne. From Rzeszow onward this battahon were employed
in destroying stations, plants, tunnels, culverts, rolling stock, and
railway bridges, to hamper as much as possible the German ad-
vance. It took the Austro-Hungarian engineers between two
and three weeks to repair the road and put it into sufficient work-
ing order to transport their heavy siege artillery. With unin-
terrupted labor and the most strenuous exertions they could only
reconstruct about four miles per day. Repairs and renovations
other than those of the railway system were necessary. The
wounded had to be sent back to hospital, and fresh troops had to
be brought up to fill the gaps torn in the Austro-German ranks
during all the severe fighting since May 2, 1915. It is not known
exactly what the series of victories cost the Germanic armies in
casualties, but it is known that their successes were dearly bought.
One fairly competent authority places the loss at between 120,000
to 130,000. From May 2 to May 12, 1915, the forces of Von Mac-
kensen, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and Boroyevitch von
Boyna claim to have captured 103,500 men, 69 guns, and 255
machine guns. A retreating army must inevitably lose many of
their number as prisoners, besides their wounded must also be
abandoned. Furthermore, the Russian line of retreat led through
rough and mountainous country, where large bodies of troops
could not be kept in touch with each other. Thus it frequently
happened that isolated detachments were captured en bloc with-
out being able to offer any resistance. In the neighborhood of
Sanok and the watering places of Rymanow and Ivonicz some
of the biggest Russian base hospitals were situated. These, of
course, could not have been evacuated in time, and the patients
consequently swelled the number of prisoners. Most of the guns
captured by the Austro-Germans were those of the Russian troops
whose retreat from northern Hungary and the passes had been
intercepted.
CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA 289
They often sacrificed large bodies of troops to save their guns.
The lack of artillery was the main cause of their defeat; what
little they could save from the wreck was therefore husbanded
with jealous care. The German staff accurately calculated on the
preponderance of heavy artillery, and that Russia would be com-
pelled to bow low before the superior blast of cannon fire.
Though it involved the sacrifice of many miles of territory, it
was now the Russian object to draw the enemy's line out to the
fullest extent. After the retreat from the Wistok the Russian
Generalissimo, Grand Duke Nicholas, was concerned only to save
the most for his country at the greatest expense to her enemies.
It meant continual retreat on a gigantic scale. Przemysl, cap-
tured ten weeks ago, lay behind Ivanoff 's line, and Lemberg was
but sixty miles beyond. Two hundred miles northward the Ger-
mans were hammering at the gates of Warsaw. A retreat such
as the grand duke contemplated might involve the loss of all
three of these places, but it would stretch the Germanic lines
enormously and enable the Allies in the west to strike with better
effect. No territorial considerations must stand in the way
against the safety of the Russian armies. It was the same policy
that had crippled Napoleon in 1812.
CHAPTER XLIII
CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA AND
THE BUKO WINA
N order to keep the narrative abreast of the steadily advanc-
ing Austro-German line, we must change occasionally from
me sector to another to watch the progress of operations over
le huge battle field. In accordance with the details laid down
in the great strategic plan, each of the different Germanic forces
had a distinct task to perform. Turning then to eastern Galicia
and the Bukowina, we find that on May 1, 1915, the Austro-
Hungarian and Russian armies were facing each other along
290 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
almost the same front where we left them in the middle of March.
That front extended to the north of Nadvoma and Kolomea, by
Ottynia across to Niczviska on the Dniester, and from there east-
ward along the river toward Chotin on the Russian frontier of
Bessarabia.
By the beginning of May, 1915, the spring floods had subsided,
when operations became again possible. General Lechitsky, on
the Russian side, probably aimed at recovering the Pruth Valley,
while the Austrian commander. General von Pflanzer-Baltin,
directed his efforts to establishing himself on the northern bank
of the Dniester. He would then be able to advance in line with
the Germanic front that was pressing on from the west, and
northward from the Carpathian range between Uzsok and the
Jablonitza passes; otherwise his force would lag behind in the
great drive, a mere stationary pivot. At that time he held about
sixty miles of the Odessa-Stanislau railroad (which runs through
the valley via Czemovice and Kolomea) with the Russians only
twenty miles north of the line. If that position could be taken
the Austrians would have the South Russian line of communica-
tions in their hands, for it was along this line that supplies and
reenforcements were being transported to Ivanoff 's front on the
Wisloka from the military centers at Kiev and Sebastopol. Thus
the railway was of tremendous importance to both belligerents.
What it meant to the Austrians has been stated ; to the Russians
its possession offered the only opportunity for a counteroffensive
in the east that could possibly affect the course of the main op-
erations on the Wisloka, San, and later the Przemysl lines. But
however successful such a counteroffensive might prove, it could
not have exerted any immediate influence on the western front.
With the Transylvania Carpathians protecting the Austro-Ger-
man eastern flank, there would still be little hope of checking the
enemy's advance on Lemberg even if Lechitsky succeeded in
reconquering the whole of the Bukowina and that part of eastern
Galicia south of the Dniester. Every strategic consideration,
therefore, pointed to the Dniester line as the key to the situation
for the Austrian side, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin decided to stake
all on the attempt.
CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA
291
292 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On May, 6, 1915, the machine was set in motion by a violent
bombardment. By the 8th the Austrians captured the bridge-
head of Zaleszczyki; on the 9th the Russians drove them out
again, capturing 500 men, 3 big guns, 1 field gun, and a number
of machine guns. On May 10 the Russians took the initiative
and attacked a front of about forty miles, along the entire
Dniester line from west of Niczviska to Uscie Biskupic, crossed
into the Bukowina and advanced to within five miles of Czemo-
witz from the east. A little stream and a village both named
Onut are situated southwest of Uscie Biskupic. Here a detach-
ment of Don Cossacks distinguished themselves on May 10, 1915.
Advancing toward the Austrian wire entanglements in face of a
terrific fusilade, they cut a passage through in front of the
Austrian's fortified positions. Before the latter realized what
was happening the Cossacks were on top of them, and in a few
minutes a ferocious bayonet struggle had cleared out three lines
of trenches. Russian cavalry poured in after them, hacking the
Austrian's rear, and compelling them to evacuate the entire
district. The Cossacks charged into the hurriedly retreating
masses — on horse and on foot, with saber, lance, and bayonet,
capturing 4,000 prisoners, a battery of machine guns, several
caissons and searchlight apparati.
The entire northern bank of the Dniester was in Russian
possession by the night of May 10, 1915; several desperate
counterattacks attempted by the Austrians on the 11th com-
pletely failed to recover the lost ground. Two days later a Rus-
sian official reported: "In this operation the Austrian units
which led the offensive were repulsed near Chocimierz with heavy
losses. Our artillery annihilated two entire battalions and a
third surrendered. Near Horodenka the enemy gave way about
seven o'clock in the evening of the same day and began a dis-
orderly retreat. We again captured several thousand prisoners,
guns, and some fifty ammunition caissons." Being a junction
of six roads and a railway station on the curved line from
Kolomea to Zaleszczyki, Horodenka is considered to be the most
important strategic point along the Dniester-Czernowitz front.
It was undoubtedly a severe blow to the Austrians.
i
RUSSIAN CHANGE OF FRONT 293
During the night of May 11, 1915, and the next day they
evacuated a front of about eighty-eight miles, and retired south
of the Pruth. General Mishtchenko led his Cossacks on the
Austrian trail, taking several towns on their way to Nadvorna,
which they captured after a fierce fight. From here they took
possession of part of the railway line from Delatyn to Kolomea,
and completely severed the connection between Von Pflanzer-
Baltin's forces and those of Von Linsingen lying along the north
of the range. Larger bodies of Russian troops were on the way
to Kolomea ; on May 13, 1915, they stormed and carried some
strongly fortified Austrian positions eight miles north of the
town, in front of which the Austrians had placed reenforcements
and all their last reserves. By dint of great efforts they held
their position here, but from May 9 to May 14, 1915, the Russians
drove them back elsewhere on a front of over sixty miles for a
distance of about twenty miles, also capturing some 20,000 pris-
oners with many guns and valuable stores of munitions. About
the middle of May matters quieted down in the eastern sector;
the only fighting of importance consisted of severe artillery com-
bats around Czemowitz and Kolomea. The issue of the conflict
hung in the west with Von Mackensen's armies ; fighting in the
Bukowina at this stage became an unnecessary expenditure of
strength and energy. The fate of eastern Galicia was being
decided 140 miles away, on the banks of the River San, to which
region we will now direct the reader's attention.
CHAPTER XLIV
RUSSIAN CHANGE OF FRONT — RETREAT
TO THE SAN
AFTER the Russian troops retreated from the Lower Wisloka
- northward toward the confluence of that river with the
Vistula they held the two important bridgeheads of Sandomierz
and Rozvadov.
294 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On May 14, 1915, Ivanoff' s right was being forced toward the
Vistula in the vicinity of Opatow. This right wing was the army
under General Ewarts, which since December, 1914, had been
stationed in strongly fortified positions on the Nida in Russian
Poland. The front extended across the frontier into western
Galicia and joined on to the right wing of Dmitrieff' s Dunajec-
Biala front, which was shattered between Otfinow and Gorlice.
The retreat of Dmitrieff' s army was in an easterly direction along
Tamow, Pilzno, Dembica, Rzeszow, and Lancut to Przevorsk on
the San ; from the region of Gorlice and Ciezkovice along Biecz,
Jaslo, Frysztak, Krosno to Djoiow, Dubiecko, and Sanok, the
latter also on the San. The troops that Brussilov extricated from
the passes and those with which he held the northern part of the
western Carpathians against Boehm-Ermolli were now likewise
concentrated on the San. A glance at the map will show that
the Russian front on the San from Przevorsk down to Sanok
forms a shield between the Germanic advance and the two towns
of Jaroslav and Przemysl. It will also be observed that General
Ewarts's forces about Rozvadov are on the west side of the San,
that is to say, nearer toward the advancing Austrians under the
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.
The retreat in Galicia necessitated modifications in the Russian
front in Poland on the way to Warsaw. The line south of the
Pilica had to be withdrawn and positions on the Nida abandoned
to conform with the retreating line in Galicia. New positions
were taken up along Radom and across the Kamienna River.
The pivot or hinge from which the line was drawn back was the
town of Ivanlodz, about fifty-five miles southwest of Warsaw.
North of Ivanlodz the front remained unaltered. While this line
shifting was in progress (in Poland) the German troops hung
closely to the heels of the retiring Russians, evidently mistaking
the motive behind the change of position. Mr. Stanley Wash-
burn thus summarizes the results of these retreating battles :
"Regarding the movement as a whole, suffice it to say that in
the two weeks following the change of line one (Russian) army
inflicted upon the enemy a loss of nearly 30,000 in killed,
wounded, and prisoners. The Russian losses were comparatively
RUSSIAN CHANGE OF FRONT 295
trifling." The Austro-German forces were following up leisurely
the retreating Russian corps, not expecting any serious fighting
to occur until the lines behind the Kamienna were reached.
Instead of that, however, on May 15, 1915, the Russian com-
mander suddenly halted the main body of his troops in front of
his fortified positions on a line extending from Brody by Opatow
toward Klimontow. Between May 15-17, 1915, a battle developed
on this front, which is the more notable as it is one of the few in
this war fought in the open without trenches. To quote Mr.
Washburn : "In any other war it would have been called a good-
sized action, as from first to last more than 100,000 men and
perhaps 350 to 400 guns were engaged."
The Austro-Germans came on in four groups. The Third Ger-
man Landwehr was moving from the southwest by Wierzbnik
against Ilza, slightly to the north of Lubienia. Next to it, com-
ing from the direction of Kielce, was the German Division of
General Bredow, supported by the Eighty-fourth Austrian Regi-
ment. This body was advancing against Ostroviec, the terminus
of a railway which runs from the district of Lodz to the south-
east by Tomaszow and Opoczno, and crosses the Ivangorod-
Olkusz line haffway between Kielce and Radom. Farther to the
south three Austro-Hungarian divisions were also advancing —
namely, the Twenty-fifth Austrian Division against Lagow, and
the Fourth Austrian Landwehr Division, supported by the Forty-
first Honved Division, against Ivaniska ; they moved along roads
converging on Opatow. The Twenty-fifth Austrian Division,
commanded by the Archduke Peter Ferdinand, was composed of
crack regiments, the Fourth Hoch and Deutschmeisters of
Vienna, and the Twenty-fifth, Seventeenth, and Tenth Jager
battalions. The Russians were outnumbered about 40 per cent.
The supposedly demoralized Russians were not expected to give
any battle short of their fortified line, to which they were thought
to be retiring in hot haste. The Russian general selected the
Austrians on whom to spring his first surprise, but commenced
by making a feint against the German corps, driving in their
advanced guards by vigorous attacks which caused the whole
force to halt and begin deployment for an engagement.
296 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
This occurred on May 15, 1915. On the same day, with all
his available strength, he swung furiously with Opatow as an
axis from both north and south, catching in bayonet charge the
Twenty-fifth Division on the road between Lagow and Opatow.
Simultaneously another portion of his command swept up on the
Fourth Division coming from Ivaniska to Opatow. "In the mean-
time a strong force of Cossacks had ridden round the Austrians
and actually hit their line of communications at the exact time
that the infantry fell on the main column with a bayonet charge,
delivered with an impetuosity and fury that simply crumpled up
the entire Austrian formation. The Fourth Division was meet-
ing a similar fate farther south, and the two were thrown to-
gether in a helpless mass, losing between 3,000 and 4,000 casual-
ties and nearly 3,000 in prisoners, besides a large number of
machine guns and the bulk of their baggage. The remainder,
supported by the Forty-first Honved Division, which had been
hurried up, managed to squeeze themselves out of their predica-
ment by falling back on Uszachow, and the whole retired to
Lagow, beyond which the Russians were not permitted to pursue
them, lest they should break the symmetry of their own line." It
is admitted by the Austrians themselves that their losses were
very severe in this battle. An Austrian source at the time stated
that on May 16, 1915, not a single officer and only twenty-six
men were left of the entire Fourth Company, First Battalion of
the Tenth Austrian Infantry Regiment. By the 17th of May the
Austrians had withdrawn more than twelve miles from the scene
of the disaster.
During the following night. May 25, 1915, an Austrian divi-
sion was moving from the line of advance of General Bredow's
troops along the Lagow-Opatow road where it is separated by a
spur of the Lysa Gora, the highest mountain group in Russian
Poland. The Russians, elated over their recent victory, crossed
the mountains by a forced march, and fell on the right flank of
the German formation, while other troops opened a general
frontal attack against it. Bredow was compelled to fall back in
haste in the direction of Bodzentyn and to call for assistance
from the adjoining Fourth German Landwehr Division. The
BATTLE OF THE SAN 297
sudden withdrawal of that division had the effect of weakening
the German line southwest of Radom near the Radom-Kielce and
the Konsk-Ostroviec railway crossings. The opportunity of
thinning the enemy's line in that sector was too good to be lost,
for a Russian communique of May 17, 1915, states that "near
Gielniow, Ruski-Brod, and Suchedniov our sudden counterattacks
inflicted severe losses on the enemy's advance guards." Having
thus checked the German advance for the time being, the Rus-
sians ceased from further troubling to await developments on the
San.
CHAPTER XLV
BATTLE OF THE SAN
WHEN the Austro-German armies reached the line of the San
on May 14, 1915, the battle for mid-Galicia was over, and a
fresh chapter of the campaign opened with the battle of the San,
which might more fittingly be described as the battle for
Przemysl. The position of Ivanoff's right has been shown; his
right center lay west of the Lower San; the center east of the
river covered Przemysl ; his left center extended along the Upper
Dniester, while his left, under Lechitsky, was keeping Von
Pflanzer-Baltin employed. Von Mackensen's "phalanx" was
slowly coming into action again, directing its course toward the
Russian center. The "phalanx" was compelled to travel slowly,
for it carried about 2,000 pieces of artillery with ample muni-
tions, and the railroads had been wrecked by the retreating Rus-
sians. What has been described by military writers as "Von
Mackensen's phalanx" was a concentration of troops along the
lines on which the strongest resistance was expected or where
the quickest advance was intended. No special group of forces
appear to have been set apart for that purpose ; there was very
little shifting about or regrouping necessary during the cam-
paign, and so well was the plan arranged that the concentrations
occurred almost automatically wherever and whenever they were
298 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
most needed. The infantry marched in successive lines or
echelons, about forty yards apart, while in the ranks the men
were allowed about four feet elbow room apiece. For frontal
attacks this might be considered fairly close formation, but Von
Mackensen calculated more upon the disintegrating effect of his
artillery to first demoralize the enemy and wreck his position,
after which the infantry came into play to complete the destruc-
tion. Without an overwhelming supply of artillery the "phalanx"
plan would have been unworkable — ^machine guns would exact
too heavy a sacrifice of Hfe.
Ivanoff's chief object for the moment was to hold the enemy
in check long enough to allow Przemysl to be cleared of ammuni-
tions and supplies, and to withdraw the troops in possession of
the place. Already, on May 14, 1915, the German troops of Von
Mackensen's army had occupied Jaroslav, only twenty-two miles
north of the fortress. Ivanoff had concentrated his strongest
forces on the line between Sieniava, north of Przevorsk, and
Sambor, thirty miles southeast of Przemysl. Here he had de-
ployed the three armies which had held the entire front from the
Biala to Uzsok in the beginning of May, 1915, nearly twice as
long as the line they were now guarding. These were to fight a
holding battle on the center while he adopted a series of vigorous
counterthrusts on his right and left wings. By the retirement of
the center Ewarts had been compelled to fall back from the Nida
to the Vistula with Woyrsch's Austrian army against him. When
Ewarts dropped behind Kielce in Russian Poland, Woyrsch
seized the junction of the branch line to Ostroviecs in front of
the Russian line. Ivanoff decided to venture a counterattack
which would at the same time relieve the pressure on his center
and also check the move on Josefov, dangerously near to the
Warsaw-Ivangorod-Lublin line. The result of this plan was the
brilHant surprise attack on the Austrians and Germans previ-
ously described. Along the San the troops just south of Ewarts
delivered a fierce attack and drove the Archduke Ferdinand back
to Tamobrzeg on the Vistula. Ivanoff next drew as many reen-
forcements from that flank to strengthen his center as was com-
patible with safety. What had happened meanwhile on Ivanoff 's
BATTLE OF THE SAN 299
extreme left — in eastern Galicia and the Bukowina — has already
been stated. These counterattacks may be regarded as merely
efforts to gain time, but the hour of another great battle was at
hand.
The battle of the San, one of the greatest of the war, opened
on May 15, 1915. Jaroslav was in German hands; the Fourth
Austro-Hungarian Army (Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) reached
the western side of the San on the 14th ; by the 16th the Austro-
German armies held almost the entire left bank of the river from
Rudnik to Jaroslav, about forty miles. They crossed at several
points on the same day and enlarged their hold on the right bank
between Jaroslav and Lezachow near Sieniava, which they cap-
tured. A German division arrived at Lubaczovka, due north of
Jaroslav, and half of the Germanic circle around Przemysl was
now drawn. The German plan was an advance in force from
the Sieniava-Jaroslav front against the Przemysl-Lemberg rail-
way, the most vulnerable point of the Russian line of retreat from
the fortress. Fifteen bridges were accordingly erected over the
San in that sector between May 20-24, 1915, across which the
German battering ram was to advance on Przemysl. South of
E,the town mounted patrols came into touch with Russian cavalry ;
four Austro-Hungarian and one German army corps were stand-
Lg prepared between Dobromil and Sambor; Sambor was oc-
cupied by them. The Russians held the left bank close to the
iver from Sieniava to Jaroslav, and northward of the former
ind to the west as far as Tarnobrzeg. From Jaroslav their front
ran in almost a straight line for thirty miles southeastward to
^the outer and northern forts around Przemysl, described nearly
complete circle around the western and southern forts to
[osciska on the east, thence south to Sambor, and from Sambor
Stryj. From Stryj eastward to the Bukowina the line re-
lained unaltered. In that region Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-
taltin had been conducting a campaign all by themselves; they
rere now resting, waiting, watching.
While great Germanic preparations for the capture of Przemysl
were proceeding north of the town, the battle opened on Satur-
day, May 15, 1915, in the south, against the Russian front be-
300 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tween Novemiasto and Sambor. Here the Austro-German troops
were thrown against Hussakow and Krukenice to hack their
way through trenches and barbed-wire entanglements in order
to reach the Przemysl-Lemberg railway and thereby complete the
circle. "At the cost of enormous sacrifices the enemy succeeded
in capturing the trenches of our two battalions."
But on May 17, 1915, these trenches near Hussakow were
recaptured by the Russians. The Austrians returned to the
charge, however, and by May 19 were within six miles of
Mosciska. By May 21 they had overcome the main Russian de-
fenses to the east of Przemysl and were threatening the garri-
son's line — their only line — of retreat to Grodek, for other Ger-
manic forces were advancing upon Mosciska from the north.
On May 21, 1915, the Russians opened a sudden counteroffen-
sive along the whole line in a desperate effort to save, not the
fortress, but the garrison. The Austrians had destroyed most of
the forts before they surrendered the town on March 22; and
forts cannot be built or reconstructed in a few weeks. Besides,
the Austrians knew the ground too well. Von Mackensen's
"phalanx" was meanwhile advancing against the Jaroslav-
Przemysl front with Von Bojna's corps on his right; Boehm-
Ermolli deserted the passes which had so long occupied him and
was now pressing against the south of the town while Von
Marwitz on his right attempted to seize the railway between
Sambor and Dobromil. Von Linsingen was forging ahead toward
Stryj and the Dniester; he had finally worked through the ill-
fated Koziova positions, and was now able to rest his right upon
Halicz. From there his connection with Von Pflanzer-Baltin
had been broken by Lechitsky, and was not repaired till June 6,
1915.
The Russian counteroffensive was a homeopathic remedy, on
the principle of "like curing like:" an enveloping movement
against being enveloped themselves at Przemysl; but the case
was hopeless. Yet they met with some successes of a temporary
nature. Between the Vistula and the San they captured some
towns and villages; they also got very close to Radava, north
of Jaroslav, and forced the Austro-Germai? troops to fall back
RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL BOl
on ro the left bank of the river on a considerable line of front
north of Sieniava, where they captured many prisoners and
guns.
The counteroffensive reached its zenith on May 27, 1915, when
Irmanow's Caucasian Corps stormed Sieniava and captured
something like 7,000 men, six big guns, and six pieces of field
artillery. Von Mackensen resumed the offensive on May 24, by
advancing due east of Jaroslav, capturing Drohojow, Ostrov,
Vysocko, Makovisko and Vietlin all in one day. Radymno was
occupied by the Austro-Hungarians under General Arz von
Straussenburg, still further narrowing the circle and compelling
the Russians to fall beyond the San. On the twenty-fifth the
Austrians followed them over, captured the bridgehead of
Zagrody, the village of Nienovice and the Heights of Horodysko,
while Von Mackensen's troops farther north captured Height
241. South of the village of Naklo, between Przemysl and
Mosciska, a hill 650 feet high was violently attacked; it com-
manded the only line of retreat from the fortress still left open.
To the south of the town the Russian counteroffensive tried to
outflank the Austrian troops which had approached close to the
fortress and the railroad to Lemberg. With the assistance of
strong reenforcements the Russians were able to check the
advance here and make 2,200 prisoners, besides capturing am-
munitions and machine guns.
CHAPTER XLVI
RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL
THE counteroffensive ended — of necessity — on May 24, 1915.
The Russians could still offer an effective resistance between
Krukienice and Mosciska, but the pressure of continuous attack
against their positions around Hussakow grew fiercer every
hour. The enemy was knocking at the outer ring of the forts;
from the west the heaviest cannons were pouring shot and shell
302 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
with such violence that the fall of Przemysl could no longer be
prevented. Most of the troops had already been withdrawn, as
well as the supplies and munitions; only a small garrison re-
mained behind to man the guns of the forts to the last moment;
the little avenue to safety on the east was still open.
On May 30, 1915, the Austrian batteries began their deadly
work on the Grodek line near Medyka. The exit was under fire ;
since May 17, Przemysl had been invested from three sides, and
the fourth was all but closed. From the northern side, guarded
by the Bavarians under General Kneusel, twenty-one centimeter
Krupp howitzers bombarded the Russian positions round
Korienice and Mackovice, drawing ever nearer the forts com-
manding the road and railway to Radymno. The Tenth Austro-
Hungarian Army Corps, approaching froml Krasiczyn,
endeavored to rush some of the outer works, but paid heavily
for the venture. They settled down before the forts of Pralko-
t^ice, Lipnik, Helicha and Grochovce, and those round Tatarovka
mountain. General Artamoff, the Russian commander of
Przemysl, had laboriously reconstructed some of the old Aus-
trian forts and equipped them with Russian 12-centimeter
howitzers. As the Austrians had brought only their 15-
centimeter howitzers, they were obliged to wait until their 30.5
batteries arrived before they could undertake any serious attack.
These batteries came on the scene about May 25, 1915, it took
five days' preparation, and the final bombardment began on the
30th. It was an ironical circumstance that the Austrians and
Germans were in numerous places sheltering themselves behind
the very earthworks which the Russians had constructed when
they were besieging the place two months earlier. There had
been no time to destroy them on the retreat.
The northern sector of the outer ring of forts fell on May 30,
1915, when the Bavarians captured the Russian positions near
Orzechovce. A terrific bombardment was directed against the
entire northern and northwestern front; great columns of in-
fantry were pushed forward to finish the cannons' work — still
the Russians hung on, ever bent on doing all possible damage
to the enemy.
••iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii I mill iiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii I iiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiir
Il
RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL 303
During the night of May 30-31, 1915, the enemy succeeded
in approaching within 200 paces, and at some points even in
gaining a footing in the precincts of Fort No. 7, around which
raged an obstinate battle that lasted until two in the after-
noon of the 31st, when he was repulsed after suffering
enormous losses. The remnants of the enemy who had entered
Fort No. 7, numbering 23 officers and 600 men, were taken
prisoners.
Since the 20th of May, 1915, the clearing of the road had
been going on; Von Mackensen battering the western forts and
the river line as far as Jaroslav, and Boehm-Ermolli struggling
to force the southern comer to get within range of the Lem-
berg railway. On his right. Von Marwitz had become stuck in
the marshes of the Dniester between Droholycz and Komarno.
The Bavarians on the north again let fly their big guns against
the forts round Dunkoviczki on May 31, 1915. At four in the
afternoon they ceased fire ; the forts and defenses were crumpled
up into a shapeless mass of wreckage. Now Prussian, Bavarian
and Austrian regiments rushed forward to storm what was left.
They still found some Russians there, severely mauled by the
bombardment; but they could no longer present a front. They
retreated behind the ring. The Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army
Corps now made another attempt on Pralkovice and Lipnik. Von
Mackensen's men captured two trenches near Fort No. 11 —
"they had to pay a heavy price in blood for every yard of their
advance." Heavy batteries are also spitting fire against Forts
Nos. 10 and 12. When the curtain of night fell over the scene
of carnage and destruction, two breaches had been made in the
outer ring of the forts.
June 2, 1915, dawned — a bright, warm summer's day ; the sun
rose and smiled as impassively over the Galician mountains,
and valleys, and plains as it had smiled through countless ages
before the genius of man had invented even the division of time.
From all sides of the doomed fortress eager, determined men
were advancing; Fort No. 10 was captured at noon by the
Twenty-second Bavarian Infantry Regiment; later in the day the
Prussian Grenadier Guards took possession of Fort No. 12;
304 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
during the night the besieger's troops marched into the village
of Zuravica, within the outer ring. Austrian troops had broken
through from the southwest and also penetrated the inner circle.
June 3, 1915, dawned and again the sun smiles over Galicia
and sees the same iron belt of machinelike men still nearer the
fortress; but the haggard defenders, where are they? Gone!
Flown! They have vanished during the night. Austrians and
Bavarians march into the town early in the morning. The only
enemies they meet are the dead.
Przemysl has fallen again — fallen before twenty times as
powerful a blow as that which struck it down seventy-two days
earlier.
Before proceeding with the progress of Von Mackensen and
his mighty ''phalanx," let us briefly trace the progress of Von
Linsingen, whom we left on the road to Stryj and the Dniester,
or rather, attempting to force that road. While the forts of
Przemysl were being smashed in the north. Von Linsingen was
pounding and demolishing the Russian positions between
Uliczna and Bolechov. Heavy mortars and howitzers were at
the same time being placed into position in front of the Russian
trenches between Holobutow and Stryj.
On May 31, 1915, they began to roar, and before long the
trenches were completely pulverized — ^the very trenches that
thousands of Germans and Austrians had died in in vain attempts
to carry by assault. The Thirty-eighth Hungarian Honved Divi-
sion were sent to finish the work of clearance and take possession
of Stryj. The entire Russian line withdrew to the Dniester, step
by step, ever fighting their favorite rear guard actions, killing
and capturing thousands of their enemies. They retired behind
the Dniester, but maintained their hold on any useful strategical
position south of the river, so far as was possible without im-
periling the continuity of their line.
We must also consider two more Austro-German sectors in
order to bring the combatants stationed there into line with the
Germanic advance — the Uzsok Pass and the Bukowina-ct^m-
Eastem Galicia sectars. In the former the army of Vop
Szurmay stood beside that of Von Linsingen opposite the Ninth
RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL 305
Russian Army. Von Szurmay led his men out of the pass and
advanced northward on May 12, after the fall of Sanok had
forced the Russians away from their positions in the vicinity of
it. Their line of retreat was threatened by the Austrian ap-
proach to Sambor.
On May 16, 1915, Von Szurmay moved across the upper Stryj
near Turka and passed along secondary roads in the direction
of the oil districts of Schodnica, Drohobycz and Boryslav, arriv-
ing on May 16-17, 1915. Von Linsingen's troops had started
their advance on the same day as those of Von Szurmay, when
the Russians round Koziowa had to retire for the purpose of
keeping in touch with their line : the same pressure that Sambor
exerted on the Uzsok. Here again the Russians adopted rear-
guard tactics and considerable fighting occurred during their
retreat to Stryj and Bolechow, both of which were eventually
captured by Von Linsingen.
In Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina matters had come almost
to a standstill between Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-Baltin about
the middle of May, 1915. When the former had cut the latter's
connection with the main line, the brigade of General von Blum
and other adjoining German troops on the extreme right
of Von Linsingen tried hard to relieve the pressure of Lechitsky
on the Austrian forces. Not till after the fall of Przemysl was
the connection restored, when the Russians had to fall back from
Kalusz and Nadvoma; on June 9 they evacuated Obertzn,
Horodenka, Kocman and Sniatyn. Lechitsky was also com-
pelled to withdraw from the Bukowina between Zaleszczyki,
Onut, and Czernowitz, where the Austrians were moving along
the Dniester in the north, the Pruth in the south, and over the
hills in the center against the village of Szubraniec. Here the
Russians once more inflicted servere losses on the Austrians, but
being in danger from a flanking movement by the Forty-second
Croatian Infantry through the Dniester forests, they retired
from the Bukowina on to Russian territory on June 12, 1915.
306 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XLVII
CAPTURE OF LEMBERG
THE capture of Przemysl and of Stryj terminates the second
stage of the Austro-German offensive in Galicia. The third
stage may be described as the battle for Lemberg, or Lwow.
Lemberg is the ancient capital of Galicia, and formerly bore the
name of Lwow. The Austrians many years ago had changed
it to "Lemberg." When the Russians captured the town on
September 3, 1914, they had given it back the old Slavonic name,
which, however, was destined soon to be transformed back again
into the more pronounceable appellation of "Lemberg."
It is estimated that between April 28, 1915, and the recapture
of Przemysl the Russian forces in Galicia had been diminished
by at least a quarter of a million casualties. The heaviest losses
occurred among Dmitrieff' s troops in the first days of May, 1915,
but in the battles on the San, at the close of the month, the forces
of Von Mackensen's "phalanx" were also greatly reduced. Along
the entire Galician front, it is computed that quite 600,000
Austro-German troops were put out of action.
While the fight for Przemysl was in full swing an important
event of the war occurred — Italy joined the enemies of Austria
on May 3, 1915; the Dual Monarchy had now to defend her
western frontier as well. Dankl and Von Bojna were transferred
to the Italian front with a considerable portion of their Galician
troops. A general redistribution of units was effected among
the Austrian and German armies. The army of the Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand was held along the lower San as far as
Sieniava. Von Mackensen was advancing east of Jaroslav along
the railway toward Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli was fighting
on the road to Lemberg from Mosciska. An army under Count
Bothmer was operating near the Dniester marshes, beyond
which, farther south, a group of armies under Von Linsingen
(mainly German) had forced the passage of the Dniester at
Zuravno, and was trying to advance on Lemberg and catch
CAPTURE OF LEMBERG 307
Ivanoff' s main forces on the flank. This last movement, if suc-
cessful, would be the most effective method of crushing the
retreating Russian armies : being thus outflanked, some of their
lines of retreat would be cut and a dissolution of a large portion
of the retiring forces could hardly have bden avoided. How-
ever, all attempts in this direction failed. The Russians
gradually rolled up their line on the Dniester from west to east,
keeping step with the retreat of the armies which were facing
west. With strong reenforcements from Kiev and Odessa
Brussilov commanded the Dniester front under the direction of
General Ivanoff. If only the ponderous advance of Von Macken-
sen could have been arrested, Brussilov would have had little
diflSculty in sweeping Voi^Linsingen back to the Carpathian bar-
rier. A somewhat similar condition existed in the north, where
the Austrians were at the mercy of Ivanoff's strong right wing.
The archduke's front was smashed at Rudnik early in June,
1915; his forces were driven back a day's march and lost 4,000
men in prisoners, besides many guns. The Second, Third and
Fourth Tyrolese regiments were almost annihilated. German
troops were hurried to the rescue. Boehm-Ermolli also got into
serious difficulties at Mosciska, where the Russians held him up
for a week with a furious battle. Ivanoff was scoring points
against all his individual opponents excepting only Von Mac-
kensen. The "phalanx," always kept up to full strength by a
continuous influx of reserves and provided with millions of high-
explosive shells, not only pursued its irresistible course eastward,
but had to turn now right, now left, to help Austrian and Ger-
man commanders out of trouble. Heavy howitzers lumbered
along the way to Rawa-Ruska — ^not to Lemberg, but to the north
of it, on the flank of the Russian army still holding the Lower
San. This army had therefore to retire northward to the river
line of the Tanev stream, cautiously followed by the archduke's
forces. The "phalanx" had again saved them from disaster.
Similarly, at Mosciska, when Boehm-Ermolli tried to storm the
Russian position by mass attacks, his infantry was driven back
with such terrible punishment that they could not be induced to
make another advance. There was nothing to be done here, but
308 THE STORY GF THE GREAT WAR
wait till Von Mackensen turned the flank of the Russian position
for them, which he did in one of the most stubborn conflicts of
the war— the battle of the Lubaczovka, a tributary of the San
between Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg. Never were the fighting
abilities of Slav and Teuton more severely tested. For over a
week the struggle raged ; a half million men were brought up in
groups and flung against the Russian front. Shell, shrapnel,
bullets and asphyxiating bombs finally wore down the Russian
resistance.
Incapacitated by physical exhaustion and outnumbered by
three to one, the Russian infantry gave way on June 13, 1915.
The "phalanx" drove into their ranks and advanced rapidly in a
northerly direction on its great flanking movement. But the
Russian spirit was not broken, for at this critical moment Gen-
eral Polodchenko rode out with three regiments of cavalry — the
Don Cossacks, the Chernigov Hussars, and the Kimburn Dra-
goons. They dashed into the unbroken lines of the triumphant
German infantry like a living hurricane, sabered the enemy, and
put thousands on the run. Swerving aside, they next charged
deep into the German rear, mauled the reserves into confusion,
hacked their way out again and captured several machine guns.
The most remarkable feature about this extraordinary exploit
was the fact that the losses sustained by the cavalry amounted
only to 200 killed and wounded. The effect on the "phalanx,"
however, was such that no more attacks were made that day, and
the Russians were able to retire to the hills near Rawa-Ruska.
Ivanoff was now compelled to draw reenforcements from other
parts of the line to strengthen his front at Rawa-Ruska. This
meant weakening Ewarts's against the archduke and Brussilov
against Boehm-Ermolh. The downfall of the Dunajec-Biala
front had been attributed by the Russian War Staff to overcon-
fidence or neglect on the part of General Dmitrieff, who was
subsequently relieved of his command and replaced by General
Lesch. At an official inquiry Dmitrieff was exonerated and re-
instated on the reasonable ground that, whatever precautions of
defense he might have taken, they would have proved ineffective
against the preponderance of the German artillery.
CAPTURE OF LEMBERG 309
After the battle of Lubaczow the Russian line drew back about
twenty miles. For the defense of Lemberg the front ran in a
concave form from along the River Tanev, five miles from
Rawa-Ruska, down to Grodek and Kolodruby ; then eastward be-
hind the Dniester to Zuravno and Halicz. The marshes of the
Dniester, then swollen by heavy rains, formed a good natural
defense ; the intrenchments on the hills north of Grodek to Rawa-
Ruska protected the approaches to Lemberg from that direction.
The weakest spot lay around Janov, fifteen miles north of Grodek,
where the level ground would permit the easy transport of heavy
artillery. This position had been fortified with trenches and
wire entanglements. Here also were concentrated the troops
withdrawn from other parts of the line, and four armored trains
with quick-firing guns from the depot at Rovno. General Ivanoff
had no intention of making any decisive stand against the
"phalanx" ; neither did he think of risking his armies in a battle
for Lemberg. That town was certainly of great military and
political importance — worth a dozen Przemysls — and worth
fighting for. But for that he would need artillery in enormous
quantity. Von Mackensen carried 2,500 guns with him, as well
as siege trains of heavy howitzers. Ivanoff possessed none of
these, and could therefore hope only to fight rear-guard actions
while retiring before Von Mackensen. In any other part of the
Galician line except the center he had little to fear. We left Von
Linsingen forcing the Dniester at Zuravno. He got the bulk of
his army across, the main advance commanded by Von Bothmer,
who captured the northern heights and penetrated the forests
near the Stryj-Tamopol railway. They were less than fifty miles
from Lemberg.
The "retreating" Brussilov suddenly turned round and fell on
Von Bothmer's advance. The fight lasted three days, with the
result that the Austro-Germans were obliged to fall back across
the Dniester, leaving behind 2,000 killed and wounded, besides
17 guns, 78 machine guns, 348 officers and 15,430 men as pris-
oners, June 8-10, 1915.
On June 11, 1915, however, the Germans renewed the attack
on Zuravno, recaptured the town, and on June 12 were five miles
310 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
north of it. By June 13 they had made ten miles, when Brus-
silov lashed out again. Within two days the Germans were back
on the Dniester. Von Mackensen had meanwhile concentrated
a new series of heavy batteries around Jaroslav and formed a
new "phalanx" (with reenf or cements) west of the San between
Piskorovice and Radymno. Another attempt was preparing to
break through Ivanoff's right wing.
A violent bombardment began on June 12, 1915, and Austro-
Hungarian troops crossed the river and occupied both Sieniava
and Piskorovice. Next day the advance spread along the whole
line, extending from Tarnoviec on the Zlota to the Radymnc
Javorov road, pressing north and eastward against the Russian
front. Pivoting on Sieniava, Von Mackensen swung his right
toward Mosciska, which Von Marwitz captured on June 14, 1915.
The same night the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's entire army
was slowly wheeling from the San toward the Tanev, facing
due north.
On June 16, 1915, the left of this line was already inside the
borders of Russian Poland, and its right wing along the entire
Tanev front. By June 16 numerous towns and villages were
taken by the Germans. The Wolff Telegraphic Bureau an^-
nounced that Von Mackensen's army had captured 40,000 men
and 69 machine guns, which undoubtedly referred to all the
Galician groups, for on June 12, 1915, Von Mackensen had
"replaced" the Archduke Frederick as generalissimo of the
Austro-Hungarian armies. The "phalanx" was pressing against
Rawa-Ruska, Magierow, and Janov; Boehm-Ermolli against
Grodek, part of which he captured by a midnight assault on
June 16. In five weeks the Russian line or front in Galicia had
shrunk from 300 miles to about 100. Before Dunajec, when it
was united with the northern groups, it had represented the long-
est battle line in the history of the world.
The Russians began to evacuate Lemberg about June 17, 1915,
the day Von Mackensen's right entered Javorov. On the 19th his
advance guard was approaching Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli
was meanwhile undergoing severe punishment near Komarno,
where an Austrian advance force endeavored to get through the
CAPTURE OF LEMBERG 311
Grodek Lakes. The Russian artillery drove them back ; for three
days there were furious bayonet and cavalry charges and counter-
charges; despite the most terrific bombardments the Austrian
attacks were broken by the desperate Russians. On this occa-
sion, at least, the Russians were well supplied with shells hur-
riedly sent by rail from Kiev, which enabled them to repulse the
Austrians on the lakes. Boehm-Ermolli is said to have lost half
of his effectives in his attempt to penetrate through Grodek and
Dornfeld, fifteen miles south of Lemberg.
Von Mackensen again came to the rescue by making a great
turning movement in the district of Zolkiev, about sixteen miles
north of Lemberg, and attacking the Russian positions about
Janov, forcing the Russians over the hills and the Rawa-Ruska
railway to Zolkiev. His left wing, resting on Lubaczov, swung
northward in a wheeling movement to envelop Rawa-Ruska. But
the Russians intercepted the move; ferocious encounters and
Cossack charges threw the Germans back to their pivot with
heavy losses on both sides. Von Mackensen's center, however,
was too strong, and Ivanoff desired no pitched battle — ^the only
way to check its advance. He therefore fell back between Rawa-
Ruska and Lemberg, yielding the former to Von Mackensen and
the latter to Boehm-Ermolli, who was able to lead his battered
troops into the town on June 22, 1915, without further resistance.
Brussilov now had to withdraw from the Dniester. As at
Przemysl, the Russian garrison departed with all stores and
baggage before the victors arrived. Lemberg had been in Rus-
sian possession for 293 days.
A German attack near Rawa-Ruska was repulsed by the Rus-
sians on June 25, 1915. For two days the "phalanx" rested to
replenish its stock of shells; when these had arrived along the
Przemysl line. Von Mackensen turned northward in the direction
of Kholm on the Lublin-Brest-Litovsk railway. On his left
marched the Austro-Hungarian army of the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand. These two armies drop out of the Galician cam-
paign at this stage and become part of the great German offen-
sive against the Polish salient. The gigantic enveloping move-
ment had failed in the south ; it was now to be a^^empted against
812 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Russian line in front of Warsaw, conducted by Von Hinden-
burg and Von Gallwitz in the northern sector, and by Von Mac-
kensen, assisted by General Woyrsch and Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand, in the southern. These operations are described in
the pages following.
More than three-fourths of Galicia had now been reconquered,
and it was left to the Austrians and the Germans to complete the
conquest. The campaign was one of the greatest operations of
the war. An English military writer thus describes the achieve-
ment: "Only a most magnificent army organization and a most
careful preparation, extending to infinite detail, could execute a
plan of such magnitude at the speed at which it was done by the
Austrian and German armies in May, 1915."
Not yet, however, were the Russian armies destroyed; to the
German War Staff it was not now a question of taking or retak-
ing territory, but of striking a final and decisive blow at the
vitals of Russia. The continuous series of reverses suffered by
Boehm-Ermolli and Von Linsingen exerted an important effect on
the end of the Galician campaign : it frustrated the plan of elim-
inating the Russian forces. The battle lines in France and Flan-
ders could wait a while till the Russian power was annihilated.
After the fall of Lemberg, Ivanoff withdrew the main body of
his troops toward the river line of the Bug, Boehm-Ermolli fol-
lowing up behind. Again that unfortunate general was roughly
handled — another of his divisions was annihilated southeast of
Lemberg in a rear-guard action. Von Linsingen directed his
efforts against the Gnila Lipa and Halicz, while Von Pflanzer-
Baltin still operated on the Dniester. For many months the
Russians and Austrians faced each other in eastern Galicia;
they were still skirmishing at the end of the year. Both Russia
and Austria had more important matters on hand elsewhere : the
former against Germany in the north, and the latter with her
new enemy — Italy. Galicia became a side issue.
The Galician campaign will rank as one of the most instructive
episodes in military history, an example of unparalleled calcula-
tion, scientific strategy, and admirable heroism, involving, it is
computed, the terrible sacrifice of at least a million human lives.
PART VII— RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER XLVIII
WINTER BATTLES OF THE MAZURIAN
LAKES
THE battle known in the German official accounts as the
"Winter Battle in Mazurian Land" is sometimes described
as the "Nine Days* Battle." In this sense it is to be considered
as beginning on the 7th of February, 1915, and ending on the
16th, when the German Great Headquarters reported that the
Tenth Russian Army, consisting of at least eleven infantry and
several cavalry divisions, had been driven out of its strongly
fortified positions to the east of the Mazurian Lake district,
forced across the border, and, having been almost completely
surrounded, had been crushingly defeated. In fact, however,
fighting continued as part of the same action until the 21st of
February, 1915, when the pursuit of the defeated army ended.
The forces engaged in this titanic conflict were the Russian
Tenth Army, consisting, according to the Russian version, of
four corps, under General Baron Sievers, and the German East
Prussian armies, under General von Eichhorn, operating on the
north on the line Insterburg-Lotzen, and General von Billow on
the line Lotzen-Johannisburg to the south of Von Eichhorn.
Sources favorable to the Allies represent the strength of Gen-
eral Sievers's army as 120,000 men. They assert that the total
German force consisted of nine corps, over 300,000 men. Thes*
are said to have included the Twenty-first Corps, which had been
with the Crown Prince of Bavaria in the west; three reserve
corps, also from the west ; the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth Corps,
314 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
new formations, from the interior of Germany; the equivalent
of three corps from other sections of the eastern front; and a
reserve corps of the Guard. The German official description of
the battle credits the Russians with having had in this sector
of the battle front in East Prussia at the beginning of February
six to eight army corps, or about 200,000 men.
For months the heavy fighting in the east had centered on
other sections of the immense battle line, running from the
Baltic to the Carpathians. The second general Russian offen-
sive, the great forward thrust of the Grand Duke Nicholas
toward Cracow in the direction of Berlin, aimed through the
center of the German defense, had been met, and the German
counterthrust toward Warsaw had come to a standstill in the
mud of Poland and before the stone-wall defensive of the Rus-
sians on the Bsura and the Rawka. Attacks launched by the
Russians against the East Prussian frontier, centering at Lyck,
in January, 1915, seemed to forebode a fresh Russian offensive
intended to sweep back the German armies in this section whose
position on the Russian right wing was a continual threat to the
communications of the Russian commander in chief.
The Germans, disposing of comparatively weak forces, esti-
mated at three army corps, were compelled to yield a strip of
East Prussian territory, and had fallen back to positions of con-
siderable natural strength formed by the chain of Mazurian
Lakes and the line of the Angerapp River. They reported their
forces standing on the defensive here as 50 per cent Landwehr,
25 per cent Landsturm, and only 25 per cent other troops not
of the reserve. Repeated attempts of the Russians to gain pos-
session of these fortified positions had, however, broken down.
They had been directed especially against the bridgehead o^
Darkehmen and the right wing of the German forces in th<J
Paprodtk Hills. Wading up to their shoulders in icy water, the
hardy troops of the Third Siberian Corps had attempted in vain
to cross the Nietlitz Swamp, between the lakes to the east of
Lyck.
At the beginning of February, 1915, finally Von Hindenburg
had been able to obtain fresh German forces and to put them
BATTLES OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES 315
in position for an encircling movement against the Russians
lying just to the east of the lakes, from near Tilsit to Johannis-
burg. With the greatest secrecy the reenforcements, hidden
from observation by their fortified positions, and the border
forces maintaining the defense, were gathered behind the two
German wings. The Russians apparently gained an inkling of
the big move that was impending about the time the advance
against their wings was under way. The first news of the open-
ing of the battle came to the public in a Russian ofl[icial announce-
ment of the 9th of February, 1915, to the effect that on the 7th
the Germans had undertaken the offensive with considerable
force in the Goldap-Johannisburg sector. The northern group
of Germans began its movement somewhat later from the direc-
tion of Tilsit.
Extensive preparations had been made by the German leaders
to meet the difficulties of a winter campaign under unfavorable
weather conditions. Thousands of sleighs and hundreds of thou-
sands of sleigh runners (on which to drag cannon and wagons),
held in readiness, were a part of these preparations for a rapid
advance. Deep snow covered the plain, and the lakes were
thickly covered with ice. On the 5th of February, 1915, a
fresh snowstorm set in, accompanied by an icy wind, which
heaped the snow in deep drifts and made tremendously difficult
travel on the roads and railways, completely shutting off motor
traffic.
The Germans on the south, in order to come into contact with
the main Russian forces, had to cross the Johannisburg Forest
and the Pisseck River, which flows out of the southernmost of
the chain of lakes. The attacking columns made their way
through the snow-clad forests with all possible speed, forcing
their way through barriers o;f felled trees and driving the Rus-
sians from the river crossings.
Throughout the 8th of February, 1915, the marching columns
moved through whirling snow clouds, the Germans driving their
men forward relentlessly, so that, in spite of the drifted snow
which filled the roads, certain troops covered on this day a dis-
tance of forty kilometers. The Germans under General von
316 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Falck took Snopken by storm; those under General von Litz-
mann crossed the Pisseck near Wrob^ln. The immediate objec-
tives of these columns were Johannisburg and Biala, where
strong Russian forces were posted.
On the 9th the southern column, under Von Litzmann, was
attacked on its right flank by Russians coming from Kolna, ta
the south of them. The German troops repelled the attack,
taking 2,500 prisoners, eight cannon, and twelve machine guns.
General Saleck took Johannisburg, and Biala was cleared of the?
Russians. The advance of these southern columns continued
rapidly toward Lyck.
The German left wing at the same time fell overwhelmingly
on the northern end of the Russian line. On the 9th they took
the fortified Russian positions stretching from Spullen to the
Schorell Forest and nearly to the Russian border. They had
here hard work to force their way through wire entanglements
of great strength. Having noticed signs of a retreat on the part
of their opponents, these German forces had on the preceding
day begun the attack without waiting for the whole of their
artillery to come up. The Russians retreated toward the
southeast.
Swinging forward toward the Russian border, the German
left wing now exerted itself to the utmost to execute the sweep-
ing encircling movement for which the strategy of Von Hinden-
burg had become famous. The Russian right wing had been
turned and was being pressed continually toward the southeast.
The German troops rushed forward in forced marches, ignoring
the difficulties which nature put in their way. By the 10th of
February these columns reached the Pillkallen-Wladislavrow line,
and by the 11th the main highway from Gumbinnen to Wilko-
wyszki. The right wing, up to the capture of Stallupohnen, had
taken some 4,000 prisoners, four machine guns, and eleven am-
munition wagons. The center of this army, at the capture of
Eydtkuhnen, Wirballen, and Kibarty, took 10,000 prisoners, six
cannon, eight machine guns, numerous baggage wagons, includ-
ing eighty field kitchens, three military trains and other roll-
ing stock, a large number of gift packages intended for the
THE RUSSIANS OUT OF GERMANY 317
Russian troops, and, of chief interest to the fighting men, a whole
day's provisions.
On the afternoon of February 10 some one and a half Rus-
sian divisions had come to a halt in these three neighboring
villages : Eydtkuhnen, Kibarty, and Wirballen. Although it was
known that the Germans were approaching, it was apparently
regarded by the Russians as impossible that pursuers would
be able to come up with them in the raging snowstorm. So cer-
tain were they of their security that no outposts were put on
guard. Only thus could it happen that the Germans, who had
not allowed the forces of nature to stop their advance, arrived
right at the Russian position on the same day, though with
infantry alone and merely a few guns, everything else having
been left behind, stuck in the snowdrifts.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE RUSSIANS OUT OP GERMANY
TT was evening when the Germans made their surprise attack
•^ on Eydtkuhnen and midnight when they fell upon Wirballen.
On the roadway stood two Russian batteries with twelve guns
and a considerable number of ammunition wagons. The Ger-
man infantry approached without firing a shot until they were
within fifty yards. Then all the horses were shot down and the
guns and ammunition seized. The men of the battery fled. In
both these towns there was street fighting in the night, lit up
by burning houses which had been fired by the Russians in their
retreat.
One of the captured trains was the hospital train of the czar.
This was utilized as headquarters for the night by the staff of
General von Lauenstein.
By the 12th of February, 1915, the German troops of the left
wing, sweeping down from the north and pressing the Russians
back from village to village, were entirely on Russian soil. Wiz-
818 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
winy, Kalwarja, and Mariampol were occupied on this day. The
number of guns taken by these troops had been increased by
seventeen, according to German reports. The German Head-
quarters Staff declared that by this time the Russian Seventy-
third and Fifty-sixth Divisions had been as good as annihilated,
and the Twenty-seventh division nearly destroyed. The Russians
lying before the Angerapp line and the defenses of Lotzen had in
the meantime also begun to retreat toward the east. German
troops, consisting chiefly of reserves of the Landwehr and Land-
sturm which up to this time had been held back within the Ger-
man fortified line, now advanced to attack the yielding army,
whose long marching column could be observed by the German
flyers. While General von Eichhom's troops, coming from the
neighborhood of Tilsit and making their way through snow and
ice, were advancing upon Suwalki and Sejny, and the German right
wing was fighting its way through Grajewo, toward Augustowo,
the center of the troops of General von Billow for several days
fought the Russians in furious battle in the vicinity of Lyck.
From all sides the Germans were closing in. To protect the
withdrawal of this main army to Suwalki and Augustowo, the
Russians endeavored by all means to hold the narrows of the
lakes before Lyck, where they were favored by the nature of
the ground and aided by strong defensive works, for the most
part well provided with wire entanglements. The best of the
Russian troops, Siberian regiments, here fought with great
energy under a determined leadership, and the Russians, in f act>
at some places took the offensive. By the 12th of February,
1915, however, the Germans had taken these positions and the
Russians had withdrawn to the narrow passages among the lakes
before Lyck. The battles around this town were carried on
under the eye of the German Emperor. The German soldiers
were still occupied in hunting through the houses for scattered
Russians as the emperor stepped from his motor car. He was
received with hurrahs, and the soldiers surrounded him, singing
"Deutschland, Deutschland uber Alles." The emperor, standing
amid the blackened ruins of burned homes, delivered a short
address to the soldiers gathered about him, giving special recog*
TIGHTENING OF THE NET 319
nition to Infantry Regiment No. 33, an East Prussian unit
which had especially distinguished itself and suffered great
losses. On the same day the Germans advanced beyond Lyck,
and by the 15th of February no Russian remained on Ger-
man soil.
CHAPTER L
TIGHTENING OP THE NET— REPORT OF
THE BOOTY
THE Russian right, retiring to avoid envelopment, sought the
natural line of retreat along the railway to Kovno. In exe-
cuting this movement it turned toward the northeast, and ex-
ceeding in speed of movement the corps to the south of it, the
Twentieth, under the command of General Bulgakov, the latter
was left out of the line. In consequence its right wing was
turned and it was pressed down toward the south with the enemy
on three sides of it. It speedily became a broken force in the
forest north of Suwalki. The Russians endeavored to reach
the protection of their great fortress of Grodno. It was the
task of the German division coming down from the north in
forced marches to cut off this way of escape and prevent the
Russians coming out of the forest toward the southeast.
The march of these German troops carried them through
great woodlands, amid frozen lakes, when suddenly a thaw set
in. The sleighs which had been used had to be abandoned and
wagons requisitioned on the spot wherever possible.
An officer with these troops relates that infantrymen were
sent forward on wagons, and on the night following the 15th
of February took Sopozkin, to the east of Augustowo, on the line
of the Russian retreat, capturing the baggage of an entire Rus-
sian army corps. *The morning," he writes, "presented to us
a unique picture. Hundreds of vehicles, baggage carts, machine
guns, ammunition, provision and ambulance wagons stood in
a vast disorder in the market place of the town and in the street,
21— -War St. 3
320 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
In between were hundreds of horses, some harnessed, some loose,
dead Russians, dead horses, bellowing cattle, and sounding over
it all the words of command of our troops endeavoring to create
order in this mad mix-up, and to take care of the rich booty.
Many an interesting find did we make — 'mementos' which the
Russians had taken with them from Prussia and which now were
to find their way back."
A German commander tells how, in their efforts to cut off
the Russian retreat, the artillery were compelled to cross many
brooks running through deep gullies, so that it was necessary
frequently to lower guns and wagons by means of ropes on one
side and pull them up on the other.
One of the German leaders, describing this encircling move-
ment to the southeast from the north in which he played a part,
says : "The roads and the weather were beyond all description — •
twelve to fifteen degrees Reaumur, with a cutting wind and driv*
ing snow, with nothing to eat, as the field kitchens on these
roads could not follow. During pauses in the march one could
but lean against the wall of a miserable house or lie down in the
burned-out ruins, without straw to lie on and no covering. Men
and horses sank to their hips in the snow, and so we worked
our way forward, usually only about two kilometers an hour.
Wagons and horses that upset had to be shoveled out of the
drifts. It was a terrible sight, but we got through. We had
to go on without regard for anything, and the example of the
higher officers did much.'*
Two Russian corps from the southern wing of the army re-
treating by the Suwalki-Sejny causeway and by the Ossowetz
Railway, according to accounts from Russian sources, made their
way out of the trap under heavy rear-guard fighting.
The escaped portions of the Russian army crossed the Bobr
toward Grodno. From the direction of this Russian stronghold
a desperate effort was made to relieve the four corps which
were endeavoring to escape toward the fortress from the forest
southeast of Augustowo into which they liad been pressed by
the Germans from the west and north. On the 21st of February
came the final act in the great drama. The German troops
TIGHTENING OF THE NET 321
pushed forward at their best speed from all directions toward
the forest. The help that had been intended for them came too
late. Concerning the captures of this day, the German Great
Headquarters reported: **0n the 21st of February the remnants
of the Tenth Army laid down their arms in the forest of Angus*
towo after all attempts of the Russian commander of this army,
General Sievers, to cut a way out for the encircled four divisions
by means of those parts of his army which remained to him
after escaping over the Bobr to Grodno failed with extremely
heavy losses."
Summarizing the results of the entire battle in an announce-
ment of the 22d of February, the German Great Headquarters
said : "The pursuit after the winter battle in Mazurian Land is
ended. In cleaning up the forests to the northwest of Grodno,
and in the battles reported during the last few days in the region
of the Bobr and the Narew, there have been captured to date
one commanding general, two division commanders, four other
generals, and in the neighborhood of 40,000 men, seventy-five
cannon, a quantity of machine guns, whose number is not yet
determined, and much other war material.
"The total booty of the winter battle in Mazurian Land, there-
fore, up to to-day rises to seven generals, more than 100,000 men,
more than 150 cannon, and material of all sorts, inclusive of
machine guns, which cannot yet be approximately estimated.
Heavy guns and ammunition were in many cases buried by the
enemy or sunk in the lakes ; thus eight heavy guns were yester-
day dug out or hauled out of the water near Lotzen and Lake
Widmin.
"The Tenth Russian Army of General Baron Sievers may,
therefore, now be considered as completely annihilated."
This summary was corrected in a later announcement, which
stated that the number of guns taken as booty in the pursuit
after the winter battle in Mazurian Land had risen to 300,
including eighteen heavy guns. This was published on the 23d
of February. In an announcement of the 26th of February the
Great Headquarters amplified its account of the victory with this
statement :
322 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"In the Russian official report the extent of the disaster in
the winter battle of Mazurian Land is either concealed or an
attempt is made to obscure it. It is unnecessary to go further
into these denials. As evidence of the extent of the defeat,
the following list of the positions held by the captured generals,
however, may serve ;
"Of the Twentieth Army Corps: the commanding general,
the commander of the artillery, the commander of the Twenty-
eighth and Twenty-ninth Infantry Divisions, and of the First
Brigade of Infantry of the Twenty-ninth Infantry Division. The
commander of this latter division succumbed to his wounds soon
after being made prisoner.
"Of the Third Army Corps: the commander of the Twenty-
seventh Infantry Division and the commander of the artillery
and of the Second Infantry Brigade of this division.
"Of the Fifty-third Reserve Division : the division commander
and the commander of the First Infantry Brigade.
"Of the First Siberian Cossack Division: a brigade com-
mander."
This brought the total of Russian generals captured up to
eleven.
This account of one of the greatest battles of the European
War is necessarily based to a large extent on reports of the
Germans, owing to the fact that material from this source is
virtually the only official account available of the operation as
a whole. The Russian General Staff has contented itself with
the following announcement, made public on February 21, 1915 :
"When the Germans, after a series of extraordinary obstinate
and persistent attacks which caused them heavy losses, had rec-
ognized the impossibility of pressing in our front on the left
bank of the Vistula, they turned at the end of January to the
execution of a new plan. After the creation of several new corps
in the interior of the country, and the bringing up of troops
from their west front, the Germans threw important forces into
East Prussia. The transportation of troops was made easier
by the extraordinarily developed net of railways which Germany
has at its disposal.
TIGHTENING OF THE NET 323
'The task of the new troops sent to East Prussia was to de-
feat our Tenth Army, which held strongly constructed positions
along the Angerapp. To assure the success of the undertaking
the Germans brought a portion of their forces from the Bzura
and Rawka fronts to the right bank of the Vistula. A movement
of the Germans in East Prussia already became noticeable on the
4th of February, 1915. But the extent of this movement could
only be recognized a few days later. As our leaders, because of
the lack of railroad lines, could not collect the necessary forces
on the East Prussian front with the necessary speed to meet the
hostile attack adequately, they decided to take back the above-
mentioned army of East Prussia to the border. In this move-
ment of the right wing the Tenth Army, which was pressed by
heavy hostile forces and threatened with being surrounded from
the right, was forced to make a rapid change of alignment in the
direction of Kovno. In this rapid movement a corps was
separated from the rest of the army. The other corps which con-
tinued the battle obstinately without interruption, slowly drew
back in the prescribed direction, bravely repelling the enemy and
inflicting upon him heavy losses. Our troops overcame un-
believable difficulties, which were caused by the snow which filled
all roads. As the streets were impassable, automobiles could not
run. Trains were delayed and frequently failed to arrive at
their destination. Our corps which formed the left wing of the
Tenth Army held the enemy, while drawing back step for
step for nine days on a stretch of territory which ordinarily
is covered in four days. On the 19th of February these corps
withdrawing by way of Augustowo left the battle field and
took the position assigned to them. Further battles devel-
oped in the region before Ossowetz, on the roads from
Lomza to Jedwabno and to the north of Radislow, also halfway
between Plozk and Plonsk. These battles were in places very
intense."
An English authority says: "The chief Russian loss was in
General Bulgakov's Twentieth Corps, which the German staff
asserted they had completely destroyed. But during the fort-
night which ended on Saturday the 20th, at least half of that
324 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
corps and more than two-thirds of its guns safely made their
way through the Augustowo and Suwalki woods to the position
which had been prepared for the Russian defense. The total
Russian losses may have been 80 guns and 30,000 men ; they were
no more. The two southern corps, in spite of their stubborn
action at Lyck, crossed the woods between Augustowo and
Ossowetz without serious disaster."
CHAPTER LI
BATTLES OF PRZASNYSZ — BEFORE
MLAWA
THE shattering of the Tenth Russian Army in the "winter
battle" of the Mazurian Lakes was part of a greater conflict
which in February, 1915, extended far down the armies on the
right flank of the great Russian battle line which ran from the
Baltic to the Dniester. A "new gigantic plan" of the Slavs was
involved. As interpreted by the German General Staff it meant
that while the extreme northern wing of the Russian armies was
to sweep westward through the projecting section of Germany,
East Prussia, along the Baltic another Russian army was to
advance in force from the south against the comer formed by
West Prussia and the Vistula. With vast masses of cavalry in
the van, it was to break through the boundary between Mlawa
and Thorn, and pushing northward, come into the rear of those
German forces which were facing eastward against the attack
aimed at East Prussia from the northeast. For operations in
this section the Russians had favorable railway connections.
Two railways terminating at Ostrolenka permitted the rapid
unloading of large masses of troops at this point, and the line
Warsaw-Mlawa-Soldau led straight into the territory aimed at by
such an invasion. It seemed easily credible that the Russian
commander in chief did, as reported, give orders that Mlawa
should be taken be the cost what it might.
BATTLES OF PRZASNYSZ 825
The northern Russian armies based upon the fortresses of
Kovno and Grodno on the Niemen had not fully started on their
part of this great, well-planned undertaking when the German
counteroff ensive was suddenly launched with tremendous strength
from the Tilsit-Insterburg-Mazurian Lakes line. The disaster
which followed, and which banished all hope of an advance of the
Russians on this wing, has been described on a preceding page«
While the Germans, using to the best advantage their net of rail-
roads for the swift accumulation of troops, had gathered large
forces on the Mazurian Lakes line, they had at the same time
strengthened the troops standing on the southern boundary of
West and East Prussia. An artillery officer. General von Gall-
witz, was placed in command of this army with orders to protect
the right flank of the German armies attacking in Mazurian
Land, and to prevent the expected Russian attempt at invasion
in his own sector of the front.
While the "winter battle" was raging to the east of him, Von
Gallwitz in the characteristic German fashion of defense by a
strong offensive moved forward up the right bank of the Vistula
to Piozk. A cavalry division and regiments of the Guard at
Sierpe and Racionz, February 12-18, 1915, won well-earned laurels
for themselves by driving an enemy of superior strength before
them. At Dobrin, according to German report, they took 2,500
prisoners.
General von Gallwitz's plan, however, was of more ambitious
scope. It was his intention, by encircling the Russians in the
territory before him from both wings, to sweep clear of enemies
the entire stretch of country in the Polish triangle between the
Vistula and the Orczy rivers. The right wing of his troops that
lad come down the bank of the Vistula was to swing to the east-
ward in behind the Russians. German troops which had arrived
it Willenberg inside of the East Prussian boundary, one of the
German concentration points on the line of railroad lying behind
leir front, on the other hand, received orders to descend the
ralley of the Orczy and to come in behind the Russian right flank
from the east. These troops, making a wide detour, swept past
^rzasnysz on the east, and swinging round to the south of the
326 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
city attacked the Russians holding the place from this direction.
The Germans had understood that only small Russian forces
were in the city. Anticipating the German movement, however,
a Russian division, as the Germans learned later, had hastened
to Przasnysz. The Russians also had collected large forces on the
Narew, and were hurrying them toward Przasnysz on roads
covering a wide front. Two full Russian corps from this line
were flung upon the German left wing.
The forces of Von Gallwitz which had carried out the en-
circling movement from the east and south of Przasnysz now
found themselves caught between two Russian armies. How-
ever, they were unwilling to relinquish the booty which they had
planned to seize. A part of the German forces was disposed in
a half circle as a defense against the Russians coming up from
the south, and a division of reserves, February 24, stormed
Przasnysz. The German Great Headquarters announced that
the Germans captured 10,000 prisoners, including 57 officers, and
took 36 cannon, 14 machine guns, and much war material of
various sorts. However, the Russian troops were now pressing
forward from the south with irresistible force. The Germans, in
consequence, slowly fell back, fighting under great difficulties,
and moving northward toward their defensive lines, carrying
with them their prisoners and booty.
The Russian General Staff on the first of March, 1915, devoted
an explicit account to the fighting about Przasnysz which differs
but slightly from the narrative by the German Great Head-
quarters which has in general been followed in the preceding
description. Both sides apparently considered the operation of
special importance, and as reflecting credit upon their respective
troops. The Russian story emphasizes the attacks made by
their force on the line Lyssakowo-Chainovo simultaneously from
north and south, that is, both in the flank and in the rear of the
Germans to the west of Przasnysz. They represent their troops
in the city as having consisted of only a brigade of infantry and
some insignificant cavalry units. On the 25th of February, when
the Germans had established themselves in the town, the Rus-
sians, according to their account, were pressing their enemies
t
k
BATTLES OF PRZASNYSZ 327
hard upon a long front from Krasnoseltz through Vengerzinovo,
Kolatschkowo to Vohaverlowska.
On the evening of this day they drove the Germans into posi-
tions close to the city. The Thirty-sixth German Reserve Divi-
sion on the same evening is said to have met serious disaster
after a determined resistance at the crossings of the Anetz. On
the evening of the next day the Russians began to reenter
Przasnysz, but did not completely occupy the town until the night
after the 27th. "The Germans," the Russian account continues,
''hereupon began a disorderly retreat, endeavoring to withdraw
in the direction of Mlawa-Chorgele. Regardless of the exhaus-
tion consequent upon the marching they had undergone and four
days of battle, our troops energetically took up the pursuit of the
enemy. On the 28th of February they inflicted serious losses
upon his rear guard. In these battles we seized a large amount
of booty. The total number of prisoners amounts to at least
10,000." The Russians maintain that they had defeated no less
than two German army corps and thrown them back to the
border.
On the 12th of March, 1915, the German Great Headquarters
protested against this version of the affair, and pointed to the
fact that within a few days their troops were again threatening
Przasnysz, and that since giving up the city they had captured
on the battle fields between the Vistula and the Orczy no less
than 11,460 Russians.
The city of Przasnysz itself suffered heavily in these attacks
and counterattacks. For days and nights it had lain under bom-
bardment and repeatedly fierce, hand-to-hand combats had been
fought in its streets. Most of the houses of the place were left
mere heaps of smoking ruins.
From the German point of view this offensive just north of
the Vistula which included the temporary capture of Przasnysz
was a success, especially in this, that it had prevented the big
Russian forward movement against the West Prussian boundary
which the impending great Russian offensive had foreboded. It
had been impossible for the Russians seriously to endanger the
German flank in this section, while the Germans had struck to
328 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the east in the "winter battle/' and had definitely spoiled the
Russian appetite for invasion from the Kovno-Grodno line.
As though determined to avenge their defeat to the east
of the lakes, the Russians now continued to direct a series
of fierce attacks in the direction of Mlawa, intending apparently
to break through the German line of defense between Soldau
and Neidenburg. It was said that the Russians believed General
von Hindenburg in person to be in charge of the German forces
in this sector. In consequence the German troops for the most
part were forced to stand upon the defensive. In the beginning
of March the Russian attacks increased steadily in violence.
They broke against the German positions to the east and south
of Mlawa, according to German reports, with enormous losses.
At Demsk, to the east of Mlawa, long rows of white stones mark
common graves of masses of Russians who perished before the
German barbed-wire entanglements. The Germans point to these
as dumb witnesses of the disaster that overtook forty-eight Rus-
sian companies that assaulted ten German ones. The cold
.weather at this time had made possible the swampy regions in
which the Orczy rises, and had enabled the Russians to approach
close to the German line of defense.
The Russian attack at this point in the night of the 7th of
March, 1915, was typical of the fighting on this line in these
weeks. After a thousand shells from the Russian heavy guns
had descended upon and behind Demsk, a seemingly ceaseless
series of infantry attacks set in. They were carried close up to
the lines of wire of the German defense. Enough light, however,
was shed by the searchlights and light balls shot from pistols to
enable the Germans to direct a destructive infantry and ma-
chine-gun fire on the approaching lines. Those of the Russians
who did not fall, fled to the next depression in the ground. There
they were held by the beams of the searchlights until daybreak.
Then they surrendered to the German patrols. Of another
attack a few kilometers farther to the north, at Kapusnik, the
Germans reported that after the enemy had penetrated into their
trenches and had been driven out in a desperate bayonet fight,
they buried 906 Russians and 164 Germans.
FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR ^29
On the 8th of March, 1915, General von Gallwitz again tried
an offensive with fresh forces which he had gathered. It was
thwarted, however, on the 12th, to the north of Przasnysz. The
Germans estimated the Russian forces which here were brought
up for the counterattack at some ten army corps and seven cav-
alry divisions. The Russians in advancing this time, instead of
directing their thrust at Mlawa, pushed northeastward of
Przasnysz along the rivers Orczy and Omulew. In this sector
the Germans counted from the 13th to the 23d of March forty-
six serious assaults, twenty-five in the daytime and twenty-one
at night. With special fury the battles raged in the neighbor-
hood of Jednorozez. This attempt to break into Prussia was
also unsuccessful, and in the last week of March the Russian
attacks slackened, quiet ensuing for the weeiks following Easter.
For six weeks the armies had struggled back and forth in this
bloody angle, fighting in cold and wet, amid snow and icy rains.
The Germans asserted that in these six weeks the troops of Gen-
eral von Gallwitz had captured 43,000 Russians and slain some
25,000. They estimated the total losses of the enemy in this
sector during the period at 100,000. Countless graves scattered
about the land, and the ruins of cities and villages were left to
keep awake the memory of some of the fiercest fighting of the
war in the east.
CHAPTER LII
FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR —
BOMBARDMENT OF OSSOWETZ
rpHE winter battles of the Mazurian Lakes had forced the
-*- armies at the northern end of the Russian right flank
back into their great fortresses Kovno and Grodno, and behind
the line of the Niemen and the Bobr. A great forest region lies
to the east and north of Grodno, and between the Niemen and
the cities of Augustowo and Suwalki which the Germans, after
their successful offensive, used as bases for their operations. A
330 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
strip of country including these forests, and running parallel to
the Niemen was a sort of no-man's land in the spring of 1915.
Movements of troops in the heavily wooded country were difficult
to observe, and the conditions lent themselves to surprise at-
tacks. This resulted in a warfare of alternate thrusts by Rus-
sians and Germans aimed now at this point, now at that, in the
disputed territory. Several actions during the spring stand out
beyond the rest in importance, both because of the numbers en-
gaged and their effects. In what follows will be described a
typical offensive movement in this district undertaken by the
Russians, and the way it was met by the Germans.
A new Russian Tenth Army had been organized by the end of
February, 1915, with Grodno for its base. General Sievers, his
chief of staff, and the general in command of the Third Russian
Army Corps had been demoted from their commands, and three
new army corps (Two, Three, and Fifteen) had been brought to
Grodno. The ranks of the remaining corps that had suffered
in the "winter battle" had been filled up with fresh recruits.
Hardly had the German pursuit in the forest of Augustowo come
to an end when the freshly strengthened Russians moved for-
ward from their defensive lines in a counterattack. The Ger-
mans had been engaged in the task of gathering and carting
away their enormous booty which lay scattered about the forest.
They now drew back from in front of the Russian fortified lines
to prepare positions close to Augustowo, and on a line running
roughly north and south from this place, with the forest in front
of them.
The Third Russian Army Corps advanced from Simno toward
Lozdsisjo, their Second Army Corps from Grodno by way of
Kopiewo and Sejny toward Krasnopol and other Russian corps
advanced through the forest of Augustowo. Here they soon
struck strong German resistance, and for several days vainly
attacked German fortified positions.
On the 9th of March, 1915, a German offensive began against
the Russian Third Corps which held the right wing of the ad'
vancing army. When this corps suddenly found itself threatened
in the flank from the north and in danger of being surrounded
FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR 331
it hastily began to retreat toward the east and southeast, leav-
ing several hundred prisoners and several machine guns in the
hands of the Germans. This withdrawal exposed the right flank
of the adjoining Second Army Corps, which by this time, March
9, 1915, had reached Berzniki and Giby. The German attack
w^as now continued against this corps. It was cold weather, the
thermometer was considerably below the freezing point, and the
roads were slippery with ice, so that dozens of horses fell, com-
pletely exhausted, and the infantry could march only two or
three kilometers an hour.
On March 9 and 10, 1915, the battle flamed up at Sejny and
Berzniki, the Russian corps, which had developed its front to-
ward the west, being forced to swing about and face the north,
whence the Germans were driving down upon it. At Berzniki
two Russian regiments made up entirely of young troops were,
according to the German account, completely annihilated, and
the commanders of the regiments captured. It seemed as though
the leader of the Russian armies saw approaching a repetition of
the encircling movements that had proved fatal to the Russians
in the Mazurian "winter battle," for on the 10th of March he
gave orders for the withdrawal of his entire army. The German
airmen on this day reported the Russian columns on the march
through the forest in full retreat toward Grodno all along the
line from Giby to Sztabiz, far to the south.
On the 11th of March, 1915, the German troops vigorously
pushed the pursuit. They occupied Makarze, Froncki, and Giby.
On the same night a German cavalry division took Kopciovo by
assault. At this place alone they counted 300 dead Russians,
and more than 5,000 prisoners, 12 machine guns, and 3 cannon,
fell into the hands of the Germans.
The threatened envelopment of this Russian army was typical
of the method employed by the leaders under Von Hindenburg in
local operations, as it was of German method in general when
applied to operations extending over the entire field of action. It
could be applied with special success where the German informa-
tion service was superior to that of the Russians, as it usually was,
and the movements of German troops were facilitated by good
382 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
railway connections. In the Augustowo forests, however, rapid-
ity of movement had to be achieved by the legs of the German
soldiers to a large extent, and on this they prided themselves not
a little. The operation just described was regarded by the Ger-
man Great Headquarters as being of great significance, valuable
for its moral effect in establishing in the German troops a sense
of superiority, and confidence in their leadership, and for its in-
fliction of material losses of considerable moment on the Russians^
The Russians likewise claimed advantages from their forward
thrust from Grodno. As represented by the Russian General
Staff the withdrawal of the Germans from a front close to the
line of the fortress in the first place was not a voluntary one, as it
is pictured in the German account, but was forced by the strong
pressure exerted by the Russian attacks following upon their
retreat after the "winter battle." Thus they report the complete
defeat of two German army corps, resulting in the seizure by the
Russians of Height 100.3, which they described as dominating
the entire region of the operations before Grodno. "In this
battle," says the Russian report of March 5, 1915, "we took 1,000
prisoners and six cannon and a machine gun. Height 100.3 was
defended by the Twenty-first Corps, the best of them all which
lost during the battle 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers, as can be esti-
mated from the dead left behind. After the shattering of the
German counterattack at Height 100.3 the operations of the
enemy became entirely passive. We, on the other hand, took vil-
lage after village, and everywhere made prisoners."
The fortress of Ossowetz on the Bobr River proved incon-
querable by the 42-centimeter mortars which had worked such
terrific effects on the forts of Belgium and France. It was
continually under German artillery fire through the months of
February and March, 1915, without suffering appreciable dam-
age. The great mortars were brought up within range of the
fortress with much difficulty, owing to the fact that the place
is almost completely surrounded by swamps. The Germans
apparently had counted seriously at first on making a breach in
the Russian defensive lines at this place. After persistent at'
tempts to make an impression on the fortress with their heaviest
FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR 333
guns they were obliged, however, to content themselves with
keeping the garrison in check so as to forestall offensive moves.
A German artillery officer who took part in the bombardment
relates that the chief obstacle to the pressing home of an attack
were several heavily armored batteries which lay concealed out-
side the visible works of the fortress itself in the broad strip
of swampland surrounding it. These were built deep into the
ground, protected by thick earthworks, and very effectively
screened from observation. They were a constant menace and
apparently could not be destroyed by the German fire. Even
though the main fort itself had been destroyed they would have
prevented the approach of the enemy's troops, for they com-
manded the only causeway leading through the swamps to the
fortress and would have blown to pieces any infantry that ven-
tured to push along this road.
Furthermore, even the intense cold did not make the swamp
passable except by the roadway because warm springs here
and there prevented the ice from freezing sufficiently strong to
bear the troops. The German gunners noted too that their
shots fell practically without effect, plunging quietly into the
mud to a great depth so that they did not even throw up earth
or mud.
The result was that the 42-centimeter monsters were hastily
withdrawn after a few trial shots and the bombardment was
continued with a battery of 28-centimeter coast defense guns,
an Austrian motor battery, a 30.5-centimeter mortar and some
other heavy batteries. The fire rose to considerable intensity
in the last days of February and the first days of March.
On the 3d of March the Russians in their official report
dwelt on the fierceness of the bombardment and its ineffective-
ness. On the 16th they reported that the Germans were pushing
several of their batteries up into closer range, as they had
recognized the uselessness of shooting from a greater distance
and on the 18th they stated that the fire was falling off. On
the 22d, finally, they reported that beginning with the 21st the
Germans had been withdrawing their heavy batteries. They
added that a 42-centimeter mortar had been damaged by the Rus-
334 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sian fire, and that "not a single shot of these mortars has
reached the fortress, not a redoubt has been penetrated. The
superiority of the artillery fire evidently rests with us. The
German attack was not only far removed from placing the forti-
fications of Ossowetz in a critical position, it did not even suc-
ceed in driving our infantry out of the field works."
On the 27th of March there was a resumption of the bombard-
ment on a small scale and another effort began on April 11
with some heavy guns, ending in an attempted advance which
was repulsed without difficulty by the Russians.
CHAPTER LIII
RUSSIAN RAID ON MEMEL
AN event in which no great number of troops were concerned,
- but which is of importance, because of the feeling which it
aroused in Germany and because it was the first of a series of
operations in what was practically a new theatre of the war was
the Russian invasion of the very northernmost tip of East
Prussia. On Thursday, the 18th of March, 1915, the Russians
coming simultaneously from the north and the east across the
border of Courland, moved on the Prussian city of Memel in
several columns. Their troops included seven battalions of
militia with six or eight guns of an old model, several squadrons
of mounted men, two companies of marines, a battalion of a
reserve regiment, and border defense troops from Riga and
Libau, a total of some 6,000 to 10,000 men. The German Land-
sturm troops at the Prussian boundary fell back on Memel, not
being in sufficient force to resist the advance. They were finally
driven through the city and across the narrow strip of water
known as the Kurische Haff to the dunes along the shore of the
Baltic. The Russians burned down numerous buildings along
the roads on which they approached, according to the German
report, inflicting heavy damage on fifteen villages. A consider-
RUSSIAN RAID ON MEMEL ^ 335
able number of the inhabitants, including women and children,
were removed to Russia, and a number of civilians were killed.
The troops entered the city on the evening of March 18 and took
the mayor and three other men of the town as hostages. Ap-
parently the Russian commander made some efforts to restrain
his men, but plundering of stores and dwellings nevertheless
occurred. On the 20th of March, 1915, the city was for a time
cleared of Russian troops, but on Sunday, the 21st, other soldiers
entered the town from the north. These were met by German
patrols, which were followed by stronger German forces that
had come up from the south to drive back the invaders. Street
fighting followed, and the Russians were finally thrown out, los-
ing about 150 dead.
The Russians were pursued on March 22 and 23, 1915, and in
passing through Polangen, close to the shore of the Baltic, came
under the fire of German cruisers. They lost some 500 prisoners,
3 guns, 3 machine guns, and ammunition wagons. With the
German troops which cleared the Russians out of Memel was the
son of the emperor. Prince Joachim of Prussia.
Concerning this raid the following official announcement was
made by the Germans on March 18, 1915: "Russian militia
troops have gained a cheap success in the northernmost comer
of East Prussia in the direction of Memel. They have plundered
and burned villages and farms. As a penalty, we have ordered
the cities occupied by us in Russian territory to pay consider-
able sums in damages. For every village or farm burned down
by these hordes on German soil three villages or farms of the
territory occupied by us in Russia will be given over to the
flames. Each act of damage in Memel will be answered by the
burning of Russian Government buildings in Suwalki and other
capitals of governments."
To this the following Russian official reply was made on
March 21, 1915 : "The official communique of the German Great
Headquarters of the 18th of March concerning the movement of
Russian troops against Memel contains a threat of reprisals to
be exacted on Russian villages and cities held by the enemy on
account of the losses which might be suffered by the population in
22— War St. 3
336 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the neighborhood of Memel. The Russian General Staff gives
public notice that Memel was openly defended by hostile troops,
and that battle was offered in the streets. Since the civil popu-
lation took part in this fight our troops were compelled to reply
with corresponding measures. If, therefore, the German troops
should carry out their threat against the peaceful inhabitants
of the Russian territory which they hold, such acts should be
considered not as reprisals but as independent acts. Responsi-
bility for this, as well as for the consequences, would rest upon
the Germans."
The move against Memel was apparently part of a Russian
operation which was intended also to strike at the city of
Tilsit. The German Great Headquarters reported that for op-
erations intended to seize the northern regions of East Prussia a
so-called Riga-Shavli army group had been formed under the
command of General Apuchtin. While portions of these troops
were active in Memel on March 18, 1915, the fourteen German
Landsturm companies holding Tauroggen, just to the north of
the East Prussian boundary, were attacked by superior forces
and practically surrounded. They fought their way through to
Langszargen with some difficulty, and were being pressed back
on the road to Tilsit when on March 23 German reenf orcements
came up and General von Pappritz, leading the Germans, went
over to the offensive.
A heavy thaw made movement of troops anywhere except on
the main roads extremely difficult. Guns were left stuck in the
mud, and the infantry waded to the knee in water, and some-
times to the waist. It is reported that one of the horses of the
artillery literally was drowned on the road. Germans attacked
Tauroggen, where the enemy had intrenched himself, under an
artillery fire directed from the church tower of the place. On
the 28th the town was taken^ after a difficult crossing of the Jura
River in front of it, on the ice. The Germans then exulted in
the fact that not a Russian was left on German soil.
GERMAN INVASION OF COURLAND 337
CHAPTER LIV
GERMAN INVASION OP COURLAND—
CAPTURE OF LIBAU
ON the 20th of April, 1915, an announcement was made by the
German Great Headquarters which took the Russians and
the world in general more or less by surprise. It gave the first
glimpse to the public of a group of operations which caused no
little speculation in the minds of strategists. It read :
"The advance troops of our forces operating in northwestern
Russia yesterday reached on a broad front the railway running
from Dunaburg (Dvinsk) to Libau. Thus far the Russian troops
present in that region, including also the remnants of those
which took part in the raid against Memel, have attempted no
serious resistance anywhere. Fighting is now in progress near
ShavU.''
The advance into Courland here announced had been made by
the German troops at high speed. The forces were under the
command of General von Lauenstein. They had begun to move
early on the 27th of April, in three columns. One of these crossed
the Niemen at Schmalleningken, forming the right wing of the
troops engaged in the movement. The columns of the left wing
broke out of East Prussia at its northernmost point, and moved
along the dunes of the Baltic. On the second day of the forward
march it was learned by the leaders of the advancing troops t3iat
the Russians had hastily left their position at Skawdwile, on the
main road from Tilsit to Mitau, to escape being surrounded on
leir left flank, and had withdrawn to Shavli by way of Heilmy.
)n the third day the German right column crossed the Win-
Lwski Canal under the enemy's fire, and on the afternoon of the
JOth of April this column entered Shavli, which had been set on
•e by the Russians.
The Germans had now crossed at several points the Libau-
>unaburg railway. They were in Telsche and Trischki. Their
ivalry pushed ahead at full speed with orders to destroy the
388
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
GERMAN ADVANCE ON RIGA
GERMAN INVASION OF COURLAND 339
railways wherever it found them. On the road to Mitau they
captured Russian machine guns, ammunition wagons, and bag-
gage, and broke up the railway tracks to the southwest and
northwest of ShavH. The Russians who had been taken by sur-
prise by this movement had apparently only weak forces in
Courland, and these had retired while reenforcements were
being rushed up by railway. The German infantry, upon the
receipt of reports that the Russians were moving up by rail from
Kovno on their right flank, was ordered to stop its advance and
prepare to hold the Dubissa line, taking up a front running a
little east of south. Cavalry moving forwiard in the center of the
German advance on the 3d of May, 1915, got within two kilo-
meters of Mitau, going beyond Grilnhof and capturing 2,000
Russians. At Skaisgiry on the day before 1,000 prisoners
had been taken, and Janischki and Shagory had been oc-
cupied far beyond the Libau-Dunaburg railway. By this time
Russian reenforcements were arriving at Mitau in huge
numbers. The German cavalry ultimately fell back after
indicting all possible damage to the communications in their
reach.
The Germans prided themselves a good deal on the marching
of their troops in this swift advance. They pointed out that the
roads were in extremely bad condition, the bridges for the most
destroyed, and the population to a large extent hostile. A mili-
tary correspondent figured that for a daily march of fifty Kilo-
metei:s, such as was frequently made in Courland, 62,000 steps
of an average of eighty centimeters were required. This for a
day's march of from nine to ten hours gives an average of five
to six kilometers per hour, some 6,000 to 7,000 steps. That
makes in the neighborhood of 100 steps per minute, which the
correspondent regarded as a considerable accomplishment when
allowance is made for the fact that this was kept up hour after
hour in full marching equipment.
The column coming from Memel, directed along the Baltic
shores, had been steadily moving on Libau. In preparation
for the land attack German naval vessels on the 29th of April
had bombarded the forts defending the town. On the 6th of May
340 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Russians themselves blew up one of the forts on the eastern
front. The shore batteries were soon after silenced by German
fire. The German troops advancing from the land side took the
forts on the south almost without opposition. Russian troops
which had been unloaded at Mitau and sent forward toward the
southwest were unable to come up in time to offer any obstacles
to the German advance, and on the 8th of May, at six o'clock in
the morning, the German soldiers marched into Libau, where
they took about 1,500 prisoners, twelve guns, and a number of
machine guns.
The Germans immediately turned the metal-working plants of
the city to their uses in the manufacture of chains, barbed wire,
etc. They also found here a large supply of tools for intrench-
ing work. Most of the Russians of the city had fled. One motive
for the German advance into Courland advanced by their ene-
mies was that it was an attempt to include a rich section of
country in foraging operations, and it is a fact that the German
authorities gave expression to their satisfaction at seizing a
region that was of considerable economic value. It is apparent,
however, in regarding these operations in the retrospect that
they had no small bearing on the German plan of campaign as
a whole. It was at the time that the inroad into Courland was
started that the signal was about to be given for the great on-
slaught far to the south on the Dunajec, as described in the
account of the Austro-Russian campaign. As the vast campaign
along the whole eastern front developed, it became more and
more apparent that the position of the German troops in Cour-
land placed them advantageously for taking the Russian line of
defenses, of which the fortress of Kovno represented the north-
em end in the flank in this carrying out of an important part of
the vast encircling movement which took all Poland in its grasp.
They were a constant threat to the all-important Vilna-Petro^
grad Railway.
In hostile and neutral countries the Courland invasion pro-
voked comment indicating astonishment at the resources of the
Teutonic powers in being able to extend their lines while already
fully engaged on an enormous front.
GERMAN INVASION OF COURLAND 341
fhe Russians, awakening from their first astonishment, made
vigorous attempts to obtain permanent possession of the
Dubissa line. Along this line the German troops were for a
time forced to yield ground and to go into the defensive and
to resist heavy Russian attacks. Shavli was given up under
Russian pressure. By May 14, all the territory east of
the Dubissa and Windau (Vindowa) was reported free of
Germans.
Especially noteworthy among the struggles for the Dubissa
was the fight at Rossiennie, a town which was of special impor-
tance because of its command of the roads centering in it. On
the 22d of May, 1915, an attack was delivered against this place
by the First Caucasian Rifle Brigade with artillery and assisted
by the Fifteenth Cavalry Division. On the 23d the German cav-
alry which had resisted their crossing the river drew back, and
the Russians here crossed the Dubissa, approaching Rossiennie
from the north. The Germans during the night moved the
greater part of their troops around the western wing of their
opponents and placed them in position for attack.
At daybreak heavy artillery fire was poured upon the Rus-
sians from the German position to the north of Rossiennie, while
at the same time the German infantry fell upon the Russian
flank and rolled it up, with the result that the Russians were
compelled to recross the Dubissa. In the crossing numerous
wounded were drowned in the river. The Germans took 2,500
prisoners and fifteen machine guns. Similar counterattacks were
delivered by the Germans on the River Wenta. Then, on the
5th of June, 1915, a general ofl^ensive was entered upon by the
whole German line on orders from the General Staff, which car-
ried it beyond the Dubissa, and after heavy fighting finally se-
cured for the Germans the Windawski Canal, which they had
had to relinquish before. Their troops now slowly pushed their
way back toward Shavli until the city came within reach of
their heavy guns, and took Kuze, twelve kilometers to the north-
west of Shavli on the railway. On the 14th of June, 1915, this
series of operations came to a temporary halt. German official
reports pointed to the fact that among 14,000 prisoners which
342 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
they had taken there were only a few officers, and that with
these not a single cannon was captured. They regarded it as
showing that the Russians were getting very cautious in the
use of their artillery and were short of officers.
CHAPTER LV
EUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM KOVNO — FOREST
BATTLES IN MAY AND JUNE
OFFENSIVES on a large scale such as that which had been
prevented by the "Winter JBattle of the Mazurian Lakes"
were not attempted by the Russians on their northern wing after
the short counterattack that had pushed their lines into the
Mlawa angle in the corner of the Vistula and the Prussian
boundary beyond Przasnysz, to the east of Thorn. They vir-
tually remained in their strongly fortified positions along the
Narew, the Bobr, and the Niemen, except for the sending out
of occasional attacking columns against the German lines lying
opposite to them.
These forward thrusts were made especially from the for-
tresses Grodno and Kovno, and the fortified place Olita. We
have already dealt with one such operation which came to grief
in the forest of Augustowo in March. The German invasion
of Courland had taken place, and the extension of the German
lines to the north invited a thrust at their communications when,
in the middle of May, the Russians attempted to break through
the German lines with columns starting from the great forest
to the west of Kovno. Here German troops under General Litz-
mann, acting under the command of General von Eichhorn, stood
on guard. When Litzmann received information that the Rus-
sians were advancing in force he was obliged hastily to gather
such troops as he £ould find to stem the Russian attack. Troop
units from a large variety of different organizations were freshly
grouped practically on the battle field. At Szaki and Gryszka-
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM KOVNO 343
buda, on May 17-20, they struck the Russians with such force
that the Slavs were driven back into the forests.
The German general now decided to clear this territory of
his enemies, as it had given them a constant opportunity for
the preparation of moves which could not be readily observed,
because of the protection of the thick woods. Again he executed
the favorite maneuver of Von Hindenburg's armies. He gath-
ered as heavy a weight of troops as possible on his left wing
and pushed them forward in an extended encircling movement.
From the south a strong column from Mariampol and the line
of the Szsczupa moved upon the fortified position of the Rus-
sians and the southern corner of the great forest, meeting with
strong resistance at Dumbowa Ruda. The troops moving down
from the northern part of the woods swung to their right to cut
off the Russians from their retreat toward Kovno. By the time
the operations had reached this stage it was the second week
in June, 1915, and in the great pine forests extending for miles
there was an oppressive heat with perfect absence of breeze.
Three Russian positions lying in the river valleys in the forest
were encircled one after another from the north and had to be
given up.
The Russians recognized the danger of the concentric attack
directed at them and fought with great bravery. They strove
to keep open the road of their retreat toward Kovno as long
as possible. However, the ring of the German troops closed
swiftly. At Koslowa Ruda, in the southern part of the forest,
they found at night a sleeping army ; something like 3,000 Rus-
sians had lain down exhausted in order on the next day to find
the last opening through which to make their escape. They were
now saved the trouble and were led away prisoners. The great
forest was cleared of Russians. The German move had served
to insure the safety of the lines connecting the troops in Cour-
land with their bases to the south of the Niemen.
In an official announcement of the 18th of March, 1915, the
German Government sketched the line held in the east by the
German troops northward of the front covered> by joint German
and Austrian forces. It read : " Jhe line occupied by us in the
344 THE STORY DF THE GREAT WAR
east runs from the Pilica, along the Rawka and Bzura to the
Vistula. North of the Vistula the line of our troops is continued
from the region to the east of Plozkz by way of Zurominek-
Stupsk (both south of Mlawa). From there it runs in an east-
erly direction through the region to the north of Przasnysz —
south of Mystinez, south of Kolno — to the north of Lomza, and
strikes the Bobr at Mocarce. From here it follows the line of
the Bobr to northwest of Ossowetz, which is under our fire, and
runs by way of the region to east of Augustowo, by Krasnopol,
Mariempol, Pilwiszki, Szaki, along the border through Taurog-
gen to the northwest. This is from beginning to end entirely
on hostile soil." This long line, it appears, was under the supreme
command of Von Hindenburg, while Von Mackensen had charge
of the great drive to the south.
The statement here quoted was issued as reassurance to Ger-
mans who had been made nervous by reports of a Russian inva-
sion of East Prussia, and was connected with the Russian raid
on Memel.
Until June there was practically no change in this great line,
except that on its northern end it was swung outward into Rus-
sian territory to include a large part of Courland, the River
Dubissa roughly forming the dividing line until the front swung
eastward toward Libau, in the line of the Libau-Dunaburg
Railway.
The tasks of both German and Russian troops were similar.
Comparatively weak German forces held the front in the region
of the Niemen, the Bobr, and the Narew, safeguarding such
Russian territory as had been seized by the Germans, and pro-
tecting East Prussia against invasion. Opposed to them lay
considerable Russian forces whose task it was, supported by the
fortresses of the Narew and the Niemen, especially Grodno, to
protect the flank and rear of the Russians standing in Warsaw
and southward in the bend of the Vistula, with the Warsaw-
Vilna Railway behind them, while great decisions were fought
for in the Carpathians and Galicia.
In Poland, between the lower and the upper courses of the
Vistula, the Germans about the middle of February, 1915, hav-
CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN POLAND 345
ing occupied the Rawka-Sucha ridge of upland, had developed
fortified positions along the rivers Bzura, Rawka, Pilica, and
Nida. The bad weather of the winter and early spring, which
had turned the roads of Poland into pathless morasses, made
against extensive operations, and the momentous undertakings
carried out on the wings of the eastern front led the German
General Staff to refrain from important movements in this sec-
tion, where the Russians had strongly fortified themselves for
the protection of Warsaw. It was not until the Teutonic allies
had gone over to the offensive in the Carpathians and in west-
ern Galicia, and the Russians had withdrawn to the Polish hills
of Lysa-Gora early in May, that, favored by improved weather*
conditions, operations in this part of Poland again took on larger
scope. Especially along the Bzura the German attacks again
became violent in an effort to hold the Russian forces in the dis-
trict to the west of Warsaw while thrusting at th^ir wings from
the south and north. However, fighting was not of great conse-
quence in this middle sector until the middle of June, 1915.
CHAPTER LVI
CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN POLAND — MOVE-
MENT UPON WARSAW
BY the 1st of July, 1915, the stupendous enveloping campaign
of the Teuton armies on the eastern front had advanced to
a point where the Allies were forced to recognize the imminence
of a catastrophe, which could be averted only by the most decisive
action of the Russian armies.
Far in the north, on the extreme right wing of the Russians,
tlxe army of General von Biilow was hammering at the defenses
of the Dubissa line. Off and on fighting was taking place in the
neighborhood of Shavli. Russian counterattacks, reported from
day to day through June, with difficulty had held in check this
army, which evidently was aiming at the Warsaw-Petrograd
346 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Railway on the sector between Vilna and Dvinsk. On the right
flank of these forces operated the troops of General von Eich-
horn, with the line of the Niemen for their objective. Next to
these on the south, aiming at the Bobr River and the Upper
Narew, were the forces of General von Scholtz, and on their
right the army of Von Gallwitz, based on Mlawa with Przasnysz
in front of it. Below the line of the Vistula, before the Bzura
and down to the middle course of the Pilica, operated the Ninth
German Army, commanded, at least in the later stages of the
Warsaw campaign, by Prince Leopold of Bavaria. The whole
group of northern and central armies was acting under the gen-
eral direction of Field Marshal von Hindenburg.
The armies to the south of this group, cooperating in the
drive under Field Marshal von Mackensen which had gained
the Teutons Przemysl and Lemberg, had as their left flank the
forces of Generals von Woyrsch and Kovess between the Pilica
and the Vistula mouth of the San. The troops of Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand were pushing forward on the right of these,
and the army directly under Mackensen himself came next in
line to the eastward, joining up with the armies still operating
in Galicia at the extreme right of the great German battle line.
The chief danger to the Russians at this stage still threatened
from the south, where the archduke and Mackensen had pushed
forward irresistibly in their advance to the east of the Vistula
toward the railway running from Warsaw through Ivangorod,
Lublin, Cholm, and Kovell to Kiev and Moscow.
The advance of these Austro-German armies, which had oper-
ated in the neighborhood of Lemberg, was extremely rapid in
the last days of June, 1915. In four days they covered from
thirty to forty miles in pursuit of the Russians. By the 1st of
July, having swept out of Galicia, their right, under Mackensen,
entered the upper valley of the Wieprz, a marshy country which
presented considerable difficulty to the advance of troops where
a tributary of the Wieprz, the Por, afforded the Russians a natu-
ral line of defense. Drasnik, on the Wyznica, which here ex-
tended the Russian defensive line westward, was occupied by the
archduke's forces on Mackensen's left on the 1st of July, 1915.
CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN POLAND 347
The drive of the Austro-German armies through Galicia has
been dealt with in the account of the Austro-Russian cam-
paign. As we carry forward the account of the activities of the
greatest part of the forces concerned in that series of opera-
tions from the point where they crossed over the boundary
between Galicia and Poland out of Austrian territory, it will
be well to glance backward a moment to enumerate here
briefly the gains of these armies on Polish soil up to the 1st
of July.
On June 16, 1915, the Teutonic allies forced the Russians to
fall back upon Tarnograd from north of Siemandria, thus push-
ing this section of the front across the boundary into Poland
about to the line of the Tanev. Tarnograd itself was occupied
by the Teutons on the 17th, and on the 18th the Russians re-
treated behind the Tanev. There was little change in this par-
ticular sector during the fighting which was crowned for the
Austro-Germans by the capture of Lemberg on June 22, 1915.
Further to the east, however, to the south of the Pilica and west
of the Vistula, Von Woyrsch was exerting pressure, and on the
20th of June Berlin announced the capture of several Russian
advance posts by these troops. By the 24th the Slavs had begun
to retreat before Von Woyrsch in the forest region south of the
Ilza on the left bank of the Vistula ; thus rear guards had been
thrown across the Kamienna, and Sandomir was occupied by
the Austro-Hungarians. On the 25th the fighting developed on
the line Zarvichost-Sienno-Ilza, to which the Russians had fallen
back.
Defeats of the Russian rear guards on June 29, 1915, to the
northeast and west of Tomaszow, where Teutonic forces had
now also crossed into Poland, caused the Slavs to begin the re-
linquishment of the Tanev forest district and the lower San.
Tomaszow itself was occupied by the pursuing troops. By the
30th the Teutonic allies had swept forward beyond the Tanev
region to Franpol, Zamoez, and Komarovo, and on the same eve-
ning they threw the Russians out of their strong defenses on the
Zavichost-Ozarow-Sienno line, west of the Vistula. The pur-
suit was pushed energetically on both sides of the Kamienna.
348 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The important bridgehead on the Vistula, Josefovo, was taken
on the 1st of July.
The Russians between the Bug and the Vistula were now
offering strong resistance with large forces on the line Turobin-
Krasnik-Josefovo, the rivers Por and Wyznica forming roughly
their defensive front, as previously pointed out.
In its daily bulletins of July 1, 1915, the German Great Head-
quarters made this announcement for the eastern theatre of
war (from the Baltic to the Pilica) : "The booty for June is :
Two colors, 25,595 prisoners, including 121 officers, seven can-
non, six mine throwers, fifty-two machine guns, one aeroplane,
also a large amount of war material." For the southeastern
theatre of war (from the Pilica to Bukowina) the headquarters
announced : "The total booty for June of the allied troops fighting
under the command of General von Linsingen, Field Marshal von
Mackensen, and General von Worysch is 409 officers, 140,650
men, 80 cannon, 268 machine guns." The Austro-Hungarian
General Staff on the same day reported: "The total booty for
June of the troops fighting under Austro-Hungarian command
in the northeast is 521 officers, 194,000 men, 93 cannon, 364
machine guns, 78 ammunition wagons, 100 field railway car-
riages, etc."
CHAPTER LVII
BATTLE OF KRASNIK — CAPTURE OP
PRZASN YSZ
ON July 2, 1915, the forces of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand
which had passed through Krasnik, dn the Lublin road,
struck serious resistance from the Russian army of General
Loesche which held strong positions across the highway, just
to the north of the town, and was now evidently deteimined to
stop once for all the Teuton advance toward the railway at
its back, connecting Warsaw with Kiev, through Lublin and
Cholm.
BATTLE OF KRASNIK 349
On July 3, 1915, the Austrian report, however, announced that
4,800 prisoners and three machine guns had been taken in the
neighborhood of Krasnik and along the Por stream, and the
next day they reported that they had occupied the heights which
run along to the north of the city, having pierced the enemy's
main position on both sides of Studzianki, and taken more than
1,000 prisoners, three machine guns and three cannon.
The Russian front was turned to such an extent that they
had to fall back some three miles on the Lublin road. The Aus-
trians on the 5th of July summed up their enemy's losses as
twenty-nine officers, 8,000 men, six cannon, five ammunition
wagons, and six machine guns. As the result of this Austrian
advance the adjoining enemy forces to the eastward along the
Wieprz River had been obliged to fall back beyond Tamograd,
and by the 6th of July Vienna summarized the Austrian cap-
tures in these battles as having grown to forty-one officers,
F 11,500 men.
The Austrians, however, could make no further headway. On
July 5, 1915, they were heavily attacked, being forced back to
their intrenched lines on a ridge of hills to the north of Krasnik,
The Russians now reported that they had taken 15,000 prisoners
and a large number of machine guns. Two thousand bodies were
eported by the Russians to have been found before their front.
ore prisoners were taken by the Russians on the 7th and it
was only on the afternoon of July 9 that the Austrians were
able to stem the tide. The total loss of the Austrians in this
[action was given by their opponents as 15,000 men.
The Austrian explanation of their retirement in front of
Krasnik issued on July 11, 1915, pointed out that the relative
subsidence of activity of the Teutonic allies was due to the fact
that the goal set for the Lemberg campaign had now been attained.
This, they explained, was the taking of the city and the securing
of ^strong defensive positions to the east and north. The ridge
to the northward of Krasnik was a natural choice for this pur-
pose on the north, while the line of the Zlota Lipa and Bug rivers
served the purpose toward the east (see Austro-Russian cam-
paign). The Austrian explanation pointed out further that
350 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
some of their troops had rushed beyond the positions originally
selected to meet heavy reenforcements brought up by the Rus-
sians from Lublin, and that these had to withdraw to the ridge,
where they were successfully resisting all attacks.
The battle of Krasnikwas regarded by the Russians as an effec-
tive victory, for it seemed to have halted the advance on Lublin.
The army of Von Mackensen had now also come to a stop about
halfway between Zamosc and Krasnostav, an artillery duel on
July 7, 1915, being the last activity noted on the front of this
army for some time.
Their comparative quiet in the region between the Vistula
and the Bug where the main advance of the Teutonic forces on
the south had been under way with great vigor for several weeks
until the check at Krasnik was not interrupted until July 16,
1915. Day after day the Teutonic headquarters reported "noth-
ing of importance" in this quarter. When the quiet was finally
broken it appeared that it had been the lull before the storm.
Before taking up again the activities on this section of the front,
it will be necessary to take a glance toward the northern
half of the great arc that enveloped the Warsaw salient on two
sides.
In these early days of July, 1915, considerable uncertainty
prevailed among those who were watching the progress of the
campaign in Poland as to where the heaviest blow of the Teutons
would fall, whether from the south or the north. The decisive
stroke came with lightning suddenness. A tremendous attack
was launched in the direction of the Narew by the army of
General von Gallwitz.
A laconic announcement of the German General Staff on July
14, 1915, bore momentous news, although its modest wording
scarcely betrayed the facts. It read : "Between the Niemen and
the Vistula, in the region of Walwarga, southwest of Koino, near
Przasnysz and south of Mlawa, our troops have achieved some
local successes." The Russian report referring to the beginning
of the same action was equally noncommittal, though possibly
more misleading. This states : "Considerable enemy forces be-
tween the Orczy and the Lidynja adopted the offensive and the
BATTLE OF KRASNIK 351
Russians declining a decisive engagement retreated during the
night of the 13th to the second line of their positions."
On July 15, 1915, the Germans announced that the city of
Przasnysz, for which such hot battles had been fought in
February, and which had since been strongly fortified by the
Russians, had been occupied by them. The German summary of
this action given out a few days later stated that three Russian
defensive lines lying one behind the other northwest and north-
east of Przasnysz had been pierced and taken, the troops at once
rushing forward to Dzielin and Lipa, respectively west and east
of the town. Under attack from these two points the Russians
after yielding Przasnysz, on the 14th, retired to their defensive
line Ciechanow-Krasnosielc which had been prepared long before-
hand. On the 15th the German troops pressing closer upon the
retiring Slavs stormed this line and broke through it to the
south of Zielona on a breadth of seven kilometers, forcing the
Rus&lans again to retire. General von Gallwitz's troops in this
assault were supported by the forces of General von Scholtz,
on their left, who were pressing the Russians from the direction
of Kolno. On July 16, 1915, the Russians were retreating on the
whole front between the Pissa and the Vistula, toward the
Narew.
The German summary of the fighting during these days re-
ported the capture by the army of General von Gallwitz of eighty-
eight officers, 17,500 men, thirteen cannon (including one heavy
gun), forty machine guns, and seven mine throwers; and by the
army of General von Scholtz of 2,500 prisoners and eight ma-
chine guns.
I' This great attack in the north, to which may be ascribed the
final breaking of tlie lines that had so long protected Warsaw,
tad been carefully planned and undoubtedly was timed in co-
ordination with the movements of Mackensen's armies on the
pouth, striking the Russians just when Mackensen and the Arch-
duke Josef, having had time for recuperation and preparation
for another push forward after the check administered at
Krasnik, were in readiness to inflict a heavy blow on their side
of the Warsaw salient. When it began the German lines all
23— War St. 3
352 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
along the front burst into fresh activity. It was the signal for
a simultaneous assault along nearly a thousand miles of battle
front.
In the Mlawa sector to the north of Przasnysz the Russians
had developed an exceedingly strong system of fortified
positions between their advance lines and the Narew fortresses.
For miles, to a depth of from fifteen to twenty kilometers, there
ran some three or four and at certain points even five systems
of trenches, one behind the other. Hundreds of thousands of
thick tree trunks had been worked into these defensive works
and millions of sand bags piled up as breastwork. Bombproof
dugouts had been constructed deep in the ground. Everywhere
there were strong wire entanglements before the front, some-
times sunk below the level of the earth, arranged in from two
to three rows. Projecting bastions and thoroughly protected
observation posts gave these systems of trenches the character
of permanent fortifications.
The country in this region is hilly, with here and there steep
declivities and peaks of considerable elevation. The Russians
had cut down whole stretches of forest in order to afford them
a free field for their fire and an opportunity to observe the
advance of their opponents. Enveloping tactics on the part of
the Germans were here quite excluded as the two lines ran
uninterruptedly close to one another. Przasnysz which had
become a heap of ruins had been converted virtually into a
fortress by strong defensive works built while the Germans and
Russians lay opposite each other in front of it throughout the
spring. The country round about had been drenched with much
German and Russian blood.
General von Gallwitz, to capture a place with the least possible
loss, decided to break through the Russian defenses at two points
at both sides of the town sufficiently close to each other so that
the intervening lines would be immediately affected. His attacks
were therefore directed at the first line Russian positions, which
formed projecting angles to the northwest and northeast of
Przasnysz so that instead of taking the city directly from the
front he would seize it as with a gigantic pair of pincers from
BATTLE OF KRASNIK 353
both sides and behind. The plan succeeded to the full. The Rus-
sian lines were broken on both sides of the city and the German
troops, rushing through, met behind it, forcing the Russian de-
fenders hastily to evacuate the place to avoid being caught within
the circle.
Strong infantry forces were collected opposite the points of
attack, and enormous masses of artillery were placed in position
with abundance of ammunition in readiness. The preparations
had been made with all possible secrecy and even when the Ger-
man batteries had begun gradually to get their range by testing
shots no serious assault seems to have been expected by the Rus-
sians. On the morning of the attack they were just to inaugurate
service on a small passenger railway line they had constructed
behind their front.
On the morning of July 13, 1915, soon after sunrise, a
tremendous cannonade was let loose from guns of all calibers.
Although the weather was rainy and not well fitted for observa-
tion the German guns seem to have found their marks with
great accuracy. When the German infantry stormed the first
line of works which had been shattered by the artillery fire
they met with comparatively little resistance and their losses
were small. The bombardment apparently had done its
work thoroughly. The German infantry rushes were started
in successive intervals of a quarter of an hour, line fol-
lowing line. Swarms of unarmed Russians could be seen
coming out of the trenches seeking to save themselves from
the terrible effect of the shell fire by surrendering. During
the course of the forenoon the sun came out and illuminated a
scene of terrific destruction. The Russian positions on the
heights northwest of Przasnysz had been completely leveled. In
their impetuous forward rush the German troops did not give
the enemy time to make a stand in his second line of trenches^
and overrunning this, by night began to enter the third Russian
defensive line. Przasnysz was flanked in the course of twenty-
four hours and could no longer be held. A fine rain was falling
as the German columns marched through the deserted, smoke-
blackened city, a melancholy setting for a victory.
354 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On July 14, 1915, the German troops had broken through on
both sides of the city, met to the south of it and forming a mighy
battering ram, on the next day, forced the next Russian line, the
last, to the north of the Narew. This ran through Wysogrod-
Ciechanow-Zielona to Kranosiele. The Russians here made a
desperate defense and the German advance pushed forward but
slowly. The effect of the German artillery fire seems not to have
been as striking as on the first day of battle. The German
report of the attack on this line points out that the regiment of
the Guard holding the right wing of a division which was to
attack the heights to the south and southeast of Zielona was im-
patient to go forward, and was allowed to advance before the
reserves which were to be held in readiness to support the move
had come up.
However, confident of the accuracy with which the "black
brothers" (shells from the big guns) struck the enemy's
trenches, the riflemen leapt forward through fields of grain as
soon as they saw that a gust of their shells had struck in front
of them. By means of signs which been agreed upon they then
signaled their new positions and the guns laid their fire another
hundred meters farther forward. The infantrjonen then
stormed ahead into the newly made shell craters. Thus they
went forward again and again. Neither Russian fire nor the
double barbed wire entanglements were able to check their
assaults.
As the German shouts rolled forth the Russians ran. A
neighboring division consisting of young men who had enlisted
in the course of the war, in a brilliant charge took a bastion at |
Klosnowo. The effect of this first penetration of the Russian
main position made itself felt in the course of the afternoon and
night along the whole front. Further German forces were
thrown into the breach and strove to widen it.
The Russians at many points resisted obstinately, but under
the pressure from the front and in the flank they were finally
unable to hold their ground. The German account speaks with
admiration of the ride to death of a Russian cavalry brigade
which attacked the German infantry southeast of Opinozura
BATTLE OF KRASNIK 355
without achieving: any results. Cossacks and Hussars were
mowed down in an instant.
The German advance taking several intermediate places did
not halt until it stood before the fortification of the Narew
line itself. As a result of this stroke the German troops had
advanced some forty to fifty kilometers into hostile territory on
a breadth of a hundred and twenty kilometers and had captured
some 10,000 prisoners and much war material. By the 18th of
July, 1915, German trains were running as far as Ciechanow.
Advances were likewise made by the Germans to the right of
the attack on the Przasnysz positions on both sides of the Mlawa-
Ciechanow Railway, rolling up the Russian positions as far as
Plonsk. On the left progress had also been made and heavy
fighting done, but the German great headquarters pointed out
that in times to come history will assign the important place to
the central feature of this great offensive by General von
Gallwitz, that is the enveloping attack at Przasnysz and the ram-
ming thrust at Zielona.
The report issued by the Russian General Staff on July 19,
1915, admitted that to the west of Omulev their troops had with-
drawn to the Narew bridgeheads on the 17th. The points of
some of the German columns on this day, in fact, came within
the range of the artillery of the fortress of Novo-Georgievsk and
the army of General von Scholtz reached the line of the Bobr
and the Narew between Osowice and Ostrolenka. The action at
Przasnysz had been decisive. It resulted ultimately in the
relinquishing by the Russians of the lines of the Rawka and
Bzura which had been so stubbornly held against the Germans
in the long defense of Warsaw. The troops directly charged
here with defending the capital fell back to the Blonie lines
about fifteen miles from the city.
356' THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER LVIII
GRAND OFFENSIVE ON THE WARSAW
SALIENT
THE great stroke at Przasnysz was the most dramatic feature
of a grand offensive all around the German lines that were
endeavoring to close in upon the Russian armies. On July 16,
1915, the Archduke Joseph struck hard at the Russians on the
Krasnik-Lublin road in an endeavor to carry the fortified
positions at Wilkolaz. His men, however, were thrown back after
ten furious assaults. Krasnostav, on the road to Cholm, was
attacked on the same day by the army of General von Macken-
sen, and after a series of desperate rear-guard actions had been
fought by the Russians was swept over by the German Allies.
By the close of the day the Germans had taken twenty-eight
officers, 6,380 men, and nine machine guns.
The Germans, prepared in the recent pause in the fighting, by
the bringing up of their artillery on the long lines of com-
munication which now stretched behind them, with troops re-
enforced by such fresh forces as they could muster, were hurling
themselves upon the Russian defensive positions everywhere
along the line. Thus, on the forenoon of July 17, 1915, the
army of General von Woyrsch, whose objective was the mighty
fortress Ivangorod, operating just to the west of the upper
Vistula, broke through the Russian wire entanglements and
stormed the enemy's trenches on a stretch of 2,000 meters. The
breach was widened in desperate hand-to-hand combat. The
Teutons by evening inflicted a heavy defeat on the Moscow
Grenadier Corps at this point and the Russians were forced to
retreat behind the Ilzanka to the south of Swolen. Some 2,000
men were taken prisoners by the Germans in this battle and five
machine guns were captured.
Far in the northeast in Courland the army of General von
Billow, on July 17, 1915, defeated Russian forces that had been
rushed up at Alt-Auz, taking 3,620 prisoners, six cannon and
4
OFFENSIVE ON THE WARSAW SALIENT 357
three machine guns, and pursuing the Slavs in an easterly-
direction. Desperate fighting was also taking place to the north-
east of Kurschany.
Notes of anxiety mixed with consoling speculations had begun
to appear in the press of the allied countries when the vast Ger-
man offensive had thus become plainly revealed and had demon-
strated its driving force. A Petrograd dispatch to the London
"Morning Post" on the 15th of July, 1915, said of the German
plan that it was to catch the Russian armies like a nut between
nut crackers, that the two fronts moving up from north and south
were intended to meet on another and grind everything between
them to powder. The area between the attacking forces was
some eighty miles in extent, north to south, by 120 miles west
to east. The writer offered the consolation that this space was
well fortified, the kernel of the nut "sound and healthy, being
formed of the Russian armies, inspired not merely with the
righteousness of their cause, but the fullest confidence in them-
selves and absolute devotion to the proved genius of their com'
mander in chief."
The dispatch pointed out that it was all sheer frontal fighting,
that the Germans had been twelve months trying frontal attacks^
against Warsaw on a comparatively narrow front and in vain.
What chance had they, he added, "of success by dividing their
forces against the united strength of Russia." This sort of
argument is typical of the endeavor to sustain the hopes of
Russia's friends during these days. Doubts, however, began
to creep in more strongly as to the possibility of holding
Warsaw.
In Berlin the announcement of the Teutonic victories that
jgan with the successful assault at Przasnysz was received with
general rejoicing, and the appearance of flags all over the city.
le Russian retreat toward the Narew River in particular was
jgarded by the military critics as threatening momentarily to
crumble up the right flank of the positions of the Russians before
le capital of Poland.
Cholm and Lublin on the southern line of communication of
LB Russian armies were now in imminent danger. On July 19,
358
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
.^•^FRONTIER
» > » *- RAILROADS
SCALE OF MILE'S
I I 1 I
5 [O 15
GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO REACH WARSAW IN 1914
OFFENSIVE ON THE WARSAW SALIENT 359
1915, came the announcement that the troops under Field Mar-
shal von Mackensen, which had pierced the Russian line in the
region of Pilaskowice and Krasnostav, had increased their suc-
cesses, and that the Russians were making the most desperate
effort to prevent complete defeat. All day the battle had swayed
in a fierce struggle for mastery. The Russians threw a fresh
division of the Guards into the fight, but this too had to yield to
the overwhelming force of the Teuton onslaught. Farther to the
east as far as the neighborhood of Grabowiec, Austro-Hungarian
and German troops forced the crossing of the Wolica, and near
Sokal in Galicia Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the Bug. (See
Austro-Russian Campaign.) In consequence of these Teuton
successes the Russians on the night of the 18th to the 19th of
July retreated along the whole front between the Vistula and the
Bug — practically the last line of defense, for the Warsaw-Kiev
railway had been broken down. The German troops and the
corps under the command of Field Marshal von Arz alone from
the 15th to the 18th of July, 1915, took 16,250 prisoners and 23
machine guns.
It was announced by the Germans that according to written
orders captured during this action the Russian leaders had re-
solved to hold the positions here conquered by the Germans to
the utmost, regardless of losses.
The same day that brought the report of this Russian retreat
on the south brought the news that in the adjoining sector to the
west of the Upper Vistula the army of General von Woyrsch had
met resistance from the Russians behind the Ilzanka after the
Russian defeat on July 13, 1915, that, however, Silesian Land-
wehr on the 18th had captured the Russian defenses at Ciepilovo
by storm, and that the Russian line at Kasonow and Barenow
was beginning to yield. The army of General von Gallwitz had
now taken up positions along the whole Narew line from south-
west of Ostrolenka to Novo Georgievsk. The Russians, how*
ever, as already indicated, were still holding fortified places and
bridgeheads on the right bank of the river. In this sector the
number of prisoners taken by the Germans had risen to 101
officers and 28,760 men.
360 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
In the sector next adjoining, passing onward around the en-
veloping lines, that lying between the Pissa and the Szkwa, the
Russians likewise had retreated until they stood directly on the
Narew. Here the Slavs had been favored by forests and swampy
land which made pursuit difficult.
At the extreme left end of the German line a magnificent suc-
cess had been achieved in the occupation of Tukkum and Windau.
This capture brought the Germans to within fifty miles of Riga,
seat of the governor general of the Baltic provinces. They were,
however, destined not to make any substantial progress in the
direction of that city for many months to come.
Blow fell upon blow. The question "Can Warsaw be held?"
began to receive doubtful answers in the allied capitals. The
colossal coordinate movement of the Teutonic forces in these
July days had received so little check from the Russian resistance
that the British press had begun to discount the fall of the
Polish capital. Shortness of ammunition and artillery was
ascribed as the cause of Russia's failure to make a successful
stand against the onrushing Teutons.
On July 20, 1915, Berlin announced the capture of those forti-
fications of Ostrolenka lying on the northwest bank of the
Narew River. This was one of the strong places designed to pro-
tect the Warsaw-Grodno-Petrograd railway. The threatened
fall was highly significant. To the south of the Vistula the
Teuton troops had advanced to the Blonie-Grojec lines. Blonie
is some seventeen miles west of Warsaw and Grojec twenty-six
miles south of the city.
Farther eastward and to the south troops of the army of Gen-
eral von Woyrsch had completely turned the enemy out of the
Ilzanka positions, having repulsed the counterattacks of the
Russian reserves which had been quickly brought up, and cap-
tured more than 5,000 prisoners. Von Woyrsch"s cavalry had
now reached the railway line from Radom to the great fortress
of Ivangorod, the objective point of this army, and Radom itself
had been seized.
BEGINNING OF THE END .,361
CHAPTER LIX
BEGINNING OF THE END
SO uncertain had grown the positions of Lublin on the south-
em railway line leading to Warsaw that the Russian com-
mander in chief had issued an order that in case of a retreat the
male population of the town was to attach itself to the retiring
troops.
On July 21, 1915, the Russians throughout the empire were
reported to be joining in prayer. "Yesterday evening," tele-
graphed the London "Daily Mail's" Petrograd correspondent on
the 21st, "the bells in all the churches throughout Russia clanged
a call to prayer for a twenty-four hours' continual service of
intercession for victory.
"To-day, in spite of the heat, the churches were packed. Hour
after hour the people stand wedged together while the priests
and choirs chant interminable litanies. Outside the Kamian
Cathedral here an open-air Mass is being celebrated in the pres-
ence of an enormous crowd."
The chronicle of the closing days of July, 1915, is an un-
broken narrative of forward movements of German armies on
all parts of the great semicircle. The movement now, however,
was slow. The Russians were fighting desperately, and the
Germans had to win their way inch by inch. By the 21st the
Russians were withdrawing in Courland to the east of the line
Popeljany-Kurtschany, and the last Russian trenches westward
of Shavly had been taken by assault. To the north of Novgorod
the capture of Russian positions had yielded 2,000 prisoners and
two machine guns to the Germans on the 20th.
Farther south on the Narew a strong work of the fortress
Rozan defending an important crossing was stormed by the
Germans, and desperate fighting was going on at Pultusk and
near Georgievsk. Already the Russians were beginning to yield
their positions to the west of Grojec, which meant that the
Teuton armies were about to push into the opening between
362 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Warsaw and Ivangorod and divide the Russian forces. The
armies of Von Woyrsch on July 20, 1915, seized a projecting
bridgehead to the south of Ivangorod, and captured the Hnes that
had been held by the Russians near Wladislavow.
In the positions defending the railway between Cholm and
Lublin, Russian resistance was once more marked, and was
checking the progress of the armies of Von Mackensen and Arch-
duke Joseph Ferdinand.
By noon of July 21, 1915, the Silesian troops of Von Woyrsch
had stormed the bridgehead on the Vistula between Lagow and
Lugawa-Wola, with the result that Ivangorod was now inclosed
from the south, while to northwest of the fortress Austro-Hun-
garian troops were lighting on the west bank of the Vistula.
Austro-Hungarian troops too were battling their way close up to
the fortress directly from the west. Line after line was giving
way before the Teutons. The Russian retreat over the bridge at
Novo Alexandria to the south of Ivangorod was carried on under
the fire of German artillery. Numerous villages set afire by the
Russians were now sending great clouds of smoke into the sky
over all this region.
The troops of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, after a stub-
born resistance on the part of the Russians, seized enemy posi-
tions on July 21, 1915, near Chodel and Borzechow, ad-
vancing another step toward Lublin. Eight thousand Russian
prisoners, 15 machine guns, and 4 ammunition wagons were
taken.
By the 23d of July, 1915, the Teutonic troops were close up to
the encircling forts of Ivangorod and stood on the Vistula all the
way between the fortress and the mouth of the Pilica. On the
24th the Teutons announced a victory over the Fifth Russian
Army by General von Biilow at Shavli. The report read : "After
ten days of continuous fighting, marching, and pursuit, the Ger-
man troops yesterday succeeded in brmging the Russians to a
stand in the regions of Rozalin and Szadow and in defeating them
and scattering their forces. The booty since the beginning of this
operation on the 14th of July consists of 27,000 prisoners, 25
cannon, 40 machine guns, more than 100 loaded ammunition
BEGINNING OF THE END 363
wagons with their draft animals, numerous baggage wagons and
other material."
This day brought the announcement also of the capture of the
fortresses of Rozan and Pultusk on the Narew, after violent
charges by troops of General von Gallwitz. The crossing of the
Narew between these places was now in German hands, and
strong forces were advancing on the southern shore. The Rus-
sians had been resisting obstinately in this quarter, and the Ger-
mans had made their way only by the most heroic efforts. Ger-
man headquarters announced at this time that in the battles
between the Niemen and the Vistula covering the ten days since
July 14, 1915, more than 41,000 prisoners, 14 cannon, and 19 ma-
chine guns had been captured. The German troops now also
attained the Vistula to the north of the Pilica. In their summing
up of results since the 14th of July the Teutons recounted
further on this day, the 24th, that some 50,000 prisoners had
been taken by the armies of General von Woyrsch and Field
Marshal von Mackensen during the period.
The army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had been making
rapid progress. On July 24, 1915, under the attacks of these
troops the Russians retreated on a front of forty kilometers,
between the Vistula and the Bistritza, from eight to ten kilo-
meters northward to prepared lines, their attempts to halt in
intermediate positions being frustrated by the onrush of the
victorious Teutonic forces in pursuit.
By July 25, 1915, the Narew had been crossed by the Germans
along its whole front, southward from Ostrolenka to Pultusk,
and by the 26th they had gained the farther side of the Narew
above Ostrolenka likewise. The troops moving southeast from
Pultusk now approached the Bug, getting toward the rear of
Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw, and threatening to close the
Russians' Hne of escape, the Warsaw-Bielostok railway.
On July 26, 1915, the Russians made a determined counter-
offensive from the line of Goworowo-Wyszkow-Serock in an
effort to remove the threat to the rear of Warsaw. This, how-
ever, had little success, the Hp'^'sians losing 3,319 men to the
Germans in prisoners.
364 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
To the south of Warsaw the Germans had seized the villages
of Ustanov, Lbiska, and Jazarzew, which brought them nearly
to the Vistula, just below the capital.
The great attacks of the Germans on the troops defending
Warsaw were being hampered to some extent by the laying waste
of the country by the retiring Russians. Difficulty in moving
heavy artillery on roads had also interfered with their progress,
but on the morning of July 28, 1915, Von Woyrsch crossed to the
eastern shore of the Vistula between the mouth of the Pilica and
Kozienice at several places, and was threatening the Warsaw-
Ivangorod railway.
Novo Georgievsk was steadily being inclosed. The Russian
counterthrusts in the neighborhood of Warsaw both on the north
and the south of the city were repelled by night and day. To the
south near Gora-Kalvaria a desperate attempt of the Russians
to push forward toward the west on the night from July 27th to
the 28th, 1915, was shattered.
The armies of Field Marshal von Mackensen, breaking
through Russian positions to the west of the Wieprz, captured
thousands of prisoners and many guns, and once more thrust
back the Russian front between the Vistula and the Bug. On
the evening of the 29th they attained the Warsaw-Kiev railway
at Biskupice, about halfway between Lublin and Cholm, thus
crowning their efforts to get astride their important line of com-
munications. The Russians were destroying everything of value
in the country as they retired, even burning grain in the fields.
On the afternoon of July 30, 1915, Lublin at last was occupied
by the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and on the 31st
the Germans of Von Mackensen passed through Cholm. Thus
the Teutonic armies were now across the important railway
from Warsaw and Ivangorod to Kiev, on a broad front, running
all the way down to the Vistula at Novo Alexandria. In Cour-
land the Germans continued to push forward, so that on the 12th
of August they were enabled to seize the important railway
center Mistan.
Hope in Russia died hard. Press correspondents up to July
29, 1915, still spoke of the possibility of the Russians standing a
BEGINNING OF THE END ^5
siege in their principal fortress on the Warsaw saHent. On the
29th, however, reports came from Petrograd that the fortresses
of the Warsaw defense were to be abandoned and the capital of
Poland given up to the army.
The correspondent of the New York "Times" on July 29, 1915,
in a special cable summed up the situation in an announce-
ment that the fate of Europe hung on the decision that Russia
might make on the question : "Shall Russia settle down to a war
of position in her vast fortifications around Warsaw, or shall she
continue to barter space against time, withdrawing from the line
of the Vistula and points on it of both strategic and political
importance, in order to gain the time which Germany has already
stored in the form of inexhaustible gun munitions?" The reply
was the evacuation of Warsaw.
The decisive blow to Russia's hopes came with the crossing of
the Vistula about twenty miles north of Ivangorod on July 28,
1915, already noted. It showed that Warsaw was being rapidly
surrounded. The Russian communique of the 30th of July told
of the crossing over of the Teutons on both sides of the Radomka,
a tributary of the Vistula, to the right bank of the Vistula on
pontoons, and of attempts to throw bridges across the great
rivers. Von Woyrsch's troops that had crossed over were irre-
sistibly pursuing still farther east on the 30th, defeating troops
hastily brought up to stop their advance. By August 1 two entire
German army corps reached the right bank of the Vistula. Ivan-
gorod, now threatened from all directions, could evidently not be
held much longer.
The fortress surrendered on August 4, 1915, after a violent
bombardment of the outer forts had taken place, beginning on
the first of the month. Austro-Hungarian troops under General
von Koevess especially distinguished themrelves in the attack ^^
the west front.
866 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER LX
WARSAW FALLS
THE retreat from Warsaw began during the night of August
3 and 4, 1915. Already the city had been stripped as far as
possible, to judge by reports from Petrograd, of metals, such as
church bells and machinery that might possibly be of use to the
Germans. A portion of the civilian population left the city. The
Blonie line just to the west of the capital was given up under
pressure from the Teutons on the 3d. While the retreat was
taking place the Russians gave all possible support to their forces
defending the Narew lines, so far as ^hey still were maintained.
Desperate charges were hurled by the Russians against the
Germans moving forward all along the front Lowza-Ostrow-
Wyszkow. The bravery of the Russians, especially in their
counterattacks on both sides of the road from Rozan to Ostrow
on the 4th of August, won the admiration of the Germans.
The correspondent of the London "Times" reports that on
August 4, 1915, there was probably not over one Russian corps
on the west side of the Vistula. "Half of that crossed south of
Warsaw before 6 p. m.," he writes, "and probably the last divi-
sion left about midnight, and at 3 a. m. on August 5 the bridges
were blown up. The Germans arrived at 6 a. m." The formal
entry of the Polish capital was made by Prince Leopold of
Bavaria as Commander in Chief of the army which took the city.
The formal announcement issued by the German Great Head-
quarters on the 5th of August read : "The army of Prince Leo-
pold of Bavaria pierced and took yesterday and last night the
outer and inner lines of forts of Warsaw in which Russian rear
guards still offered stubborn resistance. The city was occupied
to-day by our troops."
In the capture of Warsaw seven huge armies had been em^
ployed. The German northern army, operating against the
double-track line which runs from Warsaw to Petrograd, 1,000
miles in the northeast, via Bielostok and Grodno; the army
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WARSAW FALLS
367
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ADVANCE AND CAPTURE OF WARSAW
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368 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
operating in the Suwalki district, threatening the same line
farther west; the army aimed at the Narew based on Mearva ; the
army directly aimed at Warsaw, north of the Vistula; the
(Ninth) army directly aimed at Warsaw, south of the Vistula;
ten or twelve Austrian army corps attempting to reach the
single- and double-track railway from Ivangorod to Brest-Litovsl«
and Moscow, and the line from Warsaw to Kiev via Lublin
and Cholm, which is for the most part a single track, and, finally,
the army of Von Linsingen, operating on the Lipa east of
Lemberg.
The campaign for Warsaw had been fought along a front of
1,000 miles, extending from the Baltic to the frontier of Ru-
mania. An estimate which lays claim to being based upon
authoritative figures placed the number of men engaged in
almost daily conflict on this long line at between 6,000,000 and
7,000,000. The attacks upon the sides of the lines on which the
defense of Warsaw depended had been the most furious in the
course of the war on the eastern front. The losses on both sides
undoubtedly were enormous, though they can be ascertained
only with difficulty, if at all.
The following summary of captures was issued by the German
Great Headquarters on August 1, 1915: "Captured in July be-
tween the Baltic and the Pilica, 95,023 Russians ; 41 guns, includ-
ing two heavy ones ; 4 mine throwers ; 230 machine guns. Taken
in July in the southeastern theatre of war (apparently between
Pilica and the Rumanian frontier) : 323 officers ; 75,719 men ; 10
guns; 126 machine guns."
PART VIII— THE BALKANS
CHAPTER LXI
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS
IN discussing the causes of the Great War in Vol. I
we have already shown how important a part the little
Balkan States played in the long chain of events leading up to
the final catastrophe. When two mighty lords come to blows
over the right of way through the fields of their peasant neigh-
bors, it is only natural that the peasants themselves should be
deeply concerned. While it is not likely that any of them would
feel especially friendly toward either of the belligerents, it might,
however, be to their advantage to take a hand in the struggle on
the side of the victor. But until each thought he had picked the
V^inner he would hold aloof.
This was, in fact, the situation of all the Balkan States when
the Great War began, with the exception, of course, of Serbia,
which had been directly attacked. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece
very hastily announced their complete neutrality to each other
as well as to the world at large, though Greece was in the very
awkward position of having signed a defensive treaty with
Serbia.
Though the Balkan situation has always been considered very
complicated, certain broad facts may be laid down which will
serve as a key to a fair understanding of the motives behind each
of the various moves being made on the Balkan chess board.
First of all, it must be realized that popular sentiment plays
a much smaller part in Balkan politics than it does in such
countries as England, France and our own country. Though
870 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
each is more or less democratic in form, none of these govern-
ments is really controlled by its people in matters requiring such
quick decisions as war. At the head of each of the Balkan States
is a monarch surrounded by a governing clique who have full
authority in military matters. Each of these cliques has only
one aim in mind : How shall it increase the area of its territory,
or at least save itself frr^m losing any of what it already con-
trols?
Rumania, being of Latin blood, has no natural affinity with
either of the big fighting powers that concern her: Austria or
Russia. In her case, therefore, sympathy may be entirely
eliminated. She does, however, covet a piece of Austrian ter-
ritoiy, Transylvania, in which there is a substantial Rumanian
population which has always been rather badly treated by Austria.
Bulgaria, like Russia, is Slavic. Added to that, Bulgaria owes
her freedom to Russian arms. Because of these two reasons
there is a very strong sentiment among the people in favor of
Russia. Russian political intrigues during the past thirty years
have done a great deal, however, in undermining this kindly
feeling among the more intelligent Bulgarians. And then Rus-
sia's ambition to possess herself of the Bosphorus as an outlet
into the Mediterranean is directly contrary to the ambitions of
the governing clique of Bulgaria, which also has its eyes on
Constantinople.
Toward the Austrians the Bulgarians feel nothing but dislike:
"Schwabs," they call them contemptuously. Moreover, Austria's
contemplated pathway to Saloniki would cut down through
Macedonia, another territory coveted by Bulgaria. Ferdinand,
King of Bulgaria, however, is a German by birth and training.
Greece, like Rumania, is also racially isolated. She fears
Russia for the same reason that Bulgaria does ; Greece is deter-
mined that Constantinople shall one day be hers. And she fears
Austria because Austria's pathway would even take Saloniki
from her. And finally she fears Italy because Italy has ambitions
in Asia Minor and Albania. All the belligerents seem to be
treading on the toes of Greece.
It will be seen, therefore, that the diplomatic game was an
especially delicate one in the Balkans. Being comparatively
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS 371
weak, these small states cannot fight alone for themselves. Their
selfish ambitions, or of their governing cliques rather, make a
combination impossible. Their only chance is to bargain with
the winner at the right moment.
During the first half year of the war there was very little for
the Balkan diplomats to do but lie low and watch ; watch for the
first signs of weakening of either the Allies or the Teutons. To
be sure, Turkey threw in her lot with the Teutons during this
period, but German control of the Turkish machinery of govern-
ment and the army appears to have been so strong that it
seems doubtful whether Turkish initiative was much of a factor
in the move.
One of the first moves by the Teutonic Powers through Aus-
tria-Hungary was the attempted invasion of Serbia, by which
they hoped to eliminate her from the field and also to swing the
other Balkan States, especially Bulgaria, over to their side. And
had Austria succeeded in penetrating the peninsula through
Serbia, there can hardly be any doubt that the effect would have
been immediate.
But the invasion by Austria, attempted three times, was an
abject failure. At the end of five months a whole Austrian army
corps had been annihilated by the Serbians and the rest of the
huge invading armies had been driven back across the Danube
and Save. Following close upon this came the extraordinary suc-
cess of the Russians in Bukowina and in the Carpathians, which
placed Hungary in immediate danger of being invaded. The
cause of the Allies began to look promising and the machinery of
Balkan diplomacy began slowly to revolve.
Meanwhile the principal efforts of the Entente statesmen had
been directed toward effecting a reconciliation between Bulgaria
and the other Balkan States which, she maintained, had robbed
her of Macedonia. Indeed, it may well be said that the Treaty
of Bucharest, whereby the Macedonian Bulgars were largely
handed over to Serbia, and Greece was, and continued to be, the
main stumblingblock in the path of the Allies to bring Bulgaria
around to a union with Serbia and Greece and Rumania, for
Rumania had also picked Bulgaria's pockets while she was down,
372 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
by taking a strip of territory at the mouth of the Danube. In
this she had not even had the excuse of reclaiming her own
people, for here were none but pure Bulgarians.
In January, 1915, Rumania began to show signs of shaping
a definite policy that might later lead her to taking sides. Her
King, Carol, a Hohenzollem by blood, had died shortly after
the war and his nephew, Ferdinand, ascended the throne on
October 11, 1914. Possibly he may have had something to do
with the change. At any rate, though Rumania had previously
accepted financial assistance from Austria, in January she re-
ceived a loan of several millions from Great Britain, most of
which was spent on the army, then partly mobilized.
At the same time negotiations of a tentative nature were
opened by the Foreign Office with Russia offering to throw the
Rumanian troops into the conflict on the side of the Allies for a
certain consideration. This consideration was that she receive
Bukowina, part of the province of Banat, and certain sections
of Bessarabia populated by Rumanians. The Allies considered
these demands extortionate, and the negotiations were pro-
tracted. When the Austrians and Germans, later in the spring,
succeeded in driving the Russians out of the Carpathians,
Rumania hastily dropped these negotiations and seated herself
more firmly on top of the fence. And so, under the guidance of
Bratiano, her prime minister, she has continued throughout the
whole year, listening to proposals, first from one side, then from
the other, but always carefully maintaining her neutral position.
Bulgaria had, at about the same time, accepted a loan from
Germany. Attempts were made at the time to explain away
the political significance of the transaction by representing the
advance as an installment of a loan the terms of which had
been arranged before the beginning of the war, but the essen-
tial fact was that the cash came from Germany at a time
when she was herself calling in all the gold of her people into the
Imperial treasury.
Bulgaria now plainly let it be understood under what condi-
tions she would join a union of the Balkan neutrals against the
Teutonic Powers. Her premier, Radoslavov, head of the Bui-
r
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS 373
garian Liberal Party, whose policy has always been anti-Rus-
sian, is one of the most astute politicians in the Balkans, and this
description is equally true of King Ferdinand as a monarch.
These two stated definitely Bulgaria's price; that part of Ma-
cedonia which was to have been allowed to her by the agreement
which bound her to Serbia and Greece during the first Balkan
War; the Valley of the Struma, including the port of Kavalla,
that part of Thrace which she herself had taken from Turkey,
and the southern Dobruja, the whole of the territory Rumania
had filched from her while her back was turned during the two
Balkan wars.
The Entente Powers held council with the other Balkan
States, each of which had taken its share of booty from Bulgaria.
In order to persuade them to consent to Bulgaria's terms, they
suggested certain compensations for the concessions they were
asked to make. To Serbia, which, in spite of her very precarious
situation at the time, was very averse to returning any part of
her Macedonian territory, they pointed out that she could find
compensation in adding to her territory Bosnia, Herzegovina and
the other Slav provinces of Austria, where the population was
truly Serb. To Rumania, which was already willing to meet Bul-
garia half way, they promised Transylvania and Bukowina. To
Greece, which had done less and gained more than any of the
other states during the two Balkan Wars and so could afford to
be generous, they held out the prospect of gaining a considerable
area in Asia Minor, thickly populated by Greeks.
These changes naturally all depended on the complete defeat
of the Teutonic Powers, but Bulgaria demanded that at least
some, and especially Serbian Macedonia, should be handed over
to her at once.
This latter demand brought about strong opposition. The
)ther Balkan States considered that, granting even that all these
concessions were to be promised to Bulgaria, she should not
expect their fulfillment until she had earned them by helping to
defeat the Teutonic Powers.
Venizelos, the premier of Greece, and probably the most broad-
minded statesman in the Balkans, stated that, on the part of
874 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Greece, concessions to Bulgaria were possible, though, as de*
veloped later, in this he did not have the backing of the King
and the rest of the governing clique. In February no progress
in the negotiations had been made, though a special French Com-
mission, headed by General Pau, visited all the Balkan capitals
and tried to bring about a mutual agreement.
At about that time another important military event occurred,
especially affecting the Balkans; the warships of the Entente
began bombarding the forts in the Dardanelles and it seemed
that Constantinople was presently to fall into their hands. Not
long after Venizelos stated, in an interview, that he was privy
to this action and proposed to send 50,000 Greek soldiers to
assist the Allies by a land attack on the Turks.
The Greek General Staff, however, immediately declined to
support Venizelos. Such a campaign, it declared, was impossible
unless Greece first had strong guarantees that Bulgaria would
not take the opportunity to invade Greek Macedonia and fall
on the flank of the Greek army operating against the Turks.
Venizelos thereupon approached . Bulgaria and was told that
Bulgaria would remain neutral if Greece would cede most of her
Macedonian conquests, which would include Kavalla, Drama, and
Serres, which stretch so provokingly eastward along the coast
and hold Bulgaria back from the sea.
Venizelos attempted to compromise, and here he was caught be-
tween two obstacles. Bulgaria absolutely refused to recede one
inch from her demand ; and, on the other hand, the Greek govern-
ing clique suddenly refused to consider any proposal that would
mean the cession of any territory at all to the hated Bulgars.
What probably stiffened the opposition of the other members of
the Greek Government to the Turkish campaign was the grow-
ing suspicion on their part that the Allies were also negotiating
with Italy for her support. Now it was obvious that if Italy
was to fight in the Near East, she meant to demand a good price.
And this looked bad for Greece. Greece and Italy had already
nearly come to blows over their clashing interests in southern
Albania, yet even this was a small matter compared to rivalry
in the -^gean and Asia Minor. What deepened these suspicions
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS 375
was the fact that the Allies refused to indicate definitely just
what territory Greece was to have in return for her support
against the Turks. Their promise of '^liberal compensation" was
not at all definite enough. Only Venizelos was satisfied with this
promise ; he was in favor of trusting implicitly to Anglo-French
gratitude.
To bring this deadlock to a conclusion King Constantine called
a Royal Council, and by this body the matter was thoroughly dis-
cussed during the first few days of March. The Council, together
with the king, decided against supporting the Allies actively on
such terms. On the morning of March 6 Venizelos called at the
British legation in Athens to say that the opposition of the
king made it impossible to fulfill his promise. That night he
resigned.
The fall of Venizelos was, naturally, a heavy blow to the Allies.
He was succeeded by Gounaris, an ex-Minister of Finance, who
announced his policy as one of strict neutrality. Venizelos was
so deeply mortified that he declared that he would withdraw
permanently from public life, and then left Greece.
April, 1915, opened with an occurrence that seemed to throw
a strong light on the attitude of Bulgaria. On the night of the
second day of the month a large force of Bulgar Comitajis made
a raid over the southeastern frontier of Serbia, and, after at-
tacking successfully the Serbian outposts and blockhouses, in an
attempt to cut the railroad, by which Serbia was getting war
supplies from the Allies, they were repelled by the Serbians,
though only after severe fighting.
Serbia and Greece both protested loudly, but Bulgaria affirmed
that she had had nothing to do with the matter.
As has developed since, Bulgaria had by this time definitely
decided to strike for the Teutonic allies when the right moment
should come. Already back in January, 1912, a secret treaty
had been negotiated between Bulgaria and Germany. This was
signed a little later by Prince Biilow and M. Rizoff at Rome.
There were more reasons than one for keeping this secret. For
within the Bulgarian Parliament there was a strong opposition
to the German policy of Ferdinand and Radoslavov, led by
376 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Malinoff, chief of the Democratic party, and Stambulovski, chief
of the Agrarian party, an opposition so bitter and determined
that the king had good reason to fear an open revolution should
he openly declare himself for the Germans.
On May 29, 1915, the Allies again sent a note to Bulgaria,
making proposals which comprised the results of their efforts to
obtain concessions from the other Balkan States. On June 15
Radoslavov sent a reply, asking for further information, obvi-
ously drawn up in order to gain time.
Meanwhile, on June 11, Venizelos had again appeared in
Athens, where he received a warm welcome from the populace,
with whom he was the prime favorite. Within a few days he
resumed the leadership of the Greek Liberal party and, at a
general election, which was held shortly after, he showed a
popular majority support of 120 seats in the Popular Assembly,
nothwithstanding a determined opposition made by his oppo-
nents. Before the Balkan wars the Greek Parliament had con-
sisted of 180 members, but by according representation to the
districts in Macedonia annexed after the wars the number was
brought up to 316. Venizelos and his policy in favor of the
Allies were emphatically indorsed by the Greek suffrage. Natu-
rally this expression of the people's voice was a smart blow at
the king and his councillors. On the other hand, they were en-
couraged by an unfavorable turn that was now taking place in
the military operations of the Allies.
The attack on the Dardanelles by the warships had been a de-
cided failure. Nor were the operations of the British troops on
the peninsula of Gallipoli meeting with any real success. The
Austrians and the Germans had driven the Russians back from
the Carpathians and had retaken Przemysl and Lemberg. In
fact, the situation of the Austro-German armies had now become
so favorable that it was possible for the Teutonic allies to make
proposals to the Balkan States with a fair chance of being
listened to.
During July, 1915, Serbia was approached by Germany with an
offer of a separate peace, but Serbia would not even consider the
terms.
DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS 377
On July 8 Austria delivered a note to Rumania, through the
Austrian Minister in Bucharest, Count Czemin, which con-
tained two sets of proposals. One was contingent upon the
continued but ''friendly'' neutrality of Rumania, the other on
her active participation in the war on the side of Austria-
Hungary.
In the first proposal Rumania was promised all of Bukowina
south of the Seret River, better treatment of the Rumanian popu-
lation of Austrian territory, the establishment of a Rumanian
university in Brasso, large admissions of Rumanians into the
public service of Hungary, and greater liberty of administration
to the Rumanian churches in Austria.
The second proposal specified that Rumania should put five
army corps and two cavalry divisions at the disposal of the
Austro-Hungarian General Staff to operate against the Rus-
sians. In return^ Rumania should receive all of Bukowina up to
the Pruth River, territory along the north bank of the Danube
up to the Iron Gate, complete autonomy for the Rumanians in
Transylvania and all of Bessarabia that the Rumanian troops
should assist in conquering from the Russians.
Just a week after this note was received in the Rumanian
capital. Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, whose wife was a sister of
the Queen of Rumania, arrived in Bucharest and tried to induce
King Ferdinand to come to terms with Austria, or at least to
allow the transportation of war munitions through the country
to the Turks, who were then running short of ammunition. The
king refused this concession. How important it would have
been, had it been granted, may be judged from the many efforts
the Germans had made to smuggle material down to Turkey.
In one case the baggage of a German courier traveling to Con-
stantinople had been X-rayed and rifle ammunition had been
found. Again, cases of beer had been opened and found to con-
tain artillery shells.
Rumania, however, could not yet make up her mind which
was going to be the winner. She accepted neither of the Aus-
trian proposals, and protracted making any definite answer as
long as possible.
378 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
There was another reason why Rumania wished to continue
her neutraHty until the following winter, at least. The harvest-
ing of her great wheat crops would begin soon, and this wheat
could, as had been done the previous year, be sold to the Germans
and Austrians at big prices, the blockade of the British fleet
having already produced a pressing shortage in foodstuffs. And
then, her conscience being uneasy regarding her robbery of
territory from Bulgaria, she must also be quite certain how
Bulgaria was going to turn.
Having failed at Bucharest, the German agent. Prince Hohen-
lohe-Langenburg, moved on to Sofia. At that moment King
Ferdinand of Bulgaria was endeavoring to get Turkey to sign
A treaty, for which negotiations had been going on secretly for
some months, by which Bulgaria was to obtain all the Turkish
land on the west side of the Maritza River, and so free the
Bulgarian railroad to Dedeagatch from Turkish interference.
On July 23 this treaty was finally signed, and Bulgaria acquired
a full right of way along the line.
Bulgaria was now frankly asking bids for her support from
both sides. In an interview which the Premier, Radoslavov,
granted to the correspondent of a Budapest newspaper on
August 3, 1915, and who remarked to the premier that it was at
least strange for a nation to carry on such negotiations simul-
taneously with two groups of powers, he replied :
"It is these negotiations which give us the chance to make a
decision. Our country seeks only her own advantages and
wishes to realize her rights. We have decided to gain these in
any case. The only question is : How can we achieve this with the
least sacrifices? As regards the internal situation of Bulgaria, I
may proudly say that our conditions have improved, and that
everybody in the country looks forward to the great national
undertaking we are about to embark on with immense joy and
enthusiasm."
PART IX— ITALY ENTERS THE WAR
CHAPTER LXII
SPIRIT OP THE ITALIAN PEOPLE — CRISIS
OF THE GOVERNMENT
rpHE crystallization of popular opinion in favor of intervention
-L kept pace with the trend of diplomatic negotiations. Italy,
especially the northern provinces, was a great beehive, humming
with patriotic fervor. Evenings in almost any northern town
might be seen companies of young men in civilian dress march-
ing in companies and maneuvering with military precision. At
first the organizers of these "training walks," as they were
called, maintained reticence regarding their purpose. The
youths, they said, were merely undergoing voluntary training to
be ready "in case they should be needed." But the purpose of
these volunteer drills was unmistakable. At times, when the
drill grounds were rather isolated, the marchers would burst into
patriotic songs — the hymn of the Garibaldians, or, perhaps
"Trieste of My Heart." Soon the neutralists began to organize
counterpreparations. Encounters between bands of the rival
factions became increasingly frequent, in fact daily occurrences.
From jeers they passed to scuffles, in which missiles and clubs
were the weapons. As a rule these encounters took place far
enough from the city limits to avoid interference by the police,
and only vague reports of them reached the main body of home-
loving citizens.
Milan was the center of these demonstrations. During April,
1915, the Socialists proclaimed a "general strike," which left a
large part of the working population idle to attend gatherings
379
380 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
addressed by the neutralist orator. These meetings generally-
wound up with a parade, and perhaps a hostile demonstration in
front of the office of some interventionist newspaper, or cheers
outside the German Consulate. The next day the Piazza would
be thronged with a gathering of interventionists wearing the
national colors entwined with the flag of Trieste, and, perhaps,
with the "honorable red shirt" of the Garibaldians. During the
period just before the entrance of Italy into the war these rival
processions were held on different days by order of the police,
who ruthlessly broke up any attempt to interfere with assemblies
entitled to the right of way. As the war party began to gain,
their opponents adopted the custom of attacking the demonstrants
after they had disbanded.
As it was, a mob attacked the Milan branch of the Siemens-
Schuckert works, the great Berlin electrical machinery factory,
battered in the main entrance, and exchanged shots with some
young German employees left in charge. The timely arrival of
the armed police stopped this riot, and removed the Germans to
safe quarters.
At this juncture, or before, the influence of the "Garibaldi"
movement became widely apparent. Early in the war the Gari-
baldians had launched a movement to recognize the aid received
from France by Italy during her War of Independence. A special
corps of Garibaldi volunteers was enrolled in France, and its
valiant service in the Alsace campaign, where one of the members
of the Garibaldi family fell, had a telling effect in Italy. Vol-
unteers for this corps at once sprang up from all parts of the
country.
On May 10, 1915, Germans and Austrians throughout Italy
were advised by their consulates to leave the country. The
exodus proceeded rapidly, and during the next ten days nearly
all the citizens of the two Central Powers who were able to leave
had taken refuge in Switzerland. Italy seemed ripe for war;
but still the Government delayed. There was now no doubt of
the popular mind; but events ouside the country were not en-
couraging. Perhaps the weightiest of these deterring factors
was news of the Russian retirement in the north and informa-
SPIRIT OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE 381
tion reaching the Italian Minister of War that the Entente Allies
were short of ammunition.
Then came the crisis in the Government. Baron Sonnino's
denunciation of the Alliance caused a change in the attitude of
the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. Prince von Bulow and
the Austrian Ambassador, Baron von Macchio, were authorized
to conclude a new agreement on the basis of further Austrian
concessions. Sonnino refused to accept the new terms and the
German and Austrian representatives played their last trump.
Baron von Macchio telegraphed to Vienna accusing the Italian
Foreign Minister of concealing information of the Austrian con-
cessions both from the king and the majority of the cabinet.
The concessions were printed and circulated widely among the
people. Signor Giolitti, Salandra's predecessor, and at one time
all but dictator of Italy, hurried to Rome and rallied his fol-
lowers. The neutralists hailed him as the man to save Italy
from a ruinous war.
Parliament was to meet on May 20, 1915. It was clear that
the supporters of Giolitti, in majority both in the Senate and
the Chamber of Deputies, could, if they chose, overthrow the
Government. Popular anxiety was intense.
On the evening of May 13, 1915, came the announcement that
the Salandra ministry had resigned. If there had been any
doubt of the state of things throughout Italy up to that point,
this news cleared the situation. The whole country burst into
a flame of indignation. The next day Italy learned for the first
time that the Triple Alliance had been denounced early in the
month.
It became clear that whatever the fate of Salandra and his
cabinet, his foreign policy was bound to be continued.
On May 15, 1915, announcement that the king had declined
to accept Salandra's resignation caused a great popular out-
burst of joy. In Rome an immense gathering called to protest^
against the Giolittians and German influence was transformed
into a demonstration of triumph; more than 150,000 persons
took part in a procession a mile long that moved from the
Piazza del Popolo to the Quirinal.
882 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The next morning, May 16, 1915, there was nobody in Rome
who doubted what Italy would do. That day Giolitti left Rome,
and his departure marked the end of his active influence during
the opening months of the war. His party crumpled.
When Parliament met on May 20, 1915, Salandra received
an overwhelming vote of confidence in the passage of a bill
conferring extraordinary powers upon the Government in the
event of war. Miles north of Rome, word came to the Austrian
commanders, working feverishly to strengthen their forts in
the fastnesses of the Alps, to brace themselves for the assault.
CHAPTER LXIII
THE DECISION MADE — ITALIAN
STRATEGIC PLAN
ON the night of May 24, 1915, little groups of the Alpini,
Italy's famous mountain troops, moved silently. They passed
from San Giorgio, Cividale and Palmanova on the eastern
frontier, from Paluzza and San Stefano and Pieve on the north,
from Agordo, Feltre and Asiago, from Brentino and Malcesine
toward Lake Garda, from Garganano the western shore of
the lake and from other positions all along the mountain frontier
up to the Stelvio Pass.
Marching silently and in single file, by three o'clock in the
morning of May 25, 1915, one detachment reached a deep trench.
"Our frontiers," said their officers. "We advance to make new
ones.'' Then began a long, steep climb up narrow mountain
paths, through snow lying in patches knee-deep, and through a
storm of sleet and rain that broke along the Trentino boundary
before dawn. As dawn broke they hurled themselves upon an
Austrian shelter trench excavated the autumn before on the
plateau. It was empty. The enemy had retired only a few hours
before. The camp-fire ashes were still warm. As the sun began
to throw the long shadows of the Alpine peaks to the west Aus-
THE DECISION MADE 383
trian guns crashed out their first salute from the rocky fortresses
beyond. Italy and Austria-Hungary were at war.
To comprehend the task before the Italian army it is neces-
sary to examine the Italian-Austrian frontier. Austria's prob-
lem was one only of defense. Her warning had been ample
and when war was declared she was prepared to the last detail.
Being the challenged party hers was the choice of weapons, and
she had equipped herself with an almost impregnable line of for-
tifications. The grievance was Italy's, and hers the duty of
assault. Every advantage of position lay with Austria.
The strategic plan of the Italian generals was determined by
hard geographical facts. The Italo-Austrian frontier is about
;480 miles long, divided naturally into three sections. On the west
le Austrian province of Trentino indents Italian territory like
[a wedge; next comes the great wall of the Dolomites and the
fCarnic and Julian Alps ; then, on the east, a boundary line run-
[ning north and south between the main Alpine chain and the
[Adriatic Sea. Steep mountain heights dominated by Austrian
[troops guarded the first two parts of this frontier. Only on the
eastern border, from Pontebba to the Adriatic was Italian offen-
[sive on a large scale at all feasible; but before offensive opera-
tions could be started here it was necessary for the Italians to
fclose the open gates to the north.
Here in the north lay Italy's problem at the opening of the
^,war ; and here her armies confronted an almost impossible task.
[in a word, they had to fight uphill. A salient, such as that formed
fhy the Trentino, may offer dangers for the side that holds it —
[an example of which is the Russian position in Poland at the
[opening of the war ; but the Trentino situation was quite unlike
that in Poland. The sides of the Trentino were buttressed with
^mountains. The most tempting avenue of invasion was the
^valley of the Adige River. An enemy advancing by this route
["Would find himself confronted with the strongly fortified town
)f Trent, which long resisted attacks from Venice in the Middle
Lges. Having forced his way past Trent the enemy would be
[in a wilderness of lateral valleys with the main ridge of the
Alpine chain, at the Brenner, still before him.
^ 25— War St. 3
384 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On the western side of the Trentino is the lofty Stelvio Pass,
leading from the Upper Adige to the valley of Adda. This pass
is 9,000 feet high and its narrow defiles were easily defended.
To the south lies the pass of Tonale over which runs the road
from Noce to the Oglio, but this offers similar difficulties. The
road pass of Comelle, close to Lake Garda, is too narrow for any
considerable force. On the eastern side of the salient conditions
for invasion are still worse. The railway from Venice to
Innsbruck crosses the Valsugana at Tezze, but the Brenta valley
through which it runs is a difficult road to Trent. Summed up,
the salient of the Trentino was an ideal position for those who
held it, both offensive and defensive. The few breaches by
which invasion could come were a source of strength rather
than weakness, because they compelled attack from the Italian
plain to be made on divergent lines from different bases.
The second part of the frontier is the ramparts of the
Dolomite and Camic ranges through which an important offen-
sive was possible for neither belligerent. The main pass, at
Ampezzo, 5,000 feet high, makes a sharp detour toward the west
to circumvent the mass of Cristallo, and here the road is a
narrow defile commanded by a hundred points of danger. The
adjacent passes of Misurina and the Monte Croce are no better,
and the defiles to the east contain little more than bridle paths.
The lowest pass, which leads from the valley of the Fella by
Pontebba to the upper streams of the Drave and carries the rail-
way from Venice to Vienna is only 2,615 feet high at its greatest
elevation. Although this is the easiest of the great routes
through the mountain barrier, it is still narrow and difficult.
A modern army given the advantages of time and preparation
should be able to close and hold it with ease.
Although the maps show few natural difficulties on the third
section of the frontier to compare with those farther west, it is
not the obvious avenue of attack a hasty survey would seem to
suggest. It is only twenty miles wide and behind it is the line
of the River Isonzo with hills along its eastern bank. The upper
part of this stream, above Salcana, is a ravine ; then comes six
miles of comparatively level ground in front of Gorizia; then
THE DECISION MADE 385
the hills begin again and sweep round to the seacoast by Mon-
falcone. What this front lacks in natural defenses had been
amply supplied before the war opened by Austria with artillery
and men. Toward this narrow twenty-mile stretch, and
especially toward the plain before Gorizia, tended, in a sense,
however, all the operations of the Italian strategists. The
engagements fought during the first of the Italo-Austrian
struggle all had their bearing upon the great offensive launched
later against Gorizia.
But the natural lay of the land was by no means the only con-
sideration with which the rival generals had to deal. In respect
to lateral communications Italy had the advantage. Behind her
invading armies stretched an elaborate system of railways
through her northern provinces. Austria had a railway running
through the whole curve of the frontier, but owing to the dif-
ficulty of breaking through from the hill valleys this system
had few feeders. This lack of branch lines meant that Austria
had to concentrate any offensive at certain definite places —
Trent, Tarvis, and Gorizia. Italy aimed at these points and one
more, Franzensfeste, the junction of the Pusterthal line with
the railway from Innsbruck to Trent. If she could take this
point she could cut Austria's communications in the whole
Trentino salient. But Franzensfeste was the most difficult of
any of these local points for Italy to reach, for south and east of
it lay the bristling system of the Dolomites.
The successive revelations of Italian strategy during the first
months of the war brought few surprises. Austria had her
hands full in the Carpathians just then and was unable to take
advantage of the opportunities for swift offensive which her
frontier positions offered. It was a foregone conclusion that the
first advance would come from the Italian side and the direction
of that movement was not long in doubt. Its objective was
Trieste, the Austrian peninsula, and the hills of Styria which
sweep to Vienna. There lay the country where modem armies
could maneuver. At the same time the whole northern boundary
must be watched to prevent Austrian forces from the Trentino
cutting the communications of the invader and attacking him
386 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
in the rear. Therefore General Cadoma, the Italian commander
in chief, resolved to attack at all the salient points. Such a plan
led to a series of movements — toward Trent, across the Dolomite
passes against the Pusterthal railway, at the Pontebba Pass,
and across the Julian Alps to threaten the line between Tarvis
and Gorizia. Meanwhile the main Italian army was to strike
at the Isonzo and the road to Trieste.
The same conditions which made the Austrian frontier lines
easy to defend also would have given the Central Power a big
advantage in offensive operations, but for excellent reasons the
Austrian staff did not attack. In the first place, Austria lacked
men. The Teutonic war councils concluded that Austro-Hun-
garian troops were of more value in the great drive then in
progress against the Russians than they would have been in
offensive operations against the cities of the northern Italian
plains. Had the Austrians debouched from their mountain
strongholds and forced the Italians to concentrate against them
in Italian territory, as they undoubtedly could have done, the
benefits of such an enterprise from the standpoint of the alliance
powers would have been small in proportion to the risks. Only
a combined drive by both Austria and Germany, it is believed,
could have gained any telling advantage in northern Italy; and
Italy, it must be remembered, had not declared war on Germany.
Ensconced in their mountain fastnesses, the Austrians believed
they could maintain a successful defensive indefinitely. Then,
after the Italian armies had exhausted themselves beating
against the mountain barrier, an opportunity might arise for
Austrian reprisals. At the time few believed that Italy would
long be able to maintain her attitude of neutrality regarding
Germany — an opinion, by the way, which was not supported by
the developments of the first year of the war.
The Austrians had months in which to prepare, and they had
made good use of their time. The natural difficulties confront-
ing an Italian assault had been enormously increased by trenches
of steel and concrete. The Austrian engineers had connected
their elaborate systems of wire entanglements with high-power
electric stations, and dug mines at all vulnerable points. Heavy
THE DECISION MADE 387
guns had been moved, at great expenditure of labor, to the
frontier forts and rails laid on which to move them from place
to place. The broken nature of the ground afforded ideal oppor-
tunities for the concealment of artillery positions. It is safe to
say that nowhere in the whole theatre of the Great War was
there a line better adapted by nature and equipped by man for
purposes of defensive warfare. The Austrian Archduke Eugene,
who was in charge of the Italian operations, revealed his plan
of campaign during the first few days after the beginning of
hostilities. His aim was to risk nothing until Field Marshal
von Mackensen had finished his operations in Galicia, where
Austria's best troops were fighting with their German allies.
To meet the Italians he had only the Landsturm and a few
reserve divisions, but these were considered enough. The arch-
duke resolved to hold the crests of the passes along the Trentino
frontier and the line of the Camic Alps, withdrawing his out-
posts before the enemy's advance. On the Isonzo he would
abandon the country west of the river line and make his stand
on a fortified line to the east which touched the Isonzo only at
Gorizia, where the Austrians held the bridgehead on the western
bank.
It has been pointed out in preceding pages that not a little
of Italy's delay in entering the war, and of the tortuous diplo-
matic negotiations which for several months kept the outside in
doubt as to her ultimate intentions, was due to the state of
military unpreparedness confronting the country in the summer
of 1914. But by May, 1915, the country had had nine months
in which to get ready. Moreover, she had been able to profit
by the lessons of the war. When Italy started to get ready there
was no waste motion, although the task to be accomplished
entailed enormous labor and expense.
388 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER LXIV
STRENGTH OF ITALIAN ARMY AND
NAVY
AT the head of the Italian army and navy was the king,
- Victor Emmanuel, a monarch whose gallantry and simplicity
had made him a popular idol. Popularity with the people meant
also popularity with the army. The chief of the General Staff
was General Count Luigi Cadorna. At the outbreak of the war
General Cadorna was sixty-five years old. As a young man
he had seen service under his father, Rafaele Cadorna, who, in
September 1870, led an army into papal territory and blew in
the Porta Pia. He had been a corps commander at Genoa. In
1914 he had succeeded General Pollio as chief of the General
Staff.
Cadorna was the Von Hindenburg of Italy. As the German
commander had studied the bogs of East Prussia, so he had
devoted a large part of his life to becoming familiar with the
broken line of Italy's northern frontier. He was known through-
out Europe for his writings on military science.
The beginning of the war found the Italian navy far better
equipped than the army. For the task of holding Austria in
the Adriatic, which Italy now took over from France, she pos-
sessed four dreadnoughts and two more almost ready. Sha
possessed also ten battleships of the predreadnought class and
a number of older vessels. Compared with those of Great Bri-
tain and Germany, her armored cruisers were slow, none of
them being capable of a speed exceeding twenty-two knots ; but
she had twenty submarines, forty destroyers and a large number
of torpedo boats. Compared with the Austro-Hungarian fleet,
the Italian navy showed on paper a distinct superiority. Its
admiral in chief, the Duke of the Abruzzi, ranked among the
most brilliant men of his time, not only as a naval man, but
as a scientist, explorer, and man of affairs. He was first cousin
of the king.
ITALIAN ARMY AND NAVY 389
By May, 1915, General Cadoma virtually had remade the
Italian army. Nine months earlier Italy's military forces were
anything but prepared. There was a shortage in every kind of
munitions, stores, and equipment. This was plainly evidenced
when General Porro had refused an offer of the portfolio of
Minister of War in the spring of 1914 because he was unable
to obtain a pledge for the adoption of a program of reequipment
that demanded a great expenditure of money. The late Govern-
ment had not made good the expenditure of material caused by
the Lybian War, and great quantities of stores had been allowed
to deteriorate until they were almost valueless. There was a
certain number of guns of medium caliber, but no heavy artillery
of the modern type which the Teutonic allies soon showed they
possessed in abundance. Of machine guns Italy had a lower
proportion than any other of the great powers. All this had
been realized, but the money to repair these deficiencies was not
forthcoming until the Italian statesmen knew that they were
on the brink of war.
Filling the gaps in the army, raising it from a peace to a
war footing, was an easier matter. The Italian military law
provided automatically for this increase. Every Italian citizen
able to bear arms is liable to military service. Recruits are
called in the year during which they become twenty years old,
although volunteers are accepted as young as eighteen. The last
Italian census, in 1911, gave Italy a population of 34,686,683 and
the levy lists of that year totaled 487,570. By the close of the
year 1914, when the mobilization began, it is reasonable to sup-
)ose that the population had grown to something like thirty-six
>r thirty-seveh million, with a corresponding increase in the
lumber available for military service. The peace strength of
[the army was 14,000 of!ice?:*s and 271,000 men. Mobilization
[added to each of the twelve corps a division of Mobile Militia
[bringing its strength up to 37,000 men and 134 guns. The
[army's war strength was about 700,000 in the first line — from
the two classes of the regular army — and 320,000 in the Mobile
Militia with a reserve of more than 2,000,000 in the Territorial
Militia. The force of trained men that Italy put into the field
390 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
at the beginning of hostilities, therefore, numbered something
over 1,000,000 men. The reservoir of the Territorial Militia
contained twice as many more untrained men who for some
reason or other were exempt from military service in times of
peace, although physically fit to be soldiers. This class was
designed primarily for garrison duty, guarding railways and
bridges, but in war time was liable to any service. When the
mobilization began the men of this class immediately went into
training. Each of the twelve army corps consisted of two
divisions of line infantry, a regiment of Bersaglieri (light in-
fantry corresponding to the French Chasseurs and the German
Jaegers), a regiment of cavalry, a section of Carabinieri
(military police), thirty-six field guns and from two to three
heavy howitzer' batteries. In addition there was the ammuni-
tion column, telegraph and engineer parks, ambulance and
supply sections, reserve store and supply sections, and a section
of field bakery.
The famous Alpine troops ("Alpini") and the mountain artil-
lery were not within the organization of the twelve permanent
army corps. These numbered seventy-eight companies, each of
256 officers and men on a war footing. The rest of the Italian
infantry units at normal war strength were as follows: Com*
pany, 255 officers and men; Battalion, 1,043 officers and men;
Regiment, 3,194 officers and men. Five of the cavalry regiments
contained six squadrons, the rest five. The war strength of a
squadron was 142 officers and men.
The infantry were armed with a magazine rifle of very small
caliber, 256-inch. The magazine held six rounds and was loaded
with a clip. The length of this piece was 4 feet 2% inches, with
bayonet 5 feet 2i/^ inches. It weighed without bayonet 8 pounds
6 ounces, and was sighted up to 2,200 yards. The outbreak of
the war found a process of rearmament going on in the artillery.
Italy at that time had no adequate siege train and her heaviest
mobile weapons were 210-millimeter howitzers and 149-mil-
limeter guns. While the details of the final artillery equipment
were not made public by the War Department, events showed
that the Italians were well supplied with modem guns of both
ITALIAN ARMY AND NAVY 391
medium and heavy caliber. The mountain artillery, of which
there were thirty-nine batteries, was especially efficient, not only
in ^ns, but in men and transport animals. It was said that the
Italian artillery mules could drag a gun wherever there was room
for its emplacement.
Italy was one of the first countries to use aeroplanes in war,
and her aviation corps had had experience in Tripoli. Although
handicapped by lack of money, the Italian military aviators were
well abreast of their opponents, at least in the theoretical and
mechanical development of the science. During the winter of
1914 a considerable increase was made in the personnel of the
corps and in the number of machines.
There is reason to believe that at the beginning of the war
the Italian soldier was not highly regarded by Austrian and
German military authorities. As a whole the army's reputation
had been injured by the Adowa disaster and by the slowness
of the campaign in Tripoli. But the developments of actual
warfare in the spring and summer of 1915 proved that Italian
apologists were correct in their claim that in the former war the
army was handicapped by political causes. Physically the
Italian troops were equal to any in Europe. The Alpini were
perhaps the best mountain soldiers in the world. The Italian
soldier is not impressive as to stature, but he is tough and endur-
ing. He is cheerful and obedient under discipline and hardship,
and the relations between officers and men were such as to
produce the best results in a hard campaign.
All these qualities were requisite for the difficult task to which
General Cadorna now turned his first line troops, numbering
about 700,000 men. To oppose this advance the Austrians
mustered on the frontier about half that number. General
von Hofer was chief of staff under Archduke Eugene and
General Dankl was in command in the Tyrol.
Two reasons have been advanced to explain the succession of
small victories with which the Italians opened their campaign.
The first, already mentioned, is that it was part of the Austrian
plan to yield their outpost positions with slight resistance and
protect their numerically inferior forces in the main strongholds
392 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the mountains. The other is that the archduke and his
generals made the mistake of underestimating the enemy. For
centuries Italy had supplied the Austrian Court with its poets
and musicians, until in the Dual Monarchy the Italians were re-
garded as an effete race, fit only for the politer pursuits of art,
literature and song. Italy's successful War of Independence in
the latter half of the nineteenth century had not altogether de-
stroyed this impression. This idea, it may be said, was not
shared by the Germans, whose military men had made a closer
study of world conditions and had learned to respect the virility
of the men of modem Italy.
CHAPTER LXV
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS
OWING to the nature of the scene of hostilities the first days
of the Austro-Italian campaign brought a series of engage-
ments between small groups of combatants. Artillery played a
large part, and here the Austrians, with their big guns already in
carefully studied positions, had a decided advantage. Viewed as
a whole only does the campaign at this stage take on an impor-
tance and dignity that ranks with the great battles on other
fronts of the Great War. Never before had two great powers
fought in territory so absolutely ill adapted to the movement of
large bodies of troops. For the same reason the story attains
a picturesqueness absent from the dreary plains of Galicia and
Poland and Flanders. Austrians, Hungarians and Italians
fought in a land known throughout the world to tourists for its
grandeur of scenery, its towering, snow-clad peaks, and idyllic
lakes and valleys. It was warfare where the best soldier was
the man most able to surmount the natural difficulties and take
advantage of the natural protection of the ground. The official
statements of the Italian and Austrian war offices told of feats
of mountaineering, and of hand-to-hand struggles, of dripping
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 393
bayonets and of combatants locked in last embrace with hands
clutching each other's throats.
On both sides of the boundary were thousands of men who
had spent their lives exploring the trackless mountainsides,
climbing with ropes and ice axes and staves. Both nations had
encouraged the formation of Alpine clubs.
Soon after midnight on May 23, 1915, the Alpini and Ber-
saglieri of the Italian army, supported by a few battalions of
first line troops and gendarmes, crossed the mountain frontier.
Soon the peaks resounded with the popping of rifle fire and the
louder detonations of the Austrian mountain guns. Along the
whole Trentino front that night a hundred skirmishes drove
back the Austrian outpost. Only a few thousand men in all
were engaged. The Italian cyclist sharpshooters advanced
swiftly up the steep mountain roads until greeted by musketry
fire. Then they sought shelter, pushing forward from rock to
rock and from tree to tree. Often the light infantry and Alpini
foot soldiers were able to skirt the enemy's posts and catch them
in the rear.
By May 26, 1915, all Italy was thrilled by the news that all
the lower passes of the Dolomites were won and breaches made
at Tonale Pass along the northwest and in the Carnic and Julian
Alps along the northeast front. Among the points occupied
were the Montozzo Pass, 9,585 feet high, Ponte Caffaro, running
into southwestern Trentino, the ridge of Monte Baldo, extend-
ing northward fifteen miles toward Arco and Roverto in
southern Trentino, some of the heights looking westward to-
ward Trento, all the valleys in the labyrinth of the Dolomites,
and several footholds in the Alps of Carinthia. The eastern
army was well inside Austrian territory, its left at Caporetto
on the Isonzo just under Monte Nero, its center looking down on
Gorizia from the heights between Indria and the Isonzo, and
its right between Cormons and Terzo. Losses on both sides were
surprisingly small considering the extent of territory covered
by the fighting. The Austrians, after slight resistance, with-
drew into their fortresses and waited behind their guns, grimly
conscious that the real struggle was still before them.
894 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Then, through the holes pierced by the mountain troops, the
Itahan engineers began to move forward their artillery and
building emplacements and constructing trenches. Skirmishing
on the mountain frontier continued until the end of May, 1915.
By that time Italian forces attacking Trentino had crossed the
Lessini Mountains north of Verona, captured the Austrian town
of Ala on the Adige, and penetrated nearly ten miles into Aus-
trian territory. They held high ground on the south command-
ing the forts of Roverto, and had begun to bring up their heavy
guns against this important stronghold. Roverto is one of a
number of strongly fortified places girdling Trent and command-
ing the converging routes to this center of the Austrian de-
fensive. Other lesser fortresses in this girdle are Laredo on
the Chiese, Levico on the Brenta, and Riva at the head of
Lake Garda. Upon these the Italians closed in, and there they
consolidated their positions awaiting the support of the
first-line troops advancing in heavy detachments, and of their
artillery.
While Italy struck the first blow on land, the first offensive
operation of the Italo-Austrian conflict by sea came from Aus-
tria. This was an extensive raid on Italy's Adriatic coast. Its
object was to delay the Italian concentration by attacking vital
points on the littoral railway from Brindisi to the north.
The Austrian fleet began its attack early on the morning of
Monday, May 24, 1915. The ships engaged were a squadron
from Pola, consisting of two battleships, four cruisers, and
eighteen destroyers, strongly supported by aircraft. The assault
extended from Brindisi to Venice, and covered a large extent of
coast territory hard to defend. At Venice the Austrian air
raiders dropped bombs into the arsenal and the oil tanks and
balloon sheds on the Lido. The priceless relics of art and
architecture, all that remained to recall the city's proud position
as ruler of the Adriatic, were uninjured, but the attack from the
air caused an outcry from the nations of the Entente almost equal
to that which rang through the world when the Germans shelled
the cathedral at Rheims and destroyed Louvain. The Austrians
replied that the attack was a serious military operation, and by
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS
395
BOHBAROet)
BVAeROPLANI
L^^MOfffENBORO
^3vg^
HAllfiRO.
THE COASTS OF ITALY AND AUSTRIA, SHOWING THE NAVAL RAID
MAY, 1915
396 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
no means the wanton outrage their enemies had tried to make it
appear.
The Austrian naval raid lasted barely two hours, but in that
time the cruiser Novara and several destroyers attacked Porto
Corsini, north of Ravenna, in ^ vain effort to destroy the Italian
torpedo base; the cruiser St. Georg shelled the railway station
and bridges at Rimini ; the battleship Zrinyi attacked Sinigaglia,
and wrecked the railway station and bridge ; south of Ancona the
battleship Radetzky destroyed a bridge over the River Potenza.
In the south the cruisers Helgoland and Admiral Spaun with
destroyers shelled a railway bridge and station and several signal
stations in the neighborhood of Manfredonia and Viesti, and
caused some damage in small coast towns. The raid was well
planned and swiftly executed, and it accomplished much of its
purpose. The Italian fleet was taken by surprise, and the
marauders were back in safety at Pola by six o^clock in the morn-
ing, unharmed.
While Italian Alpine troops were driving in the Austrian out-
posts on the frontiers of Trentino and the Tyrol, General Cadoma
advanced his main infantry force, the Third Army, across the
Friuli Plain through Udine, Palmanova, and St. Georgio toward
the Isonzo. Here the covering troops on May 24 and 25 had
captured nearly all the small towns and villages between the
frontier and the river from Caporetto in the north just below
Monte Nero to Belvedere in the south on the Gulf of Trieste.
Cadorna feared lest his opponent. General von Hofer, would
launch his main attack from Gorizia against the Italian city of
Palmanova, fourteen miles to the west. But Von Hofer, so it
developed, had a subtler plan of campaign than a direct attack
through Gorizia. What he did was to place a strong force on the
mountain of Korada between the Isonzo and the Judrio. This
height commanded the middle course of the Isonzo, and it had
been transformed into a network of permanent trenches, pro-
tected by strong wire entanglements.
The Austrian general believed that by the time the Italians
could bring up their heavy artillery and begin to smash the en-
tanglements with their field guDs, supports could be pushed across
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 397
the river. Realizing that Korada must be captured, if at all, by
dash and surprise, the Italian brigadier in charge of the attack
gathered a herd of fierce bulls, which are numerous in that part
of Venetia, and penned them in a hollow out of sight of the
enemy, while his artillery began to bombard the hostile trenchesr
When the animals were wrought to a frenzy of rage and fear by
the noise of the guns, they were let loose and driven up the
mountain against the Austrian positions. Their charge broke
through many strands of the wire entanglements, and before the
last of them fell dead under the Austrian rifle fire, Italian troops
with fixed bayonets had crowded through the gaps in the wires
and captured the position.
By the end of May, 1915, the Third Army had reached the
Isonzo River, but had not crossed. Its advance was slow and
cautious. Operations were hampered by the heavy rains, which
caused the river to overflow its banks and added greatly to the
difficulties put in the path of the advancing army by the Aus-
trians, who, as they withdrew, left not a bridge behind them.
Grado, a fishing town of about 5,000 inhabitants, but impor-
tant on account of its strategic situation, was occupied by the
Italians with no great difficulty. Grado lies at the head of the
Adriatic, and is twelve miles from Trieste and sixty from Pola.
The waters of the lagoons in this neighborhood were valuable to
the Italians as a safe shelter for submarines and other small war-
craft, and as a base for a prospective attack later upon Pola
itself. The inhabitants, most of whom preserved their Italian
traits and sympathies, although the town had been under Aus-
trian rule since 1809, hailed the conquerors enthusiastically.
Cannon and military carriages were decorated with flowers.
Thousands of Italian flags appeared as if by magic. The enter-
ing troops were greeted with shouts of "All our lives we have
been waiting for this moment when we can cry 'Viva Italia !' "
The possession of Grado gave the Third Army virtual control of
the mouth of the Isonzo, but the main Austrian position of de-
fense at Gorizia remained apparently unweakened.
Scenes like those at Grado were witnessed at Ala, the first Aus-
trian town of any size and the first railroad center captured by
398 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Italians in the Trentino. Ala was occupied May 27, 1915.
Three days before this the Italian light infantry had massed
behind the boundary line, and when they began their advance
along the main highway their first act was to pull down the yellow
and black pole that marked the frontier.
The next day, May 28, 1915, the commanding general with his
chief of staff and two guards motored to the spot, cut a passage-
way through the barricade, and, encountering no opposition,
kept on until they reached Ala, seven miles beyond.
The Italian troops were ordered to advance next day. May 29,
1915, and as they marched into the town, officers shouted : "Open
your windows. Long live Italy !" The Mayor of Ala called out
his townsmen and set them at work removing the barricades on
the main road.
In the midst of these rejoicings the sharp rattle of musketry
was heard, and the Italians rushed to cover. A reconnoitering
party reported that the Austrians were intrenched in a large
villa beyond a stream outside the town. The Italian troops began
an attack upon this position, and a skirmish party sought to take
a position in a house on a near-by hill commanding the villa held
by the enemy. Although the way to this house was exposed to
thQ Austrian fire, the Italian officer decided to risk an attempt
iio reach it. But as he raised his sword to signal an advance, a
young girl ran to his side and told him of a path sheltered from
the Austrian fire. This girl, Signorina Abriani, whose name
will go down in Italian history as one of the first heroines of the
war, guided the detachment safely. The Austrians holding the
\dlla were strongly intrenched, and they held out against superior
forces until late in the afternoon, when four shells crashed into
the building, bringing it down about their ears. The Italians had
brought up a battery on the opposite side of the Adige River and
opened fire at long range. The Austrians made good their re-
treat, leaving all their ammunition and three dead. Later fifty-
seven Austrians were taken prisoners.
That night the Italian general took the precautions, usual on en-
tering a newly occupied town, of ordering that all the windows in
town be kept open and illuminated, and kept patrols about the
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 399
town. The mayor was reconfirmed, and his first act was to
announce to the citizens that "the royal military authorities,
knowing the needs of the inhabitants, have with affectionate
solicitude and great generosity placed 5,000 rations of bread and
2,000 of rice at the disposal of the poor." Thus Ala became Italian.
The incidents of these first advances into Austrian territory
were reported in detail in Italy, and are set down here as typical
of events that accompanied the irruption of Italian troops over
the border into the country which once had been Italian and
where, despite more than a century of Austrian occupation, a
large proportion of the inhabitants in spirit was Italian still.
Such reports spread through Italy naturally increased enthusiasm
for the restoration of the "unredeemed" provinces.
Although, as a rule, the Austrians retired before the first
Italian advance into Trentino, they did not depart until they had
left every possible obstacle. Roads were barricaded, bridges
destroyed, and mines were laid, cleverly concealed on hillsides
where it was intended their explosion would overwhelm the
Italians under masses of rock and earth. But this was just what
the Alpini and Bersaglieri had been trained to anticipate. Ac-
cording to the official Italian accounts, their scouting was so
excellent that the wires connecting these mines with Austrian
hiding places were discovered and cut, and hardly a mine was
exploded. All this took place while the Austrians were drawing
in their outposts and consolidating their forces in the great
strongholds where later they held the Italians in absolute check.
The Italians advanced cautiously in small groups, and the Aus-
trians abandoned the frontier villages soon enough to avoid
serious encounters, but not a minute sooner.
In the Alps in these days of May, 1915, the Great War was
fought much as wars have been fought in times we are accus-
tomed to regard as the age of true romance. The Italian King
visited the Alpine troops and surprised his men and redoubled
their devotion by showing his skill as a mountain climber. "You
forget," he told an officer who remonstrated with him as he was
about to scale a particularly difficult position to examine a gun*
"chamois hunting is my favorite sport."
26— War St. 3
400 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
If certain portions of the Italian population seemed lukewarm
toward the war during the period of diplomatic negotiations,
there was no doubt of the temper of the nation after hostilities
actually began. The chord of national feeling was struck by
King Victor Emmanuel in an order issued upon taking supreme
command of the army and navy.
''Soldiers on land and sea," said the order, "the solemn hour
of the nation's claims has struck. Following the example of my
grandfather, I take to-day supreme command of Italy's forces on
land and sea, with the assurance of victory which your bravery,
self-abnegation, and discipline will obtain.
"The enemy you are preparing to fight is hardened to war and
worthy of you. Favored by the nature of the ground and skillful
works, he will resist tenaciously, but your unsubdued ardor will
surely vanquish him.
"Soldiers, to you has come the glory of unfurling Italy's colors
on the sacred lands which nature has given as the frontiers of
our country. To you has come the glory of finally accomplishing
the work undertaken with so much heroism by our fathers."
The stormy scenes which followed the resignation of the
Salandra cabinet gave way to a confident calm. From his seclu-
sion in the Vatican the pope addressed a letter to Cardinal Van-
nutelli, breathing a spirit of resignation and faith, but carefully
refraining from any expression of partisanship in the great
struggle.
"The hour which we are traversing is painful," he said, "but
our prayers will go out more frequently and more fervently than
ever to those who have in their hands the fate of nations." The
pope recalled that in his first Encyclical issued at the beginning
of the war he exhorted the belligerent nations to make peace, but
his voice was unheeded and the war continued "until the terrible
conflagration has extended to our beloved Italy. While our hearts
bleed at the sight of so much misery," he wrote, "we have not
neglected to continue our work for relief and the diminution of
the deplorable consequences of war. I wish that the echo of our
voice might reach to all our children affected by the great scourge
of war, and persuade all of them of our participation in their
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS 401
troubles and sorrows. There is little of the grief of the child that
is not reflected in the soul of the father."
The greatest enthusiasm, naturally, was manifested in the
cities of the north nearest the scene of war. The Master
Workers' Guild of Milan voted unanimously to give up one day's
pay each month to be devoted to the relief of the families of men
at the front. Many business houses carried soldiers' names on
their payrolls and remitted their wages to their families.
In all cities within range of the enemy's aircraft precautions
were taken to guard public buildings, and especially the famous
objects which for centuries had made Italy the Mecca of lovers of
art. In Venice the bronze horses of St. Mark's were taken down
from their pedestals and hiddden in the subterranean caverns of
the cathedral. The gilded statue of the Virgin surmounting the
celebrated white marble cathedral at Milan was covered with
cloth, so that it might not serve as a guide to Austrian raiders.
The stained glass windows of the edifice were removed as a pre-
caution against possible bombardment. After the first Austrian
sea and air raid along the Adriatic coast orders were issued that
lights should be darkened in all Adriatic ports. This order was
extended also to certain inland cities, such as Milan, Bologna,
Verona, Brescia, and Udine. A special watch for aeroplanes was
kept at Bologna on account of the location there of an important
factory for the manufacture of explosives. Watches were set on
the crests of the Appenines ready to notify Rome of approaching
danger from the air.
.^- The attitude of Germany toward Italy at this period of the
iHp^ar is best indicated by the speech delivered at the session of the
^^feeichstag by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chan-
I^Kellor. He imputed the Italian declaration of war to a combina-
I^Rion of mob dictation, bad faith on the part of the cabinet of
Premier Salandra, and, to a certain degree, to the money of the
I powers of the Entente. The greater part of the Italian people,
the chancellor asserted, and a majority in the Italian Parliament
had not wanted war, and were even kept in ignorance of the
ejttent of the concessions which Austria-Hungary was wilhng to
make for the sake of peace. The Salandra cabinet, he declared.
402 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
long before the Triple Alliance had ceased to exist, aligned itself
with the Triple Entente and "unchained the mob spirit and in-
timidated the advocates of peace."
On the eve of leaving Rome, Prince von Bulow gave out a
statement in which he declared that Italy was led into the war by
a "noisy minority," and that even if in the end she obtained
what she asked she would not get much more than what Austria
already had offered. "It should be understood," he explained,
"that it was impossible to deprive the central empires of Trieste,
their only outlet to the Adriatic in the Mediterranean."
Turkey regarded the entrance of Italy into the war on the side
of the Entente with apparent equanimity. "We will not declare
war on Italy," announced Talaat Bey, the Turkish Minister of the
Interior. "We can wait. What can Italy do to us?"
CHAPTER LXVI
FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS
WHILE the world hears little about strategic plans that
fail to work out, it is believed that the Austrians in May,
1915, had in mind to let the enemy obtain a good start in his
advance against Trieste. Then, when the Italian operations were
well under way, and the two railroads from Venice were choked
with their supplies, the Austrians probably intended to launch
a swift attack upon Verona and the rich cities of Lombardy, thus
cutting off the chief centers of Italian industry. At the same
time, they undoubtedly meant to send an invading army through
the passes of the Carnic and Julian Alps from their base at
Tarvis, and by a sudden swoop southward take the Italian forces
on the Isonzo in the flank. At least this is what the Italian staff
believed was their plan, and they arranged their own forces
accordingly.
This was the' reason for the extensive Italian drive during the
third week of May, 1915, at all the mountain passes of the long
FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS 403
frontier. For almost any of these passes might prove to be the
gateway of invasion, whereas, once captured, they could be held
by a few battalions. But behind each force that occupied the
passes won in the first Italian dash was a large reserve ready to
lend support wherever the enemy tried to break through. The
Italians were not kept long in suspense as to where this thrust
from the north first would come.
On May 29, 1915, under cover of a heavy fog, the Austrians
concentrated a strong force from Villach, brought them to
Mauthen, and from that point launched five successive attacks in
an effort to win back the pass of Monte Croce in the Carnic Alps.
The Alpini met the attacks with musketry and machine-gun fire,
then, after the last attempt had failed, leaped from their trenches
and drove the Austrians down the valley.
Thus began the battle of Monte Croce, an engagement de-
scribed in the official bulletins of both countries in a way that
gave the world its first intimation of the peculiar features of this
mountain warfare. Each side had large reserves, and the
struggle for the pass continued day and night, the Italians push-
ing over the neighboring passes and gathering their strength for
a counterattack when the Austrians were exhausted.
On June 8, 1915, the Italians stormed Freikofel, a height com-
manding the Plocken Plateau, and took the Pass of Valentina and
the Pass of Oregione, 7,500 feet high, and overlooking the wooded
I valley of Gail. The Alpini won Oregione by climbing through ice
and snow over Paralba Mountain and fighting their way down-
ward. Undaunted, General Dankl called up a fresh corps.
On the night of June 14, 1915, the Austrians made a supreme
effort to break through the Italian line and put into effect his plan
of pouring an army through the Carnic Alps to attack the flank
of the main Italian army. Although 100,000 men were engaged
in this battle, the ground permitted no massed movements. For
miles the saddle of Oregione, the snow-clad sides of Paralba, and
every smaller peak and ravine extending to Monte Croce and
Freikofel were speckled with fighting men. After the two sides
came to grips, the big guns held their fire, and it was man to man
and bayonet against bayonet. At one point only did the Austrian
404 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
thrust reach Italian soil. For a short time the Austrians were on
Paralba at an elevation of 8,840 feet, but threatened both in the
flank and in the rear they were forced to retreat and take refuge
in their prepared positions on Steinwand, a huge limestone
mountain overlooking the Gail Valley.
The strategic idea of General Cadorna is more easily under-
stood when one studies the railway map of the Austrian territory
north of the Camic border. Here their railway line through the
Drave Valley passed closer to the boundary line than did the
Italian system on the south, and they could bring up fresh
troops with more speed. In the Gail Valley they had a wide
region in which they could mass hidden from the enemy, and
they had a good road up the mountains from Mauthen, while
the Italians had to depend upon rough tracks through the valley.
Although Cadorna had the hard task of keeping the doorway to
Venice closed while he attacked the enemy on both flanks, he
accomplished his purpose.
The Italian army operating in the province of Cadore won its
next success in an attack upon the village of Cortina, situated in
a salient of the frontier, 4,000 feet high, amid some of the most
beautiful scenery in the world. Cortina was taken on May 30.
The Austrians had barricaded the famous road winding up
through the Dolomites, and dug elaborate trenches; but the
Italians, by superhuman efforts, moved up their mountain guns,
while the Alpini scrambled over the mountains by the glaciers of
Serapis and the tarns of Croda da Lago, and descended into
Cortina on either side. Then, holding the enemy on the east,
they advanced into the Tyrol westward to Falzarego.
In this region they had ^n experience which illustrated the
foresight of the Austrians in preparing for the attack they be-
lieved would come. Some years before an Austrian had built a
hotel in a deep ravine shut in by walls of limestone and very
difficult of approach. Tourists had commented upon the lack of
practicability of the man who placed a hostelry in so inaccessible
a spot. But when the war came it developed that the hotel builder
probably had a subsidy from the Government. For sandbags,
machine guns, and quick-firers quickly converted the hotel into
FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS 405
an excellent fort, which dominated the famous ravine. Thanks
to the hardiness and ingenuity of their picked Alpine troops, the
Italians, after a week of hard fighting, cleared the mountains
above the ravine and dropped upon the hotel fort.
By June 9, 1915, the Italians had won the Falzarego Pass. At
times the fighting raged on summits 10,000 feet high, where the
thin air exhausted the combatants far quicker than their physical
exertions. In the last battle of this engagement the Italians ob-
tained a footing upon a point of great strategical importance
three miles beyond the pass on the Sasso d'Istria, close to where
the Dolomite road bends southward through the ravine and
penetrated the mountains in two tunnels.
This victory gave the Austrians cause for anxiety regarding
the western defenses of Tyrol, for by a double flanking move-
ment along the Cordevole River and the Dolomite road the
Italians in Cadore had extended like two arms around one of the
principal systems of defense. General Dankl hurried reenforce-
ments to the Cadore front to check the thrust up the Cordevole
Valley. At the end of this valley was the focal point of the sys-
tem of railways that carried food and munitions to both the
Trentino forces and those in southern Tyrol. If the Italians had
succeeded in cutting the railway at this point the enemy would
have had great difficulty in maintaining his armies on the Tren-
tino and Tyrol fronts. The Italian effort was not pushed to suc-
cess ; but it at least had the effect of discouraging any plans Gen-
eral Dankl might have formed of invading the plains of northern
Italy at the foot of the frontier mountains.
Only twenty miles south of the Austrian outposts was the im-
portant city of Verona, famed for its memories of Romeo and
Juliet. Nearer still was Brescia with the fertile lands of Lom-
bardy surrounding it. But by his maneuvers at the opening of
the war. General Cadorna effectively protected Italian territory
and forced the enemy to devote all his attention to resisting the
attacks of active light infantry and mountain artillery. The
great 12-inch Skoda howitzers, upon which Austria depended to
batter down the defenses of these Italian cities, were needed
elsewhere, behind the Julian and Camic Alps, and especially in
406 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the comer of the frontier near Predil Pass, by which Napoleon
invaded Italy, and on the Isonzo front between Tolmino and the
Adriatic.
Thus with his infantry, Cadorna overcame the artillery handi-
cap under which Italy labored during all the first months of the
war. The Skoda gun was reputed to be the best in the world.
It had proved its worth in Belgium and Russia, and the fact that
the Austrians were able to lend guns to their ally proved their
wealth of big-gun power. Now, even after ten months of war,
when thousands of the great howitzers were busy in Galicia and
along the Danube, the Skoda works could still produce an arma-
ment superior to that of Italy. Much of the effectiveness of the
Skoda gun lay in the fact that it could be separated into two
parts for easier transportation. In addition to these 12-inch
mortars, Austria had a 6-inch steel Skoda, designed in the sum-
mer of 1914, for use in the Carpathians and well adapted to fight-
ing in the Alps. Due in part to their realization of this superi-
ority of Austria in big guns, the Italians remained neutral for ten
months, but meanwhile they had created a new armament for
their own armies at full speed. For the attack on the Austrian
infantry in the field they adapted the French' 75-millimeter quick-
firer, and for siege work they manufactured 6- and 12-inch
howitzers. But it takes time to build heavy artillery, and at this
time every armament firm in the world was pushed to its full
capacity, while the Italians, being without coal fields, were handi-
capped in the development of armament resources at home. For
political reasons also General Cadorna would not risk sacrificing
his men to overcome this artillery handicap. His problem was to
conserve his forces as much as possible in readiness for a de-
fensive campaign against combined Teutonic armies, winning
what small victories he could, and meanwhile keeping down his
casualty lists, while fighting heavy howitzers with light mountain
guns and 3-inch quick-firers. i. t atf
After the Italians had established their hold upon the frontier
points there was an apparent relaxation of effort while the in-
fantry of the line waited for the heavy siege artillery to issue
from the armament factories and come into action. This move-
FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS 407
ment of artillery was slow, especially on the Isonzo front where
engineering operations were delayed by the summer floods caused
by the melting snows from the mountain tops. To transport
heavy pieces of ordnance across the floods the Italian engineers
had to build strong bridges, often under heavy fire from the
enemy, who, even after their retirement from the east bank of
the river, continually harassed the Italian advance guard holding
the bridgeheads. The Austrians aided the work of the mountain
floods by breaking down the high embankment used to carry off
the snow water, and thereby inundated the plain. Working
under a plunging fire from the enemy's batteries on the foot-
hills, the Italian sappers built light pontoon bridges over the
floods upon which the first Italian contingent crossed at night
and occupied the first line of Austrian trenches near the river.
This much the Italians accomplished by the first week in June,
1915 ; but there they were forced to pause for the reasons already
described. Active hostilities during the first part of June on the
Isonzo front centered around Monfalcone, a seaport just below
the dominating Carso headlands. Taken from Venice by the
Austrians during the Napoleonic era, Monfalcone had become the
third most important port in the empire. In its yards warships
were being constructed.
On June 9, 1915, the Italians made their swift stroke in a
southwesterly direction from their Isonzo line. The port was
bombarded on June 7, 1915, by a light Italian cruiser squadron,
and the Castle of Duino, standing at the sea edge near Trieste
and defended by three artillery batteries, was shattered and set
afire apparently to prepare for the operations against Monfalcone
from the southwestern side of the Gulf of Panzano. Archduke
Eugene hastily collected a strong force above Duino ready to re-
sist an attempt by the Italians to land, but the attempt never was
made. It. developed that the bombardment of Duino was a feint.
The real movement against Monfalcone was launched from an-
other quarter straight across the Isonzo. The Bersaglieri cyclist
corps and grenadiers broke through the Austrian line at the
river, and since the Austrians had neglected to prepare a reserve
" line, the Italians advanced by a swift, running fight through the
408 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
villages around the Isonzo delta. Near the historic town of
Aquileia, now a mere hamlet, the Italians forced a passage of the
river at the point of the bayonet and flowed in two streams around
the enemy's positions, depending for their rapid movements upon
their cyclists with machine guns and their fast-marching light
infantry. The Austrians set fire to the pine-clad mountain
slopes, but were unable to stem the rush of the Italians who,
under the flare of the forest fires, broke into the open town of
Monfalcone after storming the promontory of Rocca.
Here, however, the Italian advance guard was in a dangerous
/)Osition, for the Austrian batteries posted on the limestone bluffs
rising 1,000 feet on the northern side of the town still dominated
the streets occupied by the Italians near the water's edge. The
situation was critical, not only because the troops in the lower
town were In danger of annihilation if they held their ground,
but because the Italians were anxious to save the town from
bombardment, and preserve the warships under construction in
the shipyards. So a brigade of light troops scaled the limestone
cliffs dragging their mobile 3-inch guns, and forced the Austrians
to retire, taking their heavy howitzers with them. Monfalcone
now rested securely in Italian possession. The Italians in all this
engagement lost only about 100 killed and wounded, while the
enemy's casualties were estimated at 2,000. The loss stung the
Austro-Hungarian Government deeply.
CHAPTER LXVII
ATTACKS IN GORIZIA
AFTER the Italian success in June, 1915, certain readjustments
- were manifest in the Austrian forces in the Italian theatre.
Although there was no declaration of war between Italy and
Germany, it was reported that German officers were sent to aid
the Austrians, and that the forces of Archduke Eugene were
progressively strengthened from this time on. German soldiers
ATTACKS IN GORIZIA 409
who joined the Austrian detachments were supposed to have vol-
unteered in an irregular individual manner. In this manner
Germany preserved the appearance of neutrality.
The latter part of June, 1915, found Austria occupied with the
siege of Lemberg, and the archduke, apparently, was content to
hold his own on the Italian front until a decision had been ob-
tained in the more important operations against the Russians.
Satisfied with their initial successes. General Cadoma on land
and the Duke of Abruzzi at sea settled down to a slow, patient
chess play, not unlike that worked out by General Joffre in
France. Cadoma issued a statement to the Italian people in
which he warned them that the preliminary successes which, he
said, had made good the strategical defects of their frontier,
would be followed by a long stage of gradual approaches against
the enemy's second line.
The attrition of the Austro-Hungarian forces would be carried
on by long-range artillery and sappers and local trench warfare
with hand grenades. The Italian commander in chief resolutely
refused to divert any part of his forces to the Dardanelles. Pos-
sible danger to Italian dominion in Tripoli, pointed out by the
leaders of the Entente Powers, did not change his purpose to main-
tain a single concentrated front and not diffuse his efforts. The
war with Austria, he believed, would be won or lost on the Italian
frontier. His theory as to the best way to meet advances by the
Teutonic allies in new fields was to increase pressure on their
home frontiers where their interests were most vital. The Italian
army in the field was increased to a million men, and, after the
fall of Lemberg, Austria gradually moved more and more troops
to the Alpine passes and the Isonzo, until by August she had
600,000 men facing the Italians, double the number arrayed on
this front when Italy declared war. Had the Russians been able
to hold out longer in Galicia, there is little doubt that Cadorna
would have had something to show for the month of July besides
a few local victories which did not vitally affect the main
campaign.
On June 9, 1915, the capture of Gradisca completed the Italian
control of the lower Isonzo, and Cadorna prepared for a general
410
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
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ATTACKS IN GORIZIA 411
attack on all the strongholds guarding Trieste. Of these the most
important were the Carso tableland on the south, Gorizia barring
the river-valley of the Vipacco between the Carso and the foot-
hills of the Julian Alps, the fortified system of heights north of
Gorizia surrounding the town of Tolmino, and the great in-
trenched camp of Tarvis above Tolmino extending to Malbor-
ghetto and the other Alps of Carinthia. These fortified points
had to be attacked generally or not at all. Any attempt to mass
an army against any one of them would have spelled disaster, for
the Italians would have been flanked by Austrian forces from the
north or south. A properly defined advance against Trieste
called for a simultaneous thrust at Tolmino and the Tarvis for-
tress commanding the road to Vienna. The Austrians had been
strengthening Tarvis ever since 1859, after Napoleon III over-
threw the Austrians in the battles that freed Lombardy. The
Austrian fortresses were again strengthened after the siege of
Port Arthur had demonstrated the power of high-explosive
shells, and again in 1910 when the Teutonic allies made their
great discovery that their new giant howitzers laughed at modem
defense works of steel and concrete. In remodeling her Alpine
strongholds Austria selected positions on the plateau for systems
of earthworks containing mobile siege guns.
The key to this immensely strong Austrian line of defense was
the railway town of Plava on the eastern bank of the Isonzo
under the wooded heights of the Ternovane Forest. Plava was
in a salient occupying about the middle of the Austrian line.
Here, on the night of June 17, 1915, the Italians began their
general offensive by an attack from Mount Korada on the opposite
side of the river. Under cover of darkness the Italian sappers
built a pontoon bridge, and the Bersaglieri crossed and carried
the town and the surrounding heights at the point of the bayonet.
The Austrians realized the importance of the position and quickly
returned to a violent counterattack. The Italians threw all their
available men into the gap, and a great battle raged on the edge
of the highlands east of the river. The Austrians had the ad-
vantage of position, for their forces could be massed in the wood-
land out of sight of the Italian aviators. But, on the other hand,
412 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Italian batteries on Mount Korada were able to pour a plung-
ing fire into the lower tableland; and due mainly to the aid of
their artillery the Italian troops drove back the enemy and main-
tained the ground won by the first dash.
General Cadorna was now in a position to begin a direct attack
upon Gorizia. He assailed the Hill of Podgora, forming the bar-
bican of the city's system of defenses and advanced a recon-
noitering force toward Mount Fortin. Meanwhile he massed 500
pieces of artillery on the heights commanding the city. But the
defenses of Gorizia had been well planned, and they proved their
completeness by a long resistance covering a period that brought
successive reports that the fortress had fallen. All these reports
proved false. South of the city the Austrian intrenchments
covered a front of more than ten miles, from the Mount of San
Gabriele below Plava to Mount San Michele on the Carso table-
land. The trenches were built in the most modern style, of con-
crete more than a yard thick covered with steel armor, against
which ordinary shrapnel had no more effect than so much hail,
and even high-explosive shells of medium power did little dam-
age. The Italian weapons of attack were hand grenades and
short knives, in the use of which the infantry were expert. Four
army corps operating under the Duke of Aosta between Gorizia
and the sea were beaten back by the Austrians with heavy
losses. This victory so encouraged the archduke and chief
lieutenant, General Boroevics, that they decided upon a counter-
offensive in force. Therefore, as soon as the Italian attack
slackened, the main Austrian army advanced across the Carso
Plateau.
The series of battles that now followed were the first engage-
ments of any size between the Italians and the Austro-Hunga-
rians in the open field. They began June 22, 1915, and lasted
until the close of July, with a short let-up at the end of the first
week in July. The theatre included the whole Carso front, the
Vipacco Valley, and the southern part of the Ternovane Forest.
After his first repulse General Boroevics brought up fresh corps
and renewed the attack, but in the end he was driven back to his
main line with shattered forces.
ATTACKS IN GORIZIA 413
In the Carso tableland the Austrians had as nearly perfect a
position of natural defense as a general could choose. On the
east of the Isonzo plain the broken, rocky wall rises in places to
1,000 feet, seamed with gullies and ravines, and bristling with
forest growth which afforded ideal cover. The action of the rain
has pitted the limestone with funnel-shaped holes which form
natural redoubts for machine guns ; and there are larger depres-
sions and caves where heavier pieces of artillery may be placed in
excellent shelter.
But while the Italians were unable to capture this position,
when General Boroevics took his troops out of their defenses and
sent them charging across the open ground, he found that the
enemy had made good use of his precarious hold on the edges of
the tableland. Although they occupied* barely more than the rim
of the plateau, with the flooded Isonzo a third of a mile broad
beneath them, the Italians had strengthened their positions with
sandbag intrenchments and hauled up a few pieces of light
artillery.
The chief support of the infantry holding these sandbag de-
fenses was the heavy guns across the river, which searched out
the Austrian columns whenever they left cover. In weight of
artillery the Italians had the advantage, for most of the Aus-
trian 12-inch howitzers were busy in the Alps, and they had to
depend mainly upon 6-inch pieces.
By the second week in July, 1915, the Austrians relaxed their
efforts, and the Italians began a slow advance, working up the
hills overlooking Gorizia by a variety of methods. In the places,
comparatively few, where there was cultivated ground, they
practiced the siege method of sapping forward, but generally
their advance was over bare rock, where trenches could be exca-
vated only by the use of dynamite, and when a charge was made
the troops had to carry sandbags to build temporary cover from
machine-gun fire. This method of warfare, in fact, was general
throughout the whole mountain front, where the hard rock car-
ried a mere veneer of earth, and sandbags had to serve for de-
fense until the engineers could blast trenches and galleries in the
flintlike face of the slopes.
414 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The repulse of the Austrian counterattack in the middle of
July, 1915, ended the first phase of the battle of Gorizia. On
July 18th, 19th and 20th, General Cadorna delivered a fierce
assault aided by knowledge gained in the first stage of the
battle, which, for the Italians, was little more than a reconnais-
sance in force. For three days and nights he drove the troops
of his combined Second and Third Armies against the enemy's
lines all along the Isonzo. His system was to attack by day
and then at night resist the enemy's couterassaults on his newly
won positions. The Italians retained all the ground they won
during these days of terrific fighting, and captured 3,500
prisoners.
By the 20th of July their confidence had increased to such
an extent that they determined upon a night assault. But next
morning Cadorna received word from his aeroplane scouts and
his spies that the enemy was massing for a supreme effort. The
Italian advance was stayed and every man was set at work
helping the engineers strengthen the trenches.
On July 21, 1915, there came a complete lull. The next day
the Austrians opened their attack With a concentrated bombard-
ment. During the period of Italian advance the railways had
been piling up the Austrian shells and German gunners had
been sent by the Crown Prince of Bavaria to help serve the
heavy howitzers rushed to the Carso from the Julian Alps and
the Tyrol and Trentino salients. With the design to cut the
Italian line of communication, the main Austrian infantry attack
was delivered toward Gradisca where the Italians had con-
structed their principal bridges across the Isonzo. The infantry
massed behind the neighboring hills and under cover of a
tremendous artillery bombardment advanced in close formation.
The first line of Italian troops seemed about to be swept away
when the gunners on the heights across the river got the range
and poured into the advancing Austrians a massed fire from
all their 500 pieces. General Boroevics's advance was pounded
to pieces; the Italians brought up reenforements and charged
and captured the lines from which the Austrians had delivered
their assault, taking 2,000 prisoners.
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ATTACKS IN GORIZIA 415
On July 23, 1915, the archduke ordered another attack upon
the Italian positions near the sea on the edge of the Carso table-
land. This was really an effort to recapture Monf alcone ; but it
failed, although the Italians did not dare risk pursuit over the
rough ground. Later two Austrian divisions, advancing from
San Michele and San Martino against Sagrado were repulsed
with heavy losses.
By July 25, 1915, the Italians were able to attack and ciiipture
some of the intrenchments on the slopes of San Martino and
to storm Sei Busi. This hill of Sei Busi witnessed some of the
most sanguinary fighting of the whole series of engagements.
On a single day it was won, lost and won again by the Italians,
both sides bringing up strong reenforcements and concentrating
against the summit all the artillery within range. Over the
crest of San Michele which dominated a large part of the table-
land the battle surged for many days.
On July 27, 1915, the Italians, attacking with bombs and
bayonets were able to occupy the summit, but could not establish
themselves there in the face of the enemy's bombardment. The
lower slopes they were able to hold behind their sandbag in-
trenchments, but the crest, swept by the enemy's heavy artillery
and offering no shelter, was absolutely untenable. In all this
fighting artillery played the major role. The Italians charged that
Archduke Eugene, realizing that any infantry advance against
this terrific gunfire was a certain sacrifice of men, placed in his
van regiments of men from the Italian-speaking provinces and
from Old Serbia and Croatia. In this position these troops were
exposed to fire from their own batteries with the knowledge that
any attempt at treachery meant annihilation by their own guns
in the rear. No figures as to the number of men from the "un-
redeemed" provinces forced to fight against their kinsmen on
the frontier are obtainable. Italian writers, however, maintain
that during the first months of the war Austrian infantrymen
of Latin and Slav origin were sacrificed by the hundred thou-
sand around Gorizia and Trento.
Like other great drives of the Allies on the French front,
the Italian offensive on the chain of forts guarding Gorizia failed
27— War St 3
416 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to break the enemy's resistance. The fighting, however,
seasoned the untried troops of General Cadorna and won them
praise even from the veterans of General Boroevics and from
Boroevics himself. "I cannot refrain from saying," declared the
Austrian General in an interview published in a Hungarian
neWspaper, "that the bravery of the Italian regiments was
almost incredible, for even if certain regiments lost all their
offic^brs, this did not deter them from advancing with the greatest
contempt for death."
CHAPTER LXVIII
FIGHTING IN THE ALPS — ITALIAN
SUCCESSES
IEAVING the situation on the Isonzo where it rested at the
^ close of July, 1915, in a condition virtually of stalemate, we
return to the still more picturesque struggle in the Alps. While
the Italian Third Army in massed assault was making its unsuc-
cessful fight for possession of Gorizia with Trieste as its ultimate
objective, warfare was in progress in a hundred places in the
Julian, Camic, Dolomite, Trentino and Tyrolean mountains. Al-
though along this part of the frontier the Italians inflicted no
vital harm upon the enemy during the first two months of the
war, they were successful in a multitude of minor enterprises,
each of which furnishes its stirring tale of hand-to-hand fight-
ing, individual heroism and novel expedients in a country
singularly adapted to some of the methods of primeval warfare.
Being on the defensive, the Austrians frequently made use of
the primitive ambush of mountain tribes. Loose, heavy bowlders
were lashed to the edge of a precipice and masked with pine
branches. Then when the enemy passed along the mountain
path beneath, the wires holding the rocks in place were cut,
releasing a deadly avalanche upon the advancing foe.
Any description of the fighting on this Alpine front becomes
by necessity a catalogue of apparently isolated operations, for
FIGHTING IN THE ALPS 417
the nature of the ground negatived any great battle in force
such as that along the Isonzo River. In the Julian Alps the
Italian mountaineers gained a lucky success early in June.
General Rohr, the Austrian commander, had set two companies
to guard a rampart of rock between Tolmino and Monte Nero.
The position was so strong that a few hundred men with Maxims
and quick-firers could have held it against an army corps. Its
strength, in fact, was so apparent that the Austrians took their
duties too lightly. Leaving only a few sentries on watch, both
companies enjoyed plenty of sleep at night. But one night the
Italian Alpinists climbed silently over the mountain, killed the
enemy's sentries with knives before they could make an outcry
and coming upon the two companies from the rear captured
them with scarcely a struggle.
The peak of Monte Nero, a stump-shaped mountain 7,370 feet
high at the headwaters of the Isonzo, proved important to the
Italians, for it gave them a fire-control station from which 12-
inch shells were dropped into the forts of Tolmino and the
southern forts of Tarvis. North of Monte Nero, where the
boundary turns to the west, is the important pass of Predil, the
gateway to Tarvis, guarded on the southeast by the fortress of
Flitsch and on the west by Malborghetto. These two positions
were the strongest points in a great ring of fortified heights
protecting the pass and the highway and railroad running
through an angle of the Julian Alps into the heart of Austria.
The forts of Malborghetto projected into Italian territory and
its chief works. Fort Hensel, a great white oblong of armored
concrete, was visible miles away in the Italian mountains.
Against this system of fortifications the Italians brought their
heaviest howitzers and demonstrated, as satisfactorily as the
Germans had shown months earlier at Liege, that the strongest
forts were no match for modem artillery. Fort Hensel and the
other permanent forts were shattered and the ground around
them was pitted with great craters from explosions of the 12-
inch shells.
The final ruin of Fort Hensel was accomplished by a shell
which penetrated through the thickest of its steel and concrete
418 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
layers and exploded in its ammunition magazine. This bom-
bardment of Malborghetto necessitated firing mortar shells at
a high angle completely over mountains which hid the target
from the Italian gunners. The work of destruction was slow
owing to the fact that mists often curtained the mountain tops
and forced the gunners to cease operations, because to fir6 while
the cJbservers were unable to watch every shot and telephone the
results would have been only a waste of ammunition.
But the Austrians already Imew that their forts were no
match for 12-inch howitzers, once these great guns could get
into position, and they had prepared another method of defense
which they put into use as soon as the forts were destroyed.
Batteries of Skodas, hidden in a stretch of pasture land below
the summit of the mountain, were brought up and placed in pits
concealed by tufts of grass and brush from reconnoitering air-
men, while at a safe distance dummy guns were displayed to
draw the Italians' fire. Thus one of the greatest artillery duels
of the whole front continued day after day, neither sfde being
able to See the enemy and relying for information upon observers
posted on mountain tops and in aeroplanes. These 12-inch
fguns were not intended for such work. They had been labori-
ously hauled to their lofty emplacements five and six thousand
feet above sea level to destroy 6-inch batteries, as these 6-inch
guns had been brought up to overpower the lighter 3-inch moun-
tain guns, some of which the Italians worked from peaks as
high as 10,000 feet. When both sides got these monster
howitzers into position the natural sequence was a deadlock.
The most the infantry could do was to drive the enemy's troops
from summits valuable as observation points in the service of
the heavy artillery.
Thus the official reports issued by the Austrian and Italian
staff headquarters reiterated the names of peaks hitherto un-
known to the traveler and tourist mountaineer, peaks which
became of immense importance now, not so much on account of
their height as because they commanded the best views of the
surrounding territory. One of these was Freikofel. The Alpini
captured it early in tiie war with scarcely a struggle and then
MORE MOUNTAIN FIGHTING 419
for weeks the Austrians sacrificed regiments and even brigades
in vain attempts to recover it.
The loss of Freikofel by the Austrians was followed, on June
24, 1915, by the loss of Cresta Verde, and then in the first week
of July the Italians captured the important observation peak of
Zellenkofel. This mountain was held by the Austrians with a
force of only forty men, but in view of its extraordinary position
this squad was considered sufficient. The slopes below them
were swept by a battery of their mountain guns, in telephonic
communication with the more distant howitzer battery upon
which it could call for assistance if necessity arose, and a large
infantry reserve was stationed in the wooded valley below. But
one night twenty-nine Alpini crept up the almost sheer precipice
a thousand feet high that separated them from the Austrian
defenders. They carried ropes and a machine gun and just as
the moon rose they attained the summit, set up their Maxim and
opened fire. Every man in the observation station was shot down.
Then followed a desperate fight with the Austrian mountain
battery on the reverse slope. But thanks to their machine gun
the Italians were able to break up the enemy's charge and as
day broke they captured the Austrians' guns and drove the men
who served them down the mountain. When the Austrian
reserves arrived the Italians had intrenched themselves on the
southern slope and were able to make use of the captured guns.
The attacks of the reserves were repulsed and the Italians held
the mountain.
CHAPTER LXIX
MORE MOUNTAIN FIGHTING — RESULTS
OP FIRST CAMPAIGN
AT the western end of the rugged battle front, the Italian moun-
^ tain troops, after the first advance, were less successful than
the troops of Cadorna in the Camic and Julian Alps. Here the
fighting mountaineers of Tyrol redeemed their reputation by
.420 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
a daring stroke. The scene of this brilliant operation was close
above the Tonale Pass, the site of one of the greatest glaciers
in Europe. From Presanella to Care the ice extends in a
gleaming crescent for more than twenty miles. Its broadest
part stretches for six miles to Monte Adamello, 11,640 feet high.
The paths over or by these glaciers had been seized and fortified
by ;^)ie Italians and their line along this front lay mostly within
Italian territory. In mid-July a force of Tyroleans found a
neWi.t^ack through the ice and before the Italians, engrossed with
opei^ations elsewhere, knew what they were doing they had
penetrated several miles into Italian lands. The Italians met
the invaders at the famous Garibaldi Hut owned by the Italian
Alpine Club just beneath Mount Adamello and checked the
advance, although the Austrians retained some of the peaks
commanding the Hut.
Just north of the Adamello group of peaks in the upper part
of the Gf^ijidipari Valley extending to Lake Garda the Italians
took one of the northern passes by surprise and advanced toward
the forts defending Riva and Arco. Eventually they won all
the country south of the Ledro Valley with a series of fierce
artillery duels. A similar advance was made east of Lake Garda
and down the Lagarina Valley. The forward movement was
signalized by engineering feats comparable, in their mastery
of the human hand over the forces of nature, only to the building
of the Pyramids. The great siege guns weighing many tons
were hoisted to the top of cloud-piercing summits solely by man
power. Every bit of ammunition and supplies had to be brought
up by the same laborious method. At Col di Lana the Austrians
had an intricate series of works excavated deep in the solid
rock. High explosive shells and hand bombs were useless against
this defense, but Colonel Garibaldi, a grandson of the great
Italian Liberator, found a way to drive the Austrians out of
their position. He mustered a corps of engineers who had
helped drill the great railway tunnels on the Swiss frontier and
under his direction they tunneled right through the mountain
into the Austrian galleries on the reverse slope. When the
fumes of the last charge of blasting dynamite cleared away a
MORE MOUNTAIN FIGHTING 421
detachment of bomb carriers leaped through the jagged hole,
drove the enemy from their galleries, and, constantly fed by sup-
porting troops, cleared their way up and down the mountain.
The first of August, 1915, found the Italians holding the Aus-
trian outpost positions they had taken during June and July;
but the Austrian main defenses from one end of the frontier to
the other, a distance of more than 300 miles, were virtually intact.
It must be borne in mind, however, that the Italian General
Staff at this period of the war never contemplated any general
offensive except on the Isonzo River. Although their attack
along the Isonzo did not attain its object of reducing the main
defenses of Trieste and Gorizia, proved too hard a nut to crack,
the Italians here won a series of minor victories against great
odds and, to the Italian mind at least, demonstrated the valor
of the army and the effectiveness of the new artillery which
boded well for the future.
It has been pointed out that in these operations General
Cadoma had to consider other things besides the immediate
problems facing his troops. The Italo-Austrian warfare was
but a small factor in the great plan of the Entente allies, who
as the war progressed, realized more and more the importance
of cooperative action. All that happened in Galicia, Poland,
Lithuania and Courland had a direct influence upon Cadoma's
plans. Russian reverses and the failure of all attempts by the
French and British to break the German line in France and
Belgium made the Italian commander cautious. The series of
Teutonic victories made it possible that at any time he might
have to face an overwhelming host of Austrians and Germans
equipped with artillery which he could not hope to equal and
backed by an apparently limitless supply of ammunition. For
political reasons, also, he could not risk, even in the hope of
reaching Trieste, sacrificing his men in an offensive costing any-
thing like the quantities of human material being used up each
day in other theatres. His preponderance of troops at the open-
ing of operations in May was gradually reduced. But the
enemy's positions and his superior artillery offset the Italian's
greater numbers. On the whole it may be said that the Italians
422 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
accomplished quite as much as any of their allies. They
penetrated farther into the Alps and the rugged tableland west
of Trieste than the British and French with their colonials did
into the hills of Gallipoli or into the ridge of the Lille region,
and the length of their thrusts was greater than the French
advances in Artois and Champagne.
The Italians were more successful in concealing the extent
of their losses than most of the other belligerents. A conserva-
tive estimate places their total casualty list between the last week
in May and the first of August, 1915, at 25,000. The Austrians
in the same period on the same front lost about 15,000 dead,
50,000 wounded and 15,000 prisoners. The slight Italian losses
compared with their enemy's is remarkable in view of the fact
that they were almost constantly on the offensive. By far the
greater portion of the casualties were suffered in the east,
during the two assaults on the defenses of Gorizia.
Measuring the territory gained during these two months and
comparing it with the concessions offered by Austria as the
price of Italy's neutrality — on this basis the Italians had no
cause to regret their decision. On the Venetian Plain by the
lower Isonzo a few thousand men in two days with comparatively
small loss conquered all the territory which the Italian nation
had been offered for keeping out of war. This conquered ter-
ritory, however, was far less than the prize the Italian King and
his Cabinet set before the eyes of the people when they declared
war.
PART X— THE DARDANELLES AND
TURKEY
CHAPTER LXX
BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS
DURING the month of January, 1915, the British and French
naval authorities came to a decision to attempt a naval attack
upon the Dardanelles. It was decided, too, to lose no time in the
matter, but to push the campaign with all speed. Undoubtedly,
behind this decision there were many political factors of a grave
kind because, on the face of it, there were many reasons why
the attack should have been delayed until fine weather. Once
having come to a decision, no time was lost. The Island of
Tenedos was seized, and under an agreement with Venizelos, the
Greek Premier, the island of Lemnos was occupied. In the latter
the large harbor of Mudros offered an ideal naval and military
base for operations against the Dardanelles, overcoming one of
the chief original handicaps of the allied command, distance of
base from scene of operations. Lemnos was less than fifty miles
from the tip of the GallipoU Peninsula, while Tenedos was but
twenty-two miles away, lying close to the Turkish coast. At
these two depots a considerable Anglo-French naval squad-
ron was rapidly collected. They came from all parts of the
world.
The elimination of the German commerce raiders from the high
seas, and the obvious intentions of the main German and Aus-
trian fleets to avoid a general action against overwhelming odds,
freed a large number of allied, and especially British, warships
of secondary fighting value.
423
424 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
By the middle of February, 1915, the rendezvous was com-
plete. Besides the ships belonging to the British and French
Mediterranean fleets, there had arrived, fresh from the battle of
the Falkland Islands, the Inflexible, a dreadnought battle cruiser.
The Queen Elizabeth, too, arrived, the newest and strongest of
the ships of the whole British navy. It is evident that great
reliance had been placed on the enormous gun power of this
vessel, it being hoped that her great 15-inch pieces would blow
the Dardanelles defenses to pieces, somewhat in the way the
gigantic German land guns had blown the Belgian forts into
fragments. In no other way is it possible to explain the risking
of this capital ship in the highly dangerous operations in the
-^gean sea.
In addition to the Queen Elizabeth and the Inflexible, the
British force included the Agamemnon, the Irresistible, the Venr
geance, the Triumph, the Albion, the Lord Nelson, the Ocean and
the Majestic, The French ships numbered the Charlemagne, the
Gaulois, the Suffern, and the Bouvet,
Early in the morning of February 19, 1915, these vessels,
under the supreme command of Vice Admiral Sackville Garden,
and with Rear Admiral Guepratte in command of the French
division, arrived off the Gallipoli Peninsula. At 8 a. m. they
opened an intense bombardment of the several forts. At first
they battered away at the Turks at long range but finally, about
the middle of the afternoon, the Vengeance, Cornwallis and
Triumph of the British forces, and the Suffern, Gaulois and
Bouvet of the French fleet, closed in upon the Turkish forts
which were still replying. It was not until darkness that all the
land batteries had been apparently silenced.
At this time, and throughout the various attempts to reduce the
Dardanelles forts by naval bombardment, there was considerable
difficulty in making the demolition permanent. On the following
morning a detachment of the Naval Flying Corps made a recon-
naissance and discovered that the damage was not as great as
had been hoped. Accordingly, preparations were made to give
the Turks another dose of the 12-inch guns. Before this could
be done bad weather intervened.
BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS 425
On February 25, 1915, there was a further bombardment and
by five o'clock in the evening all the forts again had been silenced.
Mine sweeping operations were then begun. For this work Eng-
lish-Scotch trawlers from the North Sea had been brought down
and the crews of these little unprotected boats added many pages
of heroism to the book of great deeds of the Dardanelles opera-
tions.
The following day a division of the battleship fleet entered
the straits for a distance of four miles, the mine sweepers having
cleared the channel for that distance. The Albion, Vengeance
and Majestic opened fire with their 12-inch guns on Fort Dar-
danos, a battery mounting nothing but 5.9-inch guns, situated
on the Asiatic shore some distance below the Narrows. Fort
Dardanos bravely replied, however, until put out of action, as did
several concealed batteries, the presence of which the British and
French had not suspected.
With the completion of this operation the allied command be-
lieved they had not only permanently silenced the forts guarding
the entrance to the Dardanelles but had, as well, made both
sides of the straits then too warm for the Turkish troops. Ac-
cordingly forces of marines were landed to complete the work
of demolition. They were successful except at Kum Kale where
the Turks proved to have maintained a large force. The British
landing party was driven back to its boats in a hurry after
suffering a score of casualties.
The apparent success of these naval operations raised high
hopes in Great Britain and in the other allied countries. The
British Government, which had established a censorship for all
news that might tend to depress the British public, saw no reason
for interfering to prevent the publication of news that might
tend unduly in the other direction. The newspapers and the so-
called military experts gave the public what they evidently
wanted. The attack upon the Dardanelles, according to the ma-
jority of these, was practically over. A few voices of warning were
raised, but they were immediately silenced as "croakers" and "pes-
simists" and even "pro-Germans." Absurd reports of consterna-
tion and panic in CoristantinoDle were sent broadcast through-
426 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
out Great Britain, and thence to the whole world. Thousands
of Turks, in abject fear, were pictured as spending most of
their days and nights on the housetops of the sacred city,
anxiously awaiting the first glimpse of the victorious aUied flee^
sailing up the Golden Horn. Hundreds of thousands were said
to be fleeing into Asia Minor and preparations were being made
by the sultan and his government to follow suit.
Meanwhile, nothing of the kind was happening, either in Gal-
lipoli or in Constantinople. The German and Turkish authorities,
confident in their ability to hold the straits against all the forces
that could be brought against it, were quietly perfecting their
plans. Bad weather again interrupted the Allies* operations, and
it was not until March 1, 1915, that the Triumph, Ocean and
Albion again entered the straits, and bombarded Fort Dardanos
(once more active) , and the concealed shore batteries. The same
night the mine sweepers, under the protection of destroyers,
cleared an additional five miles of the channel, and the waters
were safe up to within a mile and a half of the entrance to the
Narrows.
About the same time the two French squadrons bombarded
the Bulair lines, where the Gallipoli Peninsula connects with the
mainland, in an attempt to interrupt the Turks' supply of troops
and ammunition.
On the following day, March 2, 1915, the Canopus, Swiftsure
and Comwallis drew close into Fort Dardanos and opened fire. By
so doing they got within range of the Turkish batteries in the
pine woods just below the Kilid Bahr plateau and all three boats
were hit.
For the next few days the bombardment of various Turkish
positions and batteries was continued. On the afternoon of
March 4, 1915, a large landing party was put ashore at Kum Kale
and Sedd-el-Bahr to complete the demolition of the works. That
on the Asiatic shore again had a hard time and was driven off
by a Turkish force after doing only small damage. The force
on the European side also found that the Turks had quickly
returned to the tip of the peninsula as soon as the fire of the
warships had ceased.
BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS 427
On the following day there occurred at Smyrna an incident
that is hard to explain. Even British experts have not made
any attempt to solve the puzzle. Vice Admiral Peirse with a
British and French fleet, appeared off the city and opened a
bombardment. The Turkish command did not reply and, after
doing considerable damage, Peirse and his ships sailed away.
He made no attempt to land, indeed he is not believed to have
had a force for that purpose with him. The only reasonable
explanation of the bombardment is that it was in the nature of
a diversion intended to keep as many troops as possible from
Gallipoli.
In the Dardanelles the operations were rapidly coming to a
head. The Anglo-French command believed the time had now
arrived for an attack in force upon the forts at the Narrows,
the real defenses of the straits. Accordingly, on March 6, 1915,
the Albion, Prince George, the Vengeance, the Majestic and the
Suffem steamed well up the straits and opened a direct fire on
the big forts. It was not upon the work of these ships, however,
that great hopes rested. A new experiment was being tried from
the Gulf of Saros on the other side of the Peninsula of Gallipoli,
at the same time. With their long range guns the Queen Eliza-
beth, the Agamemnon, and the Ocean stood well out and, by
indirect fire, threw shell after shell over the heights of the pen-
insula into the land works. All the while circling aeroplanes,
under the constant fire of the Turkish antiaircraft guns, watched
and corrected the firing, while a captive balloon, sent up from the
Agamemnon, did additional and valuable service in this respect.
It was found that, because of the angle of fire of the big naval
guns, it was not possible to score any hits from the Gulf of Saros
on the Turkish forts on the European side of the straits and the
attempt was soon abandoned. Modem big gun ammunition was
too expensive to be lightly thrown away. Furthermore, the life
of one of the big guns of these battleships is strictly limited,
especially if full charges are being used. Ultimately, the three
battleships in the Gulf shifted their fire to the forts near Chanak,
on the Asiatic side, where the works were on low ground, almost
at sea level.
428 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
It was confidently hoped that, by means of this indirect fire,
it would be possible to put the 14-inch guns of these forts out of
action, without giving them a chance to reply. The idea of
trying to force a way past these great guns, exposing the rela-
tively frail sides of precious battleships to their direct fire, wasf
not relished by the allied command.
But if the Turks could not reply to the fire of the three battle-
ships in the Gulf of Saros with their 14-inch guns, they could
and did do effective work with smaller guns concealed on the
heights of the peninsula overlooking the gulf, and the Q^ieen
Elizabeth was hit three times.
On the following day, March 7, the attack was renewed. The
four French battleships, the Charlemagne, Gaulois, the Bouvet
and the Suffem took the post of greatest danger inside the
straits and finally again silenced the Dardanos fort. The Aga-
memnon and the Lord Nelson, behind them, made a long range
attack upon the forts fringing the Narrows. Three of the allied
battleships, the Gaulois, the Agamemnon and the Lord Nelson
were hit by Turkish shells but, as an offset, it was believed that
the great forts at Chanak, as well as the works at Dardanos, had
been permanently silenced.
This confidence, as we shall see later on, was not justified.
Inside the great forts, it is true, the Turks and their German
officers were suffering terribly from the bombardment. That
they stood it in some cases for periods of seven hours at a
stretch, and continued firing effectively for the whole of that
time, is testimony to their courage and devotion to duty. As
the great shells of the Queen Elizabeth landed in the forts they
did frightful havoc. The shrapnel shells contained something
like 12,000 separate bullets and it is on record that one of these
shells wounded or killed no less than 250 Turkish soldiers. As
the high explosive shells struck the works and exploded they
threw up tons of earth and cement a hundred feet in the air,
plainly visible to the allied observers on the warships in the
straits.
But this was not the worst that the defenders had to endure.
The exploding shells gave off poisonous gases that filled the un-
PREPARATIONS FOR LANDING 429
derground passages of the redoubts. The heroic Turks worked
under such conditions as long as it was humanly possible, but
eventually their German officers were compelled to withdraw
their men from each fort in turn to allow the gases to clear away.
These circumstances undoubtedly account for the fact that
almost every one of the forts was reported permanently silenced,
only to resume action a few days later, much to the surprise and
consternation of the allied command. -
Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that the Turks were
economizing ammunition, especially big gun shells. They had
made up their minds that there would be a direct naval attack
upon the forts sooner or later, and their instructions were to
reserve their fire "until they saw the whites of the enemy's eyes,"
so to speak.
From March 6 to March 18, 1915, there was a lull in activity
at the straits. Momentous events were transpiring in London
and at the island of Lemnos, and upon the outcome of these
events depended the future course of the operations at the Dar-
danelles. While the individual ships of his fleet conducted minor
bombardments intended to harass the Turks, Vice Admiral
Garden, pleading ill health, had been allowed to relinquish the
command of the allied fleet, and Vice Admiral John de Robeck,
newly promoted to his rank, succeeded him. Almost immedi-
ately the latter steamed away to Mudros to engage in a fateful
conference.
CHAPTER LXXI
PREPARATIONS FOR LANDING — COMPOSI-
TION OP FORCES
IT had evidently been the intention of the Allies to force the
Narrows by naval power, and then follow up the success by
an occupation of Gallipoli by a land force. For this purpose the
troops solicited of Venizelos, the Greek Premier, were un-
doubtedly to be used, but sole reliance was not to be placed upon
mo THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
them. For one thing, the Allies had no intention of allowing
Greece to assume too great an importance in the campaign
against Constantinople, well knowing that the Greek people had
large ambitions in that part of the world — ambitions that
clashed with those of more impoii^ant powers.
In early March, 1915, the French were busy concentrating an
expeditionary force in North Africa, under the command of Gen-
eral d*Amade. By March 15 the French force had been gathered
together at Bizerta, in the JEgeam Sea. At the same time the
British Government had been undertaking a similar concentra-
tion, and by the third week in March a force estimated at about
120,000 men had arrived in transports at Mudros in the island of
Lemnos. This English force consisted of the Twenty-ninth Di-
vision, the Royal Naval Division, a special force formed by Win-
ston Churchill, British Secretary to the Admiralty, and used in
the attempt to relieve Antwerp, the Australian and New Zealand
divisions originally brought to Egypt, a Territorial division, and
some Indian forces.
These troops, with the comparatively small French force
under General d'Amade, were placed under the command of
one of the most popular of British officers — General Sir Ian
Hamilton.
Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff were hurried from London by
special trains and a fast cruiser steaming upward of 30 knots an
hour. By the time he reached Mudros the French troops had
also arrived from Bizerta.
The island of Lemnos presented a strange and picturesque
spectacle when all these troops, drawn from so many distant parts
of the world, were gathered in the sheltering bay. The blue and
red of the Frenchmen's uniforms, the khaki of the British, the
native costumes of the Indian and North African troops con-
trasted strangely. Mixing freely with them and driving hard
bargains, were the native Greek tradesmen. All over the little
town thousands of temporary huts and shops and tents sprang
up for the supply of the needs of the troops.
Out in the harbor hundreds of ships of every description were
moored. There were battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, sub-
PREPARATIONS FOR LANDING 431
v.- marines, transports, supply boats, barges, picket boats, and
p- dozens of Greek trading vessels. Into all this mess and chaos
came the British commander.
Then followed a long conference with General d'Amade, Ad-
miral de Robeck, and Admiral Guepratte. There does not seem
to be any reason for doubting that the plan was to launch a land
attack upon the Gallipoli defenses immediately. But General
Hamilton demurred. He inspected the loading of the transports,
and refused to give the order for an attack until grave defects had
been remedied. Of this period he wrote subsequently :
"I knew that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme
for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very
rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success."
The slightest delay in landing. Sir Ian Hamilton realized, would
prove terribly costly, if not absolutely fatal. He and his troops
were embarking on a campaign opening with a feat of arms for
which there was no precedent in history. He did not intend that
there should be the slightest chance of failure if forethought and
intelligent preparation could prevent it.
The prime obstacle to an immediate descent of the allied land
forces upon Gallipoli Sir Ian Hamilton found to be the manner
in which the British transports had been loaded. The only con-
sideration that seems to have been present in the minds of the
military authorities who superintended the work was the ques-
tion of getting the material and men aboard the ships. The sup-
plies, artillery, and ammunitions had all been loaded without any
consideration as to which was to come off the boats first. Material
absolutely necessary for the protection of the troops once they
had landed on hostile shores, and vital in any attempt to press
home the advantage thus gained, was buried under tents, hut
parts, cooking material, etc.
"I cannot go ahead with a transport fleet in this condition,"
said General Hamilton in substance to his French and English
colleagues. "The whole fleet must return to Egypt and be re-
loaded."
"But time," urged Admiral de Robeck. "It will take weeks of
valuable time."
28— War St. 3
432 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"Better lose time than run straight to certain disaster," de-
clared General Hamilton.
And back to Alexandria went the whole fleet of transports,
with the exception of a few vessels carrying the Australian
Infantry Brigade, which, by some miracle, had been properly
loaded.
When General Hamilton and his soldiers sailed out of Mudros
Harbor, bound for Alexandria, Admiral de Robeck came to a
momentous and historic decision. Acting either on his own re-
sponsibility or under orders or advice of some superior authority,
he decided not to wait for the troops, but to make a determined
attack upon the Narrows with his whole fleet. By sheer weight of
guns he would try to run past the great forts that lined the 1,500«
yard channel, pounding his way through on the theory that
"what will not bend must break."
March 18, 1915, was an ideal day for such an heroic attempt.
The sailors of the allied fleet were called to quarters as the morn-
ing sun, in a perfect sky, arose over the towering hills that lined
the straits. Briefly the officers addressed the men, told them of
the work ahead, spoke of the glory that awaited them if success-
ful, and ordered each man to his post.
The reader, in order to gain some definite idea of the defenses
that were to be attacked, should take up a map showing the
Dardanelles. He will find, about ten miles from the entrance, a
narrow channel where the shores of Asia and Europe almost
touch. There, at the narrowest point of the channel, the Turks
had built their chief defenses. On the south slope of the Kalid
Bahr were three powerful works. The Rumeli Medjidieh Battery
mounted two 11-inch, four 9.4-inch, and five 3.4-inch guns. The
Hamidieh II Battery had two 14-inch, while the Namazieh Bat-
tery had one 11-inch, one 10.2-inch, eleven 9.4-inch, three 8.2-
inch, and three 5.9-inch guns.
On the Asiatic side of the Narrows, near Chanak, was a system
of redoubts of equal strength. The Hamidieh I Battery, south of
Chanak, consisted of two 14-inch and seven 9.4-inch guns, while
the Hamidieh III Battery possessed two 14-inch, on« 9.4-inch, one
8.2-inch, and four 5.9-inch guns.
PREPARATIONS FOR LANDING 435
Besides all these formidable defenses there were^many minor
positions on the very edge of the Narrows. In fact the whole
channel, and the way of the allied fleet to the Sea of Marmora,
lay through rows upon rows of high-power guns.
The disastrous naval attack upon the big forts at the Narrows,
resulting, as it did, in the loss of three battleships and the dis-
abling of others, convinced the British and French naval author-
ities that it was hopeless to expect success along that line, except
at a price that they could ill afford to pay, and that would have
a terribly depressing effect upon public opinion at home.
Admiral de Robeck and his British "bulldogs" were called off to
await the coming of Sir Ian Hamilton and his mixed expedi-
tionary force. This force, while the 12- and 15-inch guns of the
Anglo-French fleet had been vainly battering the Dardanelles
forts, had returned to Alexandria, and, under the careful super-
vision of Sir Ian Hamilton and General d'Amade, had been re-
shipped aboard the great transport fleet.
At this point there appears to have arisen a serious misunder-
standing between Great Britain and France as to the exact num-
ber of troops to be supplied by each. Although the true facts
have not yet come to light, it is believed that General Joffre em-
phatically refused to detach any of the French troops from the
western front. The force that France eventually contributed to
the allied army at the Dardanelles consisted of units not at that
time in view for service in northern France. These numbered a
small detachment of Fusiliers Marines, a section of the Armee
Coloniale, and the Foreign Legion, a force made up of volunteers
from all over the world, enlisted for service anywhere, and gen-
erally assigned to a post of unusual danger.
Great Britain was, therefore, under the necessity of providing
the bulk of the troops.
The British authorities did not make the mistake of throwing
raw troops info the initial struggle at the Dardanelles. The back-
bone of the force supplied to General Sir Ian Hamilton was the
Twenty-ninth Division of Regulars, made up largely of the hardi-
est of England's youth — ^the north countrymen. It comprised the
Eighty-sixth Brigade of Infantry — Second Royal Fusiliers, First
484 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Lancashire Fusiliers, First Royal Munster Fusiliers, and the First
Royal Dublin Fusiliers; the Eighty-seventh Brigade — Second
South Wales Borderers, First King's Own Scottish Borderers,
First Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and First Border Regiment;
the Eighty-eighth Brigade — Second Hampshires, Fourth Wor-
cesters. First Essex, and the Fifth Royal Scots, the latter a
Territorial battalion. Attached to this force of infantry was a
squadron of the Surrey Yeomanry and two batteries of the Fourth
Mountain Brigade, a Highland artillery unit.
To the command of these regular troops. Major General Hun-
ter-Weston was appointed. This officer had been through much
of the early fighting in the western theatre, originally command-
ing the Eleventh Brigade of the Third Corps of General French's
army. His appointment to the Dardanelles was in the nature of
a promotion, it being recognized that his dash and energy would
be useful in the style of warfare that would govern the battle for
the straits.
In addition to the regular troops brought out from England,
there was the Naval Division. This force had seen a bit of action
in the attempt to save Antwerp. It consisted of two Naval Bri-
gades and a Royal Marine Brigade.
Also there was a Territorial Division, known as the East Lan-
cashires, under the command of Major General Douglas. Im-
mediately upon the outbreak of war this division had volunteered
for foreign service and had been shipped to Egypt, where it had
had six months' training. It comprised the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eighth Lancashire Fusiliers, the Fourth and Fifth East
Lancashires, the Ninth and Tenth Manchesters, the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Manchesters.
These troops, with the inclusion of the Australian and New
Zealand forces brought to Egypt at the beginning of the war,
under the command of Lieutenant General Birdwood, and a con-
siderable number of Indian troops, made up the force at the dis-
posal of Sir Ian Hamilton. They numbered in all, with the
French troops, about 120,000 men.
What had the Turkish authorities to set against this army, sup-
ported by the great fleet of battleships and unlimited number of
PREPARATIONS FOR LANDING 435
transports and subsidiary vessels? Estimates of the potential
strength of the Turkish army available for service in and about
the Gallipoli Peninsula at this time vary widely. There were
those, for instance, who claimed that, if necessary, the Turks
could command at least 600,000 troops for the defense of the
straits, and that any attempt to capture the positions with the
force supplied tp Sir Ian Hamilton was doomed to failure. On
the other hand were those who claimed that the Turks were short
of equipment and ammunition, and had no means of replenish-
ment ; that they had no heart in the fight ; that they were already
in revolt against their German taskmasters; that the Suez and
Caucasus defeats had undermined their morale and depleted
their numbers, and that the Turkish high command had decided
that it was useless to attempt to defend the position. Fortu-
nately, between these two extremists there was a happy mean,
and the best evidence points to the conclusion that, for the de-
fense of the Dardanelles, from first to last, the Turks depended
upon about 200,000 men with reenforcements brought up from
time to time to refill the ranks. Probably when the great landing
took place only a small proportion of the Turkish troops were in
Gallipoli.
These troops were under the command of the German General
Liman von Sanders, although, from time to time in the opera-
tions, the picturesque figure of Enver Pasha appeared. Admiral
Usedom, a high German naval expert, was placed in command of
the purely naval defenses of the straits.
Unfortunately for the allied force the attack upon the Dar-
danelles lacked the important — and perhaps indispensable —
element of surprise. By their early naval attack upon the outer
fort, by the gathering of the army at Mudros and its subsequent
return to Alexandria, and, finally, by the ill-fated naval attack
upon the Narrows* defenses, the Allies had given the Turks ample
warning of their intentions. During the many weeks that inter-
vened between the first naval attack upon the outer forts and the
approach of Sir Ian Hamilton's army, the Turks, under the super-
vision of their German mentors, and borrowing largely of the
lessons of the trench campaign in Flanders and France, made of
486 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Peninsula of Gallipoli a network of positions which it proved
possible, to borrow an expression used of the German concrete
trenches in France, "for a caretaker and his wife to hold." This
elaborate system of trenches and redoubts was dominated by the
three great heights. Every foot of the sides of these major
positions had been prepared with barbed wire, monster pits,
mines, concealed machine-gun batteries, and the almost endless
variety of traps evolved out of six months' experience with the
new style of warfare.
Along the many miles of coast of the Peninsula of Gallipoli
there were but few places where, even under the most advan-
tageous of conditions, it was possible to effect a landing in the
face of a strongly intrenched enemy. The steep slopes of the hills
rose from the very water's edge. Even in cases where there was
a low, sandy beach, the nature of the country in the immediate
vicinity made it impossible to deploy and maneuver any con-
siderable number of troops.
Furthermore the Turks, well aware of the limited possibilities
at the disposal of the allied force, had made terrifically strong
defensive positions of the few beaches where successful landings
were at all possible. Row upon row of barbed wire had been
run along the shores and even out into the sea. Mines had been
constructed that could be depended upon to blow the intrepid first
landing parties to pieces. The ground had been thoroughly
studied and machine-gun batteries placed so that every inch of
the beaches could be raked with a devastating fire. And finally
the ranges for all the great guns in the hills beyond had been
accurately measured so that the ships and the troops would be
literally buried under an avalanche of shells.
PLANS OF SIR IAN HAMILTON 437
CHAPTER LXXII
PLANS OP SIR IAN HAMILTON — FIRST
LANDING MADE
THE broad outlines of the problem that faced Sir Ian Hamilton
and his force were comparatively simple. The assault upon
the Gallipoli Peninsula resolved itself into rush attacks upon two
major heights, leading up to a grand assault upon the key position
to the Narrows.
These three positions formed an irregular triangle. The first
was Achi Baba, situated within three and a half miles of the tip
of the peninsula. The second was Sari Bair, about eight miles
due north of the Narrows. By either taking or isolating these two
positions the Allies would be in a position for a grand attack upon
the third and most important height, the plateau of Kilid Bahr,
or Pasha Dagh. This position not only commanded the Narrows
and the adjacent channel but it contained two of the great forts
that successfully withstood the grand fleet attack. It was, in the
minds of the allied command, the key to the whole situation. With
Kilid Bahr in their hands, they believed the way to Constanti-
nople would be open and the elimination of the Turk as a factor
in the war and the settlement of the Balkan question or ques-
tions in a manner favorable to the allied powers would neces-
sarily follow.
The operations as planned by Sir Ian Hamilton, then, consisted
of a number of landings — as many as possible so as to conceal
the real objectives of the allied troops and to disperse the Turkish
force — and an attempt to rush the position of Achi Baba, and to
isolate the position of Sari Bair by advancing through the low
country that lay between that position and Kilid Bahr.
On April 7, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton, with his staff, returned
to Mudros and held a conference with the naval commands. By
the 20th his plans had been perfected and the great landing was
fixed to take place on Sunday, April 25, 1915. During the previ-
ous week the Allies had been making feints along the shore of
438 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Gulf of Saros in an attempt to give an element of surprise to
the real attack.
As Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently wrote, the question of
weather was one of vital importance to the success of the land-
ing. If, after a number of the troops had been thrown upon the
beaches, bad weather had intervened, prevented further landings
and perhaps driven the fleet and auxiliary vessels to Mudros Har-
bor, the unfortunate troops ashore would have been wiped out.
Sunday, April 25, 1915, however, was a perfect day. The low
mist of the early morning hid the great fleet until it was close to
the shore of the peninsula. As the day progressed the mist dis-
appeared, the blue sky presented an unbroken expanse, while no
wind disturbed the placid sea. In a setting such as this was en-
acted one of the greatest battles of all history.
At the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula were five small beaches.
They were subsequently named by the Allies, for identification
purposes, Beaches S, V, W, X, and Y. Against these points was
to be flung the Twenty-ninth Division, supported by some of the
naval division. These troops, once having gained the shore and
held it against the enemy counterattacks, were to push on in all
haste by the road that led to the village of Krithia, northwest of
Achi Baba, turn east before reaching that place, and carry Achi
Baba with a rush.
At the same time the Australian and New Zealand troops were
to effect a landing atGabaTepe, about twelve miles up the ^gean
coast of the peninsula and about three and a half miles south of
Sari Bair. Running southeast from near Gaba Tepe was a good
road connecting with the town of Maidos, on the Dardanelles,
above the Narrows. The whole way lay through low country and,
once in command of this road, the allied troops would not only
sever direct communications between Sari Bair and Kilid Bahr
but would be in a position to attack the defenses of the latter on
the flank.
Meantime the French were to make a landing at Kum Kale on
the Asiatic side of the straits. There is some doubt as to the real
purpose of this landing. After the French had reembarked —
"driven off with terrible losses," according to the Turkish official
PLANS OF SIR IAN HAMILTON
439
PICTORIAL MAP OP THE DARDANELLES, SHOWING WHERE
THE ALLIES LANDED
440 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
account — it was claimed that the landing was merely a diversion.
Certainly nothing more than that could be claimed for a feint
made by a portion of the Naval Division farther up the Gulf
of Saros.
These, then, were the plans of Sir Ian Hamilton : four land-
ing operations in widely separated points, two of serious im-
portance and the other two, probably, intended only to draw the
troops and energy of the defenders. How they prospered, what
measure of success they obtained, how the Turks, fighting with
the valor which has made them famous through ages, how the
British Colonial and French troops accomplished almost unbe-
lievable deeds of heroism and skill, make one of the most f acinat-
ing stories in the annals of warfare.
While these operations were timed to occur simultaneously,
they will appear more clear to the reader if they are taken sepa-
rately and each followed to its conclusion from the opening day.
In this way we will tell the story, first, of the Australian-New
Zealand landing northeast of Gaba Tepe; then of the landings
on the five beaches at the tip of the peninsula ; and, finally, of the
French landing on the Asiatic shore and the naval brigade
demonstration at Bulair.
By one o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 25, 1915, the
allied expeditionary force had arrived within five miles of the
Gallipoli shore. Under cover of darkness the final dispositions
were made and the ships maneuvered so that the timing of the
several landings would be accurately synchronized. Shortly after
one o'clock the landing boats were lowered from the transports.
Strung in lines of four and five the boats were slowly towed
toward shore by steam pinnaces. Not a sound was heard but the
panting of the engines of the little boats. The speed was ac-
curately calculated to bring the parties close in shore with the
first break of the dawn.
Accompanying the Australian and New Zealand troops, were
a number of destroyers. Just as they reached the shallow water
in front of the cliffs of Gaba Tepe, a Turkish lookout spied them
in the hazy light of the morning. Instantly he gave the alarm
and a flaring searchlight flashed its rays on the little flotilla.
PLANS OF SIR IAN HAMILTON 441
The need for silence had disappeared. With a cheer the
British troops leaped from their boats into the shoal water and
splashed their way ashore. While many of them were still in
their boats, however, the Turks opened fired. The whole ground
had been carefully prepared and from every cover on the shore
and the cliffs beyond a deadly fire was poured upon the Colonial
troops.
Without faltering, however, the Australian and New Zealand
troops, supported by a squadron of battleships and destroyers,
came on straight at the strongly intrenched Turks. The first
of the Australians to reach the shore were the Third Brigade
under Colonel Sinclair Maglagan. With a rush they charged the
first Turkish lines, bayoneted the defenders, and scrambled up
the steep cliffs that rise a hundred feet in the air.
Fortunately for the British troops, as these and subsequent
events proved, there had been a slight miscalculation in the land-
ing, and the men had actually gone ashore a mile and a half
northeast of Gaba Tepe, instead of at that point. Gaba Tepe is so
rugged and uninviting that it was believed that the Turks would
not trouble to intrench it. Actually the Turks appeared to have
intrenched and prepared every inch of the coast. But at Sari
Bair, where the Australian and New Zealand troops actually
landed, the character of the ground, although not so advantage-
ous at first, afforded much more protection once the men were
ashore. Sir Ian Hamilton, in his graphic account of the opera-
tions, subsequently said :
"Owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direc-
tion, the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a
mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely
overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased
the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland,
it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise,
inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation had been
much better defiladed from shell fire.
"The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a
very narrow strip of sand about 1,000 yards in length, bounded
on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its
442 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
southern extremity, a deep ravine with exceedingly deep, scrub-
clad sides, runs inland in a northeasterly direction. Near the
northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into
the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and
the gulTy the whole of the beach is baked by the seaward face
of the spur which forms the northwestern side of the ravine.
From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except
near the southern limit of the beach where gentler slopes give
access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Farther inland lie in
a tangled knot the under-features of Sari Bair separated by deep
ravines which take a most confusing diversity of direction.
Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub and falling away in many
places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass
of the mountain, from which they run northwest, west, south-
west and south to the coast. *'
As fresh British troops came ashore they cast aside their
heavy packs and followed their comrades across the forty feet
of open beach and into the scrub that covered the side of the
cliffs. Halfway up the Turks had prepared a second position^
Attacking it in open formation the Third Brigade succeeded in
clearing it within fifteen minutes of the time they came ashore,
despite the desperate and brave defense of the Turks.
Meanwhile some of the landing boats, subjected to the terrible
fire of the Turkish guns, were having a bad time. The towing
ropes of three of them were cut by the fire and the boats drifted
helplessly about under the withering rain of bullets that rapidly
wiped out their cargoes of men. But despite these mishaps the
First and Second Brigades were hurried ashore to support the
Third. Soon, in the face of terrible difficulties including the
narrowness of the beach, there were between 3,000 and 4,000
allied troops ashore.
By this time the Turks, by means of the mobile carriages pre-
pared for them by the Germans, had maneuvered some heavy
artillery into position on the heights inland. Also some of their
warships, moored in the Narrows, began throwing heavy shells
across the peninsula into the allied fleet standing close inshore.
So dangerous and accurate became this fire that the transports
PLANS OF SIR IAN HAMILTON 443
had to be ordered out to sea and this delayed the operations seri-
ously.
At Gaba Tepe and on the heights to the north of the beach
the Turks posted guns and enfiladed the Narrows beach. Thus
the troops, as they landed, had to make their way through a
rain of shrapnel, machine gun and rifle fire that wiped out hun-
dreds. Despite the success of the Australian Brigades in clear-
ing the beach and the face of the cliff, the Turkish fire never
seemed to slacken.
Because of the nature of the country there could be no central
control over the advance fighting and no continued communica-
tions between the several forces making their way to the top
of the cliffs. The battle resolved itself into a series of fights
between small parties, or even individual soldiers, whose one
object was to kill as many of the enemy as possible and make
their way as far inland as possible in the first rush.
By two o'clock about twelve British regiments had been landed
and the ground gained consolidated and prepared against coun-
terattack. Thousands of Turkish troops were by this time pour-
ing along the road from Maidos and by the middle of the after-
noon it was calculated that there were fully 20,000 of them before
the Australian and New Zealand troops. The latter, in the mean-
time, had been further reenforced by two batteries of Indian
Mountain Artillery. The pressure of the constantly increasing
Turkish force compelled General Birdwood, who came ashore
about this time, to contract his lines and to reach a decision that,
at that time at least and until the arrival of more troops, no
further advance could be made. The Gaba Tepe landing had
not been the surprise that was expected and the Turks had
proved to be in unexpected strength.
About three o'clock the Turkish counterattacks began. Abso-
lutely regardless of human life, they threw themselves in dense
masses against the Second and Third Brigades. The British
battleships, the Queen, the London, the Prince of Wales, 'the
Triumph and the Majestic, posted close inshore, poured a de-
vastating fire on the advancing Turkish troops as they came into
the open.
444 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
About five o'clock the Turks, after repeated assaults upon the
British lines, massed for a final attempt to drive the invaders
into the sea. On and on they came, concentrating on the hard-
pressed Third Brigade as the weak spot in the British defense.
Fighting gamely against heavy odds, this Australian Brigade
which had borne the brunt of the landing attack and which had
been almost continually counterattacked all afternoon, gave way
slowly, selling every inch of ground dearly. Hundreds of the
brave Turkish troops were mown down by the machine guns
which the Australians had by this time brought ashore. At
nightfall, however, General Birdwood, as a consequence of the
persistence of the enemy, had to contract his lines further.
As night settled on the battle field on the ridge above Gaba
Tepe and Sari Bair, and the two forces rested from sheer ex-
haustion, the British troops, who once were well inland toward
Maidos, their objective, were barely hanging onto the ridge over-
looking the shore of the Gulf of Saros. All their water and food
and munitions and reenforcements had to be brought ashore
across the exposed beach, while the landing of the necessary
artillery in the face of the Turkish fire was a feat to appal the
bravest. But though their hold on their position was precarious
it was tenacious and, in the end, effective. If they had not won
all they expected to win they had at least won a foothold in the
face of terrific difficulties.
While the Australians and New Zealanders were fighting
desperately beyond Gaba Tepe, the other forces of the allied army
were accomplishing similar deeds of heroism at the tip of the
peninsula.
Coming down the coast of the peninsula from Gaba Tepe, about
three miles from the extreme southwestern tip, was what was
known as Beach Y. It was almost due west of the important
town of Krithia, and the landing was intended primarily to pro-
tect the left flank of the British landing forces from attack by
the considerable forces believed to be concentrated there.
The actual landing seems to have been somewhat of a surprise
to the Turks. Indeed, subsequent events showed that they were
correct in their estimate that a landing at the so-called Beach Y
PLANS OF SIR IAN HAMILTON 445
would be a mistake. A narrow strip of sandy beach led to the
cliffs, two hundred feet high, that were believed to be almost
unscalable. It is easy to be wise after the event, but military
writers subsequently declared that if the Turks had been pre-
pared to defend the position, the force that landed at Beach Y
would have been wiped out in the preliminary attempt to estab-
lish a footing.
The force assigned to this point of attack consisted of the
First King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the Plymouth Bat-
talion of the Royal Naval Division, under the command of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Koe. The latter was under orders, if the landing
proved successful, to work his way south to effect a junction
with the force landing at Beach X, some two miles away.
About five o'clock, Koe's force appeared off Beach Y, on the
transports Braemar Castle and Southland, and escorted by the
battleship Goliath, and the cruisers Amethyst and Sapphire,
The Turks had posted a large force at Beach Y 2, between Beach
Y and Beach X, but half of the Scottish Borderers were ashore
before the Turkish command had realized what was happening.
As a result Colonel Koe's force was partly established on the
cliffs before the Turks had begun to arrive.
But if the initial stages were unexpectedly easy for this force,
difficulties soon developed. Once on the heights. Colonel Koe
ordered an advance to link up with the force at Beach X. The
British troops had not gone far when they ran into the Turkish
troops from Beach Y. So large was this force and so determined
an opposition did it offer to the British troops that Colonel Koe
soon decided it would be impossible, with the two battalions
at his disposal, to accomplish the task assigned him.
Early in the afternoon the little British force was dismayed
by the approach on its left flank of a large force of Turks from
Krithia, which threatened to cut it off from the landing beach.
Reluctantly Colonel Koe, just before he received a fatal wound,
gave the order to intrench.
446 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER LXXIII
THE BRITISH IN D A N GE R — B IT TE R
FIGHTING
THE British troops were now in a critical position. There was
a peculiar spoonlike formation of the ground at the end of the
Gallipoli Peninsula. From the high cliffs along the shore the
ground fell away. Thus it was impossible for the supporting
warships lying offshore to give any effective aid to the little Brit-
ish force once it had left the shore and the edge of the heights.
The Turks realized to the full their advantage and attacked the
Borderers and the marines with fury. Frequent attacks were
launched against the dwindling line of the British force. Guns
of large caliber were rapidly brought up from Krithia, while the
Turks showed extraordinary daring and cleverness in bomb at-
tacks upon the hastily dug trenches of the enemy.
All night long the Turks attacked. By morning the remnants
of the British force were in desperate straits. Sir Ian Hamilton
subsequently declared that the losses at this time had been "de-
plorable." Many of the officers, in addition to Lieutenant Colonel
Kee, had been killed or wounded, while 50 per cent of the Border-
ers had been put out of action. They were no longer able to de-
fend properly their trenches. Food, water, and ammunition were
running short. A consultation of the remaining officers was held.
The question of trying to hold out until reenforcements arrived
was considered, but ultimately it was decided to retreat to tha
shore and to reembark.
At seven o'clock on Monday morning the order was given. The
attending fleet had been strengthened by the arrival of the
cruisers Talbot and Dublin, and, supported by the Goliath, the
Amethyst, and the Sapphire, they began a terrific bombardment
of the tops of the cliffs. Protected by this screen of fire, the few
remaining British troops were able to get away in their boats
without molestation save for a long distance bombardment by the
Turkish artillery.
THE BRITISH IN DANGER 447
The landing at Beach X was more successful. The Eighty-
seventh Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Mar-
shall, was assigned to this part of the field. It was to work its
way as far as possible inland and link up with the troops coming
ashore at Beach W. At Beach X the Turks were well prepared.
They had constructed bomb-proof shelters and trenches on the
heights and were well led by German officers.
Before the actual landing the supporting battleships, led by the
Swiftsure and the Implacable, bombarded the Turkish positions
for almost an hour with their heaviest guns. The ground was
thoroughly swept by the great 12-inch and smaller guns of the
warships. Finally, just before the actual landing, the Implacable
steamed within 500 yards of the shore, dropped her anchor and
smothered the near cliffs and the foreshore with her fire.
Subsequent investigation proved that in this affair of Gal-
lipoli, as in Flanders and elsewhere, the British suffered from
their lack of foresight in the provision of proper shells. The bat-
tleships used shrapnel, which, it was afterward discovered, did
little damage to the deep, protected trenches prepared by the
Turks under the supervision of the German officers. If the Brit-
ish had had instead the high-explosive shells that were neces-
sary for the work, the story of the Gallipoli landings under the
wing of the great fleet of battleships might have made different
reading.
After about a quarter of an hour's final bombardment by the
Implacable, two companies and a machine-gun section of the
First Royal Fusiliers were thrown ashore at Beach X. Under
cover of the battleships, the landing was safely accomplished and
the Fusiliers advanced almost 1,000 yards without much opposi-
tion. Hill 114 on their right, where the Turks proved to be
firmly intrenched, then proved a serious obstacle to the advance.
While the Royal Fusiliers were considering the best method of
attacking this position, a Turkish battery, in position near the
town of Krithia, opened fire and tore holes in the left wing of
the British force. At the same time they were heavily counter-
attacked by a Turkish force coming from the east. Gradually
the Royal Fusiliers were compelled to give ground. Two bat-
29— War St. 3
448 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
talions of the Eighty-seventh Division were sent ashore and with
these reenforcements the British again advanced, this time clear-
ing Hill 114 of the enemy. There they joined hands with the
First Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and although all day
long the Turks tried to break the union of the two forces, they
did not succeed in doing so.
However, General MarshalPs force was hard pressed. Once
more the unceasing Turkish counterattacks drove them back to
the very edge of the heights overlooking Beach X, where only the
intense bombardment of the protecting warships saved them.
General Marshall was wounded, but refused to relinquish his
command, and a very large proportion of the total force was
either killed or wounded in the day*s fighting. When night fell
the British troops held only half a mile of territory around their
original landing place, with their right wing resting on Hill 114,
linked up with the force from Beach W.
Here at Beach W, a mile and a half down the coast, midway be-
tween Tekke Burna and Hellas Burna, was being enacted a feat
of arms which, in the opinion of competent military men, is fit to
rank with the great military accomplishments of all time. In
speaking of it subsequently Sir Ian Hamilton made use of the
following terms :
"So strong, in fact, were the defenses of Beach W that the
Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it
as my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been
achieved by the British soldier — or any other soldier — ^than the
storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of
April 25."
At Beach W the Turks, fully foreseeing a landing, had pre-
pared as at no other point. The beach is in a wide bay and leads
into a gully flanked on one side by the hills extending to Cape
Tekke and, on the other side by the steep cliffs extending to
Cape Hellas.
Every inch of the ground had been prepared against attack.
Sea and land mines had been profusely laid, wire entanglements
had been placed along the shore and stretching out into the
water. Deep trenches had been dug on the heights and on the
THE BRITISH IN DANGER 449
sides of the slopes while strong redoubts had been built at two
dominating positions. Every bush and cover contained a sniper
while larger covers concealed machine guns trained to sweep the
beach and the slopes leading to the Turkish trenches.
As a defensive position Beach W was almost ideal. It had two
weak points, however, which in the end turned the scales and
made success possible for the attacking force. At either end of
the bay were small rock positions from which it was possible to
enfilade the elaborate system of defenses.
The landing party at Beach W consisted of the First Battalion
Lancashire Fusiliers, under command of Major Bishop. "It was,"
wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, "to the complete lack of the sense of
danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our aston-
ishing success." After a preliminary bombardment by the sup-
porting warships the men of the First Battalion, in thirty-two
cutters drawn by eight picket boats, approached the shore. The
Turks made no move until the men were in shallow water and
were leaping out of the boats. Then they opened fire with a
murderous torrent from artillery, machine guns, and rifles. The
first line of the First Battalion went down to a man. The second
never faltered, but came on bravely into the fire, striving desper-
ately to cut the wire entanglements. So quickly did they fall that
observers on the warships wondered why they were "resting" on
the bullet swept shore instead of running to cover.
Rapidly the men from Lancashire worked. Finally a remnant
of the battalion forced its way through the last line of wire and
ran for shelter on the bush covered slopes. Almost at the same
moment, detachments that had landed on the rocks at Cape Tekke
and under Cape Hellas began to have an important effect upon
the struggle. At the latter point, the Eighty-eighth Brigade, un-
der Brigadier General Hare, clambered up the steep side of the
cliffs, searched out the machine gun positions of the enemy and
swept the ground clear with the bayonet. This and the work of
the force at Cape Tekke eased the Turkish fire on the beach and,
on the slopes of the Cape Tekke side of the ravine, the few re-*
maining officers of the First Battalion were able to re-form the
remnants of their force and advance upon Hill 114.
450 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
About nine o'clock reenf orcements were landed, this time not
on the exposed beach but under Cape Tekke, the heights of which
were by now largely in the hands of the British troops. With the
help of these fresh troops, three lines of Turkish trenches were
carried. Brigadier General Hare was seriously wounded and his
place was filled by Colonel Wolley-Dod, who was sent ashore with
orders to organize a further advance at all speed. At this point
the attacking force ran up against the Turkish redoubt at
Hill 138.
The afternoon opened with an intense naval bombardment of
the ground around Hill 138 and of that redoubt itself. At two
o'clock the Fourth Battalion of the Worcesters was ordered to
take the position by assault. Under Lieutenant Colonel D. E.
Cayley, they advanced a considerable distance under rifle fire
and charged up the heights with a cheer. The Turks fought
bravely against a stronger force, but by four o'clock Hill 138
was in the hands of the Worcesters.
Less than a mile down the coast, almost to the old fort and
village of Sedd-el-Bahr, was what was known as V Beach. There
a landing in great force was attempted. Largely because of the
scale of the operations, but also because of the difficulties and the
accidents of warfare, this landing was made with great losses.
The beach and the shore in the immediate vicinity form a most
regular amphitheatre of a radius of about 400 feet. The beach is
about 10 yards wide and 350 to 400 feet long and it runs into a
slightly concaved, grassy slope that rises gently to a height of a
hundred feet. Little or no real cover was to be found on this slope
and the defenders were able to sweep it from all angles with a
devastating rain of all kinds of shells. Just at the edge of the
strip of sand, however, was a continuous escarpment about four
feet high, which afforded a cover in which troops once ashore
might be re-formed. As a result of the early naval bombardment
of the tip of the peninsula, much of the village of Sedd-el-Bahr
and the fort and the barracks had been reduced to ruins. The
ruins afforded, however, excellent cover for the Turkish troops
and proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the British when
they reached the shore.
THE BRITISH IN DANGER 451
In addition to the natural disadvantages under which the at-
tacking party had to work, the Turks had constructed two lines
o£ barbed wire obstacles — one at the edge of the beach and the
second two-thirds of the way up to the top of the ridge. These
two lines of barbed wire were more stoutly constructed than
were any others with which the British had to contend. Just be-
yond the second obstacle the Turks had built their first line of
trenches and beyond the ground was scored with innumerable
covers for the defenders.
The force assigned to the attack upon V Beach was composed
of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of
the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company and
a few minor units. The action opened with a short range bom-
bardment of the enemy's trenches and such parts of the fort,
the village and the barracks as were still standing and believed to
be affording cover for riflemen and machine-gun batteries. Then
three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were towed ashore. At
this point one of the great experiments of the Gallipoli landings
was put to the test, and, despite the cleverness of its conception,
it did not meet with great success.
A large transport vessel, the River Clyde, had been loaded
with about 2,000 troops. She had been reconstructed inside and
great doors had been cut in one of her sides. The troops were
ready on long platforms for instant disembarkation. The ships
were to be run ashore, as close as possible to the beach, lighters
were to be floated in between her and the shore, the side doors
were to be flung open, and the troops were to rush ashore and
carry the slopes by sheer momentum. In the front of the vessel,
protected by sandbags, was a battery of machine guns which, it
was hoped, would be especially effective in protecting the land-
ing force from counterattacks.
As at the other landings, the Turks gave no sign of life until
^ne collier had been beached and the other landing force had al-
most reached the shore in its tows. Indeed, so long did they hesi-
tate in opening fire that at one time the watchers on the warships
thought the landing was going to be unopposed. They were soon
disabused of such an idea, however, as the first of the towboats
452 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
grounded on the sandy beach, the Turks opened fire from a
dozen different positions. Many of the Dublin Fusiliers were
killed before they were able to get out of their boats. A few
scrambled ashore and reached the shelter of the escarpment that
rimmed the beach. The Turks concentrated their fire on the boats
and their crews. None of them were able to get away, and al-
most instantly their crews were killed and the boats wrecked.
Meantime the River Clyde, had been run ashore. Unfortu-
nately, the operation was not carried out as expeditiously as it
was hoped it would be, and the Turks soon became aware of the
intentions of the British. They poured a punishing fire on the
naval party attempting to get the lighters into position between
the ship and the shore. The heavy tide that at this point sweeps
around the point of land also seriously interfered with the work.
Finally however, by deeds of heroism that received subsequent
official acknowledgment, the lighters were got into position and
the doors of the River Clyde flung open.
At a trot a company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way. It
was almost impossible to live for even a short time in the fire
that the Turks concentrated upon the lighters, and hardly a man
reached the shore. Nothing daunted, a second company of the
same battalion followed. As they dropped in scores the lighters
began to drift and dozens of the men, in attempting to swim
ashore in their heavy kits, were drowned.
Despite the storm of fire, volunteers once more swung the
lighters into position. The third company of the Munsters were
ordered to attempt to reach the beach. By this time the Turks
had been able to concentrate shrapnel fire on the River Clyde
and her human freight, and the third company suffered even
more casualties than had the first two.
There is a limit to human sacrifice, and Brigadier General
Napier, in command of the troops, called a halt in the attempt to
land. A little later, it was resumed, with General Napier and
Captain Costeker and a detachment of the Hampshire Regiment
heroically leading the way. When they had reached the lighters the
moorings again gave way and they drifted into deep water. In
the torrent of bullets that was being poured down upon them by
THE BRITISH IN DANGER 453
the Turks it was impossible to do anjrthing but lie flat on the ex-
posed decks and wait for the lighters to be swung into position
again. Scores of them were killed, including both Brigadier Gen-
eral Napier and Captain Costeker.
With this major disaster, all attempts to make further land-
ings were abandoned for the day. A few hundred British troops
had succeeded in reaching the escarpment on the shore and there
they huddled, not daring to lift their heads above the four-foot
natural cover. Fortunately for them, the machine-gun battery
on the River Clyde raked the slope, kept the fire of the Turkish
defenders down and prevented any counterattacks, which might
have ended disastrously for the British troops. The troops still
on board the River Clyde, numbering about 1,000 were effec-
tively protected from the fire of the Turks, suffering few casu-
alties, although shrapnel tore four great holes in the side of the
collier.
Matters had not gone any better at other sections of the
beach. Half a company of the Dublins landed east of Sedd-el-
Bahr for the purpose of flanking the Turkish defenses, failed to
accomplish its purpose and lost all except twenty-five of its men.
In the afternoon the landing at V Beach was definitely accepted
as a failure and plans made for the diversion of the troops not
yet landed to one of the other beaches. It was first thought that
Y Beach would be the best point, but it was decided that it would
be too late to effect the issue there and the troops were finally
diverted to W Beach, where, despite the heavy cost, the Lan-
cashire landing had led to some real results.
As nightfall approached there was a momentary thrill of hope-
fulness among those who remained on V Beach because of the
fact that some of the Worcestershire and Lancashire Fusiliers
succeeded in working their way across country from W Beach and
threatened to make untenable the Turkish positions. The few
hundred men on V Beach and the thousand or more cooped up in
the River Clyde could hear the fight coming closer and closer and,
cheered by their officers, their spirits rose. But the men from
W Beach were stopped finally by the frequent lines of barbed-
wire obstructions that had been stretched by the Turk at right
454 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
angles to the shore, between the two beaches, in preparation
for just such an eventuality as this.
Night came, but with it not much relief from the constant
vigilance of the Turks. There was in the perfect sky not a cloud
to screen the moon's rays. A successful attempt was made, how-
ever, to land the infantry from the River Clyde, and subsequently
the force then ashore, numbering close upon 1,500 men, tried to
clear the ruins of the fort and the outskirts of the village. All
these efforts were in vain, however, and finally the troops re-
turned to the protection of the escarpment along the shore. From
there the task of removing the wounded to the protection of the
River Clyde was proceeded with under a heavy fire.
In comparison with the sanguinary affairs at the four other
beaches, the landing at S Beach was a minor affair, costing only
about fifty casualties. This beach was located at the extreme
eastern end of Morto Bay, close by Eski Hissarlik Point, and the
work was delegated to the Second South Wales Borderers under
Lieutenant Colonel Casson. The chief difficulty of this landing
was found in the powerful current which delayed it for several
hours beyond the appointed time. However, the men were finally
got ashore and easily drove out the small Turkish force that had
been posted in the neighborhood.
CHAPTER LXXIV
FURTHER EFFORTS AT LANDING — FAILURE
TO TAKE KRITHIA
MEANWHILE the French were carrying on a disastrous
operation at Kum Kale, on the Asiatic shore, directly south
of S Beach. About 2,800 men had been landed after a prelimi-
nary bombardment by the French fleet. Before they reembarked
next morning they had lost more than a quarter of their effec-
tives. After landing they stormed the ruined castle of Kum Kale
and then drove inland with the object of clearing the village of
FURTHER EFFORTS AT LANDING 455
Yeni Shehr. The Turks were in force, however, at that point and
held the French midway between Kum Kale and Yeni Shehr.
Finally it became apparent that further advance was impossible
without reenforcements and the French intrenched for the night.
All through the darkness the Turks launched a counterattack
upon the landing force and morning found the French preparing
to reembark. Under the guns of the French warships this was
accomplished without any great further loss.
Thus of the seven landings that had been attempted by the
allied forces two, that at Kum Kale and that at Y Beach, had
been definitely abandoned. Of the remaining five only two had
been successful in linking up — that at Beach X and that at Beach
W. Farther up the Gulf of Saros, near the lines known by the
name of Bulair, a force of the Royal Naval Reserve made a
demonstration but did not effect a landing.
The Australians and the New Zealanders on the cliffs above
Gaba Tepe were fighting desperately against the constant Turk-
ish counterattacks, but, assisted by the fleet under Admiral
Thursby, successfully resisted all attempts to drive them into
the sea. Already the little cove in which the landing had been
made had been christened "Anzac Cove," "Anzac," of course,
was formed by taking the first letters of the official designation
of the colonial forces— Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
The spirits of the men were high, despite the awful experience
they had gone through, and they frequently exchanged cheery
messages with the gunners of the warships who were pounding
away at the Turkish positions, although not accomplishing any
great damage in their blind firing.
It had been intended to organize an immediate resumption of
the advance from Anzac Cove with daybreak of April 26. But
the Turks were constantly bringing up reenforcements. Watchers
on the warships could see them creeping over the crest of Sari
Bair and although the naval guns were turned on them, their loss
was comparatively small because of their open formation and
their cleverness in making use of every bit of cover.
During the early morning the Anzacs had hauled heavy field
guns up the face of the steep cliffs and had, in many other ways,
456 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
strengthened their positions. This was all the more necessary as
it became apparent that the Turks were massing for a great at-
tack shortly after nine o'clock. About noon the battle reached its
height. The Turks attacked bravely and although they suffered
great losses, never wavered. Despite their efforts, however, the
Anzacs held fast. By this time reenforcements were beginning to
arrive and a more permanent character was given to the trenches.
An attempt was made to organize for an advance as headquarters
were constantly impressing upon the individual commands the
necessity of making good as much ground as possible before the
Turks were able to bring into action their undoubted superiority
in forces.
The constant attacks of the Turks, however, made any real at-
tempt at advance impossible, although a little ground was gained
on the 26th by counterattacks. It soon became apparent, too, that,
although the operation at Anzac Cove was part and parcel of the
general attack, it had, through its inability to make progress, be-
come a separate affair and had been so conducted for the rest of
the campaign — or at least until a much greater advance had been
made in all quarters.
At the tip of the peninsula the chief events of the second day
of the landing, April 26, 1915, occurred at V Beach, where the
River Clyde had been run ashore. About 1,500 men were left,
composed of the survivors of the Dublins and the Munsters and
two companies of the Hampshires, under cover of the escarpment
on the beach. There Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Waif ord
rallied them on the morning of the 26th and covered by a heavy
bombardment by the warships set out to clear the village.
Desperate hand-to-hand fighting followed and the casualties were
appalling. Most of the houses contained squads of riflemen and
the more important machine guns. Each had to be carried sepa-
rately. By noon, however, the town had been cleared. Captain
Walford had fallen, bravely leading his troops in a way that
earned him the Victoria Cross.
Colonel Doughty-Wylie called a halt and collected the sur-
vivors of the attack. Under cover of some empty houses he
rallied them, re-formed tbem as best he could^ called upon them
FURTHER EFFORTS AT LANDING 457
for one last effort and walked out into the open at the head of his
troops for the assault upon the old Castle, and Hill 141.
Carrying a light cane, the figure of Colonel Doughty- Wylie was
a conspicuous one. Yet he survived almost to the end and to vic-
tory. He reached the slope leading up to Hill 141, urging his men
forward. He was in the lead when a bullet killed him instantly.
Fired by his splendid example which earned him a posthumous
Victoria Cross, the Dublins, Munsters, and Hampshires swept on
and carried the summit. By two o'clock the commanding posi-
tion was in the hands of the British.
At the same time the Lancashire Landing force had linked up
with the landing at V Beach. Also, the French Expeditionary
forceT after its hard experience at Kum Kale, was successfully
landed at V Beach. Additional troops were landed at S Beach to
prevent the South Wales Borderers being wiped out in their iso-
lation.
On the morning of April 27, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton looked over
the positions. He found that, although he had several beaches
securely in his grasp, he lacked room in which to maneuver.
Also his force was beginning to suffer from lack of water. Ac-
cordingly he decided that an immediate advance was necessary.
Sir Ian Hamilton set his men the task of clearing the com-
paratively low ground at the tip of the peninsula — a distance of
about two miles from the extreme southwestern point of the
land. He drew a straight line from the position held by the
South Wales Borderers near the ruined De Tott's Battery to Y
Beach. After some hard fighting this was accomplished with the
exception of the extreme left wing, which got only as far as Y 2
Beach, where the Turks were in force.
On the following day, April 27th, despite the fact that his
forces were almost exhausted. Sir Ian Hamilton called upon
them for a supreme effort. He intended, he said, to capture the
Village of Krithia and, from that point, carry Achi Baba, the
first main objective in the campaign to open the Narrows.
The advance was ordered for eight o'clock in the morning. The
Twenty-ninth Division, under Major General Sir Aylmer Hun-
ter-Weston, was to move on Krithia, the French force was to
458 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
move along the right flank of the Twenty-ninth to the Kereves
Dere, which ran from the base of Achi Baba, and there await
the capture of Krithia and the assault upon the main height.
The leading units of the Twenty-ninth Division advanced
almost without opposition for a couple of miles, but was then
heavily attacked by the enemy. Despite all further attempts the
British troops were able to make no further advance at this point
and intrenched for the night. A little to the right, other units
eventually got within three-quarters of a mile of Krithia, but
finally were compelled to fall back in line with the force on its left.
Still farther to the right the Eighty-eighth Brigade had been
brought to a halt and found itself running short of ammunition.
The Eighty-sixth Brigade, which had been held in reserve, came
into action shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon. It was
ordered to move through the Eighty-eighth Brigade and carry
Krithia. A few units got within sight of Krithia, but the main
body of the Eighty-sixth Brigade was unable to force a way
beyond the line reached by the Eighty-eighth.
The French, meanwhile, were having an equally hard time.
At one time they were within a mile of Krithia, but ultimately
they, in company with the whole allied line, had to give way
before strong Turkish counterattacks. Masses of Turkish troops
advanced against the British center and right and against the
whole line of the French and drove them back with the bayonet.
An almost successful attempt was made to pierce the allied line
^t the point where the French linkied up with the British. The
French gave way and uncovered the right flank of the Eighty-
eighth Brigade. The Fourth Worcesters suffered cruelly and had
it not been for the reenforcements of the Eighty-sixth Brigade
a serious situation might have ensued.
In speaking of this critical moment Sir Ian Hamilton sub-
sequently wrote :
'*The men were exhausted and the few guns landed at the time
were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The
small amount of transports available did not suffice to maintain
the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short
despite all efforts to push them up from the landing places."
KRITHIA AGAIN ATTACKED 459
The situation was now becoming serious and it became ap-
parent that Krithia could not be carried. Accordingly, the allied
forces were ordered to dig in as rapidly as possible and hold
their ground at all costs. Thus ended the Battle of the Landings,
extending over three days. The results obtained fell far short
of expectations. Krithia and Achi Baba had not been carried,
the Australians and New Zealanders had been unable to advance
along the road to Maidos and, indeed, were hanging on to a thin
strip of shore by their very teeth. It became more apparent with
each new attempt that the difficulties before the attackers in
the Gallipoli Peninsula were far beyond anything that had been
conceived.
In speaking of his failure to reach Krithia, Sir Ian Hamilton
said:
"Had it been possible to push in reenforcements in men,
artillery and munitions during the day, April 27, Krithia should
have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would
have been avoided.
"Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to
reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same
time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced
by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what
I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and
delay would better have answered my purpose."
CHAPTER LXXV
KRITHIA AGAIN ATTACKED — HEROIC
WORK OF "ANZACS"
ON April 28, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton decided to send re-
enforcements in force to Anzac Cove. Despite the constant
landing of fresh troops there the Australians and New Zealanders,
because of their heavy losses and the increasing pressure of the
Turkish attacks, had been ahnost continually in the firing line.
460 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
They had been able to enjoy little or no rest or sleep, and things
began to look serious. Accordingly four battalions of the Royal
Naval Division were sent to General Birdwood. On the follow-
ing day two more naval battalions were landed and as well a
company of the Motor Maxim Section.
These fresh units moved into the Anzac trenches and held
them against renewed Turkish attacks. Meanwhile the Aus-
tralian and New Zealand battalions were being reorganized be-
hind the line and after three and a half days' rest took their
places again in the front-line trenches.
From the evening of the 27th of April until May 1 there
was comparative quiet on what might be called the Krithia
front, at the tip of the peninsula. Fresh forces were* landed
by the French and the English, the latter bringing into line
the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade. Heavy artillery
was brought ashore and moved up to positions inland, and
the whole organization of the allied force was re-formed and
strengthened.
At 10 p. m. on the evening of May 1 opened what is known
as the first battle of Krithia. It was elaborately organized by
the German staff of the Turkish forces and took the allied troops
by surprise. Indeed, the first line of the attacking force, creep-
ing up on its hands and knees, got into the trenches of the Eighty-
sixth Brigade and bayoneting most of the defenders opened up
what Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently described as "an ugly gap."
Thanks to the fine conduct of some territorial units, however,
the Turks were not able to press home this temporary advantage
and the hole was soon closed.
Along the rest of the British front the attack of the Turks was
not serious. Instead they concentrated on the left of the French
line, held by a Senegalese brigade. After several attacks the
African troops began to give way. Realizing the seriousness of
the situation, the two companies of the Worcesters moved across
from the British right and saved the day. Some hours later,
the extreme French right was hard pressed, and it was necessary
to bring up a battalion of the Royal Naval Division from the
reserves to strengthen it.
KRITHIA . AGAIN ATTACKED 461
The following morning, the allied troops moved out of their
trenches in a counterattack. It at first met with great success.
As Sir Ian Hamilton wrote in his dispatch to London : **Had it
not been for those inventions of the devil — machine guns and
barbed wire — ^which suit the Turkish character and tactics to
perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of
Achi Baba.''
By 7.30 in the morning the British left had advanced more
than 500 yards, while the center and the right and the
French left had also registered promising advances. The rest of
the French line, however, was held up by strong Turkish forces
posted along the Kereves Dere and the more advanced sections
of the British left came under heavy cross-fire. In the end it
was necessary to relinquish all the ground gained and to retire
to the original trenches.
Although the Turks made night attacks against the French
line on May 2 and 3, 1915, and in the end inflicted such heavy
losses that it was necessary to shorten the line held by General
4'Amade's troops, it was not until May 6, 1915, that heavy fight-
ing occurred again along the whole line. On May 5 the Lan-
cashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Territorial Divi-
sion, which had been training in Egypt, arrived and was placed
in reserve, behind the British left.
At this time it was calculated that the British total losses,
killed, wounded and missing since the initial operations of^the
landing, had been just short of 14,000 men. This of course did
not include the sick who must have numbered 10,000 or the
French losses, which were not revealed. These were heavy and
serious and more than counterbalanced the reenforcements that
had arrived.
Sir Ian Hamilton decided to make a fresh attempt against
Krithia and Achi Baba on May 6, 1915. This battle was im-
portant because it marked the turning point in the character of
the campaign carried on by the allied troops in Gallipoli. Al-
though an advance was registered none of the main positions of
the Ottoman troops were carried or even reached, and it became
apparent that the task of reducing the Dardanelles was not one
462 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
likely to be solved by rush frontal attacks. Rather, as in other
fields of the world war, the problem became one of siege tactics,
and from the date of the end of this second battle of Krithia the
operations in Gallipoli resolved themselves into variations of the
methods that were being forced upon the troops of all the bel-
ligerent countries in Europe.
For his grand attack upon Krithia and Achi Baba, Sir Ian
Hamilton brought down from Anzac Cove the Second Austra-
lian Infantry Brigade and the New Zealand Brigade. With two
brigades of the Royal Naval Reserve he formed them into a re-
serve division. The Twenty-ninth Division held the British line,
and was ordered forward about 11 a. m. of May 6, 1915, with
orders to go as far as Krithia if possible, but at all events to
sieze as much of the ground around that point as possible. At
the same time the French corps were to attempt to wrest from
the Turks the crest above the Kereves Dere.
The advance was extremely slow. At the end of two hours
the Twenty-ninth Division had progressed less than three hun-
dred yards and had not yet come into touch with any of the
main Turkish positions. Three hours more of desperate fighting
showed many fluctuations but no more progress. Finally they
were ordered to intrench where they were for the night.
The French had succeeded in reaching the crest aimed at,
but found it by no means a comfortable position. They could
not go forward and they dared not go back. Yet they were
subject to a raking fire that cost them hundreds of casualties.
Time and time again the Senegalese troops were sent against the
Turkish trenches and machine gun positions, but each time they
were beaten back with cruel losses. To make matters even
worse, the French could not, in the heavy fire maintained by the
Turks, intrench until after nightfall, and they had to spend hours
in the exposed position.
The following morning May 7, 1915, the allied warships opened
a furious bombardment of the ground around Krithia. Every
few feet of the difficult country was searched out by the destroy-
ing lyddite of the Allies' shells, until it seemed that not a living
creature could have survived. But when the Lancashire Fusiliers
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KRITHIA AGAIN ATTACKED 463
Brigade moved out to the attack a few minutes later it soon
became apparent that the naval bombardment had by no means
exterminated or demoralized the Turks.
The British troops were greeted by a perfect hurricane of
fire from rifles and machine guns. Hundreds of the men went
down and, brave as the remainder were, they were compelled to
abandon the attempt to cross the open ground that lay between
the British front and Krithia. Some progress was made on the
right, however, where a clump of fir trees which had been hold-
ing up the advance for some time was finally carried by the Fifth
Royal Scots. Early in the afternoon the Turks recaptured the firs
and such of the ground they had lost and shortly after four o'clock
when Sir Ian Hamilton relieved the situation, the British were
in the position of being absolutely "stuck." The British com-
mander decided to make another desperate attempt, however, and
called upon the French for cooperation. The whole allied line
advanced to the attack just as evening was closing in but the
Turks by this time had brought up some additional batteries and
poured in on the French and the British a smothering fire of
deadly shrapnel. So heavy was the punishment of the French
that the line literally melted away and General d'Amade was
compelled to throw his last reserve into the front line. At night-
fall the allied attack subsided.
During the night, word came to Sir Ian Hamilton that heavy
Turkish reenforcements were on their way and he decided to
make one last attempt, to carry Krithia and Achi Baba before
they arrived in the morning. Accordingly, the Lancashire
Fusiliers Brigade which had been particularly roughly handled
was withdrawn from the line, and their places taken by the New
Zealand Brigade. After another naval bombardment the New
Zealanders were ordered forward shortly after 10 a. m. of
May 8, 1915. By 1.30 they were two hundred yards closer
to Krithia than any allied troops had been up to that
time. There, however, they were heavily checked. Other units
were unable to advance, and the French sent word that they
were unable to go any farther unless the British line could
move.
30— War St. 3
464 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
There was a long pause. Finally word was passed along the
line that the final desperate effort was to be made — ^namely to
carry Krithia and Achi Baba by a combined bayonet attack.
Every man in the line was ordered to fix bayonets and not to
stop short of the objectives. At 5.30 in the afternoon came
the order to advance, after a bombardment by the fleet. Almost
immediately all central control was lost, and each unit was fight-
ing desperately for itself in the hills and gullies of that difficult,
almost uncharted, country. Not for many hours afterward,
indeed, in some cases not for days, was it possible to piece the
story together.
The New Zealand troops got well past the Turkish machine
guns without discovering them, with the consequence that their
supports were mown down by a hail of fire from unexpected
quarters. Nevertheless, they got within a few yards of the
Turkish trenches and proceeded to dig themselves in. The Second
Australian Infantry Brigade actually won about 400 yards of
ground and stuck to it with a tenacity warmly praised by Sir
Ian Hamilton. To the left the Eighty-seventh Brigade had suf-
fered terribly from machine-gun fire while the French had been
severely handled. The French troops were steady enough, but
the Senegalese broke in. At one point General d'Amade rallied
the troops in person.
Nightfall came and still Krithia and Achi Baba were far away.
Thus ended the second battle of Krithia, the supreme attempt of
the allied troops to carry the Turkish positions by a maneuver
battle. Some little ground had been gained, but the losses had
been all out of proportion to the advantage wrested from the
brave and tenacious Ottoman troops. The only consolation found
in the situation by the higher commands was in the assurance
that the enemy had suffered equally heavy losses, but as they
were largely on the defensive this statement is opeyi ^ a very
large measure of doubt. ^r '|,>
While all this fighting was going on at the tip of the peninsula,
the Anzacs, or that part of them left on the cliffs overlooking
the cove, were having a hard time to maintain their positions.
The Turks were aware of the withdrawal of the two brigades
KRITHIA AGAIN ATTACKED 465
to assist in the second battle of Krithia, and they made a heavy-
demonstration to prevent the departure of any further troops.
To understand how vital a matter this was one has only to read
the dispatches of the period. Indeed, it has often since been
pointed out by military writers that, had the troops landed from
first to last at Anzac Cove been available at the tip of the penin-
sula, Krithia and Achi Baba would undoubtedly have been
carried in the early days of the fighting, thus altering the whole
course of the campaign. This dispersal of forces would appear
to have been one of the major blunders of the Dardanelles
campaign.
For five days, beginning May 6, 1915, the Anzacs were in
almost constant action. The fortunes fluctuated, gains were
made by both forces, but in the end, aside from heavy losses by
both, there was practically no change in the relative positions.
The allied troops still held a strip of land on the top of the cliffs,
of a radius of about 1,100 yards. As illustrating the intense
character of the combat at this period, it was calculated that
during one bombardment no less than 1,400 Turkish shells fell on
this small strip of land in one hour.
It has been said that the task of the Anzacs at this period was
to keep open this door to the vitals of the Turkish army and to
hold as many of the Turks as possible, and thus relieve the
pressure on the Krithia front. It can be said with equal
force that the task of the Turks arrayed against them was
to hold as many of the Anzacs on this front as possible.
Judged from these angles, both Turks and Britons were
successful.
In the following week both the British and the French received
substantial reenforcements. On May 14 General d'Amade, in
command of the French forces at the Dardanelles, was relieved
by General Gouraud, who, at the age of 47, was the youngest
officer of his rank in the French army. He had enjoyed con-
spicuous success in northern France, and had been nicknamed
by his soldiers, the **Lion of the Argonne." It was believed that
his experience in the country of the Argonne and the style of
fighting that had developed there would make him especially
466 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
valuable to Sir Ian Hamilton, who, of course, had had no previous
experience with the new style of warfare.
On May 18, 1915, began the second battle of Anzac. Elaborate
preparations were made by General Liman von Sanders, the Ger-
man commander in chief of the Ottoman forces. Fully 30,000
troops are said to have been gathered for the attack upon the
Colonial troops. The latter were fully prepared, warned of the
concentration by the observers on the warships and the aerial
scouts.
About midnight of that day the attack began. After a pre-
liminary bombardment of the British positions, successive in-
fantry attacks in massed formation were launched against the
trenches. For six hours the battle waged, but the Anzacs'
positions were not shaken. In the end the ground in front of
the trenches was literally covered with the dead and wounded.
An actual observer wrote of the scene :
"The ground presents an extraordinary sight when viewed
through the trench periscopes. Two hundred yards away, and
even closer in some places, are the Turkish trenches, and between
them and our lines the dead lie in hundreds. There are groups
of twenty or thirty massed together, as if for mutual protection,
some lying on their faces, some killed in the act of firing;
others hung up in the barbed wire. In one place a small group
actually reached our parapet, and now lie dead on it, shot at
point-blank range or bayoneted. Hundreds of others lie just
outside their own trenches, where they were caught by rifle or
shrapnel when trying to regain them. Hundreds of wounded
must have perished between the lines."
There was a lull after this terrible slaughter, during which the
Turks made unsuccessful overtures to obtain an armistice to
bury their dead. On May 20, 1915, toward evening, the Turks
again attacked, concentrating on Quinn*s Point, a strong Anzac
redoubt at the outer edge of the Australian trenches. No results
were obtained and finally, out of sheer necessity for reasons of
health, an opportunity was given the Turks to bury their slain.
There was some additional fighting on this line during the
remaining days of May, but nothing of real importance occurred.
KRITHA AGAIN ATTACKED 467
It was calculated, at the end of the month, that the total British
losses, killed, wounded and missing and not including sick, was
just short of 40,000 men. The figures for the sick were not
given out, but reports made later make it tolerably certain that
they must have numbered between 30,000 and 35,000 additional.
The intensity of the struggle at the Dardanelles will be realized
when it is pointed out that the total British casualties in the
three years of the South African War were only 38,156.
During the last two weeks of May the British and French
troops on the Krithia fronts made elaborate preparations for
an attack upon the Turkish lines. Miners had been brought out
from England and France, and mining and sapping had been
conducted on a large scale. On June 4, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton
ordered the attack. It was preceded by the usual heavy naval
and artillery bombardment. Finally, at noon, the mines were
exploded, and the troops advanced along the whole line with
fixed bayonets.
It is calculated that the British had no less than 24,000 men
on a front of less than 4,000 yards. Their attack was delivered
with tremendous power and was brilliantly successful. At one
point, however, where the French line linked up with the British,
the Turks discovered a weak spot. By noon about a third of a
mile had been gained over a front of four miles, but soon after-
ward the French began to weaken and subsequently were com-
pelled to retreat. This exposed the right wing of the British,
which was enfiladed by the Turkish riflemen and machine gun
batteries and suffered terrible losses. The Collingwood bat-
talion of the Royal Naval Reserve, according to Sir Ian Hamil-
ton, having gone forward in support when the right wing was
hard pressed, was practically wiped out.
The attack slackened in the afternoon and nightfall found
almost all the gains of the morning lost to the heavy Turkish
counterattacks. So exhausted were the British and French
troops that it was impossible to renew the battle on the following
day.
On June 21, 1915, the French force fought probably its most
successful action since the landing. About noon of that day,
468 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Second Division stormed two lines of Turkish trenches and
captured what had been called the "Haricot" redoubt, a strong
Turkish position which had twice changed hands. On the right,
the First Division was unable to make corresponding progress
until General Gouraud made a last inspiring appeal. Before
night the whole of the Turkish first line trenches above Kereves
Dere were in the hands of the P^^ench troops. The cost had been
terrible, no less than 2,500 soldiers of the Republic falling in the
assault. More important still, General Gouraud was so seriously
injured that he had to return to France. On the way his right
arm was amputated. He was succeeded in command of the
French Expeditionary force by General Bailloud.
A week of comparative inaction was followed by an action on
the British right, which became known as the battle of the Gully
Ravine. This was a successful attempt to capture the ground
originally included in Sir Ian Hamilton's instructions for the
second day of the Battle of the Landings, near Beach Y, where
the Turks had maintained themselves in force, on June 28, by a
strong British force, including the overworked Twenty-ninth
Division, which at this time had but few of the officers who
commanded at the landing on April 25, 1915, the 156th Brigade
of the Lowland Division, and the Indian Brigade. Several of
the Turkish trenches could be easily enfiladed from the sea and
H.M.S. Talbot, guarded by a ring of destroyers against the
German submarines which had given effective evidence of their
presence in the Gulf of Saros, did terrible execution and played
a large part in the success of the British attack.
By nightfall, five lines of Turkish trenches along the coast had
been captured, 200 prisoners had been taken and several guns
and much ammunition had fallen to the British troops. The
Turks made counterattacks on the two succeeding nights but
never regained the ground they had lost.
While this was going on, Enver Pasha directed in person a
determined attack upon the troops at Anzac Cove. On the night
of June 29, 1915, after artillery preparation, two unsuccessful
attempts were made by the Ottoman troops to carry the British
lines.
RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS 469
On July 4, 1915, the Turks launched another attack, starting
from the neigborhood of Achi Baba, against the whole allied
front, concentrating on the point where the French and British
lines joined up. They had a momentary success when they
penetrated into one of the British trenches, but in the end they
were driven out.
On July 12, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton ordered an attack which
won about 400 yards in the direction of Achi Baba, but at heavy
loss to one of the Territorial Brigades, which broke through a
couple of the Turkish trench lines, but was unable to establish a
connection with the French on their right. Finally some local
points and a few trenches were carried, but as the Turks had
something like fifty miles of trenches in Gallipoli, it became
apparent that at this rate the allied troops would be wiped out
long before they came within sight of the Narrows.
CHAPTER LXXVI
RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS
THE Russo-Turkish campaign which had developed in Trans-
caucasia, the Caucasus and Persia at the beginning of 1915,
proved to be little more than a futile dissipation of energy for the
best part of a year. To Russia it was more of an inconvenience
than otherwise, while for the Turks it was the only point besides
Egypt where their geographical position permitted them to strike
a blow against the enemies of Germany. Her two nearest neigh-
bors—Greece and Bulgaria — were both neutral at the time. The
most interesting feature of this campaign is the fact that it
largely influenced the allied operations at the Dardanelles.
On August, 1915, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambas-
sador in Petrograd, published the following statement in an
interview which appeared in the Russian press : "When Turkey
declared war Russia turned to Great Britain with a request that
she would divert a portion of the Turkish troops from the
470 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Caucasus by means of a counterdemonstration at some other
point. The operations at the Dardanelles were undertaken with
a double object — on the one hand, of reducing the pressure of the
Turks in the Caucasus, and, on the other, of opening the straits
and so making it possible for Russia to export her grain and re-
ceive foreign products of which she stands in need."
The Turkish offensive in the Caucasus, as we found in Volume
II, began in the middle of December, 1914, and reached its
farthest point toward the end of the year. Although it was sub-
sequently broken by Russia, its renewal was expected when the
weather became more favorable. That it was not renewed dur-
ing the summer of 1915, and that Tiflis was in consequence re-
lieved from further menace, was due entirely to the British at-
tack on the Dardanelles, to which all available Turkish troops
were immediately dispatched. Russia had her hands full enough
at the time to maintain her long front of 900 miles — from the
Baltic through the Polish salient and through the Carpathian
line of Galicia. She could therefore ill afford to spare any con-
siderable part of her forces for an extended Transcaucasian cam-
paign.
Turkey's first plan of action in the Great War appears to have
been an attempt to recover Ardahan and Kars, both of which
places, as well as Batum, had been taken from Turkey and
handed over to Russia by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. To fore-
stall any such aspirations Russian troops had entered Asia
Minor on November 4, 1914, and advanced for seventeen miles
along the road to Erzerum in Armenia, and on November 8 they
successfully resisted an attack by the Turks, armed with heavy
German artillery, at Kuprikeui, from which place several moun-
tain paths lead to Erzerum. Further attacks had also been made
by the Turks during the rest of the month and in December like-
wise in the Euphrates Valley without any notable result, until
they had reached Ardahan and Sarikamish in an attempt to re-
gain Kars,
In a three days' battle with the Russians, January 1-4, 1915,
they were driven back with enormous losses, the whole of one
Turkish army corps (the Ninth) surrendering. (See Volume II,
RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS 471
Turkey in the War.) The Turks did not get within thirty miles
of Kars. In numerical strength the Turks were estimated at
three to one against the Russians. Fighting in the deep snow at
altitudes of 8,000 to 10,000 feet in a severe winter is an enor-
mously difficult undertaking for the attacking side, and it is evi-
dent that the Turkish forces suffered terrible hardships in their
attempt to retain a footing on Russian territory.
At the end of January and the beginning of February furious
fighting raged in the neighborhood of Sarikamish, when the Rus-
sians infficted another defeat on the Turks. During a blinding
snowstorm the former had crossed a mountain and, after heavy
iighting, captured the commanding general and the staff of the
Thirtieth Turkish Division and a large quantity of war material.
The roaring of the wind was so great that the Russian approach
could not be heard, while the thickly blowing snow rendered the
troops invisible.
At the same time the Russian squadron bombarded the Turkish
barracks at Trebizond and Rizah from the Black Sea, also sinking
3ome Turkish sailing vessels used as transports. Under the
superintendence of German engineers the Turks hurriedly set
about constructing a branch railroad from Angora to Sivas, Asia
Minor, intended to replace the Trebizond water route as a line of
communication for the Turkish troops on the Caucasus front.
Meanwhile another Russian column pushed out from Julfa along
the Tabriz road to force battle upon the Turkish army invading
the Persian province of Azerbaijan. The Turks advanced north-
ward from Tabriz to Marand, where a stubborn battle was
fought. They were commanded by Djevet Pasha, who was con-
sidered one of their best tacticians and most agressive fighters,
but after a series of unsuccessful frontal onslaughts his army
broke in disorder, abandoning cannon, colors (standards), and
all their dead and wounded. To the Russians the victory was
more of political than military value, for it dealt a severe blow
at Turkish and German influence in Persia.
On February 8, 1915, the Turkish cruiser Midirli (formerly
the German warship Breslau) fired upon the Russian port of
Jalta on the Crimean Peninsula, opposite Balaklava. The Rus-
472 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sian fleet retaliated by again bombarding Trebizond on the other
side of the Black Sea.
About February 20-21, 1915, several small engagements were
fought in the vicinity of Chorokh, as a result of which the Turks
were driven beyond the river.
On February 22, 1915, news came from Petrograd to the effect
that the Turks had indulged in cruel atrocities during their occu-
pation of Ardanuten in Transcaucasia, near the Armenian
frontier. The Tiflis correspondent of the "Russkoye Slovo*' (the
"Russian Word") stated that at first the Turks confined them-
selves to pillage and killed only fifteen civilians, but that after
December 30, 1914, when news of the Russian occupation of
Ardaham was received, the local Mussulmans had organized
a systematic massacre. A hundred and fifty Armenians were
led out into the streets and killed.
Fifty Armenians were removed from prisons, stripped naked,
and compelled to leap into the abyss of Jenemdere, the "Devil's
Gap," until one victim carried a Turk with him, when the re-
mainder were shot. At Tamvot 250 Armenians were massacred
and the women carried into captivity. The Turks did not permit
the burial of the corpses, which were left to be devoured by dogs
till the arrival of the Russians. Again, it was reported from
Urumiah, northwestern Persia, that prior to the evacuation of
towns between Julfa and Tabriz the Turks and Kurds, who were
retiring before the Russian advance, plundered and burned the
villages and put to death some of the inhabitants. At Salnac,
Pagaduk, and Sarna orders were said to have been given by the
Turkish commissioner for the destruction of the towns. All the
Armenian inhabitants of Antvat were collected and, according
to this message, 600 males were put to death, and the women,
after being compelled to embrace the Islamic faith, were divided
into parties and sent to various interior towns.
On March 19, 1915, the Armenian Red Cross fund in London
issued some details supplied by an Armenian doctor named
Derderian, who testified that the whole plain of Alashgerd was
virtually covered with the bodies of men, women, and children.
When the Russian forces had retreated from this district the
RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS 473
Kurds fell upon the helpless people and shut them up in mosques.
The men were killed and the women were carried away to the
mountains. The Armenian Red Cross fund stated that there
were 120,000 destitute Armenians in the Caucasus at that time.
As war in itself is not far removed from being a wholesale,
organized atrocity on a large scale, it is always advisable to
accept such accusations with extreme reserve and to consider
the probability of their having been perpetrated. In the case of
Turk and Kurd versus Armenian, however — and unfortunately
— there is little reason to doubt even the most gruesome stories
that could possibly be written. It is a feud as old as the hills,
and no historic battle field of the world was ever so liberally
drenched with human blood as the soil of Armenia.
Having expelled the Turks from the Transcaucasian region
toward the end of February, 1915, the Russians again moved
forward on the Asiatic front, sweeping aside, destroying and
capturing detachments of Turks that opposed their advance.
By March 1, 1915, the Russians were approaching Oltichai
along one of the main highroads toward Erzerum from the west.
Another column advancing from the east encountered some Turks
in the mountain passes south of Alashkort. These they defeated,
capturing two guns. On February 28, 1915, the Russian troops
operating in the coast region occupied the port of Khopa on the
Black Sea, eighteen miles southwest of Batum. This port was of
great military value to the Turks.
On March 3, 1915, the Russian Army of the Caucasus, driving
the Turkish forces before it, had reached the River Khopachas,
the estuary of the Chorokh in Armenia. This move severed the
route of Turkish reenforcements and supplies from Constanti-
nople to the Caucasian frontier through Khlopa, Turkish Ar-
menia, thereby isolating a big portion of Turkish territory. From
Batum Russian troops advanced near the Turkish border, the
Turks opposing them step by step. Russian warships from the
Black Sea sprayed their shells over the shore and cleared a
fifteen-mile strip of coast of Turkish barracks and troops, suc-
cessively cutting off several lines of their communications by sea
until, after a three days' battle, the last route was effectively
474 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
closed. A number of Turkish coasting vessels, laden with am-
munition and supplies, were also sunk.
According to an official Russian report issued on March 3,
1915, the number of Turkish prisoners who had passed through
Pyatigorsk on their way to the interior of Russia (since Turkey
entered the war) up to February 13, 1915, amounted to 527
officers and 49,000 men.
During February, 1915, the Turks had been nibbling at Egypt
through the Sinai Peninsula. On the 25th of that month the
allied squadrons had begun heavy firing on the Dardanelles. This
decided the supreme Turkish war council early in March to recaU
most of the troops from Egypt and the Caucasus to defend the
straits. By March 16, 1915, the Turks had lost so many impor-
tant points in the Chorokh region that they completely aban-
doned to the Russians what positions they still held on the river»
On March 20, 1915, Petrograd announced that the Russian
advance to the sea had deprived the enemy of all means of operat-
ing in the Transchorokh region or of transporting troops and
munitions to Erzerum, and that the Turks had been put to flight
near Olti. The road between Archava and Khopa, to the east-
ward, was strongly defended by the Turks in a series of stub-
bornly contested battles. The Russian advance created a panic
throughout the Chorokh Valley ; the inhabitants fled to the moun-
tains, abandoning farms and villages. The mountain heights in
the district of Ardanuch, however, were strongly fortified and
still in Turkish possession. These fortifications had been built
under German supervision, and the defense thereof was con-
ducted by a German officer.
Hostilities were resumed in Persia during the last week in
March, 1915, and on the 25th the Russians defeated the Turks in
a violent, sanguinary battle at Atkutur, north of Bilman in
northwestern Persia. The Turks were stated to have lost 12,000
in killed, wounded, and prisoners, as well as many guns. Pre-
ceding the Russian occupation of Salmac Plains in Azerbaijan
province, northwest of Urumiah, hundreds of native Christians
were rounded up by the Turks in the village of Haftde^an and
massacred. Many of them were dragged out from the homes of
KUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS 475
friendly Mohammedans, who tried to hide them. The Russians
on entering the village found 720 bodies, mostly naked and
mutilated. The recovery of bodies from wells, pools, and ditches,
and their interment kept 300 men busy for three days. The
wailing of women intensified the horror of the scene. Surviving
widows who were able to identify the bodies of their husbands
insisted upon digging graves and burying the bodies. "Some of
the victims had been shot. In other cases they were bound to
ladders, and their heads, protruding through, were hacked off.
Eyes were gouged out and limbs chopped off."
Messages from Urumiah confirmed earlier reports that more
than 800 persons had already been killed in the neighborhood,
and that more than 2,000 had died of disease.
A dispatch from Tifiis, Transcaucasia, dated April 24, 1915,
stated that refugees who had reached the Russian line reported
that the massacre of Armenians was being continued on an even
greater scale. All the inhabitants of ten villages near Van were
stated to have been killed. On being advised of massacres at
Erzerum, Berjan, and Zeitun, and of the conditions at Van, the
Katolikos, head of the Armenian Church at Etchmiadzin, near
Erivan, cabled to President Wilson an appeal to the people of the
United States to act on behalf of the Armenians.
The village governments or relief committees had managed
to issue eight pounds of flour to each refugee in six weeks. A
journey through Salmac three weeks after the outrages revealed
unmistakable signs of the slaughter. Pools of blood still marked
the "execution" places in Haftdewan. The caps of thirty-six
victims lay where a mud wall had been toppled over them. A
y^oung Armenian named Hackatur related the story of his escape
from a well in which the bodies of the dead had been crammed.
He had fallen with the others and was flung into the well, but he
managed to wriggle through the bodies lying on top of him, and
escaped at nightfall.
At the end of April, 1915, after a slight lull, fresh activity
broke out again in various regions of the Caucasian front. The
campaign had almost come to a standstill owing to typhus. On
the average, 150 men succumbed daily. The epidemic raged for
476 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
a while under indescribably awful conditions. Every available
doctor was hurried out, and several of them died of the disease.
The Russians had cleared the Kurds out of the Alashkart valley
and were now pushing forward in the direction of Olti. The
fight for the valley centered on the possession of Klichgjaduk
Pass, which would have been extremely useful to the Turks,
could they have held it securely for a few days to enable them to
complete a junction with their separated forces. The Russians
'*lay low^' in strongly protected positions. The Turks came on,
first obviously for reconnaissance, and were easily repulsed with-
out the Russians making much display of force. Whatever may
be said of the Turkish soldier, he is at all times a brave and
self-reliant fighter. They advanced to make the real attack, sup-
ported by some mountain guns. But the Russian artillery
continued to lie silent, and the Turkish attack developed with
misplaced confidence and swept boldly up to the line of the Rus-
sian wire entanglements. Only sixty yards separated the com-
batants when, suddenly, a perfect tornado of fire rattled out
from the Russian intrenchments. Maxims, mountain guns and
rifles poured a deadly shower of shells >and bullets into the closely
packed thousands of Turks. With extraordinary courage the
Osmanli still rushed into the trap, uttering fierce shouts of
"Allahoo Akbar!" The Russians then broke from cover and
some terrible bayonet work completed the task of securing the
pass for the Russians.
By May 10, 1915, the Turks had been driven back to the south-
west, leaving a large quantity of tents and munitions behind
them. Farther south, from Sarikamish, a number of insigni-
ficant conflicts were kept up. Turkish stragglers formed part-
nerships with local professionals and organized companies of
banditti ; the Russians were kept busy clearing out the villages
where these bands had established their headquarters, driving
them into the hills. To the southeast, the pursuit of Halil
Bey's defeated army continued during the first week in May,
The battle had begun at Hantahta, near Urumiah, on April
29, 1915. Both sides lost heavily. In the beginning the
Russians had held the Turks at bay, but the latter received re-
RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS 477
enforcements and on April 30, 1915, the Russians had to with-
draw from Dilman. They intrenched themselves at Magonzhio,
the first village on the way to Khori, whence they battered the
Turks with their heavy artillery until the arrival of Russian
reenforcements.
On May 14, 1915, it was announced from Washington that
replies were being prepared at the State Department to a flood
of communications from various parts of the country urging
that steps be taken to protect Christians in Armenia and other
regions under Turkish control. Assurance was given that the
Department was doing all in its power to aid the Armenians.
Mr. Morgenthau, our Ambassador at Constantinople, was in-
structed to make representations to the Turkish Government.
It was at his request that Turkish regular troops were sent to
Urumiah, Persia, to keep order.
The Russian consul at that place reported on May 15, 1915,
that 6,000 Armenians had been massacred at Van, which has
been the scene of so many similar outrages during the last
twenty years. On May 23, 1915, a detachment of Russian
soldiers occupied the town of Van, in Asiatic Turkey, thus bring-
ing the eagerly expected relief to the Armenians, who were be-
sieged by the Turks — besieged in their own country by their
own countrymen. Upon the arrival of the Russians the Turks
retreated in the direction of Bitlis.
The Russian successes in the Van region included the occupa-
tion of Baslan ; in the capture of Van itself they took twenty-
six guns, a great quantity of war materials and provisions, as
well as the Government Treasury. A considerable part of the
town was destroyed by fire. All the foreigners residing there
were reported as safe. By June 6, 1915, the Russians had the
whole Van region and part of the Sanjak of Mush in their hands.
They had, practically annihilated Halil Bey's original corps and
cleared the Turkish troops out for jnany miles around. A
Turkish offensive in the Province of Azerbaijan ended in a
complete breakdown. On their right wing the Russians occu-
pied Turkish territory between the old frontier and the line of
the rivers Chorokh and Tortun and the mountain range of
478 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Tchakhir Baba. A violent counterattack made by the Turks at
Zinatcher was repulsed. In the course of an engagement in the
valley of Oltichai 200 Cossacks charged on horseback to the
trenches, where they dismounted. Leaving their well-trained
horses to look after themselves, the Cossacks dashed into the
Turks and put them to the sword. Two days later a Turkish
official report from Constantinople via wireless to Berlin and
London very briefly announced : "On the Caucasian front we
occupied enemy positions in the district of Olti, on the Russian
border of Transcaucasia."
The operations in the Dardanelles apparently had but little
effect on Turkish activity in the Caucasus, for by June 19, 1915,
they had replaced the Ninth Army Corps which had been cap-
tured by the Russians at Sarikamish, and had also restored and
supplied with ammunition the Tenth and Eleventh Corps, which
were seriously reduced in numbers by fighting and disease. The
main Turkish concentration was taking place about this time
against Olti, Melo, and Kiskin, outside of which line the First
and Sixth Corps and the remainder of Halil Bey's army were
drawn up. Here the Turks undertook some cautious offensive
maneuvers, besides attempting to prevent the Russians from
outflanking Erzerum. Some of the Kurdish leaders who were
responsible for the Armenian massacres in the Van district
voluntarily surrendered to the Russians and were deported to
the interior with their dependents.
On June 20, 1915, in a battle near Olti, fifty-flve miles west
of Kars, 200 Russians were killed and prisoners and war ma-
terials were taken. By June 24, 1915, the Russians had occu-
pied Gob, a town twenty-five miles north of Lake Van. A
general movement of Russian troops toward Bitlis, where the
armies of two Turkish commanders were concentrated, pointed
to a favorable situation in the Caucasus from the Russian stand-
point. Gob and Bitlis are connected by several comparatively
good roads. But matters now began to quiet down somewhat —
activities on both sides decreased. Russian sentiment had grown
strong in North and Central Persia, a fact accentuated by the
spirit displayed among the Moslem sects. Various isolated
RUSSO-TURKISH OPERATIONS 479
mountain tribes met the Russians with declarations of allegiance
— obviously the safest policy to adopt with a powerful con-
queror. Disease and famine stalked through the smoldering
district of Van ; only one doctor was available for 40,000 people
— SL large number of them in dire need of medical assistance.
In the first week of July, 1915, lively fighting was reported to
have occurred north and south of Lake Van and south of Olti.
A Turk force of 30,000 men, concentrated to the east of Bitlis,
were being hard pressed by the Russians. Organized massacre
of Armenians in Bitlis was regarded as an indication that the
Turks intended to retreat from that point. They had also dis-
tributed 40,000 rifles among Kurds in the Mush Valley for use
against Armenians.
Up to July 6, 1915, there had been only an artillery duel in
the coast region, and a Russian motor boat sank a Turkish sail-
ing vessel. South of the Kara Dagh range a Russian detach-
ment encountered a regiment of Turkish infantry with artillery,
machine guns, and two squadrons of cavalry. The Turks were
again reported as coming off second best with considerable
damage inflicted upon them. A Turkish offensive west of
Ahlavat also failed.
After the Russians penetrated to Mush (eighty-three miles
south of Erzerum), and Plian, Halil Bey, commander of the
Turkish forces in the Caucasus, reorganized his army, bringing
its strength up to 90,000, including six divisions of infantry,
one of cavalry, and a large body of Kurds. General Eudenitch,
the Russian commander, thus found himself confronted with
the alternative of hastily attempting to concentrate his forces
in the face of a strong Turkish army, or to retreat and thus
expose a large Armenian population to Turk and Kurdish
revenge. The main Russian army withdrew along the right
bank of the Euphrates, the Turks occupying the left bank, July
22-25, 1915, being held in partial check by rear-guard actions.
On August 1, 1915, Halil Bey's forces came into contact with
a considerable body of Russians at Palantchen, on the left bank
of the Euphrates, twelve miles southwest of Kara KiHssa. The
Russians had taken positions on a line extending from the north-
31— War St. 3
480 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
east to the southwest from Darabi, six miles north of Kara
Kilissa, to Djamschato, six miles southwest of the important
Akhtunski Pass, covering the roads to Erivan, in Transcaucasia.
In opposing this front the Turks exposed their communications,
then 150 miles long, to attack from the direction of Sarikamish.
The violent and picturesque fighting that developed during the
first week of August will be described in the next volume.
The Turkish and Persian borders had meanwhile settled down
to comparative quiet. Up to this stage the Russian commander
had made no attempt to advance to Erzerum, though there were
strong grounds for belief that the defenses of that fortress were
by no means so strong as had been supposed or represented.
Russia was waiting her time in this theatre of war: her
object was merely to hold the gate. She had just suffered severe
reverses in Galicia and the Carpathians, and was now fighting
desperately to avoid the great enveloping movement engineered
by all the skill and weight of Von Hindenburg and Von Macken-
sen on her own territory of Poland and Russia itself.
PART XI— THE WAR IN AFRICA
CHAPTER LXXVII
THE CAMEROONS
THE war in Africa smoldered and flamed during the second
period from February to August, 1915. The fight for the
colonial possessions became a struggle for existence.
During the spring of 1915 the fighting in the Cameroons was
generally favorable to the allied arms. In April the advance of
the French and British troops forced the Germans to transfer
their seat of Government from Buea to Yaunde. In this month,
Colonel Mayer's French column succeeded in pushing its way
over the River Kele, while about the same time a British detach-
ment seized a bridge across Ngwa.
On May 11, 1915, the station of Escha was taken. The Ger-
mans who occupied a strong position at Njoke were driven out,
and the place was occupied by the British on May 29, 1915.
In the hinterland, along the Sanga River, the French columns
had met with continued success in harrying and driving out the
enemy. The Germans displayed great bravery, and offered stub-
bom resistance, but were forced to fall back on fortified Monso.
Here they held out for some days, when they were forced to
capitulate, and considerable stores of guns and ammunition fell
to the victors.
The French troops continued their successful drive by taking
Assobam and Besam on June 25, 1915, and then occupied the
important post of Lomji, in the capture of which, the Belgian
soldiers furnished invaluable assistance, proving themselves
to be skillful and fearless fighters.
481
482 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
What especially contributed to make the Allies' successes
easier in this section of the war area was the revolt of the
natives against their German masters. The Germans during
their retreat had burned villages and destroyed a vast amount
of property which so enraged the natives that many deserted.
Having a perfect knowledge of the country it was easy for them
to escape capture. It was stated that many hung around the
German flanks and took revenge on their former masters by
hindering their retreat and by occasionally sniping the Ger-
man officers.
The natives of the Cameroons- were not generally trusted
by the Germans, and were forbidden to fish in the streams
of the country, lest they should furnish information to thq
enemy.
Countercharges of British cruelty were brought at this time
by certain German missionaries of the Basle Mission, on the
Sanga River. It was claimed that British troops promised to
reward natives for delivering Germans into their hands, and
for killing them. A number of Germans, it was stated, had
been cut to pieces, while others had been tortured and delivered
to the British. It was charged against the French military
authorities that German prisoners had been deported to
French Dahomey where they were forced to labor under black
overseers. These charges were denied by the accused in each
instance.
During April and May, 1915, there was sharp fighting on the
Nigeria frontier. The large native town of Gurin, just inside
British territory, was attacked by a German force from Garua
in April. The contingent numbered sixteen Europeans, and
about 350 natives. It was equipped with some large guns and
Maxims. For the defense of the town there was only a small
garrison of forty native troops commanded by Lieutenant Pawle.
For seven hours the garrison held off the enemy, when he was
forced to retire. During the struggle Lieutenant Pawle, the gal-
lant commander of the garrison, was killed. The news of this
engagement was carried by native soldiers who escaped from
Gurin, to Colonel F. G. Cunliffe at Yola, who immediately
THE CAMEROONS 483
set off with a detchment of the African Frontier Force, arriv-
ing on the scene of the siege the day following. After being
joined by a body of French troops, he moved on to capture
Garua where the British had met with disastrous defeat in
August, 1914.
Since that time the four forts of the town had been greatly
strengthened and every preparation was now made for a stout
resistance. The British and French having intrenched them-
selves, the British guns began a vigorous bombardment of the
forts. During the night sapping and mining went on steadily,
enabling the British to move their trenches gradually nearer
their objective.
The siege lasted from May 31 to June 10, 1915, when the forts
surrendered. The allied troops entered Garua on June 11,
taking over thirty-seven German, and 270 native prisoners,
while great quantities of arms, ammunition and stores became
their prizes. It was said that the garrisons of the forts might
have held out much longer if they had not lost their nerve and
become panic-stricken, which caused many desertions. It was
a remarkable feature of this spirited struggle that the Allies did
not lose a man.
Leaving Garua, the British and French troops now moved on
Ngaundere, capital of the Adamawa District, which was taken
with insignificant losses to the Allies on July 29, 1915. The
retiring Germans were closely pursued to Tangere, which stands
on a plateau nearly 4,000 feet high. This place was captured
by the allied forces July 12, and attempts made by the Germans
to regain it eleven days later were repulsed.
Early in August, 1915, the British captured Gaschaka and
Koncha, when the heavy rains suspended for the time any further
military operations. Meanwhile the French force had been work-
ing its way toward Yaunde, occupying the station of Dume on
the way. The arrival of French troops at this town seems to
have surprised and dismayed the Germans, who hastily
abandoned several fortified places and destroyed their trans-
port. They continued, however, to hold the hill above Dume
for some time, but were driven out by a French detachment after
484 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
a short struggle. From Dume a French column was dispatched
against Abong-Mbong.
At the beginning of the fall of 1915, the Germans still held
Yaunde, and a district in the center of the country, but the
Cameroons could no longer be considered a German possession.
CHAPTER LXXVIII
BRITISH CONQUEST OP SOUTHWEST
AFRICA
/^UR attention is now drawn to Southwest Africa. In the first
^ week of February, 1915, the Germans made a determined
effort to break through the encircling armies that were closing in
on them. Kakamas on the Orange, where a British garrison was
stationed to protect Schuit Drift, was fiercely attacked on
February 5 by about 600 Germans, well equipped with Maxims
and machine guns. They were beaten off after a short engage-
ment with a loss of nine men killed, twenty-two wounded, and
fifteen taken prisoners. On the Union side the casualties were
one killed, and two wounded.
On February 22, 1915, General Botha's army being ready, he
moved out of Swakopmund, and on the following day occupied
the stations of Nonidas and Goanikontes, meeting with only
slight resistance. Nearly a month was now spent in preparing
for the advance on the capital, Windhoek. Careful reconnoitering
of the enemy's positions was made, and an advanced base was
established.
On the night of March 19, 1915, two mounted brigades left
the post at Husab to clear the railway line. General Botha
accompanied the first brigade, which was commanded by Colonel
Brits, their object being Riet, an important place south of the
railway, where it was known that the enemy was strongly pre-
pared. Riet was of utmost importance to the Union force for it
commanded the highway to Windhoek. It was planned that
CONQUEST OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA 485
while Colonel Brits's brigade attacked Riet the Bloemhof Com-
mando was to execute a flank movement and seizing Schwarze
Kopje to endeavor to cut off the enemy's retreat.
At daybreak on March 20, 1915, the brigade reached the Ger-
man position. The right rested on the Swakop stream ; the left
on the foothills of Langer Heinrichberg, while the artillery was
effectively placed so as to command the river and highway.
Assisted by the guns of the Transvaal Horse Artillery a frontal
attack was made, and the fighting became general. With vary-
ing fortunes it continued until the evening when the Germans
were finally driven out and dispersed.
The second brigade commanded by Colonel Celliers had been
directed to cut the railway line between Jakalswater and Sphinx.
He was to attack the former place after blocking the way, in
case any reenforcements should be sent by the enemy from
Windhoek. Celliers succeeded in cutting the railway and seized
a train containing supplies for the Germans, but his attack on
Jakalswater was a failure, and the enemy made forty-three of
his men prisoners.
General Botha was so confident of the ultimate success of his
campaign, that he was not disposed to imperil his chances by any
hasty operations, and so his progress toward Windhoek was at
first necessarily slow. The nature of the country afforded the
enemy many natural advantages and unfortunately the Union
forces were not provided with aeroplanes, which would have
proved invaluable in scouting.
Pforto, a station on the line where the Germans occupied a
strong position, was surrounded by a column led by Colonel
Alberts. The enemy had two large guns and a number of
Maxims. A charge by the Union force and the effective work
of their battery soon silenced the enemy's artillery. The Ger-
mans had lost twenty killed, of whom three were officers, when
they surrendered unconditionally. There were 210 prisoners
taken, four guns and a large quantity of ammunition.
General Botha was engaged in April and May, 1915, clearing
the railway system of the enemy. To prevent any flank attacks
it was necessary to hold the two main lines, which run from
486 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Swakopmund north to Grootfontein, Tsumeb, and to Windhoeko
This line being cleared for fifty miles, Colonel Skinner and the
Kimberley Regiment were stationed at Trekopje, which became
the .Union railhead.
On April 26, 1915, about 700 Germans and a dozen guns
vigorously assailed this encampment and for four hours the
fight raged with varying consequences. The Germans under
a withering fire from their batteries tried to surround the
Union trenches to enfilade them, but were forced to retire,
when they had got within 150 feet of their objective, leaving
twenty-five killed and wounded behind them. The Union
force lost eleven men, of whom three were officers, and forty
wounded.
Meanwhile, the southern army was actively engaged. Sir
Duncan Mackenzie's column had dispersed the Germans ancl
taken some booty from one or two places near Luderitz Bay, and
had seized many miles of railway. On February 22, 1915, his
advance guard occupied Garub, a station seventy miles inland.
Here a company of Union scouts pushed after the retiring Ger-
mans, and in a skirmish with mounted men protecting a troop
train their leader was wounded. They were forced to retire,
leaving one of their comrades a prisoner in the hands of the
enemy. The British camp at Garub was also attacked by a
hostile aeroplane which dropped hand grenades and shells, but
there were no casualties. *
Aus, an important station fifteen miles from Garub, was next
occupied by Mackenzie. The place was evacuated without a
struggle, but it showed that much work had been done to fortify
it, and that the enemy had intended to resist. Owing to the
rapid movements of the British force the Germans had abandoned
everything, though several mines exploded when the town was
occupied.
Turning now to the movements of General Smut's army in
the south. Colonel Van der Venter, who commanded an impor-
tant section of the army, crossed the Orange River and occupied a
group of stations, inclnding Nabas, Velloor, Ukamas, Jerusalem,
and Heirachabis.
CONQUEST OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA 487
On the last day of March, 1915, Van der Venter's force waa
engaged in several skirmishes in which one man was killed
and two wounded, while six of the enemy were killed and
twenty-eight taken prisoners. At this price the stations of Plat-
been and Geitsaud which yielded a great quantity of supplies
and horses and live-stock were occupied.
On April 30, 1915, Van der Venter occupied Warmbad, the
railway terminus, without opposition and pushing forward along
the line his men entered Kabus, a station sixty-five miles to the
north, two days later.
General Smut met Van der Venter at Kalkfontein on April
11, 1915, where plans were laid to drive the Germans from Karas
Mountains where they occupied some strong positions. The
enemy was attacked in three columns, advancing from different
points. Finding themselves threatened on all sides, the Germans
made no resistance and abandoned everything.
On April 17, 1915, Van der Venter entered Seeheim, the Ger-
mans fleeing in such hot haste that they could not stop to destroy
the bridge over the Great Fish River. Colonel Berrange's force
which had set out from Kimberley was now in touch with Van
der Venter's column. At Hasnur near Rietfontein, Berrange
took an intrenched position with slight losses and after frequent
skirmishes and hard fighting joined Van der Venter's forces near
Keetmanshoop, which surrendered to the combined forces April
20, 1915/
Sir Duncan Mackenzie's column left at Aus now struck out to
the northeast with his mounted men and occupied the towns of
Bethany and Berseba without meeting resistance and April 24,
1915, reached Aritetis on the railway, seventy miles north of
Keetmanshoop, General Mackenzie could now act in conjunction
with Van der Venter against the Germans retreating from See-
heim and Keetmanshoop. At Kabus, twenty miles north, in an
indecisive engagement with the enemy, the Union forces lost
twenty-two men taken prisoners, while the Germans numbering
about 600, continued their retreat, their objective being Gibeon,
where they hoped to entrain for the capital, Windhoek. General
Mackenzie therefore sent a small party to destroy the railway
488 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to the north of Gibeon, while the Nintti Brigade was to engage
the enemy. This body was defeated by the Germans with severe
loss. They took some seventy prisoners and forced the Ninth
Brigade to fall back on the main body.
On the morning of April 28, 1915, Mackenzie led his whole
force against the Germans in a dashing attack that drove them
from the field, and his cavalry continued to pursue them over
twenty miles of country. The rocky and irregular character of
the ground in this neighborhood made it difficult for cavalry
operations, and the Germans made good their escape. The
British lost three officers and twenty men killed; the wounded
numbered fifty-five, of whom eight were officers. Among the
killed was Major J. H. Watt of the Natal Light Horse. The
British captured from the enemy seven officers, and about 200
men. They also released seventy of their own soldiers who
had been made prisoners by the Germans on the previous day.
The booty that fell to the victors included field guns and
Maxims, transport wagons, and large numbers of live stock. It
was at Gibeon, where this battle was fought, that Sir George
Farrar was killed in a railroad accident on May 18, 1915. His
important services in the Commissariat Department during the
invasion of the colony had contributed to making the successes
of the Union forces possible. His career had been full of
adventure. He was sentenced to death for the part he had taken
in the Jamieson raid, and had fought against the Boers in
1899-02.
While General Mackenzie vras successfully operating around
Gibeon, General Botha's troops were active in the north; but
nothing of importance occurred until May 1, 1915, when Kubas
was hurriedly evacuated by the Germans and occupied by
General Brits. Here, it was discovered that the Germans had
made elaborate preparations for resistance, but — ^became panic-
stricken by the sudden and unexpected arrival of Union forces.
Miles of intrenchments surrounded the place, and a hundred con-
tact mines were discovered and removed. From this point
Colonel Brits continued his advance, and encountered the enemy
at Otyimbigue, sixty-one miles from the capital of Windhoek.
CONQUEST OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA 489
After a spirited skirmish the place was taken, the Germans losing
twenty-eight men as prisoners. Continuing their victorious ad-
vance the Union forces captured Karibib, an important railroad
junction, and Johann Albrechtshohe and Wilhelmstal were next
occupied.
With General Botha threatening the capital from the west,
and all the colony south of Gibeon in British hands, the greatest
difficulties in the way of the invaders had been successfully over-
come, and the end seemed to be near.
On May 10, 1915, General Botha was informed that Windhoek,
the capital, was prepared to surrender. He set out at once for
the town in a motor car accompanied by a small escort, and
arranged with the Burgomaster of Windhoek the terms of capitu-
lation.
On May 12, 1915, General Myburgh and a detachment of
Union forces entered the town which contained at the time about
3,000 Europeans and some 12,000 natives.
Before the courthouse, in the presence of the town officials, and
Union officers and men, a proclamation by General Botha in Dutch,
English, and German was read, which placed the conquered dis-
tricts under martial law, and which further expressed the hope
that there would be no attempts to resist the Union forces as
they must prove futile. The great wireless station at the capital,
which kept the colony in touch with Berlin, was found to be
uninjured, and with its capture the Germans lost their last wire-
less station outside of Europe. Thousands of cases of ammuni-
tion and parts of guns were among the prizes taken, while on
the railway a number of locomotives and quantities of rolling
stock were seized.
It now became the immediate business of General Botha's
army to deal with those German straggling forces which re-
mained stillvUnder arms in the north. In a few days following
the occupation of the capital. Colonel Mentz found part of the
enemy at Seeis, and without losing a man took 252 prisoners and
a great quantity of booty. General Botha meanwhile occupied
Omaruru, a station on the railway, and in the same week took
possession of Kalkfield which was strongly intrenched, but which
490 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the Germans were compelled to abandon owing to Botha's adroit
flanking movements. The Germans declining to make a stand,
Botha's army swept victoriously onward.
In the last week in June, 1915, all the districts around Water-
berg were cleared of the enemy. Leaving Okaputu in the eve-
ning of June 30, 1915, General Manie Botha with the Fifth
Brigade got in touch with the Germans at dawn the next day
near Osib, after a forced march of forty-two miles in sixteen
hours. The Germans were driven off, and before nightfall Otavi
was occupied. Here a good supply of water was found and as
the country around is arid and like a desert, the loss of the town
was a serious one to the enemy.
General Lukin with another brigade had set out from Omarasa
at the same time as Manie Botha, and between them came
General Botha and the Headquarters Staff.
The fight at Otavi was the last stand of importance made by
the Germans. They had shown great bravery, but supplies were
failing, they had been driven into the most inhospitable part of
the colony, the natives were not always friendly, and during the
first days of July, 1915, they made preparations to surrender.
The Union troops under General Myburgh, having left the rail-
way, encountered a body of Germans sixteen miles south of
Tsumeb and in the skirmish that followed lost one man and
took eighty-six prisoners.
At Tsumeb, which Myburgh entered on July 8, 1915, some
600 more prisoners were taken, while he was able to release a
number of Union comrades who had been left behind by the
Germans in their hurried retreat. Colonel Brits had by this
time reached the German port of Namutoni, where he took 150
prisoners, and released some Union captives, the last that re-
mained in German hands.
Dr. Seitz, the Governor of German Southwest Africa, now
opened communcations with General Botha concerning a sur-
render, and received the Union officer's terms in the form of an
ultimatum. Botha stated that he and his troops stood ready to
fight, if need be, another battle, but his terms were accepted
before the time limit he had fixed expired.
CONQUEST OF SOUTHWEST AFRtGA
491
CONQUEST OP GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA BY UNION TROOPS
UNDER GENERAL BOTHA
492 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
At two o'clock in the morning of July 9, 1915, at a spot called
Kilometre 500, General Botha, Dr. Seitz the Governor, and
Colonel Francke, commander of the German troops in South-
west Africa, signed the terms of capitulation. All the Germans
surrendered unconditionally. Officers were released on parole,
and were free to live where they pleased in the country. The
regular troops were permitted to retain their rifles, but no
ammunition, and were interned for the remainder of the war
in charge of one of their officers. The Landwehr and Land-
sturm of the reserve forces were permitted to retain their horses,
but no arms, and were released on parole, and could return to
their homes.
The formal surrender of the prisoners was held at Otavi, July
11, 1915, where General Lukin who was in charge of the details
took over 204 officers, and 3,293 of other ranks; thirty-seven
field guns and twenty-two machine guns. By the conquest of
German Southwest Africa 322,450 square miles of territory,
113,670 more miles than all Germany, came under the British
flag.
The suppression of the rebellion at home, and the invasion and
conquest of this large territory had been accomplished by the
Union forces with comparatively small loss of life considering
the great number of engagements that were fought in a most
difficult country for military operations. The best estimate gives
1,612 for both campaigns. The killed numbered 406, of whom
ninety-six were killed in action by the Germans and ninety-eight
by the rebels, fifty-eight died of wounds, and 153 by disease,
accident, and other causes, and 606 were taken prisoners. The
losses to the rebels were 190 killed and between 300 and 350
wounded. The Germans lost 103 killed, and 195 wounded. Be-
fore the surrender the Union forces held 890 German prisoners
in Southwest Africa.
While it is true that the Union troops greatly outnumbered
the Germans, General Botha's conquest of the colony was none
the less a brilliant military achievement. The most dangerous
foe that the Union soldiers encountered was not the Germans,
but the deadly climate ; the stretches of burning desert veld from
OTHER AFRICAN OPERATIONS 493
eighty to a hundred miles wide, that had to be crossed in a heat
that rose at times to 120° Fahrenheit in the shadow of the tents.
All the supplies, the provisions for the men, and much of the
water for their consumption had to be brought from Cape
Town. The care taken in the commissariat department, and
especially in the water supply, in a country where the enemy
had polluted the wells, accounted for the general good health of
the invading army. That 30,000 men should have been able to
fight in such a difficult country for five months at a cost of less
than 2,000 casualties was an experience rare in military annals,
and reflects lasting credit on General Botha who planned the
entire invasion.
The Germans, outmatched and outnumbered, avoided engage-
ments whenever possible, but offered a stubborn resistance and
fought with great bravery when there was no alternative. Once
the Union forces were ready to advance, their rapid movements
and forced marches took the Germans by surprise in the midst
of their preparations, and baffled and bewildered them. Cut off
entirely from help from the outside, and running short of am-
munition which could not be replaced, their struggle could only
result in one conclusion.
LIBRARY h?? CHAPTER LXXIX
<^>
o»
THER AFRICAN OPERATIONS
THE fighting along the African coast during this period was
minor but picturesque. On February 26, 1915, the British
military authorities announced that the coast of German East
Africa would be blockaded on February 28, four days being
allowed for the departure of neutral vessels. Some minor suc-
cesses, chiefly naval, were obtained by the British during the
month of March, when they occupied Shirati on Lake Victoria
Nyanza and established there a base for armed steamers.
It was here on March 6, 1915, i;hat the Miianza, the only
494 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
German armed steamer that remained on the lake, was destroyed
by the British steamer Winifred.
In April, 1915, Major General Tighe, who had won distinc-
tion in the Indian Service, was appointed to command the British
troops in German East Africa. During this month there was
some desultory fighting along the edges of Kilmanjaro, and
repeated but ineffectual attempts were made to cut the Uganda
Railway line ; otherwise there were no hostile movements worthy
of note in this region.
On March 9, 1915, a German column, marching along the
Maru River to invade the Karungu district on the eastern shore
of Lake Victoria Nyanza, was defeated and scattered, after a
short engagement, by a force of British troops under Colonel
Hickson.
Along the region between the Uganda Railroad and the German
frontier there were frequent skirmishes during May between
British patrols and German troops, in which the losses were
trifling on either side. The German forces had been operating
for some time from the fortified port of Bukoba, and it was
important to the future movements of the British that the
place should be destroyed. On June 20 an expedition was
dispatched by steamer from the British port at Kisumu, 240
miles away on the eastern shore ; at the same time it was planned
that British troops on the Kagora River were to cross the thirty
miles that divided them from the German fortified port.
On June 25, 1915, Brigadier General J. A. Stewart, command-
ing detachments of the First Loyal North Lancashires, King's
African Rifles, and the Twenty-fifth Royal Fusiliers reached
Bukoba. The port was attacked by land and water. The British
were in superior numbers, having only about 400 against them,
but the Germans fought intrepidly, and their Arab allies showed
great bravery. The British success was not easily won. The
Germans lost most of their artillery and there were heavy
casualties. The wireless station was ruined, boats in the harbor
were sunk or captured, and the destruction wrought by the
British on the port was complete.
The capture of Bukoka was important to the British, for as
OTHER AFRICAN OPERATIONS 495
a direct result the Uganda borders were kept clear of the enemy
for the greater part of the summer of 1915.
The German town of Sphynxhaven on the eastern shore of
Lake Nyassa was attacked on May 30, 1915, by a British naval
force under Lieutenant Commander Dennistoun, supported by
field artillery and a landing party of King's African Rifles.
During the sharp, short engagement that followed the place was
bombarded from the water, the enemy was driven out, and great
quantities of rifles, ammunition, and military stores fell to the
British.
The climatic conditions in the low-lying Nyassaland and
Uganda borders in the summertime caused the British soldiers
more suffering and deaths than their enemies. Insect pests
like the tsetse fly swarm around Lake Victoria Nyanza, while
different fevers of peculiarly malignant varieties lie in wait
to attack the European. There is the terrible sleeping sickness
that spares neither white nor black race. The great lake can-
not be bathed in without danger for its abounds in crocodiles
and hippopotami.
Guerrilla warfare was kept up during most of the summer of
1915 along the northeastern borders of Rhodesia and in Nyassa-
land. On June 28 the Germans were driven off when they
attacked in two bands on the Saisa River, near Abercorn. A
month later, having gathered 2,000 men, they besieged the place
for six days, when British reenforcements arriving they were
driven off. During these skirmishes and engagements the
Belgian troops were of great service to the British in defending
the frontier between Lake Mweru and Lake Tanganyika, and
especially the western shore of the latter lake.
It was in this summer of 1915, during the early days of July,
that the German cruiser, the Konigsherg, met her end. Late
in October of 1914 she was in shelter at a point some distance
up the Rufiji River, where the water was so shallow that a ship
of ordinary draft could not approach. When the British dis-
covered the location of the cruiser they sank a collier across the
mouth of the river to prevent the German boat from reaching
the sea. The Konigsherg, surrounded by forests and thick
32— War St 3
496 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
jungle growth, was exactly located by British aircraft. On July
4, 1914, Vice Admiral King Hall, commander in chief of the
Cape station, entered the river with the monitors Severn and
Mersey and opened fire.
The crew of the Kdnigsherg had been active in fortifying
their position during the time the cruiser had been sheltering in
the river. They had established shore batteries with (German
thoroughness that commanded all the turnings of the river, and
there were observation towers from which they could get the
range of any vessel attacking. The British could not get a
clear view of the enemy because of the dense jungle, but their
aeroplanes were of great service in directing the action of the
guns. There was never any doubt of what the ultimate fate of
the Kdnigsherg would be.
On July 4, 1915, the British bombarded the cruiser for six
hours, when she was seen to be on fire. The attack for some
reason was not renewed until July 11, 1915, when the cruiser
was found to be completely destroyed, whether as the result of
the British shells or because she was blown up by her own
crew was not discovered at the time. The annals of naval war-
fare offer no more curious story than this of the German
cruiser, which lay for so many months helpless in a jungle river,
surrounded by steaming swamps, while far beyond lay thej
longed-for open sea.
PART XII— WAR IN ARABIA, MESOPOTAMIA
AND EGYPT
CHAPTER LXXX
MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA
THE flames of war were sweeping across Mesopotamia and
Arabia. In the last days of January, 1915, Lord Hardinge,
Viceroy and Governor General of India, made a tour of the con-
quered territory around the Persian Gulf, and at Basra was re-
ceived by the native community with an address of welcome,
which expressed the hope of permanent British occupation.
Owing to the overflow of the Tigris and Euphrates in Febru-
ary and March, when the surrounding country is flooded, there
was little fighting in those regions. But on March 3 the enemy
appeared near Ahwaz, on the Karun River, where the British
had a small garrison to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's
pipe line.
A contingent sent out from the town to discover the strength
of the Turkish force, located them at Ghadir. The enemy was
found to be about 12,000 strong, having been joined by a body
of tribesmen from Arabia and Persia. As the British troops
only numbered 1,000 men, there was imminent danger of them
being cut off, and a hurried retreat was ordered. The Turks
seemed determined that their enemy should not escape them,
and used every effort to prevent a successful retreat. There
was much hand-to-hand fighting before the British could
struggle back to Ahwaz. As the Turks did not continue to
attack it was to be supposed that they had lost heavily. The
Anglo-Indian force had lost about 200. The colonel of the
497
498 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Seventh Rajputs was wounded, and four of their white officers
were killed.
On this day, March 3, 1915, a body of British cavalry recon-
noitering toward Nakaila, about twenty-five miles northwest of
Basra, was attacked while on their way back to camp by some
1,500 mounted Turks. The British pretending to retire, maneu-
vered to lure them on to a position where they had concealed
infantry with machine guns and artillery. The Turks, quite
unsuspecting a ruse came on, were met by a withering fire from
the guns that sent them shattered and broken flying back to
Nakaila. In this little fight the British had four officers killed
and several severely wounded.
Reenforcements had been sent from India in anticipation of
the end of the flood season, and Ahwaz and Kurna were greatly
strengthened. Lieutenant General Sir J. E. Nixon, K. C. B.,
accompanied the new troops, and on his arrival took command
of the entire force of between 30,000 and 40,000 men.
The Turks, who had also been largely reenf orced with soldiers
probably from Bagdad, on April 11 attacked the three British
positions at Kurna-Ahwaz and Shaiba, the last a fort protecting
Basra. Kurna was bombarded for two days, with small result.
A bridge across the Tigris was partly destroyed, but they in-
flicted no casualties. Guns from the shore and those in H.M.S.
Odin did effective work in scattering such of the enemy as ap-
peared in boats. At Ahwaz large bodies of hostile cavalry could
be seen against the sky line surrounding the British positions,
but they did not attack.
The main object of the Turks was evidently to capture Basra,
their attempts on Kurna and Ahwaz being merely feints to keep
the British occupied while they struck a real blow at Shaiba.
On April 12, 1915, an action began that lasted three days — one
of the most notable fights in the history of this campaign. The
attacking force was estimated at between 18,000 and 22,000
men. Perhaps 11,000 were regular infantry and cavalry from
Bagdad, and 12,000 irregular levies of Kurds and Arabs. The
Turkish infantry after some irregular artillery fire, commanded
by German officers, advanced in the early morning of the 12th
MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA
499
O 25 go lOO
MESOPOTAMIA — THE BRITISH OPERATIONS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF
500 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
toward the south-southwest, and west of the British lines. For
three hours they were pressing forward, and then when the artil-
lery fire fell off began to dig themselves in. An attack from
the south was made in the afternoon, but was beaten off by the
British before making much progress. The Turks were busy
during the night of the 12th keeping up a spirited fire from rifles
and machine guns, and by morning were found to have occu-
pied some houses on a rising ground to the north of the British
position. An Anglo-Indian force easily dislodged them from this
place, and a counterattack made by the Turks from the west was
repulsed with a loss to them of several hundred prisoners. The
British also captured eighteen officers and two guns.
The British had repulsed all attacks, but the most difficult
part of their task now lay before them, for the Turks were
strongly intrenched near Basra some four miles from the British
lines. On April 14, 1915, the Anglo-Indian force moved from
camp toward Zobeir to the south, and driving off the Turks from
their advanced position found themselves in front of their main
lines. Some 15,000 Turkish soldiers and six big guns occupied
well-concealed trenches in a tamarisk wood. The Anglo-Indian
troops began their advance toward the enemy at 11.30 in the
morning, and continued for five hours across a bare plain under
a fierce sun and a pitiless heat. Not an enemy could be sighted,
but a continuous fire, too accurate to be pleasant to the advancing
host, came from the concealed trenches. At about 4.30 p. m. the
117th Mahrattas and Dorsets had led the way into the trenches,
and, the whole line uniting in a great charge, the Turks were
driven out at the point of the bayonet and dispersed. The
Anglo-Indian troops however had purchased their victory
dearly. There were some 700 casualties. Lieutenant Colonel
H. L. Rosher of the Dorsets, Lieutenant Colonel T. A. Britten of
the 110th Mahrattas, and Major J. C. M. Wheeler of the Seventh
Lancers were among the seventeen British officers killed.
The routed Turks had fled toward Nakaila, and were vigor-
ously pursued by the victors. They tried to escape by land and
water. A dozen boat loads of fugitives were overhauled or sunk.
The Turks lost about 2,500, of whom 700 were prisoners in
MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA 501
British hands. Great quantities of stores, ammunition and guns
were also captured. The region around Basra was now cleared
of Turkish soldiers for a distance of fifty miles.
On April 17 the Anglo-Indian cavalry occupied Nakaila. The
rout of the Turks was complete, and it was said that in their
retreat they were attacked by their former allies the Arabs,
who turned on them as soon as the tide of battle went against
them.
During the greater part of the month of May the British were
occupied in clearing the territory of the Turks that remained.
At Kurna and Ahwaz and their neighborhood the enemy had
gathered in sufficient numbers to give some trouble. A British
contingent was dispatched to drive them out of the Ahwaz
locality, but the Kharked River was in flood, and severe sand
storms hindered progress, so that before the Turkish camp
could be reached the enemy had vacated Persian soil and fallen
back to Amara.
General Gorringe, who commanded the British troops, now set
about punishing those tribes which had been assisting the enemy.
Some surrendered and gave up a number of rifles and arms.
Others were disposed to show resistance, but the British easily
defeated them, cleared out their strongholds, and destroyed some
of their property.
On May 31, 1915, the Turks had become threatening in the
vicinity of Kurna, and a British expedition consisting of soldiers
and sailors set out at 1.30 a. m. to attack them. By wading and
in boats the British surprised the enemy's position, two miles
from the town, and soon silenced his guns by superior artillery
work. The heights were won by midday, and the Turks took to
flight, leaving three guns and about 250 prisoners behind them.
They retreated to Amara as the force from Ahwaz had done.
Their flight was so precipitate, that tents were left standing,
as they took to mahalas and steamers on the river to escape.
The British naval flotilla carrying General Townshend and Sir
Percy Cox, Chief British Resident of the Gulf, was in pursuit of
the fleeing Turks. Their gunboat Marmaris was sunk, and the
transport Mosul captured. Two lighters containing field guns,
,502 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
mines, and military stores were also taken, and about 300
prisoners.
Amara, the important business town on the Tigris about sixty
miles from Kuma to which the Turks had fled, surrendered to
the British June 3, 1915, its garrison of 1,000 becoming pris-
oners of war. In the town and vicinity 80 officers and some
2,000 men were also captured, and large quantities of ammuni-
tion, 13 guns, 12 steel barges, and 4 river steamers.
The whole of the country between Amara and the sea was now
in British hands, and the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia had
been partly destroyed and so demoralized that it was unlikely
that they would soon take the offensive again.
In the last weeks of July, 1915, they again became trouble-
some. On July 24 the British, under General Gorringe, ad-
vanced to attack Nasiriyeh. The town was shelled by gunboats,
and after a prolonged struggle the enemy retired, and the Brit-
ish occupied the place on the following day. They had captured
during the fight 1,000 prisoners and 13 guns, while the dead
Turks numbered about 500. The British casualties were be-
tween 300 and 400. During this engagement the fiercest foe
the British had to contend against was the excessive heat, which
registered as high as 113, and caused great suffering and some
deaths.
Along the Euphrates, between Sukh-es-Sheyukh and Nasiriyeh,
operations now began that lasted for twenty days. The country
around here is peculiarly difficult for military movements, pre-
senting a network of marshes and canals. The Turks occupied
intrenched positions at the entrance of Kut-el-Hai Channel on
the main line of communication between the Tigris and Bagdad.
A British force was dispatched from Kuma to attack these
positions. The expedition was supported by extemporized gun-
boats, and took the waterway of the Euphrates and Hamar
Lake. Their progress was fiercely opposed by the Turks, who
hovered about their flanks. The river had overflowed it banks,
and inundated the neighboring country so that marching was
difficult. It was necessary to drag boats over the land in some
places along the advance. But the British troops were success-
SYRIA AND EGYPT 503
ful when reaching their objective. One regiment outflanked the
enemy's gun position on the right bank, and during the engage-
ment the Turks lost 7 officers and 83 regular troops and Arabs.
The British casualties were 109. There were 25 killed.
CHAPTER LXXXI
SYRIA AND EGYPT
AFTER the declaration of war against Turkey, the allied war
•vessels were concentrated in the Levant and Red Sea to
watch the coasts of southern Asia Minor, Syria, and Turkish
Arabia. On the Syrian coast there was only one point where a
naval force could effectively attack communications between
Constantinople and the Turkish forces. This was the little town
of Alexandretta, and the shore north to Payaz, a small village.
The Turks, if they wished to reenf orce their Syrian army must
move their men, guns, and stores up a mountainous road over
the Amanus from Baghche to Radju, or risk great losses by the
coast route between Payaz and Alexandretta. The Turks took
this chance, and were successful, for there was no allied warship
in the Gulf of Alexandretta to oppose their progress. On Decem-
ber 17, 1914, H.M.S. Doris, a protected cruiser, appeared off
Alexandretta and destroyed four bridges on the road and rail-
way between that town and Payaz. The captain of the Doris
sent an ultimatum to the Turkish commandant of Alexandretta
demanding the surrender of the town, failing which he threat-
ened bombardment of the place. To this the Turks paid no
attention. A second ultimatum brought forth a telegraphic
message from Djemal Pasha at Damascus, threatening to exe-
cute allied subjects interned in that city if any Ottoman non-
combatants were killed at Alexandretta by the British guns.
The captain of the Doris promptly replied that Djemal Pasha
would be held responsible for the execution of allied subjects, if
he dared to carry out what he proposed. Thanks to the influence
504 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
brought to bear on the Porte by the American Embassy at Con-
stantinople, the Ottoman military authorities in Syria became
more reasonable, and finally agreed to blow up the two railway
engines at Alexandretta themselves, much of the war material
having been removed from the town while negotiations were
pending.
During the first three months of 1915 there was only one fight
of any importance on the coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta. On
February 6 a landing party from H.M.S. Philomel was sub-
jected to heavy fire from a concealed trench where eighty Turks
were located. Six of the British and New Zealanders who
formed the crew of the Philomel were wounded, three mortally.
The cruiser promptly avenged their death by steaming in and
opening a point-blank fire on the trenches with her 4.7-inch guns.
More than fifty of the Turks were killed or badly wounded, the
high-explosive shells shattering some to pieces. After this salu-
tary lesson the Turks at Alexandretta did not seek any further
encounters with the sailors of allied war vessels.
The British cruisers were late in arriving in the Gulf of Alex-
andretta, and had lost some opportunities to injure the enemy
by their delay, but now they did valiant duty in preventing the
Turks from sending any number of men or stores to Aleppo for
the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, or the Egyptian border by the coast
route, which would greatly have facilitated their movements.
They were forced, owing to the vigilance of British warships,
to send their troops and munitions over the Giaur Dagh by the
pass called the Syrian Gates, between Cilicia and northern Syria,
a rough, mountainous region, with bad roads, that made progress
extremely difficult.
At the beginning of the allied operations against the Dar-
danelles, the observation of the Syrian coast was taken over
entirely by the French fleet.
On April 19, 1915, the Turkish intrenchments at El Arish were
bombarded by the French battleship St. Louis. The Turks had
some fifteen or twenty field guns, and replied vigorously, but
only one shell hit the battleship, which did no damage. The
Turks suffered some losses. In the early part of May the big
SYRIA AND EGYPT 505
camp at Gaza, where numbers of Ottoman soldiers were gathered
to be reviewed by Djemal Pasha, was shelled by the St. Louis,
when some fifty Turks were killed by French shrapnel, and per-
haps as many more wounded.
On April 29, 1915, the cruiser D'Entrecasteaux worked effec-
tively on the Cilician coast, shelling the trenches at Taruss, while
her hydroplane, dropping a bomb on the railway tracks, blew up
trucks laden with high explosives and wrecked the railway sta-
tion. On May 10 the Turks at El Arish were again shelled by
the guns of the Jeanne D'Arc,
On Ascension Day, Alexandretta was the scene of some
spirited work, in which the cruiser D'Estrees played the leading
part. M. de la Passadiere, her commander, demanded of the
Kaimakam that the German flag should be hauled down that was
flying over the German Consulate. The Turkish commander
sent no reply, and it was pretended that he was ill or absent.
M. de la Passadiere having fixed a time limit when the flag must
be hauled down, cleared his decks for action and trained the ship's
guns on the consulate building. At the expiration of the time
limit he opened fire, and the consulate was reduced to ruins. The
only casualties were three Turkish soldiers, who, in spite of
warning, had remained near the building.
The captain of the D'Estrees on May 14, 1915, destroyed a
petrol depot which might be used to supply hostile submarines,
and which contained over 1,000 cases. A few days earlier a
much larger depot containing some 20,000 cases at Makri on the
southern coast of Cilicia had been destroyed by the cruiser
Jeanne D'Arc.
Budrum on the southwest coast of Asia Minor in the Gulf of
Halicarnassus was bombarded for a serious act of Turkish
treachery. The captain of the Dupleix had sent two boat crews
to parley with the authorities, when they were fired upon by
armed Turkish civilians and some soldiers. About twenty
French soldiers were killed or captured as a result of this
treacherous act, concerning which the Ottoman authorities pub-
lished a communique in which they described the incident as the
repulse of a landing force. The French losses were quickly
506
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
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THE TURKISH ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL
SYRIA AND EGYPT 507
avenged, for the Dupleix at once began a bombardment of the
Moslem quarter of the town, and continued firing for three hours
during which great damage was done.
Armed Turkish inhabitants perpetrated a similar outrage on
boat parties on May 18, 1915, at Banias, near Latakia ; a tug and
a boat belonging to the D'Estrees were fired on from roofs
and landing places while chasing a merchantman belonging to
the enemy that was seeking refuge in the port. As a punishment
for the treachery of the civilians, who had posed as peaceable
inhabitants until the French boats came into port, part of the
town was destroyed by the shells of the D'Estrees.
In February, 1915, toward the close of the month, in the Red
Sea, the French armored cruiser Desaix landed a reconnoitering
party near Akaba, and found the Turks occupying a neighboring
village. After receiving reenforcements from the cruiser, the
French sailors drove out the fifty or sixty Turks hiding among
the houses of the village, killing and wounding a dozen of them,
their only casualty being one man, who was slightly wounded.
The Red Sea was now patrolled by vessels of the Indian Marine,
which were frequently successful in making captures, and in re-
moving mines from the Gulf of Akaba.
On March 21, 1915, H.M.S. Dufferin at Mutweilah on coast of
Midian, where an old Turkish fort is located, was the victim of
the white-flag trick. Through this treacherous act one British
sailor was killed, and an officer and nine other men were
wounded. In the middle of May, H.M.S. Northbrook captured
a dhow, having on board six German officers belonging to the
merchant marine, and ten men who were trying to reach one
of the Turkish Red Sea ports to the north. In these waters and
in the Levant there were many incidents of this character, in-
significant in themselves, but important in the aggregate, since
they kept the enemy worried, and created a wholesome fear of
allied vigilance.
In the last week of January, 1915, the three Turkish columns
advancing on Egypt, the northern marching toward Kantara,
the central and main advance headed for Ismailia, and the
southern, whose objective was Suez, had been located, and
508 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
were under surveillance of allied aeroplanes. By January 26
advanced guards of the central and southern columns were dis-
covered near the canal. The central column was at Moia Harab,
and some thousand men were also discovered at Wadi Um
Muksheib. The southern column was found to be located at
Bir Mabeiuk. On this same date British troops engaged the
northern Turkish column a few miles east of El Kantara, losing
in the skirmish five men and one officer. It was now evident to
the British that the Turks were about to begin the main attack
on the canal. Consequently the Auckland and Canterbury Bat-
talions were dispatched to Ismailia; the Otago and Wellington
Battalions were sent to El Kubri, and the New Zealand Infantry
Brigade was sent up by rail from Cairo.
While this was transpiring on land, H.M.S. Ocean, Swiftsure,
Clio, and Minerva joined the French warship D'Entrecasteaux
and H.M.S. Hardinge and two torpedo boats already stationed
in the canal. For three or four days following there were
numerous skirmishes between enemy outposts and British
patrols, the most effective work being wrought by allied aero-
planes and hydroplanes, which dropped bombs on the Turl^
as they swept over them and killed many camels and men.
Lieutenant Patridge of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers and
a French pilot lost their machine outside the British lines
through the engine breaking down, and on returning to camp at
night were shot and killed by a British picket.
On February 1, 1915, Djemel Pasha's main force occupied
Katayib el Kheil, some low hills east of the southern end of Lake
Timsah. The Turkish commander had every reason to feel satis-
fied with the progress he made in bringing his army across the
desert in good condition, and with only the loss of a few de-
serters from among the irregulars. As many Tripolitan, Al-
gerian, and Indian pilgrims had been forced to join the army by
the persuasion of the leaders of the irregular troops, the Turkish
force had increased in numbers.
Djemel Pasha's plan was to attack the canal with the main
force, made up of the Twenty-fifth Division, and all, or part of
the Twenty-third Division, which were to force their way be-
SYRIA AND EGYPT 509
tween Serapeum and Tussum, while his right wing by a feint
attack was to hold the British force at the Ismailia Ferry bridge-
head. El Kantara was to be attacked by the northern column,
while at the same time to prevent reenforcements from arriving,
a demonstration was to be made at Ferdan. The southern
column was directed to carry out the same tactics at Kubri, near
Suez, which, as was subsequently shown, they did most in-
effectually.
In the morning of February 2, 1915, an Indian reconnoitering
force met the Turks about four miles east of the Ismailia Ferry.
In the desultory action that followed, the British troops tried
ineffectually to draw the Turks within range of their main posi-
tion, and a violent sand storm arising in the afternoon, the en-
gagement ended. The Turks retired and intrenched themselves
about 2y2 miles southeast of the Ferry post. On this same after-
noon the Twenty-fifth Division of the Turkish army had arrived
at a point within four or five miles of the canal. Their scouts
were already established on the eastern bank, which is backed
by trees, brushwood, and sand hills, affording excellent cover
for infantry. A narrow sandy beach, not more than 9 feet wide
extends along the foot of the eastern bank. The Turkish advance
was made after night had set in, the Twenty-fifth Division, with
pontoon companies and engineers of the Fourth and Fifth Army
Corps, being first to reach the canal. They brought with them
some twenty pontoons, and five or six rafts constructed out of
kerosene cans fastened in wooden frames.
The first comers were followed by a part of the Seventy-fifth
Regiment, old fighters from Tripoli and the Balkans; "Holy
Warriors" as the Arabs called them. About 3 a. m. they had
gained the openings along the canal bank, the most northerly of
which being within a few hundred yards of the Tussum bridge-
head. The remainder of the Seventy-fifth Regiment covered them
from the left. Toward Serapeum, some distance south, the
Seventy-fourth Regiment was stationed.
The night was dark and thickly clouded, and from the silence
on the western bank of the canal the Turks must have believed it
to be unoccupied. That they were entirely confident of success
/
510 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
was shown in a letter afterward found on a dead Turkish officer
and dated February 2. After describing the hard march across
the desert, he concluded, "And to-morrow we shall be across the
canal on our way to Cairo !''
The Turks crowded on the narrow strip of beach or in the gaps
in the banks, and suffered heavily from the fire of this mountain
battery. A number of their boats which left the shore were sunk.
The Sixty-second Punjabis left their cover under a withering fire,
and pluckily charged down the bank to repel the Turkish at-
tempts to make a landing. Toward Tussum, farther south, a
field battery belonging to the East Lancashire Division, sup-
ported by New Zealanders of the Canterbury Battalion, opened
a rattling fire, to which the Turks immediately replied with
machine guns and rifles. The small torpedo boat 0-1^3 with its
crew of thirteen now took part in the fray by dashing up the
canal and landing a few men at a point south of Tussum.
At the first gray light of dawn the action became general, and
fresh forces entered the conflict. The Turks on the eastern bank
who had occupied the day line of the Tussum post now advanced,
protected by artillery, against the bridgehead, while the Sera-
peum post was assailed by another body of troops. On the
canal and Lake Timsah the allied warships opened fire, and con-
tinued it for some time. From the slopes of Katayib el Kheil
three batteries of Turkish field guns replied, doing considerable
damage to every visible target. But they had not taken careful
observations of the British positions, and the carefully masked
Territorial battery between Tussum and Serapeum was not dis-
covered. This battery, aided by the New Zealanders, almost
silenced the Turkish fire from the eastern bank, and enabled
them to attend to the reserves of the enemy now seen advancing
on the desert to the east. Four of the Territorial gunners were
wounded by the Turkish batteries. A pontoon which the Turks
had pushed across the canal in the dark was sunk, but until day-
break those who had engineered this work managed to keep
afloat, and continued sniping with some damage to British artil-
lery horses until they were raunded up and taken prisoners by
some Indian cavalry.
The story of the
Great War :
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